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REVITALIZING UNION DEMOCRACY: LABOR LAW,
BUREAUCRACY, AND WORKPLACE ASSOCIATION
MATTHEW DIMICKt

Do core doctrines of labor-relationslaw obstruct the internal democratic governance of labor unions in the United States? Union democracy is likely an essentialpreconditionfor the broaderstrategicand organizational changes unions must undertake in order to recruit new union members-the labor movement's cardinalpriority. Yet according to
widely accepted wisdom, the weakness of democracy within labor unions
is the unavoidable outcome of an "iron law of oligarchy" that operates
in all such membership-basedorganizations.This Article challenges this
conventional thinking and argues that the triumph of oligarchy over democracy in U.S. labor unions is not inevitable, but conditioned on the
nature of American labor law. The main message is that labor law will
directly or indirectly undermine what I call "workplace association," a
decisive strategic component in the florescence of union democracy,
when, as in the U.S., it: (1) provides for exclusive representation; (2)
establishes institutions andproceduresfor collective bargaining;and (3)
inhibits the use of economic "self help" as alternatives to such procedures. To reach this conclusion, the Article develops a game-theoretic
model of union democratization,formalized in the Appendix, that highlights the role of union bureaucracy and workplace association in the
success orfailure of union democracy. The Article then uses the model to
analyze the impact of U.S. labor law on this game of union democracy,
and makes comparison to Great Britain, where labor law has contrasted
dramatically,with equally divergent resultsfor union democracy.
INTRODUCTION

In January of 2009, the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) placed its United Healthcare Workers-West (UHW) affiliate into
trusteeship, removing all of its elected leaders.' Prominent friends of the
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versions of this Article.
1. Michelle Amber & Joyce E. Cutler, Former Leaders of UHW Local Quit SEIU, Plan to
Form New Health Care Workers Union, 17 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-17 (Jan. 29, 2009).
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labor movement met the news with dismay. 2 By all accounts, the large,
150,000-member UHW was a "model" and "democratic" local union.
The trusteeship ended a long internal feud between SEIU and UHW over
a plan to sever 65,000 members from UHW and merge them with workers from two other affiliates.4 As the conflict reached its apogee, the
UHW leadership said they would only accept the reorganization plan if
members of the local were allowed to vote on it. The trusteeship was
imposed the next day. At the heart of the conflict, according to one service clerk and former elected leader of the UHW, is union democracy:
whether UHW members will "be part of a union that they control democratically" or "one that is led by a handful of outsiders from Washington,
D.C."7 Received opinion would regard this outcome as just another example of a general and inherent organizational dynamic toward oligarchy
in labor unions-unfortunate but characteristic, and perhaps even inevitable. This Article contests that wisdom and argues that labor law critically conditions this organizational tendency toward oligarchy.
What makes the dissolution of UHW particularly tragic is that not
only was it a model, democratic union, but that it was also enormously
successful in organizing new members. Recruiting new workers into
unions is the labor movement's cardinal priority.8 However, success in
organizing new members is not easy to achieve. To do so, labor unions
must make far-reaching strategic and organizational transformations-a
process scholars call union "revitalization."9 The first requirement is high
levels of membership participation and commitment in the comprehenId. (describing the reactions of labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein and labor researcher
2.
Kate Bronfenbrenner).
3.
Id.; see also Paul Pringle, Breakaway Union Could Prompt War of Attrition with SEIU,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-union2-2009feb02,0,6911054
.story ("[T]he UHW had been widely viewed as one of the most vibrant and successful locals in the
SEIU .. .. ").
Amber & Cutler, supra note 1.
4.
5. Id.
6. Id. The ousted leaders of the UHW responded the day after the trusteeship by forming a
new union, the National Union of Healthcare Workers (NUHW). Id. The NUHW has had notable
success in winning over former UHW members in contested NLRB elections with the SEIU. See
Michelle Amber, Employees at Two Facilities Vote for NUHW After NLRB Finds Elections Should
Be Held, 196 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-2 (Oct. 14, 2009).
7. Amber & Cutler, supra note I (quoting Angela Glasper, a former UHW elected leader).
8. This has been the official stance ofthe AFL-CIO since 1995; the slow change ofpace was
the pivotal reason several major unions left the AFL-CIO to form the Change To Win Federation in
2005. See Joesph A. McCartin, Reframing US Labour's Crisis: Reconsidering Structure, Strategy,
and Vision, 59 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 133, 133 (2007), available at http://www.historycooperative
.org/journals/llt/59/mccartin.html (describing how the Change to Win Federation left the AFL-CIO
due its failure to devote more resources to recruitment). As it is well known, union density, the
proportion of the workforce that are union members, has declined dramatically over the past several
decades. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union Members Summary (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.bis.gov/news.release/union2.nr).htm (showing that in
2009 the number of workers belonging to unions was 15.3 million and that union members accounted for 12.3 of employed wage and salary workers, down from 20.1 percent in 1983; also reporting that union density is 7.2 percent in the private sector and 37.4 percent in the public sector).
9. Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization
in the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. Soc. 303, 304 (2000).
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sive use of "rank-and-file intensive" tactics.o In their widely-cited study
of 14 organizing unions, Kim Voss and Rachel Sherman showed that this
kind of strategic orientation demands dramatic organizational changes as
well: shifting resources into organizing requires reducing the size of the
union's traditional, bureaucratic-professional staff and increasing the
amount of voluntary self-representation of members within the workplace." Coincidentally (or not), the UHW was almost certainly one of a
handful of "fully" revitalized labor unions highlighted as exemplars in
Voss and Sherman's study.12
The UHW's combination of robust union democracy with an aggressive organizing posture seems to have been far from accidental. Eliciting high levels of membership participation requires that members have
a voice in the decisions that make such heavy demands on their time and
attention.13 Downsizing the union's traditional professional staff can
catalyze resistance from those on whom oligarchic leaders most depend.14 Most important, a mobilized rank-and-file can not only better
organize new members, it can also organize the opposition that removes
the old guard from office.' 5 Entrenched union officials with parochial
prerogatives and interests, fortified in relatively undemocratic unions,
will therefore assiduously avoid adopting an organizing posture, even as
this strategic choice sacrifices the larger interests of the labor movement.
Consequently, lack of union democracy may be thwarting union revitali16
zation.
What is more, the successful case of UHW is very rare. Actual
commitment to organizing still does not match the rhetoric in the vast
Kate Bronfenbrenner, The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB Certification Elections, 50
10.
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 195, 198 (1997). See also Kate Bronfenbrenner & Robert Hickey, Changing to Organize: A National Assessment of Union Strategies, in REBUILDING LABOR: ORGANIZING
AND ORGANIZERS IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT 17, 19 (Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004);

Steven H. Lopez, Overcoming Legacies of Business Unionism: Why GrassrootsOrganizing Tactics
Succeed, in REBUILDING LABOR: ORGANIZING AND ORGANIZERS IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT
114, 115 (Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004).
I1.
Voss & Sherman, supranote 9, at 313, 315.
12.
Id. at 315. In accordance with their research protocol, Voss and Sherman did not reveal
the identities of the local unions they studied. Nevertheless, they conducted their research on "almost
all the major Northern California locals affiliated with SEIU." Id. Given the UHW's reputation and

the fact that it was based in Oakland, California, the conclusion that the UHW was one of Voss and
Sherman's model "revitalized" locals seems inescapable.

13.
Teresa Sharpe, Union Democracy and Successful Campaigns: The Dynamics of Staff
Authority and Worker Participationin an Organizing Union, in REBUILDING LABOR: ORGANIZING
AND ORGANIZERS IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT 62, 63 (Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss eds., 2004)

(explaining that workers "are more likely to stay involved if they feel a sense [of] ownership over
the direction and outcome of the organizing drive").
14.
Voss & Sherman, supra note 9, at 321-22.
15.
See id. at 322.
16. The necessity of internal organizational change also implies that current reform efforts,
such as the Employee Free Choice Act, may be insufficient to spark the kind of organizing revival
needed to restore the prospects of the labor movement. See William B. Gould IV, The Employee
Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can be Done About the Broken System of
Labor-Management Relations Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 299-300 (2008)
(arguing that the Employee Free Choice Act is not the best answer to labor law reform).
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majority of unions.17 And for the most part, labor unions in the US remain at best nominally democratic, governed like "one-party states."' 8
And even more dismaying, prevailing opinion says that the absence of
union democracy is the normal, even inexorable, organizational outcome
for labor unions.19 Many scholars believe the struggle to preserve and
enhance union democracy is futile and ineffectual. 20 These scholars rest
their claims on a long tradition of empirical and theoretical scholarship
that credits these outcomes to an "iron law of oligarchy." 2 1This research
argues that large-scale, membership-based organizations, such as labor
unions, require the installation of bureaucracies in order to efficiently
function. 22 But bureaucracy enhances the capacities of the officialdom
while it simultaneously promotes membership powerlessness and inactivity.23 As the balance of power changes, so does the governance of the
organization, as the leaders seek to erode the democratic constraints that
inhibit their personal interests from prevailing over the interests of the
members and larger movement. According to the iron law of oligarchy,
-*
*24
the prospect for union revitalization is grim.
This Article will contend that the permanence of oligarchy in labor
unions is far less assured than widely supposed. More precisely, it will
argue not only that union democracy is possible, 2 5 but also that labor law

17. See Bronfenbrenner & Hickey, supra note 10, at 55 (explaining that "[e]ven the country's
most successful unions" must organize on an unprecedented scale "if they are going to make any
significant gains in union density"); DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE: LABOR AND THE NEW

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 45 (2003) ("Unions talk about committing 30 percent of their resources to
organizing ... but almost no unions in fact do so."); Voss & Sherman, supra note 9, at 324 (stating
that "[the amount of resources devoted to organizing] is so low it's almost embarrassing.... We're
lucky if we're doing three [percent]") (alterations in original).
18.
Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 247, 247 (2000). See
also Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union Control, 1992
U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 368-70 (1992); Clyde W. Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspectives From Landrum-Griffin, 43 MD. L. REV. 93,93-95 (1984).
19.
Schwab, supra note 18, at 371.
Estreicher, supra note 18, at 247-48 ("The pursuit of union democracy is counterproduc20.
tive .. . .").
21.

ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL

TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 377-92 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., Dover Publications
1959) (1915).
22. See id. at 25-27.
23. See id. at 50-51, 60-61, 69-72, 80-82, 130; see also Summers, supra note 18, at 93-95
(summarizing the iron law of oligarchy).
24. Voss & Sherman, supra note 9, at 304.
Sustained union democracy has been shown to be possible in several other studies. See,
25.
e.g., Margaret Levi, Inducing Preferences Within Organizations: The Case of Unions, in
PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF INTERSECTION BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL

CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 219, 228-36 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005) [hereinafter Levi, Inducing Preferences]; SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL., UNION DEMOCRACY: THE
INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 15 (1956); JUDITH STEPANNORRIS & MAURICE ZEITLIN, LEFT OUT: REDS AND AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL UNIONS 12, 161

(2003); Margaret Levi et al., Union Democracy Reexamined 37 POL. & SOC'Y 203, 208 (2009). In
most of these studies, the factors sustaining union democracy are acknowledged to be unique to the
particular cases.
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26
plays a pivotal role in conditioningthe possibility of union democracy.
By comparing the labor laws of the United States and Great Britain,
where labor unions are significantly more democratic than their American counterparts, this Article concludes that foundational doctrines of
ostensibly pro-union U.S. labor law forcefully inhibit the realization of
union democracy within American labor unions. In particular, democracy
in labor unions is less likely to survive or thrive where labor law, as in
the U.S.: (1) grants to labor unions the exclusive right to represent a
given group of workers, (2) establishes or provides support for professional and institutionalized procedures to resolve disputes in collective
bargaining, and (3) prohibits or discourages the use of strikes or other
forms of economic "self help" as alternative ways to address those disputes.

To reach this conclusion, the Article develops a game-theoretic
model that explains how union democracy and labor law are related
through two key mediating variables: the size of the union's bureaucracy
and the extent of membership self-organization in the workplace-what I
will call "workplace association." 2 7 Union leaders prefer oligarchy while
the membership would rather prefer that the union be run democratically.
Nevertheless, leaders may concede to union democracy when members
can threaten to disrupt the normal functioning of the union. Union democracy then solves a commitment problem for union leaders, and
thereby avoids disruptions that are costly to both sides. Critically, members' capacity to threaten disruption depends on the strength of their own
autonomous forms of self-organization: workplace association. Workplace associations are groups of union member-workers who are organized in their workplaces to improve conditions of work, as distinguished
from the union's full-time officers and employees-the union's bureaucracy-who typically perform the same tasks.28
26. Previous research on law and union democracy has either focused on the direct regulatory
impact of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, see, e.g., Alan Hyde, Democracy in
Collective Bargaining,93 YALE L.J. 793, 833-34 (1984); Edgar N. James, Union Democracy and
LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in National Union Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247,
248-49 (1978), or on the law governing elections for certification by the National Labor Relations
Board, see, e.g., Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and
FederalLaborLaw, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1993); Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the
Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (2008); Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating
Inter-Union Competition: A Proposalto Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651,
656-57 (2006); Schwab, supra note 18, at 367. Research has left unexplored the impact of major
principles and doctrines of the National Labor Relations Act on union democracy.
27. While the combination of game theory with a case-study comparison of the U.S. and U.K.
may strike the reader as odd, these two methodologies share an underlying concern with the specification of causal mechanisms in social-science explanations, as distinct from the more typical general, covering-law approach. For an introduction to this "analytic narrative" methodology, see generally Robert H. Bates et al., Introduction, in ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 3, 10-12 (1998). For the contrast between causal mechanisms and general laws, see Peter Hedstrdm & Richard Swedberg, Social
Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay, in SOCIAL MECHANISMS: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO

SOCIAL THEORY 1, 1-26 (Peter Hedstrdm & Richard Swedberg eds., 1998).
28.
The definition is refined below. See infra Part I.A.3.
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However, workplace association and union bureaucracy are "substitutes" in production of the collective goods that unions and workers
strive for, such as increases in wages and benefits, or improvements in
conditions of work. As such, the strength of workplace association depends inversely on the size of the union's bureaucracy. In addition, a
large bureaucracy is an important source of bargaining power with which
the union leadership can deflect democratizing threats from rank-and-file
insurgents. In sum, union democracy is more likely when workplace association is stronger, but a strong workplace association is only possible
with a smaller union bureaucracy.
Labor law affects the relative strengths of union bureaucracy and
workplace association and through them influences the outcome for union democracy. Exclusive representation blocks the ability of workplace
associations to reach bargains with employers independent of the formally-recognized union. Exclusive representation also underpins powerful incentives to invest in bureaucracy by removing a free-rider between
unions that would arise should they attempt to jointly represent employees in a given workplace. In addition, law that facilitates legallysupported, institutionalized procedures for resolving disputes with employers lowers the costs of union bureaucracy and therefore encourages
its growth. Finally, excluded as legitimate and recognized bargaining
agents and unable to make use of the technical and arcane procedures of
institutionalized collective bargaining, workplace associations must turn
to economic self help to address their grievances; but legal restrictions on
the ability to strike or take other economic action foreclose precisely
those alternatives.
Part L.A of the Article introduces the two cases and describes how
unions in the U.S. and Britain vary across the three organizational dimensions we have introduced: democracy, bureaucracy, and workplace
association. Part I.B considers and rejects several reasons why U.S. and
U.K. unions might differ significantly across these variables. Part II of
the Article explores in more detail the intuition for the game-theoretic
explanation of union democracy and oligarchy I have just introduced.
Part III then uses this model as an analytical framework for exploring the
effects of the three areas of labor law highlighted above: exclusive representation, legally-institutionalized collective-bargaining procedures, and
restrictions on economic-action alternatives to those procedures. This
Part will demonstrate how labor law in the U.S. and Britain has differed
dramatically in these three areas and how these legal differences help
sustain distinct organizational configurations in American and British
unions. The Conclusion offers a brief review of issues necessary for a
future normative and policy debate in light of the theory's arguments.
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The Appendix provides the formal version of the game-theoretic model
upon which the analyses in Parts II and III are derived.
The primary goal of this Article is to develop an explanatory, or
"positive," theory of the possibility of union democracy and show how
particular configurations of central labor-law doctrines may frustrate this
possibility. Consequently, this Article treats labor law as an "independent
variable" and asks how it affects the relationship between union leaders
and members, rather than asking how union leaders, members, employers, or other interested actors may have played a role in creating or preserving the U.S. or U.K. systems of labor law. In addition, while union
democracy may be critically important for union organizing success, that
proposition is still hotly debated. By centering on the questions of
whether and how labor law conditions the possibility for union democracy, this Article does not directly engage that debate. Nevertheless, the
importance of the question is not diminished: if it is impossible to sustain
union democracy, what use is there in debating its implications for union
organizing? Furthermore, although the Conclusion will address some of
the normative issues that arise from the explanation, the focus of the Article remains on the positive analysis because establishing the link between labor law and union democracy is a necessary first step to the important normative questions that follow.
I. U.S. AND U.K. LABOR-UNION DIFFERENCES
Although the claims made by the iron law of oligarchy are still considered to be significant,2 9 enough instances of union democracy have
been observed to question its unexceptional universality. 30 The persistence of union democracy in British labor unions is one such instance.
This Part describes the democratic differences between U.S. and British
unions, as well as their distinctions in two other organizational characteristics: the size of their bureaucracies and the strength of their workplace
associations. Apart from these illuminating contrasts, additional reasons
make the U.S. and U.K. a good case comparison. Although their labor
laws and the organization of their labor unions have differed greatly, they
are otherwise similar in other factors which one would like to control.
They share more broadly a common law legal heritage, as well as a similar tradition in labor movement organization and philosophy, based on
craft unionism and voluntarism. 3 ' Thinking ahead about the consequences of union democracy, it is also worth mentioning at the outset
that British unions have performed better on what are considered key
29. See Paul Osterman, Overcoming Oligarchy: Culture and Agency in Social Movement
Organizations, 51 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 622, 623 (2006) ("A great deal of literature suggests that the iron
law is a common outcome... .").
30. See LIPSET ET AL., supra note 25, at 404-05; Levi et al., supranote 25, at 222.
See William E. Forbath, Courts, Constitutions,and Labor Politics in Englandand Amer31.
ica: A Study of the Constitutive Power of Law, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 23 n.79, 24 n.80 (1991).
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measures of union success. Chiefly, over the course of the post-World
War II period, Britain has had both higher union density and greater coverage of employees working under a collective bargaining agreement. 3 2
A. ComparingLabor Unions in the U.S. and U.K.
1. Union Democracy
The most important difference between U.S. and British unions lies
in how democratic they are. 33 In a path-breaking comparative study of
U.S. and British unions, David Edelstein and Malcolm Warner found
significant differences in the level of democracy between British and
American labor unions. 34 Their measure of democracy was the closeness
of elections to fill vacancies in the union's top and next-to-top posts
(typically the offices of president and secretary respectively). 35 An election was judged closer when the runner-up received a higher percentage
of the victor's votes. 36 For Britain, Edelstein and Warner found that during the years 1949-1966 the mean closeness of elections was 53.9 percent for top vacant-post elections and 69.5 percent for next-to-top vacant-post elections.37 For the same years in the United States, the results
were 10.3 and 14.8 percent respectively. 38 Elections in British unions
were therefore more competitive than those in U.S. unions.

32. See Michael Wallerstein & Bruce Western, Unions In Decline? What Has Changed and
Why, 3 ANN. REV. POLl. SC. 355, 358 tbl.1 (2000) (categorizing the U.K. as a "middle-density"
country, with densities between 45.1 (1950), 56.3 (1980), and 41.3 percent (1992), and the U.S. as a
"low-density" country, with densities between 28.4 (1950), 24.9 (1980), and 15.3 percent (1992); in
1990, contract coverage was 47 in the U.K. and 18 percent in the U.S.).
33. For methodological reasons, the definition of democracy used in this Article is a relatively
formal one. If, as I hope to demonstrate, workplace associations help explain the likelihood of union
democracy, one needs a definition of democracy that keeps those two concepts distinct. Nevertheless, if union democracy requires extensive member participation in workplace associations our
overall notion of democracy is obviously more robust than the formal definition. By the same token,
this idea of union democracy is not overly demanding: although it requires significant levels of
member participation, it falls short of requiring direct democracy and recognizes that effective
membership direction of the union may be indirect, e.g., via competitive elections for union office.
See J. DAVID EDELSTEIN & MALCOLM WARNER, COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY:
34.
ORGANISATION AND OPPOSITION IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN UNIONS 4 (Transaction Books 1979)

(1975).
35. Id. at 95. One may question whether electoral opposition is a necessary element of democracy. For example, consider a unanimous faculty vote in favor of a single candidate for new department chair. Genuine consensus decisions such as these are democratic, perhaps even more democratic than a majority decision. However, the possibility of consensus and unanimity in large, heterogeneous organizations, such as labor unions seems remote.
36. The closeness of vacant-post elections is arguably a better measure of democracy than
either turnover in posts or the closeness of elections involving incumbents. For instance, one could
have frequent turnover without any opposition, such as a quick succession of union presidents who
appoint their successors. In elections with incumbents, an incumbent who is repeatedly reelected
does not necessarily indicate a frustration of majority will. The leader may be a genuinely effective
and favored officer. The focus on vacant-post contests avoids the problems of either of these measures of democracy.
37. EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 34, at 95.
38. Id.
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Edelstein and Warner also compared the constitutions of British and
American unions and found that those of British unions were more favorable to democracy than those of U.S. unions.39 For instance, consider
the rules governing a union's convention-the union's "legislature" and
highest policy-making body. In British unions, conventions were held
more frequently 40 and had fewer delegates, which facilitated their ability
to act more as functioning decision-making bodies and less like large pep
rallies for rubber-stamping predetermined back-room agreements. 4 1 British union constitutions also shielded conventions from the dominance of
executive officers by restricting or prohibiting them from participating or
acting as delegates.42 In the U.S., field staff appointed by national offi43
cers are frequent participants and often delegates in union conventions.
Similarly, constitutional rules governing the union's highest executive body were more democratic in Britain than in the U.S. In Britain,
members of the union's executive council were much more likely to be
elected by a subdivision of the union.4" Electing executive councilors in
this fashion gives them a reliable base of support from which to launch
electoral challenges for higher union office.45 By contrast, executive
councilors in U.S. unions were more likely to be elected by the convention as a whole.46 Union rules also influenced the power of the union's
president.47 Union presidents in Britain rarely had the power to appoint
subordinate officials. By contrast, many in the U.S. had this power.48
British and American union constitutions were further distinguished
by how they protected the civil liberties of union members and officers.
British unions' constitutions were much less likely than U.S. unions'
constitutions to have a disciplinary "blanket clause" expressing vague
prohibitions against conduct "unbecoming to a union member" or acting
"contrary to the interests of the union."49 In British unions, final-appeals
bodies considering matters of internal union discipline tended to exclude
the participation of full-time officers, while officer participation was

39. See id. at 99, 101.
40.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 104-05. This fact outweighs our more romantic considerations that having a large
41.
number of convention delegates better approximates an ideal of direct democracy.
42. Seeid.at 101.
43. Id. at 104.
44. Id. at 107.
45. Sara Gamm, The Election Base of National Union Executive Boards, 32 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 295, 295 (1979).
EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 34, at 107.
46.

47.
48.
49.

See id. at 99, 101.
Id at 101.
Id at 109.
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more common in US unions.5o Constitutional rules differed in many
other relevant aspects as well.s'
Perhaps most interestingly, Edelstein and Warner's study sought to
show that a union's constitutional rules were in fact related to the competitiveness of elections for top officers. 52 Indeed, even within the sample of U.S. unions, they found that elections were closer when, among
other rules, the time between conventions was shorter, the percentage of
the union's executive council elected (or appointed) by subdivision was
greater, the highest appeal body was independent from national officers,
and the union's president was elected by direct vote rather than by the
convention. 53 In short, not only do constitutional rules give the appearance of more democracy in British unions, but those rules actually matter
for the competitiveness of union elections.54
2. Union Bureaucracy
Another striking difference between British and American unions is
found in the size of their administrative bureaucracies. In Britain, union
bureaucracies are notably smaller than in the U.S. A 1961 study of British trade unions found an average of one full-time union employee for
every 1400 union members.s In contrast, contemporary estimates put the
employee-member ratio in the U.S. between I to 27356 and I to 300.51
Compared with labor unions in other countries, the size of union bu-

50.
Id at 110.
51.
For Edelstein and Warner's full discussion of overall British-American union differences,
see generally id. at 87-114.
52.
For their specification of mechanisms linking rules and election outcomes, see generally
id. at 63-82.
53.
Id. at 142-47. The claim that rules matter for election competitiveness still holds in Britain, but in a more complicated way because of the part of the heterogeneous British sample on which
the comparative U.S. hypothesis was tested. Id at 184-86.
54. The importance of rules, or more broadly institutions, is a significant but underappreciated
point. In most discussions, the issue of union democracy is reduced to a simple agency dilemma,
with the problem inhering in the difficulty union members have in monitoring their leaders. See, e.g.,
Estreicher, supra note 18, at 248-50; Schwab, supra note 18, at 379-81. At the very least, however,
the problem of monitoring is insufficient to address the issue of union democracy. Consider the
election of executive councilors on an at-large versus regional basis. Electing executive councilors
on a regional basis does not improve democracy by giving union members more information, but by
exploiting the self-interest of executive officers for the members benefit (since when offices are open
to competition candidates will be compelled to cater to members' preferences).
55.
H.A. CLEGcG, AJ. KILLICK & REX ADAMS, TRADE UNION OFFICERS: A STUDY OF FULLTIME OFFICERS, BRANCH SECRETARIES AND SHOP STEWARDS IN BRITISH UNIONS 104 tbl.29 (1961).

A full-time employee of the union includes full-time officers of the union-typically those who hold
elective position in the union-as well as full-time members of the union's professional or administrative staff. Id at 19-20.
56.

SAMUEL LUBELL, FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 193 (Anchor Books 1955) (1952)

(dividing the number of union members by the number of union employees).
57.
RICHARD A. LESTER, AS UNIONS MATURE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF
AMERICAN UNIONISM 116 (1958).
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reaucracies in Britain ranks low, while in the U.S., the size of union bureaucracies ranks high.58
The paucity of administrative resources in British unions relative to
U.S. unions correlates with differences in financial strength as well. In
Britain, average dues (or subscriptions in British terminology) are approximately 0.4 percent of the average manual earnings of full-time
working males. 59 This places the dues rates of British unions below those
of unions in most other European countries.60 Only unions in countries
such as France and Italy have had similarly low levels of dues. 6 ' Dues
data are hard to come by in the United States-probably owing to the
decentralized nature of dues policy in U.S. labor unions. But an estimate
can be made that places dues in U.S. unions at around one percent of the
average manual wage. 62 Thus, U.S. unions fair rather well financially
compared to European unions, fitting somewhere at the bottom end of
the high dues-rate category. 63
3. Workplace Associations
British and American unions are also distinguished by the sophistication and autonomy of their shop-floor organizations, or what I will
term more generally as workplace associations. Shop-floor or workplace
58.
Jelle Visser, In Search ofInclusive Unionism, 18 BULL. COMP. LABOUR REL. 168, 168-69
tbl.24 (1990) reports data for most European trade union confederations for several years between
the 1950s and 1980s). Staff to member ratios for some of the better-staffed confederations, with
years (in parentheses) chosen closest to the U.S. and U.K. figures, are as follows: Netherlands, 1:485
(1952) and 1:478 (1970); Germany, 1:855 (1950) and 1:800 (1970); Sweden, 1:690 (1980). Id. These
figures include only officers and employees of the national and confederal unions, and therefore
exclude regional and local officers and employees. Id. Including the latter would undoubtedly make
the actual densities higher. To give some sense of the possible discrepancy, compare the more inclusive figure we reported for Britain (1:1400, in 1961) to the more exclusive ones reported by Visser:
1:5000 (1950) and 1:2857 (1970). Id. If that discrepancy carries over, some of European labor union
bureaucracies would be comparable and probably larger than those of the U.S. On the other hand,
the highly decentralized structure of labor union organization in the U.S. raises union staff densities
relative to European unions.
59.
Paul Willman, The Logic of "Market-Share" Trade Unionism: Is Membership Decline
Inevitable?, 20 INDUS. REL. J. 260, 268 (1989). The estimate is based on unions' per-capita income
from subscriptions. Id.
60. Visser, supra note 58, at 166-67 tbl.23 (dividing European dues rates into three categories: "low" if less than 0.5% of gross wages, "medium" if greater than 0.5% but less than 1.0%, and
"high" if greater than 1.0%).
61.
Id.
62.
Using monthly dues data from Charles W. Hickman, Labor Organizations' Fees and
Dues, MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1977, at 19, and average weekly eamings for all production workers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Current Employment Statistics, I estimate that dues were
approximately 0.9% of the average manual wage in 1974. This estimation is very approximate. On
the one hand, since only ranges for minimum dues were reported, the calculation was based on the
low end of the range and did not account for the fact that dues are usually set higher than the minimum at the local level. On the other hand, the estimation does not account for the fact that union
workers normally enjoy a wage premium over nonunion workers.
63.
Cf Visser, supra note 58, at 166-67 tbl.23 (placing high dues rate at one percent or
greater of the gross wages). On the paradox of U.S. unions' strong financial and staff resources but
weak organizing capacity, see Margaret Levi, Organizing Power: The Prospectsfor an American
Labor Movement, I PERSP. ON POL. 45, 47 (2003).
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associations are exemplified in Britain by its industrial relations tradition
of shop-steward committees. Committees of shop stewards began to appear in particular British industries at the beginning of the twentieth century, and by the 1960s were a prominent feature across virtually all industries.
Through such committees, stewards and union members in Britain
play a much larger and more independent role in collective bargaining
than they do in the U.S. In a 1994 study, 48.9 percent of full-time officers responded that the most common method of decision making about
annual pay claims was for stewards and members to decide alone.65Another 23.3 percent of officers said that the most common method was for
stewards and members to decide after consulting with a union officer,
and only 1.1 percent of respondents said that the most common method
was for a union officer to decide pay claims alone. 6 6 In the U.S., on the
other hand, agreements with employers are negotiated by local union
officials or committees of at least one or more full-time union representatives. Typically, shop stewards in the U.S. are at most involved in lowlevel grievance handling, are carefully monitored by full-time officials,
and more often act to relay communications downward from the union
hierarchy to the membership rather than the opposite.
The initiative for taking strike action also attests to the power and
autonomy of British shop stewards. Between 1960 and 1964, strikes undertaken by members and shop stewards without authorization from union officials "accounted for nearly 95 per cent of all strikes in Great Britain, and 60 per cent of days lost from work because of strikes." 6 9 In the
United States, thirty percent of all strikes in the U.S. were unauthorized
and five percent of working time lost to strikes was a result of unauthorized strikes.70 The terms "unauthorized" or "wildcat" strike carry the
sting of opprobrium in the United States. Given the prominent role of

64.

Michael Terry, Shop Steward Development and Managerial Strategies, in INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN 67, 67-68 (G.S. Bain ed., 1983).
65.

JOHN KELLY & EDMUND HEERY, WORKING FOR THE UNION: BRITISH TRADE UNION

OFFICERS 129 tbl.7.1 (1994).

66.
Id. The other 26.7 percent of officers responded that the most common method of decision-making about annual pay claims was for stewards and officers to make a joint decision. Id.
67. Jack Steiber, UnauthorizedStrikes Under the American and British Industrial Relations
System, 6 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 232, 235 (1968); see also H.M. Douty, Post-War Wage Bargaining
in the United States, 23 ECONOMICA 315, 318 n.3 (1956) (noting that in the British case multiunionism generates shop-steward bargaining "divorced from the local union." In contrast, "[the shop
steward in the U.S.] secures his representation at the plant level directly through his local union. This
means in turn that the local union [rather than the shop steward] in the United States tends to be
immediately and directly concerned with all aspects of the collective agreement. . . .").
68. Voss & Sherman, supra note 9, at 324 (quoting one participant in a partially revitalized
local union as saying that the job of a steward "is pretty much to disseminate information and maybe
observe if there's [sic] contract violations"). Shop stewards take a much more active role in fully
revitalized locals. Id. at 313.
69.
Steiber, supra note 67, at 232.
70. Id. at 234-35.
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shop stewards in Britain, however, the occurrence of an unauthorized
strike probably does not connote the same degree of dysfunction.
B. Possible Explanationsfor US.-UK. Union Differences
What explains these stark differences in British and American labor
unions, particularly in their levels of democracy? Are they related in a
way that can explain why British unions are more democratic? Before
presenting the Article's answer to these questions, it will be instructive to
first consider a few alternative hypotheses.
The alternative explanation that no doubt leaps quickest to the
reader's mind is some form of an American "exceptionalism" argument.7 According to this view, one should not be surprised that British
unions are more democratic than U.S. unions. After all, the American
labor movement-with its conservative, bread-and-butter, "businessunionism" ideology-has lacked the kind of far-reaching socialist philosophy found in Europe that one might think would seek to truly empower workers democratically. 72 While intuitive, there is not much to
support this American exceptionalism argument. Without question,
European labor movements sought to achieve political democracy by,
among other things, extending the franchise.74 Whether they maintained
democracy within their own political parties and trade unions is a much
more doubtful question. Indeed, Robert Michels formulated his "iron law
of oligarchy" theory based on his analysis of the European labor movement and of the German Social Democratic Party in particular. 75 Moreover, this disjuncture between democratic goals and internal oligarchy
may not have been as contradictory as it seems. Even early socialists
were quick to defend the need for authority against the more democratic
elements within their movement, lest internal infighting, as the argument
went, became an obstacle in the struggle against employers and the
state.76
A comparison of British and other European trade unions bears this
reasoning out. European trade unions share many of the same democratic
71.
The locus classicus of the American exceptionalism argument is WERNER SOMBART,
WHY IS THERE NO SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES? (Patricia M. Hocking & C.T. Husbands
trans., Macmillan 1976) (1906).
72. For an argument that explains the conservative orientation of the American labor movement as historically contingent on the structure of law and legal institutions, see generally Forbath,
supra note 31, and WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 2-3 (1991).
73.
For reconsiderations of the idea of American exceptionalism generally, see Sean Wilentz,
Against Exceptionalism: Class Consciousness and the American Labor Movement, 1790-1920, 26
INT'L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 1, 3 (1984), and Aristide R. Zolberg, How Many Exceptionalisms?, in WORKING-CLASS FORMATION: NINETEENTH-CENTURY PATTERNS IN WESTERN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES 397, 398-99 (Ira Katznelson & Aristide R. Zolberg eds., 1986).

74.
75.
76.

See Zolberg, supra note 73, at 414-15.
See generally MICHELS, supra note 21.
See, e.g., Friedrich Engels, On Authority, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 730, 731-32

(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2nd ed. 1978).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW

14

[Vol. 88:1

limitations that are evident in U.S. trade unions: absence of open and
contested elections, conventions that meet too infrequently and are
dominated by officials, and executive committees that lack independence. The same holds true for the other aspects of labor organization as
well. As mentioned, British union bureaucracies are remarkably small by
European standards; 78 only French unions are in contention for similarly
paltry amounts of administrative muscle. 79 While some "exceptional"
factor may account for the relatively high bureaucratic density of U.S.
unions (for instance, U.S. labor unions bargain for and administer health
and pension benefits that are provided to Europeans through their governments),so this does not appear to make bureaucracies any larger in
U.S. unions than in continental European unions. Moreover, this factor
cannot account for the conspicuous bureaucratic gap found between British and other European labor unions. Finally, no other European country
has the form of workplace associations found in Britain.81 While Germany is famous for its works councils, these labor-organization counterparts are severely curtailed in their bargaining agendas and lack the
autonomy and power possessed by British shop-stewards committees.82
In terms of union democracy, union bureaucracy, and workplace association it is British unions, not American unions, that appear "exceptional"
when measured against the rest of Europe. One is almost tempted to endorse a British version of the "exceptionalism" thesis.
Other alternative explanations can likewise be dismissed. First,
scholars have criticized weaknesses in the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), which seeks to guarantee certain democratic minima in labor unions, for being responsible for the dearth of democracy in U.S. labor unions. But this cannot explain the uniondemocracy difference between the two countries because, whatever the
LMRDA's shortcomings, there is no equivalent regulatory approach in
77.

ANTHONY CAREW, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS 195-

96 (1976) (concluding that "it seems fair to characterise the continental unions studied as being more
dominated by officialdom than is usually the case in Britain").
78.
See Visser, supra note 58, at 168-69 tbl.24, 170; see also KELLY & HEERY, supra note
65, at 37 (finding the ratio of full-time officers-as distinct from all full-time employees-to members in British unions is below the Western European average).
79. See Visser, supra note 58, at 170-71.
80. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 142-44
(2002). By failing to distinguish union officers from all full-time union staff, Lichtenstein may
overstate the degree to which the bureaucratic densities of U.S. unions exceed those of European
unions. See Willman, supra note 59, at 268.
See CAREW, supra note 77, at 196-97.
81.
82. Id at 197 (describing works councils as "essentially non-union, even anti-union, bodies
based on an assumed community of interests between employers and workers, and providing little
scope for the pursuit of workers' sectional interests").
83.
See generally Hyde, supra note 26, at 807 ("[The LMRDA] ... said nothing by its terms
about collective bargaining, but this very silence was cause for concern to some leading figures of
the period who wanted to make sure that full democracy for dues increases, election of officers, and
internal by-laws did not infect the collective bargaining process."); James, supra note 26, at 248,
251.
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Britain. Second, the structure of American unions is staggeringly fragmented relative to European unions, and this has been offered as a reason
for the surprisingly large bureaucratic sizes of U.S. unions.84 However,
the degree of centralization in U.S. and British unions is actually a point
of similarity when compared to other European unions.85 Furthermore,
given the strong association of localism with democracy in the U.S., one
would think that decentralization would enhance democracy in American
labor unions. Third, the democratic differences of U.S. and British unions reported by Edelstein and Warner are national in character and consequently abstract away from important differences in industrial or occupational characteristics. We can therefore most likely rule out explanations that attribute democratic variation to such factors.
Finally, might the much larger population size of the U.S. account
for any organizational differences? The staff-member densities relied on
above account for differences in union membership sizes across countries because bureaucracy is measured as a ratio of the number of fulltime union officers and employees to the number of union members. In
any case, we should expect bureaucratic densities to be smaller when
union memberships are larger because there are administrative economies of scale.87
If these explanations cannot account for the difference in union democracy between the U.S. and Britain, what can?
II. A THEORY OF UNION DEMOCRACY

This Part provides the intuition for the game-theoretic explanation
of union democracy presented in the Appendix. This explanation understands union democracy as a resolution to a commitment problem between union leaders and members, both of whom prefer the institutionalized procedures of union democracy to the disruption that members can
create when they are sufficiently self-organized and therefore able to
express their opposition to leadership policy. However, because union
leaders would rather be unencumbered by union democracy, they will
84. See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 80, at 142.
When seventeen countries are ranked by the degree to which wage bargaining is central85.
ized, one finds that Britain and the U.S. are among the least centralized, ranking at 12 and 16, respectively. Lars Calmfors & John Driffill, Centralization of Wage Bargaining,3 ECON. POL'Y 16,
18 tbl.1 (1988).
86. The British sample included thirty-one national unions that consisted of 203,000 members
from both blue and white-collar occupations, while the U.S. sample included fifty-one national
unions that consisted of 268,000 members, also from both blue and white-collar occupations.
EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 34, at 87-91.
87.
See Willman, supra note 59, at 268 (reporting evidence that per capita administrative
costs are negatively correlated with the size of the union's membership in British labor unions).
Nevertheless, the highly decentralized U.S. labor movement often means that membership sizes are
smaller than European labor unions. See EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 34, at 88-90 tbls.4.1 &
4.2 (comparing roughly similar total union membership sizes for the U.S. and Britain despite a
significantly larger number of U.S. unions).
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only abide by democratic restraints when the threat of disruption is
strong enough. The strength of workplace association matters, therefore,
and this factor depends inversely on the size of the union's bureaucracy
because they are substitutes in the production of collective goods union
members care about. I will explain at some length why workplace association is a particularly important form of member self-organization. The
causal relationships between union democracy, bureaucracy, and workplace association are summarized in Figure 1. We first address the positive relationship between the strength of workplace association and the
likelihood of union democracy: What are workplace associations and
what is their role in the democratization of labor unions?
A. Union Democracy and Workplace Associations
1. Secondary and Workplace Associations: Two Examples
To begin our discussion about the relationship between workplace
association and union democracy, consider the following two historical
examples. Beginning in the early 1960s, serious conflict emerged within
the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) between union leaders
and members.8 8 Democracy within the UMWA was moribund as the
union's administration and collective-bargaining were centralized under
the authority of its president. 89 After the contract settlement of 1964 between the UMWA and the mine operators, eighteen thousand miners
struck for eighteen days to protest the agreement. 90 According to Paul
Clark's account, "This demonstration took place not in protest of the
basic wage increase of two dollars a day negotiated by the UMW[A]
leadership, but rather in opposition to the lack of fringe benefits, pension
increases, and improvement in health and safety provisions in the final
settlement." 9 1 Incipient protests such as these contributed to the emergence of a rank-and-file movement-the Miners for Democracy-that
succeeded in electing a reform slate of union officers.9 2 Significant, prodemocratic changes were made to the UMWA constitution in 1973 and
1976.93 Unfortunately, this movement for democracy was unable to sustain itself. In 1979, a new administration amended the constitution in
ways that undermined the earlier democratic reforms.94 Dismayed by the
decline of the democratic reform movement in the UMWA, reform-

88.
PAUL F. CLARK, THE MINERS' FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY: ARNOLD MILLER AND THE
REFORM OF THE UNITED MINE WORKERS 22-23 (1981).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 15-22.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.
Id.at26-31.
Id. at 42-43, 85-89.
Id at 143-45.
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minded former officers concluded that, despite their efforts, "it's all right
back where we started."95
Contrast this chronology of the UMWA with that of the British
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE). 96 Significant turmoil emerged
within the ASE in the early decades of the twentieth century as the process of collective bargaining began to change.97 Previously, wages and
working conditions were set-often unilaterally-at the local level by
union members within their respective shops or by district committees of
the labor union. 98 As markets expanded and technology changed, employers sought to bargain with the union over terms of employment at a
national, rather than local, level.99 While national union officers sought
an accommodation with these changes, this transformation provoked
significant opposition from local union districts.10 0 In one of the most
significant examples, workers in Glasgow, Scotland, launched a strike in
defiance of the ASE Executive Council's agreement with the employers
on a demand for a wage reduction in the midst of an economic recession.1 " These events accumulated into "an amount of dissatisfaction and
unrest unprecedented in the Society's history."1 02
At the same time that local-central conflict was growing within the
ASE, committees of shop stewards began to appear throughout the union,
often as more formalized expressions of the ASE's ancient craft tradition
of shop-floor representation.10 3 The sophistication of these shop-steward
organizations was impressive: in 1919 they achieved formal recognition
from employers, independent from the recognition earlier granted to the
ASE. 104 These shop-steward organizations were also closely linked to
democratic reform committees within the ASE that culminated in a number of thorough-going constitutional changes, including the creation of
an annual National Committee, whose membership was limited to rankand-file members and which was responsible for setting policy for the
union's executive officers.' 05 Such reforms helped ensure rank-and-file
control over union policy and administration and reduced conflict between local and central organizations of the union. However, whereas

95.

Id. at 155.

96.

JAMES B. JEFFERYS, THE STORY OF THE ENGINEERS: 1800-1945 (1946).

97. Id. at 167-69.
98. Id. at 12, 98-100, 167; Jonathan Zeitlin, The Triumph of Adversarial Bargaining: Industrial Relations in British Engineering,1880-1939, 18 POL. & Soc'Y 405, 412-13 (1990)
99. JEFFERYS, supra note 96, at 167; Zeitlin, supra note 98, at 410,413.
100. JEFFERYS, supra note 96, at 167-69.
101.
Id. at 167.
102. Id.; see also id. at 169-71.
103. Id. at 165-66, 181-86.
104. Id. at 185-86.
105. Id at 169,193.
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reform in the UMWA faltered, democratic change in the ASE proved
durable. 06
What lead to attempts at democratic reform in each union, despite
the different outcomes? In each case, organizations that were autonomous from the official union provided a critical counterbalance to the
authority of incumbent union officials. In the UMWA this was the Miners for Democracy. In the ASE, it was the shop-steward committees. In
democratic theory such organizations are called "secondary associations." Secondary associations are best defined in the pioneering study of
union democracy by Seymour Lipset and his colleagues as "organized or
structured subgroups which while maintaining a basic loyalty to the
larger organization constitute relatively independent and autonomous
centers of power within the organization." 07 The definition, of course, is
analogous to that used in theories of civil society and civic associations;
the acknowledgement to Tocqueville is explicit.108 The existence of secondary associations within an organization enhances the potential for
democracy in several ways: they serve as arenas in which new ideas are
generated, as alternative networks of communications, as training
grounds for new leaders, as a means of encouraging participation in the
larger union arena, and as bases of opposition to the central union authority. 109
Not only must secondary associations be independent of the central
union organization, but they must also be able to exercise some considerable form of power against it as well."10 In both the UMWA and the
ASE, the ability to carry out independent strike action without the
authorization of union officials was an important example and demonstration of such power. Indeed, such "wildcat" or "unauthorized"
strikes-while often protests against conditions of employment-are
frequently demonstrations against the union's leadership as well."' Such
actions can be highly disruptive, even catastrophic, to the union, and are
therefore a potent means of sanctioning the union leadership." 2 Not only
may they pose the loss of dues revenues, but they also disrupt established
bargaining relationships, cause employers to question union leaders'
106. See, e.g., EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 34, at 263-318 (describing persistence of
democracy within the ASE, later the AUEW).
107. LIPSET ET AL., supra note 25, at 15.
108. Id. at 73-76. Tocqueville's study remains the locus classicus of the discussion of civil
society and civic associations. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

(Henry Reeve trans., The Legal Classics Library 1988) (1835).
LIPSET ET AL., supra note 25, at 80.
109.
110. Id.
111.
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 403 (1981) (acknowledging that
union-member respondents "commenced a wildcat strike, because they believed that 'the union was
not properly representing them').
112. William B. Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 672, 672 (1967) (quoting Secretary of Labor, W. Willard
Wirtz, as describing the threat of wildcat strikes as "very, very dangerous for collective bargaining").
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ability to keep their promises, and threaten the leadership's legitimacy.
Under certain conditions, secessions of smaller union organizations from
the larger body are another example of a similar disruptive mechanism.'
Nevertheless, while the democratic reforms in the ASE proved enduring, those in the UMWA did not. What explains the differing outcomes? The divergence can be attributed to the faltering of secondary
association in the UMWA and to its tenacity in the ASE. In the UMWA,
secondary association took the form of a single-issue organization based
explicitly around the goal of union democracy. Tragically, once its purpose was thought to have been served, the rationale for its continued
existence came into question. Indeed, even successful reform candidates
at all levels of the UMWA united in calling an end to the Miners for
Democracy once they took office: "The need for MFD has ceased to exist and we now must devote our time to rejuvenating the union that we all
want to serve and must improve."I14 However, without a secondary association to sustain union democracy, the reform struggle eventually failed.
By contrast, secondary associations in the ASE were rooted in the workplace organizations of shop-steward committees. Based in the struggle
with employers for gains in the workplace, the rationale for shop-steward
committees survived the movement for democratic reforms as did the
system of shop stewards itself.
The more general conclusion one draws from the different outcomes
in the UMWA and the ASE is that secondary associations are more likely
to form and persist when they address employees' primary workplace
interests, such as improvements in wages and working conditions. As has
been frequently recognized, union democracy and matters of internal
union governance are often much less salient to them than these firstorder goods that unionization delivers.' 15 Indeed, even the partial success
of the Miners for Democracy is a notable exception in an American labor
movement that could be characterized by its high number of largely marginal and failed democratic-reform organizations." However, workplace
associations do not face this "salience" obstacle, since they form precisely to improve and defend conditions of employment in the workplace.117 Their role as democracy-supportive secondary associations is
STEPAN-NORRIS & ZEITLIN, supra note 25, at 68-69, 71-72 (showing that among unions
113.
founded in the New Deal era under the Congress of Industrial Organizations, "many more of the ...
unions bom in a workers' insurgency than [those unions] led into the CIO by their top officers had
organized factions and were highly democratic").
114. CLARK, supranote 88, at 34-35.
115.
Estreicher,supra note 18, at 251.
116. See EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 34, at 197, for a long list of such reform groups.
Other cases of partial success, such as the Teamsters for a Democratic Union, owe their victories to
significant government support. See Estreicher,supra note 18, at 251.
117. In addition, workplace associations are more likely to form than associations that fulfill
workers primary non-work goals. This is because workplace gains present a more likely basis of
shared interests. For instance, while workers may have many alternative outlets for satisfying their
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incidental and unintended. Thus while secondary associations can take a
number of forms within labor unions, workplace associations are more
likely to form and succeed as a particular case of secondary associations.
We reach the paradoxical conclusion-inferred from the civicassociations literature as well-that successful secondary associations
are more likely not to have democracy as their primary raison d'etre."8
I have tended to use the term "workplace associations" to refer to
this particular kind of secondary association rather than the more
straightforward "shop-steward committees" because, as we have seen in
the U.S. case, shop stewards do not always have the responsibilities and
autonomy required to act as genuine secondary associations."19 Furthermore, we can think of autonomous forms of workplace association other
than shop-steward committees. For instance, sociologists and organizational theorists have long been fascinated with the nature and functioning
of "informal work groups." 2 0 And in analyzing the legal standing of
"employee caucuses" in nonunion work settings, Alan Hyde provides
examples of some other forms of workplace associations: "(1) unorganized networking and griping; (2) internal pressure groups that form in
protest of ad hoc [management] decisions; and (3) 'identity' groups like
women's, Black, Latino, Asian, or gay and lesbian caucuses."' 2'
2. Union Democracy and Credible Commitments
We have highlighted the capacity of wildcat strikes and union successions to create disruptions. But disruption by itself does not induce
union democracy.122 So how does the power of workplace associations
actually contribute to democratic change within a union? Moreover, how
did protests over health and safety in the UMWA and over wage reductions in the ASE lead to struggles for democratic reform? More generally, how were disputes over policy transformed into changes in constitutional principle?
To answer these questions, I propose we understand union democratization as a resolution to a commitment problem between union leaders
and union members.123 When the policy preferences of union leaders and
social needs, they have only each other when searching for ways to improve conditions on the shop
floor. See Estreicher, supra note 18, at 252.
118.
On the civic-associations inference, see ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 91-92 (1993).
119.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.

120.
See, e.g., Fred E. Katz, Explaining Informal Work Groups in Complex Organizations: The
Casefor Autonomy in Structure, I0 ADMIN. SCL Q. 204, 220 (1965).
121.
Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employment
Law, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 149, 150 n.3 (1993).
122.
For the capacity to create disruption as a general form of power distinct from institutions
such as democracy, see FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENT: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 27 (Vinatage Books 1979) (1977).
123.
For a similar analysis, see generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON,
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY (2006). See also Douglass C. North &
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members diverge,' 24 the threat of a wildcat strike or secession gives a
self-organized membership a weapon with which to contest leadership
decision-making in a relatively undemocratic labor union. Wanting to
avoid such a costly and disruptive confrontation, leaders will want to
make concessions in policy. But promises from a leadership who calls all
of the shots are simply that: promises without any binding force. Union
members will also prefer to have their policy preferences implemented
without having to carry through on their strike or secession threat, which
may entail lost wages and other costs for them as well. When an oligarchic leadership's promises are not credible, however, a wildcat strike or
secession might be the only possible outcome.12 5
Democracy is a solution to this credibility problem. Democracy entails rules and procedures that make leadership promises more binding
and policy-making more favorable to the preferences of union members. 126 To recapitulate our previous discussion, competitive elections
present leaders with the possibility of being voted out of office; executive-council members that are elected by and accountable to specific
subdivisions of the union are freer to oppose presidential authority; limitations on a parent union's power of trusteeship restricts its ability to
remove leaders elected by the local's members; and so forth. Democratization is therefore a process of institutionalization that transforms the de
facto power of workplace associations into the de jure power of union
rules that more effectively transmits member preferences into policy.1 27
Both leaders and members prefer this arrangement to the alternative:
costly wildcat strikes, successions, or other forms of disruption.
However, the key point is that union leaders will submit to democratic procedures, which restrict their policy preferences, only when
workplace association is sufficiently strong to pose a potent enough
threat. If workplace associations are too weak to mount any real opposition, then oligarchy prevails and the union leadership implements its
most preferred policy choice (in which case, the leadership's credibility
is irrelevant). A third, intermediate outcome is also possible. If workplace association is at a middling level of strength and if the union leadership's promises are sufficiently credible, then the insurgent union
members might be willing to forgo their strike threat and accept the leadership's concessions. This may indeed be a common outcome in U.S.
Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public
Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 804 (1989).
As in the "iron law of oligarchy" and agency theory, a misalignment of preferences be124.
tween leaders and members is presumed. See Summers, supra note 18, at 93-95 (summarizing the
iron law of oligarchy). There would hardly be a democratic dilemma without such a misalignment.
For a discussion of commitment problems in political democratization, see ACEMOGLU &
125.
ROBINSON, supranote 123, at 133-42.
Of course, union democracy would not fully eliminate agency costs. All that is necessary
126.
for the argument is that agency costs are lower under union democracy than under oligarchy.
ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 123, at 173-81.
127.
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labor unions. For instance, labor law practitioners are familiar with the
way that the threat of wildcat strikes can serve as an informal goad to
encourage the union to process workers' grievances.1 28 The lack of perfect credibility diminishes the value of the leaderships' concessions, but
this is the best a weaker workplace association may be able to achieve.
These three distinct union-governance outcomes-oligarchy, democracy,
and oligarchy with concessions-and the conditions of workplaceassociational strength and union-leadership credibility likely to satisfy
them, are displayed in Table 1.129
B. The Role of Union Bureaucracy
The democratic outcome of the labor union therefore depends critically on the strength of workplace associations. But likelihood of union
democracy and the strength of workplace associations both depend on
the size of the union's bureaucracy (among other factors that shall be
discussed). In our comparison of union bureaucracy and workplace association in the U.S. and Britain, we saw that while union bureaucracies
were large in the U.S. and small in Britain, the opposite was the case for
the strength of workplace association.1 30 In Britain, shop-steward organizations are far more sophisticated, autonomous, and central to its industrial-relations system than they are in the U.S. These correlations raise
the questions of whether bureaucracy and workplace association are
"substitutes" and by extension whether the size of bureaucracy is inversely related to the likelihood of democracy. This section will argue
that this is exactly the case.
In union democracy and revitalization studies, some negative relationship between union bureaucracy and union democracy or workplace
association is often presumed, but the links articulating them are often
unspecified.' 3 ' The game-theoretic model helps identify two mechanisms
linking a larger bureaucracy with a reduced likelihood of union democracy.132 Returning attention to Figure 1, these relationships are visually
summarized as the two arrows leading from union bureaucracy to workplace association and union democracy, respectively.' 3 3 The first mechanism has a negative, indirect effect on union democracy: a larger union
128. See David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL.
L. REv. 663, 751 (1973) ("[T]he grievance and arbitration machinery [must] operate with reasonable
speed.... If it does not, and grievances accumulate, the system becomes unacceptable [to workers].
This, in turn, may lead to wildcat strikes or work-slowdowns.").
129. One can regard this Table as a simplified version of the equilibrium characterization of the
union-democracy game found in the Appendix. See infra Appendix B.2.
130. See discussion supra Part I.A.2-3.
131.
See, e.g., STEPAN-NORRIS & ZEITLIN, supra note 25, at 161 (taking "union democracy"
and "monolithic, bureaucratic unions" as mutually exclusive alternatives).
132. Another possible mechanism, recognized elsewhere, is patronage: a larger bureaucracy
can buy off the opposition or incorporate those talented workers most able to lead workplace associations. See MICHELS, supra note 21, at 185-87.
133. See infra Figure 1.
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bureaucracy "crowds out" the possible strength of workplace association.134 The second mechanism has a negative direct effect on the likelihood that union democracy will emerge: a larger bureaucracy gives the
union leadership greater "capacity" to make more attractive policy concessions35 and bargain its way out of a full, de jure democratization of the

union.

1

Before investigating these mechanisms in detail, we should provide
a microfoundation for why union leaders seek to establish bureaucracies
in the first place.' 36 Bureaucracies represent significant and costly investments in professional and administrative staff. The union's staff performs work that benefits the union members: the bargaining and enforcement of contracts, the resolution of grievances, and the production
of other collective goods. The question becomes, why would unaccountable union leaders ever make such costly investments to produce collective goods that benefit union members? One answer to this question is
that union leaders care greatly about revenues.' 37 The source of union
revenues, however, is primarily dues-the monetary contributions that
members make to the union. Dues in turn depend on the level of wages
of union members. If union leaders care about revenue, they will therefore have substantial incentives to bargain wage increases and therefore
to provide the administrative means to achieve them. Union leaders may
have other motives for building bureaucracies, ranging from empire
building to a genuine commitment to the union movement. Nevertheless,
the assumption of revenue maximization is a useful and reasonable first
approximation of union leader behavior.
Given these incentives, how does union bureaucracy affect workplace associations? The first, "crowding-out" mechanism works in the
following way. Since workplace association is another way of producing
the collective goods that unions deliver, bureaucracy and workplace association are substitutes. Indeed, the high number and relative sophistication of shop stewards in Britain are seen as necessary to replace the
dearth of full-time professional staff.'38 Consequently, the more of the
collective good the union produces, then the more likely that workplace
association will run into decreasing returns. Wages, for instance, can
only be raised so high before they threaten to put the employer out of
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
There is a large literature on labor union behavior, the engagement with which is beyond
136.
the scope of this Article. For an overview of that literature, see generally Henry S. Farber, The
Analysis of Union Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS, 1039-89 (Orley Ashenfelter &
Richard Layard eds., 1986); Bruce E. Kaufman & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Monopoly, Efficient
Contract, and Median Voter Models of Union Wage Determination: A Critical Comparison, 11 J.
LAB. RES. 401 (1990).

Union revenues may be a source of personal perquisites for union leaders, or they may be
137.
used to pursue other goals.
KELLY & HEERY, supra note 65, at 119 (explaining that with "limited resources, British
138.
unions require lay activists to shoulder much of the burden of day-to-day representation").
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business. In a large-bureaucracy environment that delivers high wages,
workers will find that the costs of workplace association outweigh the
potential gains for further wage increases.
A large bureaucracy that "delivers the goods" does not, unfortunately, mean that member preferences will be fully satisfied--even while
it will still effectively obstruct the formation of workplace associations.
Better union contracts may increase the scope for certain kinds of leadership rent seeking. For instance, higher wages can support higher dues
payments, higher than necessary to pay for the larger bureaucratic effort.
In this case, members could be made better off by lowering dues while
holding the level of wages and bureaucracy constant. Large pension
funds can generate personal income for union leaders, in different ways
and in sometimes more or less legal forms.' 39 The history of the Teamsters union is a prime example of the compatibility of favorable contracts
with high costs in corruption.1 40 In these examples, there would still be
little point trying to form workplace associations in order extract greater
gains in the workplace, and yet members are not receiving all of the
gains the union wins from the employer.
In addition, the mix of collective goods the union negotiates may
not be the one that union members prefer. Since union leaders have an
interest in maximizing revenue, they may favor wage increases over
other collective goods from which it may be more difficult to measure
and extract monetary rents '4 1-for example, recall the members' healthand-safety concerns in the case of the UMWA.142 If wages are at least
partial substitutes for other union goods, wage increases will tend to
crowd out workplace associations even though the final contract is not
the one union members would have chosen.
Finally, a strong collective-bargaining agreement that delivers gains
in the workplace will crowd out workplace association, but leave unsatisfied issues that concern union members outside the direct employment
relationship. The best example of this is the organization of new members, discussed in the introduction.143 The union's bureaucratic effort
may be allocated toward improving conditions of employment in a single
plant or firm, edging out workplace associations, when members' inter139.
Benefit funds generate income for trustees but can also serve as a source of money for all
manner of nefarious schemes, from simple embezzlement to the use of funds in questionable ventures. ROBERT FITCH, SOLIDARITY FOR SALE: How CORRUPTION DESTROYED THE LABOR
MOVEMENT AND UNDERMINED AMERICA'S PROMISE 25-28 (2006) (describing benefits and corrup-

tion associated with union benefit funds).
140. See LEVI, Inducing Preferences, supra note 25, at 231-32.
141.
Edward E. Lawler, Ill & Edward Levin, Union Officers' Perceptions of Members' Pay
Preferences, 21 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 509, 515 (1968) (finding that "officers tend to greatly
overestimate the members' desire for additional cash" relative to economic security benefits), cited
in Schwab, supra note 18, at 383 n.73.
142. See supra text accompanying note 91.
143. See supra pp. 1-7.

2010]

REVITALIZING UNION DEMOCRACY

25

ests might be better served by organizing the wider industry.'" Members
may also care about the union's legislative agenda or its role in politics
more generally, about its relationship to other unions and the larger labor
movement, or about strategy and tactics leading up to the negotiation of
agreements. We could add to this a long list of noninstrumental or intrinsic benefits that union democracy could bring to union members .14 A
large bureaucracy that "delivers the goods" may therefore crowd out
workplace associations even while still failing to fully satisfy union
members' interests.
The second mechanism that links union bureaucracy with the reduced chance of union democracy is called the "capacity" effect. 14 6 As
we saw previously, union leaders will want to avoid democratization by
offering policy concessions to insurgent workers.147 In sum, the capacity
effect says that those policy concessions will be more attractive to union
members when the union's bureaucracy is larger. If bureaucracy can
produce a unit of the collective good for members at a lower cost than
workplace association, then greater gains from efficiency will be associated with a larger bureaucracy. 14 8 An efficient bureaucracy may help
union leaders more effectively pursue their own goals, distinct from
those of the membership. But, by the same token, a more efficient bureaucracy's greater "capacity" can also more effectively achieve members' interests, should the threat of disruption provoke the leadership to
make concessions. Thus, when bureaucracy is more efficient, the union
leadership can more easily "compensate" union members for the privilege of retaining an oligarchy when a rank-and-file insurgency is threatened.149 For example, a more efficient bureaucracy could bargain better
health-and-safety rules in place of high wages. On the other hand, with
an inefficient bureaucracy, the union's capacity for only modest wage
gains can only be traded off for limited health-and-safety improvements.
The success of these promised changes in policy of course depends on
the credibility of the leaders; but the point is that a more efficient bu-

144. On union members' interests in organizing, see supra text pp. 5-6.
145.
As "schools of democracy," democratic labor unions give union members the training and
experience in a broader role of citizenship.
146. See infra Appendix B.2.
147. See supraPart ll.A.2.
148. Will union bureaucracy be more efficient than workplace association? Certainly bureaucracy presents its own information problems and agency dilemmas. And when bureaucracy is used for
patronage, nepotism, or empire building, a larger bureaucracy may indeed be associated with greater
inefficiency. But abstracting from these latter effects, bureaucracy is probably at least relatively
more efficient than workplace association. Whereas bureaucracy entails full-time specialization and
hierarchical monitoring, workplace associations, whose members voluntarily contribute effort on a
part-time basis, tend to lack those efficiency-promoting attributes. There is also a heuristic reason to
assume efficient bureaucracy. One of the foundational assumptions of Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" was the bureaucracy was more efficient than other forms of organization. If it can therefore be
demonstrated that union democracy is possible even when union bureaucracy is more efficient than
workplace organization, so much the stronger for the theory. MICHELS, supra note 21, at 187.
149. See id. at 389.
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reaucracy increases the value of concessions at any given level of credibility.
The capacity effect has an important implication that is relevant for
a normative and policy discussion of union democracy. If union democracy is more likely when bureaucracy is less efficient, then there will be
some welfare loss associated with the conditions necessary for union
democracy. Indeed, British unions are sometimes portrayed this way:
poor in staff and finances and with informal and imprecise collective
agreements negotiated by lay shop stewards. 50 The question is then
raised: would concessions produce a better outcome for workers than
union democracy? After all, concessions are easier to sustain than democracy as the efficiency of bureaucracy increases. And concessions go
some distance toward satisfying members' policy preferences, while at
the same time allowing them to benefit from the efficiency gains of union bureaucracy. Offsetting the attractiveness of this alternative is the
problem of ensuring the credibility of union leaders without union democracy, since this credibility is crucial to the effectiveness of the concessionary strategy. In addition, union leaders have no incentive to concede more than necessary to avoid a de jure democratization of the union. For these reasons, union members may indeed be willing to trade
away some of the efficiency of bureaucracy for a reduction of agency
costs under union democracy.
While bureaucracy threatens to undermine democracy and crowd
out workplace association, there may indeed be limits to these effects.
Dues and benefit funds may increase the opportunities for economic
rents, but "shirking," or not working as hard as leaders could because of
the difficulty in monitoring their efforts, is a real problem in some unions
as well.'' For instance, even if leaders were solely concerned with economic rents, the non-profit nature of unions restricts those incentives
since leaders are unable to capture the full value of their effortS.1 52 Furthermore, high wages may partially substitute for other collective goods
that members care about, but by the same token, if they are only partial
substitutes, members will still have some incentive to form associations
to make further improvements in the workplace. However, the strength
of workplace associations does not depend solely on the size of the unOrrO KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 199-200 (1972) (writing that the language
150.
of many collective agreements in Britain "is so vague that a court may have to hold them to be 'void
for uncertainty'); Steven Tolliday & Jonathan Zeitlin, Shop-FloorBargaining, Contract Unionism
and Job Control: An Anglo-American Comparison, in THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY AND ITS
wORKERS: BETWEEN FORDISM AND FLEXIBILITY 99, 106-07 (Steven Tolliday & Jonathan Zeitlin

eds., 1987) (arguing that the frequent job actions and extreme decentralization of shop-steward
organizations' in Britain dissipates collective power and exacerbates sectionalism, ultimately curtailing their abilities to challenge wage inequities and employment insecurities).
151.
Schwab, supra note 18, at 395. This informational rent is the primary agency problem
discussed by Schwab. It is perfectly possible for both economic and informational rent seeking to
occur simultaneously.
152.
Id. at 396.
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ion's bureaucracy, but on other costs as well, as depicted in Figure 1.153
For example, as collective entities, workplace associations depend on the
resolution of a collective-action problem. More central to this Article's
focus are the costs of workplace association that are erected by legal
statutes and rulings. These legally-imposed costs of workplace association will now be discussed in Part III.
III. LABOR LAW AND UNION DEMOCRACY

This Part examines how labor law influences union bureaucracy and
workplace association, and hence the prospects for union democracy. As
mentioned in the Introduction, we will examine three different areas: (1)
the rights of labor unions to exclusively represent a given group of workers, (2) legal establishment or support for professional and institutionalized procedures to resolve disputes in collective bargaining, and (3) legal
prohibitions on the use of strike action-economic "self help"-as alternative means of addressing those disputes. As each area of labor law is
discussed, the U.S. version of the law will be compared to its British
counterpart. Because the data used to compare the different elements of
British and American union organization are available only from the
1960s and 1970s, the legal analysis will largely be confined to a similar
period. The significant changes in British labor law--which have taken
place since the late 1970s-therefore remain outside the scope of the
analysis.
These three areas are critically important components of labor law.
But they may not be the only important components, and one should not
presume the list to be exhaustive. Further, whether the presence or absence of one area depends on the presence or absence of another is a
question that is not addressed, although it will be possible to infer such
an interdependency from the subsequent analysis. Whether or not this is
the case, the three areas nevertheless have distinct causal implications.
Figure 2 expands upon Figure 1 to display schematically the causal relationships between labor law and union bureaucracy and workplace association, and thence union democracy. 154 Each mechanism will be elaborated in more detail as each area of labor law is discussed.
A. Exclusive Representation
Clyde Summers has called the principle of exclusive representation
ordering principle which shapes American labor law
"fundamental
the
and collective bargaining."' 55 I would add that the principle of exclusive
representation is also the fundamental ordering legal principle that influ153. See infra Figure 1.
See infra Figures 1 & 2.
154.
155.
Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A Comparative Inquiry into a "Unique"
American Principle,20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 47,47 (1998).
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ences the fate of union democracy in American labor unions. As shown
in Figure 2, exclusive representation has two momentous consequences
for union democracy. First, exclusive representation powerfully influences the union leadership's incentives to invest in building a bureaucracy. Second, exclusive representation determines which agency of the
workers-the union leaders and its bureaucracy or workplace association-is granted privileged access to the institutionalized procedures both
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and arising from collective agreements.
1. Exclusive Representation and Union Bureaucracy
The principle of exclusive representation is articulated in section
9(a) of the NLRA:
Representatives designated or selected for purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ... 156
When a labor union is certified by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) under Section 9(a) as the exclusive representative, "the
presence of a majority union precludes the employer from bargaining
collectively with a minority union."' 57 The Supreme Court has acknowledged in numerous instances that an employer must "treat with no
other"'5 8 than the exclusive bargaining representative and that a minority
union may only bargain with an employer in the absence of an exclusive
bargaining representative.' 59 In the well-known case of JI. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 160 the Supreme Court recognized that employers commit unfair
labor practices, specifically by refusing to bargain collectively with chosen representatives (Section 8(a)(5))161 and by interfering with protected

156. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
Summers, supra note 155, at 47.
157.
Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 547-48 (1937) (exploring the
158.
ramifications of the Railway Labor Act). For the NLRA specifically, see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1937).
159. See, e.g., Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 741 n.1 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("[A]bsent an exclusive agency for bargaining created by a majority
of workers, a minority union has standing to bargain for its members."); Consol. Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 237 (1938) ("[T]here is nothing to show that the [noncertified union] has been
superseded by any other selection by a majority of employees of the companies so as to create an
exclusive agency for bargaining under the statute, and in the absence of such an exclusive agency the
employees represented by the [noncertified union], even if they were a minority, clearly had the right
to make their own choice.").
160. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a)(5) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for
161.
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . . .").
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employee rights (Section 8(a)(1)), 162 when they attempt to bargain in
circumvention of a certified and exclusive bargaining representative. 6 3
The effect of exclusive representation on incentives to invest in union bureaucracy works in the following way. When unions lack exclusive
representation, unions are free to recruit members on an individual basis.
Two or more unions may seek to recruit members in the same workplace.
This scenario presents several dilemmas to unions. First, because of the
collective nature of the union good, workers will join the union which
offers the lowest dues, ceterisparibus, since they get the good regardless
of their union affiliation. This competition for members places downward pressure on the level of dues. Second, because the union-provided
good is a collective good, each union has an incentive to reduce the
amount of effort it provides (the size of its bureaucracy)-the opposite
outcome in the market for a private good. In contrast, when a union has
exclusive representation, workers have no incentive to join an outside,
competing union. The result is both smaller bureaucracies and lower
levels of dues in the absence of exclusive representation.
These mechanisms go a long way toward explaining the administrative and financial differences between U.S. and British unions. The lack
of exclusive representation has made an enormous impact on Britain's
system of industrial relations. First, what is called multi-unionism, the
presence of multiple unions within a given workplace or firm, often
competing to represent similar categories of workers, is a prominent feature of British labor relations.164 In the U.S., by contrast, similarly situated workers belong to the same bargaining unit represented by a single,
exclusive union.165 Second, rival unionism has a depressing effect on
union dues in Britain. Even within Britain, unions have lower per capita
dues income where competition for members is fiercer.166 One sees this
phenomenon in other European labor movements when competitive un162. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a)(1) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title . . . ."); see also § 7 ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . . .").
163. See JI. Case Co., 321 U.S. at 334, 339; see also Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 678, 679-80 (1944). Both JI. Case Co. and Medo Photo Supply Corp. involved the question
whether the employer could bargain directly with employees in circumvention of the exclusive
representative. The principle is virtually unquestioned where the employer attempts to bargain with a
minority union.
164.
See Robert Kilroy-Silk, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employer Associations,
22 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 544, 551 (1969) (discussing a report of the Royal Commission on
Trade Unions and Employer Associations which recommended a reduction in multi-unionism, which
is present when two or more unions exist); KAHN-FREUND, supra note 150, at 85 (interunion disputes are "of considerable importance in British industry").
EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 34, at 17-18 (contrasting the US with Britain and
165.
stating that "[iun the United States, virtually all the manual workers in a given workplace belong to
the same union, which is the sole bargaining agent for such employees").
Willman, supra note 59, at 268.
166.

30

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 88:1

ionism prevails. Both France and Italy have had multiple union confederations that compete to recruit members in the same industries and occupations. Like Britain, they have also had smaller bureaucracies and
lower dues rates than European labor movements without such competition. 167
The effects of exclusive representation can therefore be quite substantial. As will shortly be examined, the legally-supported institutionalization of collective bargaining can lower the costs of bureaucracy, and
thereby influence its growth. But whereas the costs of union bureaucracy
affect its size at the margin, the absence of exclusive representation and
the accompanying collective-action problem between unions undermines
incentives to invest in bureaucracy regardless of its costs.
2. Exclusive Representation and Workplace Association
Exclusive representation not only affects the size of the union's bureaucracy, but the strength and potential effectiveness of workplace association as well. This is because the principle of exclusive representation
not only precludes an employer from bargaining with a minority union,
but it also prohibits an employer from bargaining directly with its employees. In addition, the courts have concluded that the NLRA does not
protect employees' use of economic action to pressure the employer into
bargaining with them in circumvention of the recognized union representative because direct bargaining would violate the exclusivity principle.
In sum, this raises the costs of workplace association, making them less
likely emerge or become a meaningful and vibrant alternative to achieving workplace gains.
In an early case, Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 16 8 the Supreme
Court concluded that an employer may not bargain directly with the employees, in circumvention of the exclusive agent, even when the employees initiate the bargaining.169 In that case, a labor union was recognized
as the bargaining representative for a designated unit of workers. 17 Prior
to negotiations, however, a majority of employees in the unit sought to
negotiate wage increases without the union's intervention.17 1 The Court
held that the employer's bargaining violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5)
of the NLRA, stating: "Bargaining carried on by the employer directly
with the employees, whether a minority or majority .. . would be subver-

167. See Visser, supra note 58, at 166-67 tbl.23, 170-71. Italy is particularly revealing of the
causal relationship between competition for members and union dues, since dues went up after
contending confederations established more a cooperative relationship.
168. 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
169. Id. at 685.
170. Id. at 681.
171.
Id.

2010]

REVITALIZING UNION DEMOCRACY

31

sive of the mode of collective bargaining which the statute has ordained.
,,172

Not only will an employer who bargains directly with employees be
subject to unfair labor practice sanctions, but he or she is also free to
terminate employees who seek to press the employer into negotiations
without the participation of the exclusive bargaining agent through the
use of economic sanctions. This conclusion was most famously stated in
73
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization.'

In that case, employees who filed grievances with the union against the
employer that alleged racial discrimination became dissatisfied at the
pace of progress.174 As a result, they sought to engage the employer directly and commenced picketing their place of employment; after a warning, the employer discharged them. 175
The Court in Emporium Capwell first addressed the question
whether the employees were merely attempting to present a grievance to,
rather than bargain with, their employer. If it is clear that the NLRA
bars employers from bargaining with unions rival to the exclusive representative, the direct relationship between employer and employees raises
more of a question. The remainder of Section 9(a), following the part
quoted above, contains a proviso stating:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention
of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect: Providedfurther, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment. 177
However, despite this proviso, the Court affirmed the Board's finding that the employees' conduct was "no mere presentation of a grievance but nothing short of a demand that the [Company] bargain with the
picketing employees for the entire group of minority employees."7 8

172. Id. at 684.
173.
420 U.S. 50 (1975). The ramifications of Emporium Capwell reach far beyond exclusive
representation. For a contextual history of the case exploring the relationship between racial discrimination in employment, labor law, and the fate of New Deal liberalism, see generally Reuel E.
Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the CrisisofPost-War Liberalism, 25
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 129 (2004).

174. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 53-54.
175.
Id. at 55-56.
176. Id. at 60-61.
177. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 57 (quoting the Board's adoption of the Trial Examiners'
178.
findings and conclusions); see also id. at 60-61 (affirming the finding of Board).
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It also noted that the intention of the proviso was to allow employees to present grievances to the employer without exposing the employer
to liability for bargaining in circumvention of the exclusive bargaining
representative. 179
The second question raised in Emporium Capwell was whether the
termination of the picketing employees violated their rights under the
NLRA.o80 Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees rights "to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection" and section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with the exercise of those
rights.' 8' However, the Court concluded that the terminations of the
workers did not violate the Act because their attempt to circumvent the
union and bargain directly with the employer was inconsistent with section 9(a)'s exclusivity principle.18 2 The Court conjectured at length on
the "fragmentation" that would happen with "separate" bargaining, and
the diminution of the union's bargaining power that would accompany
it.183
These decisions place workplace associations in an insuperable position. If workers are dissatisfied with their rights established under the
collective-bargaining agreement or the procedural means for securing
them, they may seek to engage the employer directly-using "unofficial"
means such as economic sanctions-to bring the employer to negotiations. However, the use of such self-help alternatives does not receive the
same level of protection that other concerted activities are given under
the NLRA. Moreover, even if the use of economic action is effective and
induces the employer to make concessions, the law ties the employer's
hands. If the employer does bargain a separate agreement with the workplace association, the union can charge the employer with violating its
duty to bargain. Both of these outcomes significantly obstruct the ability
of workplace associations to achieve gains independent of the official
union. For workplace association to be successful it must overcome not
only the absence of statutory protection, but also the employer's fears of
liability.
3. The Closed Shop as Alternative in Britain?
The British counterpart to the American rule of exclusive representation was very simple: no principle of exclusive representation ever existed during the relevant time period. Nevertheless, union-security
agreements-such as the closed shop, which make membership in the
179. Id. at 61 n.12.
180. Id.at71.
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) §§ 7, 8(a)(1). For the text of these provisions, see
181.
supra note 162.
182. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 65-70.
183. See id.
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union a condition of employment-were legal.18 4 And if a closed-shop
agreement requires that employees join only a single union, then the union has exclusive bargaining rights.'85 Furthermore, there are cases illustrating the use of the closed shop to inhibit workplace associations from
directly bargaining with an employer.186 Was the closed shop in Britain
therefore an effective counterpart to exclusive representation in the U.S.?
The answer is no, for the simple reason that only about two-fifths of union members were covered by closed-shop agreements in the 1960s.18 7
By itself, this is not a trivial proportion. But it approaches nowhere near
the degree of pervasiveness that exclusive representation operates compared to the United States, where virtually the only way unions achieved
recognition was through an NLRB certified election that conferred exclusive-representation status where the union prevailed.' 88
B. Legally-InstitutionalizedCollective Bargaining
Inscribed in the very purposes of the Wagner Act is the goal of "removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes.",8 In accordance with these objectives, the NLRA, greatly facilitated by subsequent judicial support and elaboration, establishes opportunities to substitute legal, administrative, or arbitral process for economic self help at virtually every stage of the collective-bargaining process. These stages include: the organization of workers, recognition of the
union, the employer's duty to bargain with the union, and interpretation
and enforcement of the collective-bargaining agreement.190 The contrast
with British labor law in the post-war period could not be greater.
Whereas the Wagner Act system of collective bargaining endowed un184.
KAHN-FREUND, supra note 150, at 199-200. Union-security agreements come in a variety
of forms. Broadly speaking, in American usage, a closed shop requires the employer to hire and keep
in employment only members of the particular union. A union shop allows the employer to hire
anyone, but requires the new hire to become a member of the union within a specified time period,
such as thirty days. An agency shop requires employees to pay a "fair share" of representation fees
to the union as a condition of employment without requiring or conferring full, formal membership
rights. A maintenance-of-membership agreement requires those employees who were union members at a given date to maintain union membership as a condition of employment. In British usage,
the closed shop can be used to refer to either a closed- or union-shop agreement, with the distinction
sometimes made between the "pre-entry" closed shop and the "post-entry" closed shop. Id. at 19899.
185.
Union-security agreements need not be exclusive. For example, a closed-shop agreement
could require that all employees simply become a member of one of several possible unions. KahnFruend mentions this kind of agreement in Britain, but does not say how common such agreements
are. Id. at 199.
186. See, e.g., Morgan v. Fry, (1968) 2 Q.B. 710, 721-23 (involving employer dismissing
member of a breakaway union in order to avoid strike trouble from the union with which the employer had an informal exclusive bargaining agreement), cited in KAHN-FREUND, supra note 150, at
203.
187.

W. E. J. MCCARTHY, THE CLOSED SHOP IN BRITAIN 28 (1964).
CHARLES J. MoRRIs, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 88 (2005).

188.

189.
190.

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
See id. §§ 7, 8(a), 8(d), 9(a).

§ 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151

(2006).
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ions and workers with a set of "positive" rights, British labor law left
trade unions and workers merely with "negative" liberties. British labor
law famously became characterized as a system of "collective laissez
faire."

The main consequence of the substitution of legal and orderly procedure for economic strife is to lower the costs of collective bargaining.
At any one of these points in the collective-bargaining process a dispute
with the employer is possible. Without a binding procedure to address
that dispute, unions have only the threat of strike or other economic action to enforce their claims. Yet strikes are enormously costly. An opportunity to resolve disputes through an institutionalized procedure therefore
presents unions and workers with a lower-cost alternative to economic
action.
However, the union leadership is in a better position to benefit from
the substitution of process for self help than is workplace association.
This is for two reasons. First, as the exclusive representative, the union
has privileged access to these institutionalized alternatives. In addition
the costs of learning and accommodating collective-bargaining procedures are lower for the union bureaucracy-with its comparative advantage in skill, knowledge, and specialization-than for associated union
members on the shop floor. Thus, institutionalized collective-bargaining
procedures are expected to lower the costs of union bureaucracy rather
than those of workplace association. And lowering the costs of bureaucracy gives union leaders further incentive to expand these administrative
apparatuses, with all the consequences for union democracy that were
discussed in the previous Part.
1. Organization, Recognition, and Bargaining
The NLRA provides legal support to labor unions attempting to organize workers. Before a union has been recognized, employees have
rights under Section 7 to "form, join, or assist labor organizations." 192
Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with an employee's Section 7 rights.1 9 3 And Section 8(a)(3) makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discourage membership in a
labor organization by discrimination in hiring, tenure, or conditions of
employment.1 94 A voluminous amount of law has developed under these
provisions in the context of labor union organizing. In Section 9, the
NLRA establishes procedures for determining an appropriate bargaining
unit and certifying an exclusive representative of that unit through a
For a fuller discussion of these "two logics" of union behavior, see generally Claus Offe
191.
& Helmut Wisenthal, Two Logicsof Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form, I POL. POWER & Soc. THEORY 67 (1980).
192. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 7. For text, see supra note 162.
193. Id. § 8(a)(1).
194.
Id. § 8(a)(3).

REVITALIZING UNION DEMOCRACY

2010]

35

Board-directed representation election.195 Once recognized, an employer
has a duty to bargain with the union under Section 8(a)(5). 19 6
Thus, in each of these collective-bargaining stages-organization,
recognition, and bargaining-the law provides a procedural substitute for
the need to mobilize a large number of workers for strike action. Labor
unions and their supporters justly complain about the inadequacy of the
available remedies to redress employer violations of unions' and employees' rights under Section 8. Nevertheless, unions' consistent recourse to the protections of the NLRA indicates that they are the preferred method of addressing disputes, whatever their shortcomings.1 97
In contrast to the United States, during the relevant period in British
labor law there were no legally meaningful rights to organize or rights to
labor union recognition. Although under the British conception of collective laissez faire labor unions were free to engage in a broad range of
economic actions, this nevertheless left "a glaring contrast between the
wide scope of this freedom and the absence of any legislation seeking to
guarantee its exercise." 98 Thus, there was no legal protection against
anti-union discrimination or the interference by employers in the establishment or functioning of labor unions. 199 There was no obligation for an
employer to bargain with a union.200 Ultimately, the only sanction trade
unions could bring to bear on employers in order to enforce a claim to
recognition or against acts of discrimination or interference was the one
of economic action. 20 1 British labor law therefore failed to provide its
unions with the same kind of cost-reducing procedural alternatives that
the Wagner Act presented to unions in the U.S.
2. Interpretation and Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Once a union has successfully organized, been recognized, and has
concluded an agreement with the employer, U.S. labor law also lends its
support to disputes arising from the interpretation and enforcement of
these agreements. First, Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Rela195.
Id.§ 9.
196. Id. § 8(a)(5). The duty to bargain is subject to a good-faith standard as established in the
NLRA section 8(d). Section 8(d) also requires that, where a collective-bargaining agreement is in
effect, a party desiring a termination of modification of the agreement give written notice to the
other party, offer to meet and confer, and continue the existing agreement for sixty days after giving
such notice (or until the expiration of the contract if that occurs later) before resorting to economic
action. Id § 8(d)(1)-(4).
197. See MORRIS, supra note 188, at 83-86 (discussing how rapidly labor unions came to
embrace Board procedures in the case of representation elections). The law's failure to fully protect
the right to organize, thus making the ability to organize more costly, could explain why unions tend
to allocate bureaucratic resources to servicing existing members rather than organizing new ones.
198.

KAHN-FREUND, supra note 150, at 172.

199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 249.
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tions Act (LMRA) makes collective-bargaining agreements enforceable
in federal courts.202 In the important decision of Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 2 0 3 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 301. 204 However, the Court also went further and declared that section 301 gave the federal courts the mandate to create a federal substantive law of collective bargaining. 205 The policy of substituting institution-

alized procedures for economic strife could not have been stated more
clearly:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts
should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that
206
way.
Such legal support gives unions the assurance that disputes can be
effectively addressed through procedural means, without the need to mobilize and resort to economic compulsion and self-help. Further, this policy was forcefully elaborated in a series of subsequent decisions, known
collectively as the Steelworkers Trilogy. In those decisions, the Supreme
Court held that courts should enforce agreements to arbitrate regardless
207
of the underlying merit of the dispute, that the agreement should be
interpreted to cover the dispute even where the scope of the agreement
was ambiguous, 208 and that arbitration awards would be enforced as long
as they drew their essence from the collective agreement. 209
The contrast with British labor law is again instructive. For the most
part, collective agreements were legally unenforceable because they
lacked contractual intent. 2 10 This was as the parties desired, and is the
202.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006) ("Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties."). Prior to the passage of the LMRA, some state courts had
enforced collective agreements under various legal theories. See, e.g., Goldman v. Cohen, 227
N.Y.S. 311, 312-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928), cited in Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War
Paradigmin American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1520 (1981); see also Schlesinger v. Quinto,
194 N.Y.S. 401, 409-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922).
203.
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
204. Id. at 457-58.
205. Id. at 455-57.
206. Id. at 455.
207. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
208. United Steelworkers v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1960).
209. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
210. See KAHN-FREUND, supra note 150, at 132 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Amalgamated
Union of Eng'g & Foundry Workers, (1969) 2 Q.B. 303, 330-31 (holding that an agreement between Ford and a number of other unions could not be enforced because of the factual finding that
the agreement lacked contractual intent)).
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consequence of long tradition in British industrial relations. 2 1 1 There was
an exception to this rule, which was that certain provisions of collective
agreements could be incorporated into the terms of individual contracts
of employment through a theory of prevailing custom and usage.212
However, this theory only applied to the terms of the collective agreement that could and were intended to be terms of contracts of employment and that gave rise to rights and duties that could be enforced
through law-of-contract remedies. 213 Hence, parts of collective agreements covering the making of employment contracts themselves were
not applied, for example, agreements over job allocation or the promise
to return to work after a strike. The theory also did not cover jointly created institutions, such as committees for whatever purpose or pension
funds. Nor did it apply either to established collective bargaining rules or
"peace obligations," known in the United States as no-strike agreements.2 14
More generally, British law establishes no rules promoting the use
of legal or quasi-legal procedure to resolve disputes under the collective
agreement. In the 1970s, British labor-law scholar Otto Kahn-Freund
even felt justified in concluding that although British trade unions had
achieved de facto recognition over a broad swath of industries, "[t]he law
... had no share in the advancement of collective bargaining."2 15 Collective-bargaining parties did establish their own dispute-settlement procedures, but as just shown, such procedures lacked any legal status: the
ultima ratio for any dispute regarding the dispute procedures themselves
always remained the resort to economic self-help.2 16 Further, British law
did provide for state-initiated conciliation of disputes, but in practice this
service tended to reinforce rather than undermine the dominant British
model of collective laissez faire. That is, state intervention could not
dictate, but only facilitate, a settlement and the procedure was only triggered after the parties' own negotiation machinery had failed.217 Finally,
just as in the U.S., the British state did provide employers and unions
with voluntary, nonbinding arbitration services. Significantly, however,
the law establishing the arbitration service never created a permanent
board that could develop an expertise or a set of principles to apply in the

211.
KAHN-FREUND, supra note 150, at 132.
212. Id. at 146 ("[T]he elementary rule of contractual construction ... that the parties are, in
the absence of an express term to the contrary, deemed to have implicitly incorporated the substance
of the prevailing usages or customs, remains the principal link between collective agreements and
contracts of employment.").
213.
Id. at 149.
214. Id
215. Id. at 77.
216. See supratext accompanying note 198-201.
217. Id. at 98-100.
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settlement of workplace disputes. 218 In sum, the exceptions in British
labor law tended to prove the rule.
C. Restrictions on Economic-Action Alternatives
Key to the Wagner Act's voluntarist system of labor law is the use
of "economic weapons," such as strikes and other economic actions.
Since U.S. labor law does not dictate any of the terms to which unions
and management agree, the resulting bargaining must be one determined
by the relative economic power of the parties. The Wagner Act's commitment to "industrial peace and stability" also dictates that economic
actions will be an important object of regulation. 219 The governance of
these economic weapons is therefore a main concern of U.S. labor law.
The regulation of economic action also critically affects the fortunes
of workplace associations.22 0 We have previously examined two reasons
why workplace associations will tend to resort to strategies of economic
self help. First, they lack access to formal proceedings either before the
Board or made available under the collective-bargaining agreement because in the presence of a union they do not have exclusiverepresentation status. 221 Second, union-member workers do not have the
same opportunities to acquire knowledge or specialize in the arcane and
formal procedures under the NLRA or the collective agreement. 222if
workplace associations wish to achieve their aims, they will therefore
need to resort to the use of strikes or other economic actions. This was
exactly the conundrum faced by the workers in the Emporium Capwell
case.223 Yet U.S. labor law places restrictions on the ability to strike and
take other economic action and therefore increases the costs of precisely
those alternatives to which workplace associations must resort to advance their demands. This further reduces the strength and possibility of
218. Id. at 100. Britain also experimented with a system of compulsory arbitration arising out
of wartime industrial-relations experience and which nevertheless proved unenduring. Regarding
Britain's final experiment with compulsory arbitration, which lasted from 1951 to 1959, KahnFreund remarked, "If this system had been more important in practice than it was it would have been
inconceivable for the employers to put up with it for more than seven years." Id. at 117. The British
government also experimented during the two world wars with government-sponsored efforts to
establish industry-wide procedure agreements for collective bargaining by instituting Joint Industrial
Councils (JICs) where unions had not been established. Though notable as an exception to the British system of collective laissez faire, the JICs remained peripheral to the established trade union
sections and did not contribute to the formal institutionalization of collective bargaining. See PAUL
DAVIES & MARK FREEDLAND, LABOUR LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: A CONTEMPORARY

HISTORY 39-43 (1993). But see K.D. Ewing, The State and Industrial Relations: "Collective Laissez-Faire" Revisited, 5 HIST. STUD. INDUS. REL. 1, 17-20 (1998); CHRIS HOWELL, TRADE UNIONS
AND THE STATE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTIONS IN BRITAIN, 1890-

2000, at 72-73 (2005) (portraying a more positive impact of the JICs).
219. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1957); NLRB v.
Local Union No.1229, Int'l Bhd. of Flee. Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 476 (1953) (stating the declared
purpose of the Wagner Act is to promote "industrial peace and stability").
220. See infra Figure 2.
221.
See supra text accompanying notes 168-83.
222. See supra Part Ill.B.
223. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 53-56 (1975).
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workplace associations. In Britain by contrast, legal restrictions on economic action are unknown.
1. The Law of Economic Action in the United States
Although Sections 7 and 13 of the NLRA purported to give em224
ployees a broad right to strike, this right has been vastly restricted in a
number of ways. Important for our story are three main changes: (1) the
statutory restrictions on organizational and recognition strikes and secondary boycotts added to the NLRA by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947; (2)
judicial deprivation of protection for what I will call "shop-floor tactics";
and (3) the effect of unions' no-strike agreements on workplace associations.
a. Statutory Restrictions on Economic Action
The possibilities for workplace association can be quite favorable at
the organization and recognition stages of collective bargaining, when
the position of the labor union is less established.2 25 In this respect, the
most salient restrictions on economic action are the Taft-Hartley Act's
limitations on organizational and recognition strikes. Among these provisions is Section 8(b)(4)(C), which bans the use of economic action to
compel an employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization in the case where another labor organization had already been
certified as the employees' representative.226 A violation of any of
8(b)(4)'s prohibitions may be redressed under Section 303 of the LMRA
with an action for damages in federal court, a remedy not available for
any employer unfair labor practice. 227 Thus when employees seek to bargain directly with an employer in circumvention of the exclusive union
representative, not only does an employer face an unfair labor practice
sanction and and not only is employees' economic action unprotected, 228
as we have already seen, but economic action with such an object may be
patently illegal as well. This further raises the costs of workplace associations.
A possible distinction is the restriction of the 8(b)(4)(C) prohibition
to "labor organizations," which conceivably could be interpreted not to
224. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006); id. § 13 ("Nothing in this [Act] .. . shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.").
See Gould, supra note 112, at 680.
225.
226. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4)(C) (making it an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization to engage in economic action when the object is "forcing or requiring any
employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his
employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees
under the provisions of section 159").
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2006) (making
227.
unlawful "any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in Section 158(b)(4)" and
creating a right of action for damages in US district courts).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 168-83.
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cover employees or their associations. However, the Act defines labor
organization quite broadly, as including "any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan" that at least
in part deals with employers over terms and conditions of employment.229
A case from the First Circuit demonstrates both the negative impact
of Section 8(b)(4)(C) on workplace associations as well as the breadth of
the Act's definition of "labor organization." In Simmons, Inc. v. NLRB230
the circuit court vacated the Board's order dismissing an employer's
complaint that a committee of workers had violated Section 8(b)(4)(C)
by initiating a strike demanding that the employer bargain with the
committee, although a labor union had already been elected and certified. 231 At issue was whether the committee of workers was a "labor organization."232 The court concluded that it was, reasoning that if the
committee "sought to have itself recognized or bargained with, then it
acted as a labor organization."233 Thus, the same conduct of the committee that made its action prohibited under the NLRA also defined it as a
labor organization.
In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act also prohibits the use of secondary
tactics by labor unions.234 Secondary actions are the use of economic or
other pressure on an employer who is not the primary party to a labor
dispute.235 Such restrictions are potent, for as is recognized, secondary
actions are "one of the most effective weapons in labor's economic arse-

229.
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 2(5); see also NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360
U.S. 203, 210-14 (1959) (holding that although employee committees did not bargain with employers in "the usual concept of collective bargaining," they were nevertheless labor organizations because they existed in part for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning grievances).
230.
287 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1961).
231.
Id. at 631.
232.
Id at 628.
233.
Id. at 629, 631.
234.
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(b)(4)(B) (making it an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization to engage in economic action when the object is "forcing or requiring any
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . .
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing").
235.
Section 8(b)(4)(B)'s proviso to preserve the primary right to strike or picket has led the
Board to develop a labyrinthine set of rules governing the secondary-activity ban that, if anything,
increases uncertainty and confusion for workers. For instance, under certain conditions, unions can
target worksites that the primary employer shares with another employer (a "common situs"). Economic action can target "allies" (interpreted narrowly by the Board as those employers so integrated
with the struck employer that they form a "common enterprise" and entities that perform struck work
of the primary employer). And under the Moore Dry Dock rules, striking workers can follow and
picket supervisors, nonstrikers, and replacements that work at the location of a secondary employer.
See Sailor's Union of the Pac. v. Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549 (1950). There is also
some permissiveness for what are broadly called "sympathy strikers"; Section 8(b)(4) does not
prohibit strikers at a primary employer's location from asking delivery drivers, vendors, or outside
contractors from honoring their picket line. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union No.
175 v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 261, 262 (D.C. Cir 1961) (per curiam).
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nal." 2 36 Although one may question whether workplace-based employee
associations would be able to coordinate multi-firm economic actions, it
is clear that where developed such associations can achieve a remarkable
degree of interplant organization, which would allow them to exploit
these potent tactics.237
b. No Protection for "Shop Floor" Economic Actions
In addition to these legislative prohibitions, the courts have also deprived from the protection of the NLRA certain forms of economic action in which workplace associations may have a comparative advantage
over union bureaucracy. As we shall shortly see, unprotected economic
actions leave workers in the U.S. no worse off from a strictly legal perspective than their counterparts in Britain, where labor law has provided
no "positive" right to strike. Nevertheless, the very distinction in U.S.
labor law between protected and unprotected activities may create a
normative (as contrasted with legally coercive) disincentive to strike. The
lack of illegitimacy is absent under British labor law, where the absence
of a right to strike is the "normal" status of a strike.
Among the set of unprotected activities most likely to affect workplace associations are what might be called shop-floor tactics: work
stoppages that entail not just quitting work, but that also obstruct the
ability of employers to restart production with replacement workers because striking workers remain in the workplace. Workplace associations
have an advantage in such tactics because they typically require a high
degree of workplace communication and coordination. And because they
make it more difficult for the employer to restart production, they are
highly effective. The most important decision in this category of cases is
NLRB v. FansteelMetallurgicalCorp.238 In that case, the Court held that
sit-down strikes were not protected under the act and striking sit-down
workers may be terminated without redress. 239 The decision in Fansteel
could have been read to deprive strike activity of legal protection in the
case when workers trespass on the employer's property. 240 However, later
courts drew on Fansteel to examine a variety of different work-stoppage

236.
2 COMM. ON THE DEV. OF THE LAW UNDER THE NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS ACT, AM. BAR
Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS ACT 1621 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW].

237. See EDELSTEIN & WARNER, supra note 34, at 18 (commenting on "combine" committees
of shop stewards linking workplace organizations across multiple plants in the British automobile
industry); Terry, supra note 64, at 69 (noting the "considerable sophistication" of inter-plant coordination of workplace organizations in the British engineering industry).
238.
306 U.S. 240 (1939).
239. Id. at 256-58.
240. Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike": ProtectingNew Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 367-68 (1994); see also
James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 518, 520-26 (2004).
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tactics. 241 Decisions following Fansteel therefore found that intermittent
work stoppages, slowdowns, and partial strikes were also unprotected
concerted activities.*242
c. No-Strike Agreements and Workplace Associations
Another important source of restrictions on economic action has
been promises unions make not to strike during the term of a collectivebargaining agreement. Both scholars and activists have frequently highlighted no-strike agreements as a prime example of the way insular labor
leaders undermine the prospects for more vigorous workplace associations in the U.S. 243 Yet, the relationship between no-strike agreements
and workplace associations is more complicated than it would otherwise
appear. First, individual union members are not liable for damages when
they engage in unauthorized work stoppages in violation of a no-strike
244
agreement. Second, absent express contractual assumptions of responsibility, unions face reduced standards of liability for damages in cases of
wildcat strikes that violate a no-strike promise.245 To the extent that liability of the union encourages it to be more vigilant in policing the union's ranks for dissenters, these reduced standards weaken those disciplinary incentives. 246 Thus, no-strike agreements may actually have a fairly
weak effect on workplace associations, in terms of the prospects of damages liability.
241.
242.

Becker, supra note 240, at 368-71.
See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 236, at 1488-90.

243.

See DAVID BRODY,

WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY STRUGGLE 185-195 (2d ed. 1993) (arguing that the "contractual logic" and no-strike
promises of collective bargaining agreements "evolved into a pervasive method for containing shopfloor activism").
244.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2006)
("Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be
enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets."); see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis,
451 U.S. 401, 407 (1981) (holding individual union members not liable for damages in the express
case of an unauthorized strike in violation of a no-strike obligation); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
370 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1962) (holding that section 301(a) of the LMRA does not authorize a damages action against individual union officers and members when their union is liable for violating a
no-strike clause in a collective-bargaining agreement).
245. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(b) (stating that labor unions
"shall be bound by the acts of its agents"). But see § 301(e) (stating that in determining union responsibility for acts of its agents, the question of actual authorization or subsequent ratification shall
not be controlling). The federal courts nevertheless differed on what was the union's standard of
liability. Cf Eazor Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 962 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding the union liable for violation of a no-strike obligation for failure to use best efforts to end unauthorized strikes); United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877-78 (4th Cir.
1955) (holding the union not liable for damages from an unauthorized strike when there was no
evidence that the union "adopted the strike, that they encouraged it or that they prolonged it"). This
tension was not resolved until the Supreme Court's decision in Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 216-18 (1979) (holding that LMRA § 301(e) established that the commonlaw test of agency should be used to determine union liability for the acts of its agents). Carbon also
held that absent an express agreement in the contract, there was no implied duty of the union to "use
all reasonable means to prevent and end" unauthorized strikes. Id. at 216.
246. The subject of union discipline has received much attention.
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Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court held in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Reis247 that individual union members were not liable for
damages for an unauthorized strike that violated a no-strike agreement,
the Court expressly declined to address the issue of whether an employer
could obtain injunctive relief in such a situation. 248 Because of its immediacy, a temporary restraining order could more effectively hamper incipient workplace associations than would the more remote prospect of
damage liability. Commentary suggests that an injunction is indeed the
typical and accepted response to a wildcat strike. 249 Moreover, courts
have long held that wildcat strikes are unprotected,25 0 and again this distinction from protected activities may give such actions the cast of illegitimacy and induce a normative, if not coercive, constraint on economic
action. Indeed, the fact that labor law practitioners refer to the terminations of wildcat strikers as the industrial-relations equivalent of "capital
punishment" speaks in favor of this conclusion.251 Therefore, despite the
distant impacts of damages liability to wildcat strikers, injunctions and
the normative-legitimacy constraints on authorized job actions undoubtedly inhibit workplace associations.
2. The Law of Economic Action in Britain
Unlike the Taft-Hartley prohibitions on organizational, recognition,
and secondary strikes in U.S. labor law, no legal restrictions on strikes
existed under British law. Also unlike U.S. law, the idea of legallyprotected concerted activities was unknown. Rather, British workers and
union members have had for much of the twentieth century only privileges and immunities: for a broad range of activities, economic action
was neither legally prohibited nor legally protected. This system was the

247.
451 U.S. 401 (1981).
248.
Id. at 417 & n.18. It is clear in the case of union-authorized strikes that employers can
obtain an injunction. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252-54
(1970) (upholding an injunction for a strike in violation of a no-strike clause that was precipitated
over a dispute subject to arbitration in the collective-bargaining agreement), overruling Sinclair Ref.
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 199-201 (1962) (holding that the Taft-Hartley Act provision authorizing suits against unions did not impliedly repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibition against
labor injunctions in federal courts); see also Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S.
397, 406-09 (1976) (refusing to expand Boys Markets to strikes in violation of a no-strike obligation
over disputes not subject to grievance arbitration in the collective-bargaining agreement).
249. M. Jay Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 IND.
L.J. 472, 473 (1975) (explaining that in a wildcat strike, the "employer is typically content with a
Boys Market injunction and a speedy resumption of production").
250.
NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 205 (4th Cir. 1944). Wildcat strikes need not violate a no-strike agreement to be unprotected. In Draper, the court concluded that the employees's
actions were unprotected because wildcat strikes undermine the principle of exclusive representation, not because the strike violated a no-strike agreement. Id. at 202-04. However, for a strike to be
"unauthorized," a duly recognized labor union must be present, so an unannounced walkout in an
unorganized workplace is generally protected under section 7 of the NLRA. See NLRB v. Wash.
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14-16 (1962).
251.
See Feller, supra note 128, at 780.
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product of two statutes that the British labor movement achieved in the
culmination of a long legislative battle.2 52
First, economic action was immunized from criminal liability in
1875. The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (CPPA) immunized any act done "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute"
from the common-law doctrine of criminal conspiracy;253 abolished certain individual crimes associated with strikes, such as "molestation" and
"obstruction"; 254 and sanctioned certain forms of picketing. 255 In 1890,
British courts began entertaining actions alleging that trade unions were
civilly liable for activity that had been decriminalized in the CPPA. 256In
response, British Parliament passed the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) in
1906 which immunized peaceful picketing from civil liability, 25 7 eliminated the tort of inducement to breach of contract in the context of a
trade dispute,25 8 and protected trade union funds from civil remedies.259
The famous Section 1 of the TDA, enshrined in British labor law as the
"golden formula,"260 immunized strikes against civil conspiracy: "An act
done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or more persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not
be actionable unless the act, if done without any such agreement or combination, would be actionable."2 61
This "extraordinary freedom" 262 conferred by the TDA proved to be
broad. The Act's language granted immunity to actions done "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute" and defined a trade dispute
as a dispute between employers and workmen or between workmen
"connected with the employment or nonemployment, or the terms of
employment, or the conditions of labour of any person." 263 Importantly,
unlike the U.S., this immunity was determined to cover recognition
264
strikes and secondary disputes. 2 The immunities granted by the TDA,
along with the CPPA, were also extremely durable: with only minor
modification it "remained on the statute book for seventy-five years" and
became the "bedrock of the British system of labour law." 265
252. See Forbath, supra note 31, at 22-31 (providing a concise account of this story); see also
Michael J.Klarman, The Judges Versus the Unions: The Development of British Labor Law, 18671913, 75 VA. L. REV. 1487, 1487-90 (1989) (providing a more detailed account of this story).
253. Klarman, supra note 252, at 1496.
254. Id
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1505-21.
at1521.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1535-36.
260. Forbath, supra note 31, at 24, 31.
Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, § I (Eng.), available at
261.
http://www.constitution.org/sech/sech_ I36.htm.
262. Forbath, supra note 31, at 31.
263. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 150, at 248.
264. Id. at 249.
265.

DAVIES & FREEDLAND, supra note 218, at 15.

2010]

REVITALIZING UNION DEMOCRACY

45

CONCLUSION

The goal of this Article has been to argue that the law makes a difference for the possibility of union democracy and that, in the United
States, labor law restricts this possibility. The central claim is that labor
law can obstruct or promote the amount of workplace association either
directly, or indirectly through the law's effect on union bureaucracy; and
that the strength of workplace association is critical for the maintenance
and florescence of union democracy. Both exclusive representation and
legally-supported procedures of collective bargaining promote the bureaucratization of unions, which negatively impacts the amount of workplace association. And both exclusive representation and restrictions on
the use of economic action, which workplace associations often resort to
in order to voice their grievances, further hinder the growth of worker
self organization. Whereas such a constellation of rules accurately characterizes labor law in the U.S., the labor law contrasts in each respect in
Britain. And these different legal configurations can explain contrasting
patterns in labor organization between the two countries. British unions
have small bureaucracies, strong workplace associations, and enjoy a
greater measure of democracy. American unions have large bureaucracies, weak workplace associations, and suffer a democracy deficit.
The main thrust of this article has been to explain why U.S. labor
law presents affirmative obstacles to the emergence of union democracy.
However, before we embrace the normative conclusion that features of
the British collective laissez faire system ought to be adopted if union
democracy is the goal, a much fuller normative and policy discussion
ought to be considered. While such a discussion is beyond the scope of
this Article, some of the relevant points will at least be raised here.
The overriding consideration is the one that began the Article in the
Introduction: the paramount need for the labor movement to organize
new members. There is a contentious debate about whether union democracy hinders or helps unions generally and more specifically in the
case of organizing. 2 66 Certainly, the claim that union democracy is ineffective is unpersuasive, as the example of the United Healthcare Workers, as well as many others, demonstrates so powerfully. In fact, if anything, the story of the UHW suggests that union democracy and successful organizing are essential for one another. Some would also point out
that union members themselves can be an obstacle to union revitalization. But in this case, there are strong indications that such behavior is
a highly cultural and learned response to conditions of bureaucratic and

266.
Estreicher, supra note 18, at 247 (claiming that the "pursuit of union democracy is . . .
counterproductive because it . .. weakens (or complicates) [unions'] ability to wage economic struggle with employers").
267.
Voss & Sherman, supra note 9, at 320-21.
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undemocratic unions.268 How members act in an undemocratic union is a
poor guide to how they would respond in a democratic one.
The more troublesome objection is not that union democracy would
induce poor union performance, but that aspects of the British collective
laissez faire model would hinder unions in other ways. For example, the
absence of exclusive representation negatively affects not only the size of
union servicing bureaucracies in Britain but also their resources. And as
the research on union organizing we introduced earlier has also shown,
union organizing is a highly staff and resource intensive endeavor. While
it requires a reduction in the union's traditional bureaucracy, and therefore an increase in workplace association, it also requires new organizing
and research staff.26 9 Smaller bureaucracy has a salutary effect on workplace associations, but abolishing exclusive representation may do too
much, diminishing the union's resources and weakening bureaucracy
across the board, including the organizing and research departments that
might work more like complements rather than substitutes in the specific
case of union organizing.
How and whether this conundrum can be resolved is a matter that
will have to occupy further reflection and research. Can exclusive representation be amended to unburden workplace associations while preventing inter-union competition, in a way similar to that sought by the plaintiffs in Emporium Capwell? Should the logic of contractualism in the
workplace be weakened? Will this undermine the traditional servicing
bureaucracy sufficiently while avoiding the drastic effects of abolishing
exclusive representation? Whatever the conclusion, the burden of this
Article has been to demonstrate that the present configuration of labor
law is likely one that is extremely unfavorable to revitalization and transformations unions must undertake to organize on a serious scale, and that
certain changes are likely necessary if the labor movement wishes to
once again become a vibrant and important part of our economic and
political landscape.
APPENDIX
The formal analysis of union democratization is presented in two
games: the union-bureaucracy game and the union-democracy game. The
first game, the union-bureaucracy game, generates predictions of the
sizes of union bureaucracy and workplace association given an initial,
nondemocratic union. The other main goals of this game are to show the
inverse relationship between union bureaucracy and workplace association and the effect of exclusive representation on union bureaucracy.
Given the levels of union bureaucracy and workplace association determined in the union-bureaucracy game, the union-democracy game then
268.
269.

Id. at 321-23.
Id. at 313; see also Bronfenbrenner& Hickey, supra note 10, at 54.
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makes predictions about the likelihood of democracy when the union
leadership's credibility is at issue. Presenting the analysis in two games,
rather than one, effectively means workers do not take into account the
impact of workplace association in the second game, when they determine its level in the first game. This is necessary given our (more realistic) assumption that workplace association has only an unintended effect
on the likelihood of union democracy.
A. The Union-BureaucracyGame
1. Players, Actions, Order of Play, and Payoffs
Consider a game with two players, the leadership of a union, L, and
a group of workers, W, of size n, who we treat as a unitary actor. In the
first step of the game, the union leadership selects the level of monetary
contributions, or dues, that workers will contribute to the union,
d E [0,00), and the size of its bureaucracy, b C [0,ao). In the second
step, workers choose their level of association, a G [0, o), and whether
or not to accept the union's offer. If workers reject the union's offer,
leaders and workers each receive a reservation payoff normalized to 0.
Each worker receives a single, collective good, which is a function
of the levels of bureaucracy and workplace association, w(a, b). The
key assumption is that a and b are perfect substitutes. Production of the
collective good is assumed to take on the natural logarithmic form. Thus,
w(a, b) = In(a + b). Although In(O) is undefined, at least a or b or
both will be strictly positive. The assumption of diminishing returns for
the production of the collective union good seems natural, since there are
definite limits to efficiency in the size of organizations, bureaucratic or
otherwise. The union receives a dues payment from each worker. To
capture limitations on the residual claim (e.g., unions' non-profit status),
we assume that the leadership captures only a fraction of the dues revenue, aE [0,1], so the union receives and. Bureaucracy and workplace
association are costly; the cost of association is linear and is given by
aa, while the cost of bureaucracy is convex and is given by fib 2 /2.
Also assuming convex costs for workers would not change the underlying intuition of the results, but the linear cost assumption is maintained to
make those results clearer here.
2. Equilibrium
Using subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium to find the solution of this
game, we begin with the workers' problem. The workers' utility function
is given by:
V, = nln(a + b) - nd - as
Workers choose a to maximize VDV. More precisely, assuming that
their participation constraint is satisfied, workers set:
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if b < n/a
if b ; n/a

where n/a - b is obtained by differentiating the workers' objective function with respect to a and setting it equal to zero. As is clearly
seen, workers' associational effort is decreasing in its cost as well as in
the size of the union's bureaucracy.
Since the reservation payoff is zero if workers do.not accept the union's offer, workers' optimal choice of association can be substituted into
their objective function, and their participation constraint can be written
as d <; In(a* + b) - aa*/n. Since union leaders will want to set the
level of dues as high as possible, we can define a maximum level of
dues:
d - d = In(a* + b) - aa*/n (1)
Some further analysis would show that d will still be positive even
if the amount of bureaucracy is zero. This captures the idea that the leadership in a nondemocratic union is able to transfer to itself "unearned"
rents. We will see how the union members can remedy this situation in
the union-democracy game.
Having solved the workers' problem, we can now back up and address the union leadership's problem. The union maximizes:
VI, = and - flb 2 /2
with respect to d and b. Given the workers' optimal solution, and
assuming that dues are set as high as possible, the union's objective function can be rewritten as:

V = a[nn(a* + b) - aa] - flb /2
Plugging in the workers' optimal solutions yields:
2
Va[n In(n/a) - (n - ab)] - 9b /2,
L
unln(b) - flb 2 /2,
a.

if b < n/a
if b 2 n/a

Differentiating each equation with respect to b and setting each
equal to zero gives the union's optimal choice of bureaucracy:
b*1/

aa/p,
(on/l)1/2,

if b < n/a
if b 2 n/a

As is clearly seen, the optimal level of bureaucracy is increasing in
a, the share of the surplus which the union can appropriate, increasing in
a (for b < n/a), the cost of workers' association, and decreasing in .8,
the cost of bureaucracy. Finally, note also, that if workers could influ-
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ence the dues level, they would prefer that the union choose a//? (when
b < n/a).
3. Extension: Rival Unions
Now consider a version of the above game, but where there are two
union leaderships, L = t1,21. We can think of this situation as equivalent to the absence of exclusive representation and the previous problem
with one union as equivalent to the presence of exclusive representation.
Each union chooses its level of dues and bureaucratic effort and the
workplace association can allocate any proportion of workers between
the two unions or decide to reject both unions' offers. Since the workplace good is a collective one, workers receive the good regardless of
which union they join. The collective good function is given by
w(a, b., b 2) = In(a + b, + b 2 ). The union leadership receives a dues
payment from each worker who joins its union, with n, + n 2 = n.
The workers' utility function is now given by:

V=, nln(a + b, + b2 ) - n1 d - nd2 -aa
And the optimal choices of association are:

=/a

if b, + b 2 < n/a
if b, + b 2 n/a

- b - bY
0,

While the workers' optimal solution is similar to the previous game,
the problem facing the unions is much different. Since workers obtain the
collective good regardless of which union they are allocated to, they will
join a union based only on its choice of dues. At any dues level that union 1 sets lower than union 2, d, < d2, (or vice versa), the number of
workers joining union 2 is zero, n 2 = 0, and union 2's payoff becomes
-fbf/2, which is inconsistent with its participation constraint. Each
union will therefore set dues as low as possible.
How low will each union set dues? Answering this question will
also help us understand each union's choice of b. When d, = d2, the
lowest dues that will just satisfy each union's participation constraint is
such that unidi - fbf /2 = 0. Solving this for di gives a minimum
level of dues:
d= di = flb2/2an

(2)

This minimum dues level is clearly increasing in the level of bureaucracy. Therefore, even when each union's dues are equal and positive, each will have an incentive to lower bureaucratic effort by a fraction, which from the above equation will allow the union to lower its
minimum dues by a fraction. But then all workers will join that union
and the union's revenues will increase dramatically. My intuition is that
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this process will continue until both the level of effort and dues are equal
to zero. In reality we observe positive dues and effort between competing
unions, as in Britain. But this reasoning yields the correct qualitative
insight that competition between unions will both lower dues and bureaucratic effort.
B. The Union-Democracy Game
1. Players, Actions, Order of Play, and Payoffs
The union-democracy game is once again a game between two
players, the union leadership (L) and the union members (W). In the
first stage of the game, the union leadership decides whether to concede
to the installation of democracy (D) or to maintain an oligarchy (0). In
the second step, the level of union dues is set: do denotes the dues rate
set by the leadership in a nondemocratic union and dD denotes the dues
rate set in a democracy by the union members. The set of possible dues
levels is the interval [dd], where d and d are as defined in equations
(1) and (2) at the optimal level of bureaucracy, b', as determined in the
previous game. (Thus, in the union-democracy game b' becomes a parameter of the model.) If the leadership chooses D at the first stage, union members determine the level of dues, but if it chooses 0, then the
leadership determines dues. Following the dues decision, the union
members choose whether to stage a revolt. In a revolt, union members
cease paying dues. A revolt always succeeds if attempted, but a tradeoff
is faced since members depend solely on their own associational capacity, a, which is determined by members' optimal choice of effort, a*, in
the union-bureaucracy game. Without loss of generality, I assume that a*
always takes on its nonnegative value, n/a - b*, where b* is again determined by the union's optimal choice of bureaucracy in the unionbureaucracy game. Since b* can take any value in [O,00), we can capture
the full range of outcomes in the union-democracy game.
Therefore, if workers undertake a revolt, their payoffs are:
V,(R) = nin(n/a

- b*) - (n - ab*)

Since the union is deprived of revenue, the payoff to the union is
V (R) = -fl(b*) 2 /2. Without loss of generality, we say that the revolution constraint is binding if the workers obtain more in a revolt than
when the leadership chooses its ideal dues level, d. Therefore the revolu-

tion constraint is binding if VW,(R) > V

O(,d). Note that since the

union sets dues as high as possible consistent with workers' participation
constraint, then V, (O, d) = 0. The revolution constraint then simply
reduces to the condition that the collective good that workers can produce with their own effort is greater than the costs of doing so, or:
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> n - ab*

Because of the logarithmic collective-good function we have chothis constraint may or may not bind. For instance, as b -4 n/a,
and in particular as (n/a - b*) -4 1, then the condition tends toward
0 > a, which will fail to hold for any positive a. On the other hand,
when b -4 0, then the condition goes to In(n/a) > 1, which will hold
for n large enough and a small enough. In other words, the revolution
constraint is more likely to bind when both the size of union bureaucracy
and the cost of workplace association are smaller. This is one way of
seeing the crowding-out effect in operation. If workers undertake a revolt, the game ends with payoffs (Vr (R), V (R)).
sen, 270

If democracy has been created and there is no revolt, then the game
ends with dues set at the level preferred by the membership. Members
want the lowest dues possible, d, = d. Therefore, in the case of democracy, payoffs are:
V, (D) = nln(n/a) - nd - (n - ab*)

VL(D)= 0
Rather than democracy, the leadership can choose a nondemocratic
form of union governance and set the level of dues themselves. In this
case, in an attempt to stave off a revolt, the leadership will choose
dN = d, d < d < d. Following this decision, we are again at the stage
where workers choose to revolt, with payoffs the same as before if workers in fact revolt. In a nondemocracy, however, whether the dues level
that the union sets becomes the effective dues level depends on whether
the leadership can credibly commit to maintain its promised level. Therefore, if workers choose not to revolt, nature then moves and determines
p E [0,1], where, with probability p, the promise that the union gave
with respect to dues stands, but with probability 1 - p, the union reneges and resets the dues level. If the leadership's promise is credible,
then payoffs are:

270. It would possible to find collective good functions such that the revolution constraint
would bind for any positive level of association. This would not change the main results.
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O,do =d) =nln(n/a) - nd - (n - ab*)

V, (, do =d = nd -

(b*)2 /2

However, if the leadership's promises aren't credible, then after the
workers have decided not to revolt, the leadership can do no better than
to set dues at their most preferred level. When nature lets the leadership
reset the dues level, then payoffs are:
V,, (O, do = d) = n ln(n/a) - nd - (n - ab*)
v,(o, do = d)=

nd

-

#(b*) 2 /2

A game-tree depiction of the order of play and payoffs of the uniondemocracy game is found in Figure 3.
2. Equilibrium
Since workers are unsure whether the leadership is credible or not,
the expected payoff to workers not revolting in an oligarchy is
pV,, (O, do = 3) + (1 - p) V, (O, do = d), which we can also write
as V,(O,do) =nln(n/a)-n[pd+ (1-p)dJ-(n- ab*). If
such
that
level
dues
a
can
choose
the
leadership
V, (O, do = d) > V (R), then such a concession will be sufficient to
stop a revolt. This condition may or may not hold. To see this, let d = d,
which is the best concession the union can make to the workers (i.e., if
the condition fails at d, it fails at any d). Substituting payoffs into the
condition and simplifying a bit, we get:
In(n/a) - [pd + (1 - p)d]

In(n/a - b)

Recall that the left-hand side is the payoff from concessions and the
right-hand side the payoff from revolt; the only difference is that workers' costs of association, (n - ab*), on both sides cancel each other out.
Consider first the case where the leadership's promises are perfectly
credible, that is p = 1. Then the condition reduces to
In(nfa - b*). As b -4 0, then d -4 0, and the conIn(n/a) - d
In(n/a). Therefore, workers are indifferent
dition becomes In(n/a)
between concessions and revolt when the size of union bureaucracy is
zero and leadership promises are perfectly credible. However, as
(n/a - b*) -4 1, the condition becomes ln(n/a) - d = 0, and we
know that the left hand side is positive, since the concession payoff must
still satisfy workers' participation constraint, the costs of workplace association costs are absent, and d < d. In this case, it is again easy to
observe the crowding out effect. As bureaucracy increases, the payoff to
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revolt (the right-hand side) decreases: bureaucracy crowds out workplace
association and reduces the threat of revolt.
On the other hand, when the leadership's promises are imperfectly
credible, the condition for concessions may fail to hold. Consider the
case where the leadership's promises are perfectly incredible, that is,
p = 0. Then the condition becomes identical to the revolution constraint
previously examined, which we know will bind with a sufficiently small
bureaucracy. Similarly, as we let the leadership's credibility vary, concessions will not be sufficient to stop a revolution for a sufficiently
smaller bureaucracy. Note in particular that as b* -Y 0, the condition
ln(n/a), where the union's maximum
tends toward In(n/a) - d
dues is d > 0. In this case, the condition must fail to hold.
We can also use the condition for concessions to illustrate the capacity effect, which is more difficult to observe. It is easiest to see if we
rewrite the condition for concessions and hold the crowding-out effect
constant, at workers' best revolt payoff, i.e., with bureaucracy at zero.
When leaders' promises are perfectly credible and leaders make the best
is:
condition
the
concession,
possible
n In(n/a) - nd - (n - ab*) n In(n/a) - n. After some simplification and rearranging, the condition becomes ab* > nd. The term on
the left-hand side is the effect of bureaucracy on workers' costs of association while the term on the right is the minimum dues level, which is
equivalent to the costs of bureaucracy. Substituting in the values for d
(evaluated at b) and b, the condition then becomes:
as

f

ca'/2f2
u

which must always hold with inequality or at equality when the level of
bureaucracy is at zero (e.g., when the share of dues revenue the leadership takes is zero). In other words, as bureaucracy increases the reduction
in the costs of workplace association is greater than the increase in costs
of bureaucracy. Intuitively, because union bureaucracy is more efficient
than workplace association, the leadership can produce the collective
good with a decreasing cost as bureaucracy increases. The union's offer
to pass on this efficiency to workers in the form of concessions makes
those concessions more attractive and the threat of revolt less appealing.
Because we have assumed that leaders are perfectly credible, this capacity effect is by itself sufficient to thwart a revolt; however, with imperfect credibility this will not be the case in general.
Since the condition for concessions may or may not hold, we can
define a critical value of bureaucracy, b", such that workers are indifferent between revolt and concessions: VW (R, b"*) = V (odo = d).
This can be written more fully as:
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In(n/a - b*) = In(n/a) - [pd + (1 - p) ]
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(3)

If b* < b", then even at the best possible dues level, the promises
of the leadership are not sufficient to forestall a revolt; that is,

V, (R) > VW (O, do = d). In order to stop a revolt, the leadership will
therefore have to democratize. Democratization is a feasible strategy if
democracy leaves workers at least as well off as revolt. This is the case
when Vv(D)
VW (R), which is equivalent to:
In(n/a) - d

In(n/a - b)

This condition is identical to the condition where the union leadership offers workers concessions with perfectly credibility. We therefore
know that this condition will always hold.
On the other hand, when b* : b", then a revolt is sufficiently unrewarding that the leadership can prevent democratization by making
dues concessions. In this case, the leadership will set the dues level at the
amount which makes workers indifferent between revolting or not; in

this case, VW (R)= V (O, do = d).
We can now state succinctly the union-democracy game's equilibrium structure in terms of b:
1. If nln(n/a - b*) <; (n - ab*), then the revolution constraint
does not bind and the leadership can stay in power without democratizing or changing the dues level.
2.

If nln(n/a - b*) > (n - ab*), the revolution

constraint

binds. In addition, letting b* be defined as in (3), then:
a.

If b* 2 b", the leadership does not democratize and sets
the dues level to concede enough to avoid a revolt.

b. If b* < b*, dues concessions are insufficient to avoid a
revolution and the union is democratized.
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Figure 2. Effects of Legal Rules on Union Democracy
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ADDRESSING THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF MENTALLY ILL
PRISONERS: A SMALL PIECE OF THE SOLUTION TO OUR

NATION'S PRISON CRISIS
MICHAEL VITIELLOt
INTRODUCTION

After years of neglect, policymakers must confront a crisis in our
prisons created by the increasing number of mentally ill prisoners.' Mentally ill prisoners are both vulnerable and troublesome. Often out of control, they may need physical restraint, creating a risk to themselves and to
prison guards.2 Other prisoners fear and target the mentally ill, as well.
Apart from their special needs, they are an increasing segment of
the prison population. While many mentally ill individuals end up in a
nursing home or become homeless, their numbers have risen roughly in
proportion with the release of the mentally ill from mental hospitals and
the closing of those institutions.5 Many people who received some form
of mental health treatment in those settings are now in prison,6 where
they are unlikely to receive adequate mental health care.
Around the nation, states are looking for ways to reduce prison
costs.8 Various mainstream organizations have been recommending a
f
Distinguished Professor and Scholar, Pacific McGeorge School of Law; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. This paper is based on a presentation
that I delivered at the University of Wyoming College of Law. I want to extend special thanks to
Wyoming Professor Diane Courselle for inviting me to make that presentation and to my colleague
Gerald Caplan for suggesting the topic and then for many helpful conversations about the thesis and
comments on an earlier draft. I also want to thank Drs. Claude Arnett and Seymour Moscovitz for
their suggestions and insights. I also want to thank my research assistants Lauren Knapp and Brittany Griffith for their help in research and footnoting this article.
I. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *12 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
2.
William Kanapaux, Guilty of Mental Illness, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, available
at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/1 0168/47631.
Steven K. Hoge, Providing Transition and Outpatient Services to the Mentally Ill Re3.
leased from Correctional Institutions, in PUBLIC HEALTH BEHIND BARS: FROM PRISONS To
COMMUNITIES 461, 470 (Robert Greifinger ed., 2007).
4.
LANCE T. IZUMI ET AL., PACIFIC RESEARCH INST., CORRECTIONS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
AND THE MENTALLY ILL: SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT COSTS IN CALIFORNIA 3 (1996), availableat

http://www.mhac.org/pdflPacificResearchStudy.pdf
5. See James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Locking Down the Mentally Ill, THE CRIME REPORT
(Feb. 17, 2010, 10:06 PM), http://thecrimereport.org/2010/02/17/locking-down-the-mentally-ill/.
6. Te-Ping Chen, For Many With Mental Illnesses, Jail's the Only Treatment Option,
CHANGE.ORG (May 12, 2010, 9:23 AM), http://criminaljustice.change.org/blog/view/for many with
mental illnessesjails the only treatment option.
7.
SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S.
PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 110 (2003).
See Cost-Cutting States Reduce Prison Populations:Number of State Inmates Drops For
8.
First Time Since 1972, MSNBC.CoM (March 17, 2010, 12:02 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
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variety of reforms.9 In California, the prison system has been subject to
federal court litigation for over 20 years.' 0 In 2009, a panel of three federal judges found that overcrowding has created health risks-prompting
the court to order release of over 40,000 prisoners. California may represent the worst-case scenario, but it is hardly unique. As a result of this
national crisis, for the first time in decades, meaningful reform may be in
the air.
But if reform takes place, it should be done right. Part of the problem with sentencing generally-as well as the dramatic increase in mentally ill prisoners-is that public policy has been driven by anecdotes and
headline cases. As a result, legislation is driven by exaggeration rather
than by careful analysis. This is obvious in laws like Three Strikes in
California that resulted from the tragic kidnapping, rape and murder of
Polly Klaas. 12 Less obvious is how misinformation led to the increase in
mentally ill prisoners. And so this Article discusses how the movement
to release the civilly committed mentally ill has resulted in the increased
number of mentally ill prisoners. 3 The point of that inquiry is to learn
some lessons about how we made mistakes.14 Thereafter I apply those
lessons to today's discussions about reforming the prison system as it
relates to mentally ill prisoners. s
I. GOOD

INTENTIONS

Go AWRY

So how did we get to where we are today? One Flew Over the
Cuckoo's Nest should be assigned viewing for anyone attempting to get a
quick historical view about the current state of the law governing the
mentally ill. 16 In Milos Forman's film, based on Ken Kesey's novel, Jack
Nicholson plays a conman who ends up in a mental institution as a way
to avoid doing hard labor. 17 Central to the film is his battle against Nurse
35903114/ns/us news-crime and courts/39172744.
9.
See generally MICHAEL E. ALPERT, THE LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, SOLVING
CALIFORNIA'S CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS RUNNING OUT (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.

gov/studies/185/Reportl85.pdf; Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal For A Wholesale Reform Of California's Sentencing Practice And Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903 (2004); Lauren E.
Geissler, Creating and Passing a Successful Sentencing Commission in California (Jan. 27, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/scjc/
workingpapers/LGeissler 06.pdf.
10.
See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *12 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
11.
See id.at*115-16.
12.
Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" And The Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores
Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1655 (1997).
13.
See infra Part II.

14.
See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (Fantasy Films 1975); see also David Pescovitz,
Cuckoo's Nest Hospital to be Demolished, BOINGBOING (July 16, 2008, 9:32 AM),
http://boingboing.net/2008/07/16/cuckoos-nest-hospita.htmi (explaining that the author of the original story, Ken Kesey, got many of his ideas from working in a mental institution earlier in his life).
17.

ONE FLEW OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST, supra note 16.
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Ratched, the person effectively in charge of the mental institution.' 8 The
film captures several themes: it raises questions about whether those in
mental institutions in fact are insane; it suggests that the diagnosis of
insanity is in part used to suppress rebels, like Nicholson's character,
Randall McMurphy; and it shows the debilitating effects of mental health
treatments, including McMurphy's lobotomy.19
The film's view of mental illness was hardly unique to Kesey or
Forman. It reflected powerful themes that had serious backing in the psychiatric community during that era. Emerging as a serious intellectual
force in the 1960s, the "anti-psychiatry" movement challenged the most
fundamental assumptions and practices of psychiatry.2 0 Many prominent
figures led an attack on psychiatry as it was then practiced.2' Central to
their claims were a number of premises. For example, they believed that
definitions of many psychiatric disorders are vague and arbitrary, leaving
too much room for interpretation by the observer and to too many misdiagnosed patients.22 And the anti-psychiatrists could point to notorious
failures and misuses of psychiatry. The modem anti-psychiatrists argued that illnesses like schizophrenia reflected healthy attempts to cope
with a sick society. 24 In effect, the diagnosis of mental illness was society's way to control and limit dissent. 25
Another premise of the anti-psychiatry movement was that available
treatments were far more damaging than helpful.2 6 Treatment could be
brutal. Existing techniques included electric shock therapy, involuntary
18.
19.

Id.
Id.

20.
See EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO
THE AGE OF PROZAC 277 (1997).

21.
Id. at 274-276 (explaining that among the leaders in the movement were Michael Foucault, Ronald D. Laing, and Erving Goffmhan).
22.
Heap v. Roulet (In re Estate of Roulet), 590 P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 1979).
23.

See, e.g., THOMAS SZASZ, SCHIZOPHRENIA: THE SACRED SYMBOL OF PSYCHIATRY 152-

53 (1976) (citing the ability of husbands to have their wives committed for disobedience despite
their wives' sanity); SHORTER, supra note 20, at 303-04 (explaining that anti-psychiatrists could also
point to the American Psychiatric Association's inclusion of homosexuality as a form of mental
illness until the 1970's); Richard J. Bonnie & Svetlana V. Polubinskaya, Unraveling Soviet Psychiatry, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 279 (1999) (explaining the Soviet's use of mental institutions to deal with political opponents of the state); Ariela Gross, Pandora'sBox: Slave Characteron
Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 267, 293 (1995) (explaining the 18th
century diagnosis of a mental disease afflicting some slaves whose symptoms included their tendency to escape their masters).
24. SHORTER, supra note 20, at 276.
25.
Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 23, at 279 (explaining that the anti-psychiatry movement coincided with opposition to the Vietnam War and to civil rights and women's rights movements); see E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL

ILLNESS CRISIS 142 (1997) [hereinafter OUT OF THE SHADOWS] (explaining that a new generation of
lawyers emerged with an interest in civil liberties and borrowed strategies from other civil rights
litigation as well); Michael E. Staub, Madness is Civilization: Psycho Politics and Postwar America

available
at
Paper
No.
34,
2008),
4
(School
Soc.
Sci.,
Occasional
http://www.sss.ias.edu/files/papers/paper34.pdf (explaining that as a result, claims that the mentally
ill were victims of a sick society gained credibility).
26.

See SHORTER, supra note 20, at 208.
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commitment for long periods of time with few constraints, and lobotomies-often leaving the patient catatonic. 27 Combine those invasive
practices with famous cases of misdiagnosis of different kinds. In some
instances, a patient suffering from one mental illness was diagnosed with
a different illness.28 Even more frightening were cases where a perfectly
sane individual was involuntarily committed and kept committed for a
prolonged period of time.2 9
The system was certainly broken. Peaking in 1956, the population
housed in state and local public mental health hospitals was about
560,000.30 Many were warehoused in state institutions described as
"snake pits," where they were at the mercy of poorly trained staff, which
lacked adequate resources.3 1 Back when Geraldo Rivera was a serious
investigative reporter, he, among others, got the public's attention with
expos6s of the terrible conditions in mental institutions. 32
This period was the setting for a dramatic expansion of the rights of
the mentally ill and for the movement that led to deinstitutionalizing
mental health care. Change came through various legislation and many
lawsuits, several of which ended in the Supreme Court. 33 Several important principles emerged that expanded the rights of the mentally ill. 34 The
net result was that involuntary civil commitment and compelled medica-

27.
Sheldon Gelman, Looking Backward: The Twentieth Century Revolutions in Psychiatry,
Law, and Public Mental Health, 29 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 531, 531-32 (2003).
28. See Heap v. Roulet (In re Estate of Roulet), 590 P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 1979).
29.
See SZASZ, supra note 23, at 149-51.
30.

MICHAEL PUISIS, CLINICAL PRACTICE IN CORRECTIONAL MEDICINE 33 (2d ed. 2006)

(stating that by comparison, today, there are about 80,000 people committed to such institutions).
31.
Psychiatry: Out of the Snake Pits, TIME, Apr. 05, 1963, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,830082-1,00.html.
32..

See WILLOWBROOK: THE LAST DISGRACE (ABC 1972).

33.
See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
34. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785-86 (1971). For example, mentally ill patients who are involuntarily committed have due process interests in conditions of reasonable care
and safety and reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions. They have the right to a range of
services, including the right to treatment in a community setting. O'Connor,422 U.S. at 574-76.
Further, the Court has found that it is unconstitutional to detain someone involuntarily if that person
is not a danger to himself or to others. Thus, a finding of mental illness, without more, does not
justify continued confinement even if appropriate treatment is available. Id. at 575. Both lower
federal courts and the Supreme Court have limited the state's ability to administer psychotropic
medication in any setting. Involuntarily committed mental patients have a right to make their own
treatment decisions and may not be forcibly medicated (subject to limited circumstances, notably
emergencies and periods of incompetence). See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).
An institution's decision to medicate is not justified solely on a finding that the patient is incompetent. The decision to medicate requires additional litigation and a specific finding that the patient is
incompetent to make that decision for herself. Id. at 228. In the more recent past, some states have
cut back on the rights of the mentally ill, often in reaction to a violent crime committed by a mentally ill individual. For example, New York enacted "Kendra's Law," N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
9.60 (McKinney 2010), after a schizophrenic man pushed a young woman onto subway tracks,
leading to her death. PATRICIA E. ERICKSON & STEVEN K. ERICKSON, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND
MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES IN CONFLICT 23-25, 45-46 (2008).
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tion became far more difficult.35 Many of the same protections apply to
mentally ill prisoners as well.36
Not only have the mentally ill gained legal protection, but at the
same time, we experienced a movement away from publicly funded state
mental institutions.37 That change was not inevitable, but flowed from
the horrible exposure of conditions in those institutions. Even those revelations may not have resulted in the closing of many of those institutions.
After all, revelations about horrible prison conditions did not lead to
closing those facilities.38 But as indicated earlier, inspired in part by the
anti-psychiatry movement, numerous reformers believed, in effect, that
many mentally ill individuals were rebels against an oppressive society
and that the state used mental institutions to suppress dissent. 39
And not all of those interested in closing mental institutions were
disability rights activists. In California, in the late 1960s, then-Governor
Ronald Reagan signed legislation that paralleled developments elsewhere, and made involuntary commitment extremely difficult.40 Mentally
disabled rights activists called the California legislation "the Magna
Carta of the mentally ill" and saw it as a step towards an eventual goal of
eliminating involuntary commitment altogether. 4 1As a result of the deinstitutionalization movement, mentally ill patients who were released
from mental health facilities were sent back into their communities.42
35.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 2010). For example, under California's law,
commitment was no longer justified simply based on a showing of the need for treatment but instead
required a showing that the person was a danger to himself or to others. Id.
36. In 1990, the Supreme Court held that correction officials can administer such medication
in compelling circumstances but cannot do so arbitrarily. Washington, 494 U.S. at 221. Thus, the
state must show that the prisoner is gravely disabled or is a danger to himself or others. Under the
Court's case law, an inmate has a right to refuse psychotropic medication under most circumstances.
The net result of these various cases is a set of important procedural rights that make involuntary
commitment and treatment difficult to compel.
37. Alfred Auerback, The Short-Doyle Act: California Community Mental Health Services
Program: Background and Status After One Year, CAL. MED., May 1959, at 335, available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMCl577700/pdf/califmed001 13-0095.pdf.
38.
See Margaret Winter & Stephen F. Hanlon, Parchman Farm Blues: Pushingfor Prison
Reforms at MississippiState Penitentiary,35 LITIG. 1, 1-8 (2008), availableat http://www.aclu.org/
images/asset upload file829 41138.pdf (explaining that instead, for example, in prison litigation in
the south, court supervision led to markedly improved conditions in notorious prisons like Parchman
and Angola prisons in Mississippi and Louisiana).
39. Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 23, at 279.
40. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5150 (West 2010).
E. Fuller Torrey & Kenneth Kress, The New Neurobiology of Severe Psychiatric Disor41.
ders and Its Implicationsfor Laws Governing Involuntary Commitment and Treatment 51 (Bepress
Legal Series Working Paper No. 423, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.comlexpresso/eps/423;
see also OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supranote 25, at 143-144. As with many political coalitions, not all
of those who supported making civil commitment more difficult did so out of concern for the mentally ill. Some proponents of the legislation saw it as a way to reduce costs to the state.
42. See Antonia Moras, Human Rights Watch: The Mentally Ill in US. Prisons, ALASKA
JUST. F., Spring 2004, at 2, 2, availableat http://justice.uaa.alaska.edulforumi/21/1spring2004/
bI _mentallyill.html. As observed by one author:
State incentives for cost-shifting to the federal government reside almost exclusively in
the discharge of patients from state hospitals, who then become eligible for SSI, Medicaid, food stamps, and other federal benefits. States gain nothing by ensuring that patients
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The promise at the time was that community-based care would allow the
mentally ill greater freedom without abandoning them to their own devices.43
So what went wrong? Closing institutions seemed humane and
community-based care seemed like a sound way to treat the mentally ill.
Adequately funded community based programs have worked: many patients see a dramatic improvement in their quality of life; many are able
to hold steady employment and find housing.4 However, in most places
the development of the community-based programs lagged far behind the
demand created by the release of the mentally ill. 45 The lack of adequate
resources for community-based care has only grown worse over timeespecially since states have confronted serious budget crises brought on
by the recession.46 As described below, these reforms, even with the best
intentions, have come at a high cost to many mentally ill persons.
II. THE REVOLVING DOOR
Today, most state mental hospitals have closed or dramatically reduced available beds.47 But what happens to the mentally ill? Since the
elimination of most beds in state-run facilities, and the cutting of community health care resources offers a dramatic contrast to the world envisioned by the anti-psychiatrists and mental health care advocates, the
result of many of the reformists' efforts have come at a cost to the mentally ill.
receive follow-up care following their hospitalization because readmission of the patients
can be deflected to the psychiatric wards of general hospitals, where federal Medicaid
will cover much of the costs.
OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 102. Thus, the way in which federal funds are made avail-

able to the states provides states an incentive to discharge patients whether or not they are able to
function on their own and to do so without regard to available aftercare.
43.

See PHIL BROWN, THE TRANSFER OF CARE: PSYCHIATRIC DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND

ITS AFTERMATH 67 (1985).
44.
See, e.g., Direct

Access

to

Housing,

CORP.

FOR

SUPPORTIVE

HOUSING,

http://www.csh.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageld=501 (last updated Aug. 2005).
45. H. Richard Lamb & Leona L. Bachrach, Some Perspectives on Deinstitutionalization,52
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1039, 1044 (2001), availableat http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/

cgi/reprint/52/8/1039. Some of the additional freedoms that the mentally ill gained have exacerbated
the problem. Many mentally ill persons refuse medication that might otherwise enable them to live
more stable lives and to stay out of trouble with the law. Id. at 1041.
See Rusty Selix, State Budget Memorandum, CAL. COUNCIL COMMUNITY MENTAL
46.
HEALTH AGENCIES (Jan. 10, 2008), http://www.cccmha.org/public policy/state budget.html; see
also CAL. COUNCIL CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH AGENCIES, PRESERVE AB 2034 FUNDING: A MODEL
PROGRAM THAT WORKS AND HAS CHANGED LIVES (2008), available at http://www.cccmba.org/

documents/AB2034FACTSHEET--ProgramthatWorks.pdf For a period of time, legislation made
available federal matching grants for community health programs, including mental health care.
California initially followed suit, but in the 1990's, it shifted the burden of responsibility for funding
to local governments. For a time, it had in place pilot programs that were highly successful in reducing incarceration and homelessness among the mentally ill. But those programs were eliminated
when budget cuts were made in 2007.
47. Hitesh C. Sheth, Deinstitutionalization or Disowning Responsibility, 13 INT'L J.
PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION, no. 2, 2009 at I1, available at http://www.psychosocial.com/
IJPR 13/Deinstitutionalization Sheth.htmi.
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The effect has been a change of venue for the mentally ill from
mental hospitals to prisons, not just to nursing homes or the streets.
While there are few data on incarcerations of mentally ill people prior to
the deinstitutionalization movement, 48 evidence suggests that, since deinstitutionalization, the rate of incarceration of mentally ill people has increased significantly. 49 While estimates vary, studies are consistent that
large numbers of those admitted to prison are mentally ill.50 When states
closed or reduced the population of mental health facilities, the prison
system took in those mentally ill patients who required twenty-four hour
supervision.5 1 Due to the lack of community programs and adequate and
affordable housing for the mentally ill patients who were released from
the institutions, many of those released wound up homeless.5 2 Because of
a general public fear of those with mental illness, law enforcement was
pressured into arresting and incarcerating the homeless mentally ill for
petty crimes, such as public intoxication.53 Further, illegal drug use
among mentally ill people is common.54 Mentally ill individuals often
self medicate." As a result, many of the mentally ill people living in a
community-who would have once been institutionalized-are arrested
for behavior that they engage in as a result of their illness. 56
Further, unable to get adequate resources for mental health care
treatment in state run institutions or community health care facilities,
mentally ill individuals in prison have their symptoms exacerbated by
being put in jail or prison, causing them to act out. 57 Prisons are seldom
58
good places to receive mental health care treatment.
Mentally ill inmates who are released have a difficult time getting
into community mental health programs and public housing because of
their criminal records.59 Thus, for those who are released from prison, it
becomes a vicious cycle of homelessness, to imprisonment, and back to
homelessness. Without adequate treatment to allow the mentally ill to
adapt to living in the community, many end up back in prison.so

48. Lamb & Bachrach, supra note 45, at 1042.
49. Id.
50. Human Rights at Home: Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons and Jails, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Ill Cong. (2009)
(statement of Gary Maynard, Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services).
Lamb & Bachrach, supra note 45, at 1042.
S.
Id. at 1040.
52.
See id. at 1042.
53.
54.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
55.
56. See id. at 1042.
57.

Allan Schwartz, Imprisoningthe Mentally Ill, MENTALHELP.NET, http://www.mentalhelp.

net/poc/view doc.php?type=doc&id=14284 (last updated Jan. 14, 2008).
See Kanapaux, supra note 2.
58.
59. Id.
60.

See id.; see also OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 108.
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III. LESSONS LEARNED?

California may be forced to reduce its overcrowded prison population. Reform may be possible for the first time in years because a threejudge panel has ordered California to reduce its prison population by
about 40,000 inmates. 6' That may force California to come to terms with
its bloated prison system.62
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the order of the
three-judge panel.63 As is typical of this closely divided Court, predicting
how it will resolve the dispute is a crapshoot. But we may be in familiar
territory. As Adam Liptak wrote, the Constitution means what Justice
Kennedy says it means. 64 Despite strong conservative leanings, Justice
Kennedy may vote to uphold the order. For example, even after voting to
uphold two sentences under California's Three Strikes law, 65 Justice
Kennedy has been a vocal critic of mandatory minimum sentencing and
the overuse of prisons.66 He also authored a number of majority opinions
striking down the death penalty 67 and, more recently, an opinion striking
down true life sentences for offenders who were juveniles when they
committed offenses other than homicide.68 As a result, the conservative
wing of the Court cannot count on his vote on criminal justice issues.
If the Supreme Court upholds the federal district court order, reform
will have to take place, and California will need to find less expensive
ways to handle prisoners generally and the mentally ill specifically.
So what lessons should policy-makers take from history? The reforms of the past several decades were suitable if the then-popular assumptions were true. As discussed above, those assumptions included the
61.
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *115-16 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
62. See id. The state has taken an aggressive litigation posture. It attempted to have the prisoner receiver removed, but was rebuffed by the Ninth Circuit. Julie Small, Court Upholds Federal
Oversight of California's Prison Medical Care, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/04/30/receiver-stands/. The state has also petitioned, now twice, to
have the three judge panel's order overtumed. Schwarzenegger v. Plata 130 S. Ct. 1140, 1140
(2010). If the Court finds that the three judge panel exceeded its authority, reform may be dead. The
litigation may be the state's last-best hope for meaningful reform of its prison system. The legislature's response to prison overcrowding and massive spending on its prison system has been discouraging. For example, the senate passed a bill that included a sentencing commission, but the Democratic-controlled assembly refused to go along. Jack Chang, Sentencing Panel Sets Off Alarms,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 20, 2009, at IA, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2009/08/20/2124062/
sentencing-panel-sets-off-alarms.html.
63. Schwarzenegger v. Plata, 130 S. Ct. 3413, 3413 (2010).
64. Adam Liptak, Anthony M Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/people/k/anthonymkennedyindex.html (last updated July 1, 2009).
65.
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. IH, 14, 30-31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66,
77 (2003).
66. Pete Williams, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy: End Minimum Sentences, THE NOVEMBER
COALITION (Aug. 9, 2003), http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking/Kennedy.html.
67. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005).
68.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
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belief that diagnoses were routinely wrong, 69 that the mentally ill were
capable of easy integration into the community,o and that psychotropic
drugs and other treatments were dehumanizing, 7' and that institutions
were so bad that they had to be abandoned.7 2
And all of those assumptions were true, but only to a point. Those
who work with the mentally ill and the families of the mentally ill will
tell you that the diseases are real and that adequate care can improve the
quality of their lives.73 And ask any family member of a mentally ill person whether today's system works well-many would describe their
frustration in getting access to basic mental health care services.74 Further, policymakers were unable to work through the unintended consequences of their decisions. That is, they did not recognize that they were
basing policy on an incomplete view of the mentally ill and made overly
optimistic assumptions about the ability for the mentally ill to live on
their own without state supervision. They did not recognize the revolving
75
door from homelessness to jail and prison to homelessness and back.
Reformers should focus on these lessons of experience. As developed below, we have learned a great deal about mental illness and the
needs of the mentally ill. 7 6 Applying current data should allow a more
realistic approach to caring for the mentally ill.
IV. THE SHAPE OF REFORM
As indicated above, California may be forced to affect a reform of
its prison system. 77 Part of that reform should focus on the special problems of mentally ill prisoners. Because of California's budget crisis,78
anyone who comes forward with a proposal for reform must demonstrate
that it will save the system money. Even given that constraint, this section argues that meaningful reform is possible.
As currently delivered, mental health care for prisoners is expensive
and ineffective. 79 Treating the mentally ill in a variety of settings, like
69.

Heap v. Roulet (In re Estate of Roulet), 590 P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 1979).

70.

See BROWN, supra note 43, at 67.

See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
71.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
72.
Mental Illnesses, NAT'L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nami.org/Content/
73.
(last visited
NavigationMenu/InformYourselflAboutMentalIllness/AboutMentalIllness.htm
Dec. 29, 2010).
See MARY BETH PFEIFFER, CRAZY IN AMERICA: THE HIDDEN TRAGEDY OF OUR
74.
CRIMINALIZED MENTALLY ILL 159-160 (2007).
75.
1 assume that they did not recognize those consequences because who would have chosen
today's response to the mentally ill had they been able to foresee where we have ended up?
76.
See infra Part VI.

77.

Aaron Rappaport & Kara Dansky, State of Emergency: California'sCorrectionalCrisis,

22 FED. SENT'G REP., no. 3, 2010, at 133.
78.
Dan Walters, Overview of California'sBudget Crisis, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 21, 2009,
12:50 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/2009/07/21/2044072/overview-of-califomias-budget.html.
79.
RISDON N. SLATE & W. WESLEY JOHNSON, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY
ILL: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 289-296 (2008).
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community-based facilities, is far less expensive than is warehousing
them in prison and even less expensive than maintaining them in prison
with adequate mental health care services.8 0 Thus, using alternative settings for the mentally ill may be an effective alternative to incarceration.
If state officials adopt reforms that would enable a shift of mentally
ill prisoners from prisons to community care facilities, they must do so in
ways that protect the public. Here, they must fully appreciate the lessons
from the past. As discussed above, policy makers and the public in the
1960s and beyond had a naifve view of mental illness.81 They bought into
stereotypes about the ability of the mentally ill to live independent lives.
When many mentally ill failed to conform to reformers' hopes, we experienced a backlash that has resulted in the current situation where a person is more likely to receive mental health care in prison than in the
community. 82 In effect, society replaced one stereotype of the mentally
ill with other stereotypes. Thus, today many members of the public view
8
the mentally ill as incapable of cure 83 or as malingerers,84
individuals in
need of punishment.
Any change in policy towards the mentally ill must be grounded in
reality, rather than stereotypes. While providing care for the mentally ill
in community-based treatment facilities can save the state money, not all
mentally ill prisoners are capable of being reintegrated into society.85
To this point, I have spoken of mentally ill prisoners without making an essential distinction between two distinct kinds of mentally ill
prisoners. Many criminals suffer from an assortment of mental illnesses,
but would continue to violate the law even if they received adequate
treatment. Indeed, one suspects that treatment might make them more
capable of carrying out criminal acts. By comparison, our prisons now
house many prisoners whose mental illness has led to their criminal conduct.87
80. Mental Health Servs, Oversight & Accountability Comm'n, Commission Meeting Minutes, CA.GOv, 9 (June 26, 2008), http://www.mhsoac.ca.gov/Meetings/docs/Meetings/2008/Jul/
MHSOAC June08MeetingMinutes_2.pdf.
81.
ERICKSON & ERICKSON, supra note 34, at 25.
John Gunn, Future Directions for Treatment in Forensic Psychiatry, 176 BRIT. J. PSY82.
CHIATRY 332, 333 (2000).

83.
Rohan Ganguli, Menial Illness and Misconceptions, POST-GAZETTE.COM (Mar. 18, 2000),
http://www.post-gazette.com/forum/20000318gangl.asp.
84.

SLATE & JOHNSON, supranote 79, at 290.

85. Human Rights at Home: Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons and Jails, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Ill Cong. (2009)
(statement of Harley G. Lappin, Dir. of Fed. Bureau of Prisons).
86. Historically, mental health experts considered sociopaths and psychopaths as difficult, if
not impossible to treat. CHARLES H. KNICKERBOCKER, HIDE-AND-SEEK: THE EFFECT OF MIND,
BODY, AND EMOTION ON PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR IN OURSELVES AND OTHERS 90 (1967).

Today, some researchers contend that even those mental illnesses are treatable. Randall Parker,
Psychopathic Brain Driven to Seek Rewards, FUTUREPUNDIT (March 14, 2010, 11:14 AM)
http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/007018.html.
87.

OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 39-40.
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Many mentally ill individuals enter the criminal justice system because of drug abuse, often their way of self-medicating.88 They may
commit petty property crimes to feed themselves or to get money to buy
drugs.89 When delusional or disoriented, they may act in ways that
frighten members of the public. 90 The literature is full of accounts of
mentally ill individuals who end up in conflict with law enforcement
agents. 9 1 Those confrontations may result from the person urinating in
public or engaging in other antisocial conduct. 9 2 Otherwise non-violent,
the mentally ill individual may resist arrest or otherwise challenge the
police officer's authority.9 3 Assaulting an officer may result in serious
felony charges. 94
In addition, these offenders are less able to deal with prison. Prisons
require rigid rules and adherence to those rules. They are more likely
than other offenders to be written up for violations of prison rules.9 But
disoriented mentally ill inmates cannot understand the rules leading to
what guards see as defiance and sometimes leading to guards using
physical force against them. They often end up in solitary confinement,
making their illness worse. 9 8 As a result of their disruptive behavior, they
tend to serve longer prison sentences than other offenders.9 9 They may
also be victimized by fellow inmates. 00 Suicide rates for mentally ill
prisoners are high.o10 As quoted by one author, "the bad and the mad just
don't mix." 1 02
Reform efforts should focus on this group of mentally ill prisoners.
As a matter of decency, the state should not subject them to the brutal
conditions of prison, so ill-suited to their needs. Placing them in community-based care facilities would serve their needs far better than they are
served in prison and the state would save money by doing so.
Such a proposal, however, begs other questions. First, one might
appropriately ask about high rates of recidivism among mentally illo 3

88.

Id. at 35

89.
MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS IN CALIFORNIA'S
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (1999).
See OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 38.
90.

91.

SLATE & JOHNSON, supra note 79, at 83, 109-177.

92.
93.
94.
95.

OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 37-38.
See PFEIFFER, supra note 74, at 120-121.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §243(c)(2) (West 2010).
SLATE & JOHNSON, supra note 79, at 60.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 60-61.
OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 31.
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and why we should risk continued criminality among this group of offenders.
Here, a close look at how this group of individuals ends up in a cycle of release from prison back to the streets and back to prison helps to
explain how adequate follow-up care can reduce recidivism. Unlike the
overly optimistic view of the mentally ill that led to deinstitutionalization, 04 many mentally ill persons cannot function adequately merely left to their own devices. Currently, many mentally ill
prisoners are stabilized on medication before their release from prison. os
At discharge, they are given a small supply of medication and told to
follow up with public health officials to receive more. o0That may be the
extent of follow-up that they receive upon release.
Even if they find some kind of housing, many recently released
prisoners run out of medication and are too disorganized to continue
treatment o0or choose to go off medication. os As a result, they may be
evicted from their housing or otherwise choose to go back on the
street.109 Once homeless, they often find themselves in conflict with law
enforcement again and back into the criminal justice system." 0
At least for individuals who are going to be placed on parole, one
obvious solution is to make continued compliance with a regimen of
therapy and medication a condition of release."' Further, the state needs
to stop releasing the mentally ill back into the community without resources. Instead, it needs to expand various housing options for the mentally ill where their compliance with terms of release can be enforced."12
For individuals not yet in prison, similar rules should be put in place that
would allow alternative disposition of charges against the mentally ill.'
That is, the state should expand the options open to sentencing judges to
place the mentally ill in appropriate facilities where they can be monitored, but where they are not subject to the dehumanizing conditions that
they would otherwise face in prison."14
Some advocates for the mentally ill might object to restrictive terms
of release.' 1 But given the current state of the law, the options are lim104.

ERICKSON & ERICKSON, supranote 34, at 25.

105.
THE RELEASED (PBS Home Video 2009).
106.
Id.
107.
Id
See PFEIFFER, supra note 74, at 25.
108.
109.
THE RELEASED, supra note 105.
110.
Id.
Ill.
OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 160-61. Studies demonstrate that conditional
release increases individuals' compliance with treatment plans, including continued use of medication, and reduces their violent behavior. See id.
SLATE & JOHNSON, supra note 79, at 183-97.
112.
113.
Id at 131-34, 156. Some jurisdictions already have in place mental health courts. Studies
suggest that these courts have better outcomes than would occur otherwise.
114.
PARRY, supra note 100, at 191-92.
115. OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 162.
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ited: untreated, the individual is likely to end up in prison again. That
option is far less desirable than imposing lesser limitations on the individual's autonomy.

My proposal begs two additional closely related questions. Does
such a proposal adequately protect the public? And can we really distinguish between the bad and the mad or those who are mentally ill who
would continue to commit dangerous criminal act and those whose untreated mental illness is responsible for their criminal conduct?
A great deal is at stake. As I developed above, misperceptions about
the mentally ill led to the current state of affairs, with large numbers of
mentally ill persons in prison.' 16 If policymakers fail to learn the lessons
from our earlier experience with deinstitutionalization, we will simply
end up with the inhumane and costly alternative of dealing with the mentally ill in our prisons. Releasing dangerous mentally ill persons into the
community who commit violent crimes will quickly undo any reform
efforts.l 17
In partial answer to the first question, the mentally ill are not typically violent, despite sensationalized reports in the media.'18 And that is
especially true if the individual receives adequate follow-up care.l19
The related question is whether we are able to distinguish between
those who get involved in the criminal justice system as a result of inadequately treated mental illness and those who are likely to continue to
pose a risk of harm even if treated. Or, as argued by the antipsychiatrists, is the state of the art inadequate to make accurate diagnoses
of mental illness?
A great deal has changed over recent decades. At a minimum, data
collection is more sophisticated than in the past. In the area of criminal
sentencing, for example, advocates of evidence-based sentencing have
demonstrated that predictions about future criminal conduct are increasingly reliable.' 20 Researchers have developed testing instruments that
measure traits like the inability to feel remorse and the individual's level
of impulsivity.121 Researchers have also been able to determine factors
Gunn, supra note 82, at 333.
116.
117. Sacramento Early Release Inmate Kevin Peterson Arrested for Attempted Rape: Said
Release
Wasn't
A
"Bad
Deal",
NEWS
10
(Feb.
3,
2010),
http://www.newsl0.net/newslocal/story.aspx?storyid=74615.
118.
PARRY, supra note 100, at 23-24.
Liesel J. Danjczek, The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act and Its
119.
InappropriateNon-violent Offender Limitation, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 103
(2007).
ROGER K. WARREN, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE TO
120.
REDUCE RECIDIVISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE JUDICIARIES 2 (2007); Richard E. Redding, Evi-

dence Based Sentencing: The Science ofSentencing Policy and Practice, 1 CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST.
1, 5-6 (2009).
See generally Kent A. Kiehl et al., An Event Related Potential Investigation of Response
121.
Inhibition in Schizophrenia and Psychopathy,48 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 210 (2000).
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that predict violent behavior among the mentally ill.1 22 Further, studies of
the brain through various kinds of measurements have generated knowledge that we have lacked in the past. For example, using an MRI allows
measurement of changes in the structure and function of the brains of the
mentally ill, allowing a health care professional to determine objectively
that the person is suffering from mental illness.12 3
Not only has our ability to diagnosis mental illness improved, but
treatment has improved as well. Lobotomies and electric shock treatments as administered up until the 1970s are no longer routine.124 The
availability of Thorazine in the 1950s aided the movement to deinstitutionalize the mentally ill,125 but proved less effective than hoped
for the mentally ill because of its debilitating effects.126 While some individuals experience side effects from psychotropic drugs,12 7 they may be
reduced by adjusting the dosage 28 or by finding an alternative medication.129 Further, newer medications may be more acceptable because of
different side effects.1 30
It would also be a mistake to think that medication alone is the answer to the problem posed by mentally ill prisoners. Some studies raise
questions about the effectiveness of many medications that have been
touted by psychiatrists and the pharmaceutical companies as miracle
cures.' 3' Many mental health care professionals recognize that the best
outcomes require treatment in combination with medication.' 32 Availability to adequate therapy, as envisioned when our society began closing
state hospitals, remains an essential component to any meaningful reform.

122. OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 53 (stating that "overwhelming evidence" demonstrates that "a small subgroup of the mentally ill have a propensity toward violence," and also that
"a persons' past history of violence, concurrent abuse of drugs and alcohol, and failure to take
medications are risk factors for violent behavior").
123.
Id. at 4.
M. PADOLINA & C. SANCHEZ, COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORIES,
124.
TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 197 (1997); LINDA GASK, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHIA-

TRY 18 (2004). Since almost disappearing as a method of treatment, electric shock therapy
reemerged in the 1990's. In 1999, the Surgeon General endorsed it. About one-hundred thousand
patients a year receive electric shock therapy in the United States. As one author states, "the treatment has been refined and made gentler by lowering the amount of electricity delivered and changing where the scalp the leads are placed." DANEIL J. CARLAT, UNHINGED 167 (2010).
OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 8.
125.
126.

ROBERT WHITAKER, MAD IN AMERICA 147-159 (2010).

SLATE & JOHNSON, supra note 79, at 58 (noting that side effects include, "dry mouth,
127.
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Dystonia, Parkinsonianism, Tardive Dyskinesia, and Arganulocytosis").
128.

NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH MEDICATIONS 12 (2010).

129.
130.
131.

Id.
See OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 5-6.
For a particularly disturbing view of America's belief in the silver bullet theory of such
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Thus, as part of a larger reform of California's prison system, addressing the special problems of the mentally ill may be a way to save
the state money and improve the quality of the lives of many individuals
who would otherwise do hard time in prison.
CONCLUSION

At the outset, I argued that the deinstitutionalization movement began with some truths, like the dehumanizing conditions in state institutions and inaccurate diagnoses, but that reforms were based on exaggerations of those truths.133 As a result, the cure created a new set of problems that now confront policymakers.' 3 4 Today's policymakers should
avoid the same kind of naivet6 that led to the current dilemma.
As a result, I must underscore that releasing or diverting some mentally ill individuals from prison is only one measure to address prison
over-crowding and to reduce expenditures. All mentally ill prisoners are
not suitable candidates for conditional release.' 3 5 Not all mentally ill individuals respond to treatment; and some may pose a risk of violence that
justifies their continued incarceration.136 Releasing mentally ill prisoners
who make headlines by committing violent acts will undo any reform
that may be in place. 37
Despite that, meaningful, if incremental, reform is possible. It requires careful risk assessment of whether a prisoner can be successfully
integrated into the community, 33 and devotion of resources for follow-up
care, including finding or creating housing, and for assuring that they
comply with a regimen of treatment.139 Critics of compelled treatment
should recognize that the alternative currently is incarceration, a cruel
option for a person who may have difficulty making an informed choice
for herself. Critics of prison reform must recognize that years of gettough-on-crime has bloated our prisons beyond our ability to afford them
and that when applied to the mentally ill, those sentences are particularly
cruel and often unnecessary.

133.
See supra Part 11.
See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820, at *12 (E.D.
134.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
135. Kobley, supra note 117.
See supranotes 85-86.
136.
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OUT OF THE SHADOWS, supra note 25, at 54-56.

138.

See supra notes 120-23.

139.
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THE OVERLOOKED UTILITY OF THE DEFENDANT CLASS
ACTION
FRANCIS X. SHENt
When and how can defendant class actions serve the goal of increasing social welfare? Existing literature on class actions has overlooked the utility of defendant class actions, and thus, has failed to answer this question. This Article presents a general theory of defendant
class actions, and argues that three interrelatedprinciples should guide
the use and evaluation of defendant class actions. (1) Forwardlooking
deterrence principle. The forward looking deterrence principle holds
that the utility of defendant class actions should be measured by its contribution to future deterrence of harms by the proposed defendant class.
(2) Dynamic effects principle. The dynamic effects principle holds that
evaluation of a defendant class action should include all secondary effects such as feedbacks, price adjustments, new incentive structures,and
changing group dynamics. (3) Aggregate analysis principle. Taking the
dynamic effects principleone step further, the aggregate analysis principle holds that the evaluation of defendant class actions should ultimately
rest on an aggregate,society-wide cost-benefit analysis.In developing its
general theory, and synthesizing these three principles, this Article utilizes a newly constructed database of 177 cases considering defendant
class action certification. This Article also spends significant time analyzing deficiencies in Hamdani and Klement's 2005 proposal for "the
class defense. " Three potential applicationsfor defendant classes are
considered at various points in the paper: (1) illegalfile sharing on the
Internet, (2) corporatefraud and illegal dealing, and (3) copyright infringement. In each context, this Article argues that existing literature
andjurisprudencegenerally take a backwards looking approach, do not
properly account for dynamic effects, and too often ignore aggregate
analyses.
INTRODUCTION

You know what a class action lawsuit is. But what do you remember about defendant class actions from your civil procedure or torts
class? The answer, most likely, is nothing. That is because defendant
t
I owe a special debt of gratitude to David Rosenberg, who provided advice, critique, and
feedback on this Article. Jack Goldsmith, Jed Sugarman, and fellow participants in the Harvard Law
School Summer Academic Fellows program also provided very useful feedback. Sophia Beal provided her constant support and excellent editing skills. I note that my work is done A.M.D.G.
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class actions are typically overlooked in both law school classes and legal scholarship.' This Article argues that upon closer examination the
defendant class action can-in certain situations that may present themselves more frequently in coming years-serve the goal of maximizing
social welfare.
To date, academic analysis of class action litigation has focused almost exclusively on plaintiff class actions.2 Although there have been a
handful of articles and notes concerned with the defendant class, they do
not provide us with a comprehensive theory with which to understand
and evaluate defendant class actions. 3 Recent proposals for expanding
I. See infra Figure 1.
See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
2.
REV. 913, 914 n.2 (1998) ("A full bibliography of those publications devoted in whole or substantial
part to the use of class actions in litigation would warrant a sizable appendix. But a listing of books
and articles I have found helpful-some of which are long and detailed, while others, though short,
are incisive and provocative-may serve a dual purpose: to provide a brief, accessible bibliography
for those interested in further research and to furnish a single, easily consulted source of crossreference for later citations in this essay.").
3. See generally Theodore W. Anderson & Harry J. Roper, Limiting Relitigation by Defendant Class Actions from Defendant's Viewpoint, 4 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 200 (1971)
(discussing the differences between plaintiff and defendant class actions under the then recently
adopted Rule 23); Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: TransnationalClass Actions
and Personal Jurisdiction,72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 42-44 (2003) (discussing "the impact of the
participation of other countries' citizens in U.S.-based class action litigation," specifically in regard
to the issue of personal jurisdiction); Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members ofa
Defendant Class: A ProposedRevision of Rule 23, 1990 BYU L. REV. 909, 909-12 (1990) (discussing due process and general fairness concerns when Rule 32 is applied to defendant class actions);
Vince Morabito, Defendant Class Actions and the Right to Opt Out: Lessons for Canadafrom the
United States, 14 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 197, 197-202 (2004) ("[Olpt out regimes should not be
employed in defendant class proceedings as they create serious obstacles to the fulfillment of the
policy objectives of the class action device . . . and are not necessary to ensure that members of
defendant classes are treated fairly."); A. Peter Parsons & Kenneth W. Starr, Environmental Litigation and Defendant Class Actions: The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 881, 90814 (1975) (arguing that the defendant class action can be used as "a constitutionally sound and
highly practical vehicle for environmental litigation" in certain situations); Samuel M. Shafner, The
Juridical Links Exception to the Typicality Requirement in Multiple Defendant Class Actions: The
Relationship Between Standing and Typicality, 58 B.U. L. REV. 492, 492-93 (1978) (discussing how
the standing doctrine and typicality requirement apply to class actions involving multiple defendants,
specifically regarding the potential problems arising from the juridical links exception to typicality);
Robert R. Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant Class Actions, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1319, 1319
(2000) (exploring "the sparse law governing defendant class action lawsuits and its potential applicability to the recent wave of litigation against the firearms industry"); Barry M. Wolfson, Defendant
Class Actions, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 459-61 (1977) (presenting defendant class action as a legitimate, useful and under-utilized, tool in litigating certain issues); Angelo N. Ancheta, Comment,
Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 283-89 (1985)
(arguing that "the defendant class action is a powerful, albeit uncommon, procedure for vindicating
constitutional and statutory civil rights"); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630,
632-33 (1978) [hereinafter The HarvardNote] (presenting an overview of defendant class actions
and discussing the potential due process and general fairness issues presented by this litigation
device); Irving A. Gordon, Comment, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules
and in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REV. 518, 528 (1948) ("[T]he defendant class suit presents both motive
and opportunity for improper practice."); Debra J. Gross, Comment, Mandatory Notice and Defendant Class Actions: Resolving the Paradox of Identity Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40 EMORY
L.J. 611, 611-13 (1991) (proposing a revision to Rule 23 which would mandate notice to all defendants in defendant class action suits); -Robert E. Holo, Comment, Defendant Class Actions: The
Failure of Rule 23 and a ProposedSolution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 223, 266-68 (1990) (arguing that
Rule 23 ought not to govern defendant class actions and proposing the adoption of a new rule spe-
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the use of defendant class action devices have focused primarily on issues arising out of internet and mass communication markets, without
considering a more general application.4 For example, these recent proposals have almost entirely missed the possibility of defendant class actions as a tool for improving responsible corporate decision-making.
In the standard treatment of class actions, commentators typically
set aside analysis of defendant class actions altogether with an explanation such as, "today defendant class actions are rare and pose special
problems of representation and due process that are beyond the scope of
this paper." 5 The standard approach is correct in observing that defendant
class actions are certainly more rare and, at present, more legally suspect
in the eyes of courts than plaintiff class actions. But by stopping there,
cifically designed for this type of suit); Leighton Lee III, Comment, FederalRule of Civil Procedure
23: Class Actions in Patent InfringementLitigation, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 50, 59-60 (1973) (noting
the problem of adequate representation of defendants in patent infringement defendant class actions);
Scott Douglas Miller, Note, Certificationof Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1371, 1371 (1984) (discussing how to determine when certification of a defendant class is
appropriate and proposing a "test which minimizes heterogeneity by certifying only those classes
whose members share a legal relationship that predates the litigation-a juridical link"); Note, Statutes of Limitations and Defendant Class Actions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 347, 347-50 (1983) ("[I]n defendant class actions the statute of limitations should be tolled as to all named and absent class
members upon informal notice given by the plaintiff at the beginning of the suit."); Randy Clarke, A
Defendant Class Action Lawsuit: One Option for the Recording Industry in the Face of Threats to
Copyrights Posed by Internet Based File-sharing Systems (Spring 2001) (unpublished Honors
Scholar
Seminar
Paper,
Chicago
Kent
College
of
Law),
http://www.kentlaw.edu/honorsscholars/2001students/writings/
clarke.html (exploring the use of defendant class actions to litigate cases of peer-to-peer file-sharing
copyright infringement).
4. See generally Nelson Rodrigues Netto, The Optimal Law Enforcement with Mandatory
Defendant Class Action, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 59-60 (2007) ("The objective of this article is to
suggest an enhancement of law enforcement through mandatory aggregation of defendants and
improvement of the defendant class action to incentivize the class lawyer."); Nicole L. Johnson,
Comment, BlackBerry Users Unite! Expanding the Consumer Class Action to Include a Class Defense, 116 YALEL.J. 217, 217-18 (2006) ("This Comment takes the Hamdani and Klement proposal
["to allow certification of defense classes at the instigation of defendants"] a step further and suggests that the class defense has a more expansive applicability, not only for achieving economies of
scale and overcoming collective action problems in litigation, but perhaps more importantly in
obtaining settlements.").
5. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 919. Shapiro also notes that, "As Stephen Yeazell has shown in
his informative history of the class action, defendant classes with a pre-existing coherence were
Id. Nagareda, too, tables the
often litigants in the early stages of class action development .
question for another day:
Though the Supreme Court has yet to speak definitively to the matter, federal appellate
courts have proven relatively unreceptive to defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2).
Whether that chilly reception stands as either a proper reading of Rule 23 or otherwise a
sensible conception of the class action is a question that I leave for another day.
Richard A. Nagareda, The PreexistencePrinciple and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 149, 181 n. 131 (2003) (citation omitted). Erichson makes the same move when he writes:
Defendant class actions are permitted by Rule 23(a), and are certified on rare occasion.
This paper, however, considers only plaintiff class actions, which are far more common
and offer a better foil for understanding mass non-class litigation. Although mass litigation sometimes involves hundreds of defendants, and defense lawyers often coordinate
their efforts through joint defense agreements, the mass collective representations that resemble class actions occur almost exclusively on the plaintiff side.
Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class
Collective Representation,2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 531 n.37 (2003) (citations omitted).
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the standard mode of analysis gives us little insight into how we should
evaluate this present state of affairs.
Why do defendant class actions receive such little treatment? If they
are seen as theoretically untenable or unfair, then the theory needs to be
examined. If we ignore defendant class actions because they are fewer in
number than plaintiff class actions, the question to ask is whether they
should be used more often. If the argument is that they are not feasible in
practice, then system design issues come to the forefront. These issuestheory, frequency, and feasibility-are related, but distinct from one another. This Article will address each of them, focusing most of its attention on the fundamental principles that should motivate courts to certify
defendant classes. The goal of this Article is thus to lay out a general
theory of defendant class actions.
In developing its general theory, this Article argues that courts and
commentators have recognized the benefits of aggregation, but have
overlooked the informational advantages of the defendant class device.
Specifically, this Article argues that the class action device can serve an
auction-like function of producing information about defendants' relative
contributions to harm. In situations where the market is unlikely to produce such information, the value of defendant class actions is greater.
This Article delineates a series of real-world situations in which these
informational benefits can be gained through a defendant class action.
In developing its theory, this Article argues that three interrelated
principles should guide the use and evaluation of defendant class actions:6

(1) Forward looking deterrence principle. The forward-looking
deterrence principle holds that the utility of a defendant class action
should be measured by its contribution to future deterrence of harms by
the proposed defendant class.7 This principle stands in stark contrast to
an existing strand of jurisprudence that looks backwards and attempts to
determine pre-existing relationships (or "juridical links") between members of the proposed defendant class.8

6.

To be sure, similar principles can be, and have been, applied to traditional class actions as

well. See CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

AND WHO SHOULD Do IT 37 (2003) (identifying optimal precautions, optimal insurance, and redistribution of wealth as primary goals of the tort system).
7.
As will be discussed subsequently, the premise is that individuals in the future, whether
potential defendants or potential plaintiffs, will adjust their behavior according to the court's actions.
Thus, the court is not constantly shifting, but rather making a clear statement about what individuals
can expect if they act in certain ways, e.g., they might expect to be included in a defendant class and
stuck with joint and several liability for the harm caused by their class. Courts can still be flexible in
administering the rule in different contexts as changes occur (social, technological, etc.). See infra
Part II.A.
8.
See generally Shafner, supra note 3; Miller, supra note 3.
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(2) Dynamic effects principle. The dynamic effects principle holds
that our evaluation of defendant class actions should include all secondary effects such as information generation, feedbacks, price adjustments, new incentive structures, and changing group dynamics. This
includes the standard law and economics approach to examine incentive
structures, but "effects" here are broadly defined to also include group
dynamics related to psychological mechanisms. This principle stands in
opposition to the position that the court should focus solely on the immediate effects for the named plaintiff and defendants.
(3) Aggregate analysis principle. Taking the dynamic effects principle one step further, the aggregate analysis principle holds that our
evaluation of defendant class actions should ultimately rest on an aggregate, society-wide cost-benefit analysis. In situations where deterrence of
harm simultaneously involves deterrence of a good, the aggregate analysis principle instructs the legal analyst to consider multiple cross-cutting
effects at high levels of aggregation.
With these three background principles laying the foundation, the
Article makes a series of more specific arguments. Drawing on an analysis of 177 cases where defendant class actions were contemplated, the
Article argues that courts have failed to see that plaintiff and defendant
class actions should not be distinguished on conceptual grounds, but
rather on the different group dynamics that are likely to exist in defendant, as opposed to plaintiff, classes. Specifically, the incentives for intra-class information sharing between plaintiff and defendant class members is likely to be quite different without the class device in place.
In developing its general theory, this Article analyzes Hamdani and
Klement's proposal for "the class defense," a device that would allow
defendants to class themselves with others similarly situated.9 This Article argues that although Hamdani and Klement's analysis is more thorough than previous work on defendant class actions, it still fails to go far
enough toward a general theory. The paper also examines Netto's recent
argument for the use of defendant class actions in the case of illegal
downloading. Netto provides a defense of aggregation, but like Hamdani
and Klement, fails to recognize the informational benefits likely to arise
out of some even small defendant classes.
In addition to a general discussion, two potential applications for
defendant classes are considered at various points in the paper: (1) deterring illegal file sharing on the Internet, and (2) deterring corporate fraud
and illegal dealing. In both contexts, this Article argues that existing literature and jurisprudence generally take a backwards-looking approach,
do not properly account for dynamic effects, and too often ignore aggregate analysis. This Article argues that failure to follow these principles
9.

Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 687 (2005).
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makes it less likely that the existing solutions will achieve optimal deterrence. This Article also considers the hard case of copyright infringement, which challenges the feasibility of defendant class actions in cases
where no group of defendants is readily identifiable as the group to lead
the class defense.
This Article is organized into four sections. The first section of the
paper reviews existing literature on defendant class actions. The second
section develops a general theory, drawing in part on the psychology
literature on group decision making. The third section then presents a
system design based on the general theory, focusing in particular on the
application of these systems to the case of illegal dealings by corporate
executives, illegal file sharing on the Internet, and copyright infringement. The fourth section concludes with thoughts for future research
directions in this area.
I. EXISTING LITERATURE

The existing literature on defendant class actions is comprised of a
few journal articles, several Notes, and a handful of additional publications.' 0 Much of the literature on defendant class actions has considered
how Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23" or "the Rule") can
be applied to defendant class actions." For example, Scott Douglas
Miller, author of Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule
23(B)(2), discusses the "dispute over Rule 23's terminology" and provides an analysis of the text of the Rule.12 Likewise, Randy Clarke
moves through the language of the Rule in evaluating a potential defendant class action against music downloaders.' 3 In his commentary on
defendant class actions, Robert Holo also proceeds with a formalist
analysis, considering how the language of the Rule applies: "Despite
Doss, it is clear that (b)(2) certification of defendant classes is always
inappropriate because of the express language of the rule. Courts should
not ignore the clear language of the rule in order to better serve their perceptions of justice or fairness."' 4 This Article does not focus on formalist
10. See sources cited supra note 3.
I1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Interpretation of Rule 23 has been a challenge for courts and academics alike because it is open to varying readings. As Judge Posner noted, "The question whether there
can be a defendant class in a Rule 23(b)(2) suit cannot be answered by reference to authority."
Henson v. E. Lincoln Twp., 814 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1987). Because of this potential latitude,
federal appeals courts have moved to reign in the class mechanism. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has written that a rule to the contrary would "enable any action, with the possibility
that it might be one of multiple actions, to be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B)." Namoff v.
Merrill Lynch, 829 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987).
The language in 23(b)(2) is his concern: "Few actions for equitable relief are based on
12.
plaintiffs' conduct; rather, plaintiffs initiate such suits in response to defendants' conduct." Miller,
supra note 3, at 1375. Miller's analysis of court cases proceeds to consider how they look at the
language of the Rule. "Thus, all federal courts that have considered defendant class certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) have done little more than superficially reviewed the rule's terms." Id at 1376.
Clarke, supra note 3.
13.
14. Holo, supra note 3, at 264.
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concerns such as the best interpretation of the language of Rule 23.
Rather, this Article adopts a functionalist framework and theorizes about
when defendant class actions will best serve the goals of maximizing
social welfare.
Although articles by Netto (2007), Johnson (2006), and Hamdani
and Klement (2005) have begun to address more functionalist concerns
in the past few years, the literature remains limited.15 My review of the
literature argues that scholars have generally concentrated too much on
proceduralist concerns (i.e., scrutiny of the language of Rule 23), and
have failed to provide a thorough functionalist analysis. My purpose in
reviewing this literature is to identify some of the most discussed market
and incentive dynamics associated with defendant class actions. Once
these dynamics are recognized, Section II of the paper develops a general
theory to incorporate them.
A. All Defendant Classes are Not the Same
Defendant class actions originate out of the same legal history and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as plaintiff class actions.1 6 Like plaintiff
class actions, defendant class actions became more feasible after the
1966 amendments to Rule 23.17 Although defendant class actions are less
frequent than plaintiff class actions, "[t]he use of a defendant class action
is not a recent development."' 8

The literature also remains disconnected from previous studies. The literature, for in15.
stance, has yet to be synthesized in a single article. Even the more recent articles have not cited all
previous works. In Hamdani & Klement's analysis of defendant classes, they fail to cite several
works on defendant class actions, including a short piece from three years earlier that had considered
defendant class actions in the similar context of file sharing. The uncited work was Clarke, supra
note 3.
16. See generally Netto, supra note 4, at 76-87 (providing a history of the defendant class
action, and its development in the United States).
17. Howard Downs notes that "[w]hereas original Rule 23 restricted binding class actions to
cases involving 'joint or common rights' or actions affecting 'specific property,' amended Rule 23
relaxed these restrictions, which extended the social and economic uses of the class device." Howard
M. Downs, FederalClass Actions: Due Process by Adequacy ofRepresentation(Identity ofClaims)
and the Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 607, 608 (1993). "Although it
appears that the modem-day class action was born probably some time during the Middle Ages,
there are reports of ecclesiastical proceedings against numerous insects and animals dating as early
as A.D. 824." Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946-47 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
"These early 'defendant class actions' date from a very early period: in A.D. 824, against moles in
Aosta; in A.D. 864, bees in Worms; in A.D. 886 locusts of Romagna; and in the same century,
serpents of Aux-les-Bains." Id. at 947.
18. Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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Figure 1. Number of "class action" and "defendant class" mentions in federal and state cases, 1960-2007
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Notes: Graph notes the number of hits for "class action" vs. "defendant class"
action cases in LexisNexis database of all state and federal cases. The number
of hits does not represent the actual number of certified plaintiff or defendant
classes.
Nonetheless, the explosion of class action litigation has been overwhelmingly on the plaintiff side. To gain some historical perspective, I
conducted a LexisNexis search of all Federal and State cases from 19602007 using the phrase "class action" or "plaintiff class." I then ran the
search again with the terms "defendant class action" or "defendant
class." These searches, while not providing an accurate count of the actual number of cases contemplating class actions, nevertheless serve as a
proxy for the popularity of the class device in the courts. The number of
hits per year, presented graphically in Figure 1, gives us a sense of the
disparity between defendant and plaintiff class actions. While discussion
of class actions generally has risen steadily since 1966-growing very
significantly in the last decade-contemplation of defendant class actions
has remained quite low throughout the forty years. While this class action term search produced over 1,000 hits starting in the 1970s, over
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2000 starting in the late 1990s, and over 4,000 in the most recent years,
defendant class mentions have never risen over 100 hits. The number of
plaintiff class actions clearly dwarfs the number of defendant class actions.
One straightforward reason for such little use of the defendant class
device is current jurisprudence on Rule 23. Defendant class actions are
governed by Rule 23, and thus, as a preliminary matter courts look for
satisfaction of the four Rule 23(a) prerequisites: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation.1 9 Analysis of these prerequisites explains much of the infrequency of defendant class actions, but
tells us little about whether that infrequency is a useful (functional) outcome. I am not concerned with re-interpretation of Rule 23, but rather, I
am primarily concerned with evaluating the outcome of its current interpretation, i.e., evaluating whether the defendant class action should be
expanded on the grounds of improving social utility. For reasons to be
discussed subsequently, I argue that in fact there should be such an expansion of defendant class action use.
Before moving to that argument, let us review the prerequisites that
prevent many instances of efficient and socially desirable class certification. Courts currently do not depart radically from accepted views of
Rule 23 jurisprudence. A recent 2003 decision from the District of New
Jersey provides a concise summary of the state of the law:
There is a significant split of opinion as to whether Rule 23(b)(2)
ever permits injunctive relief against a defendant class. The Fourth
and Seventh Circuits, together with the leading treatise on federal
procedure, take the view that defendant classes are not authorized by
Rule 23(b)(2). These authorities are generally of the view that the
text of 23(b)(2) itself forbids defendant classes....
On the other hand, the Second Circuit, together with the leading
class action treatise, take the view that defendant classes are permitted by Rule 23(b)(2). The Sixth Circuit appears to agree that defendant classes are permissible under Rule 23(b), but only if individual
defendants are all acting to enforce a locally administered state statute or uniform administrative policy. The principal justification for
permitting defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2) seems to be that the
device can be particularly useful to bind to a court decree a group of
defendants who, out of recalcitrance or neglect, have refused to conform their conduct to settled substantive law or to eliminate the need
for ancillary proceedings against a number of semi-autonomous defendants once the court has made a basic determination of legal issues applicable to all. 20

19.
20.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 217. (D.N.J. 2003) (citations omitted).
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Ultimately, the court concluded that:
A review of the foregoing district court decisions reveals that the certification of 23(b)(2) defendant classes has been implemented only
tepidly in the Third Circuit, and has met success, if at all, only in
cases where the individual defendants of the class are alleged to be
acting in conformity with an illegal state statute, rule, or regulation.2 1
Commentary from other courts similarly note that "defendant
classes seldom are certified," and if they are certified, "such certification
most commonly occurs[:] (1) in patent infringement cases; (2) in suits
against local public officials challenging the validity of state laws; or (3)
in securities litigation." 22
To gain a broader perspective on defendant class actions, I examined cases in which a defendant class action was contemplated. 23 Utilizing the LexisNexis database of all federal and state cases, as well as previous academic and court citations, I identified 177 cases in which a defendant class was contemplated.24 These cases, listed in the online appendix, were coded for subject. Table 1 provides a summary of the subject matter.
The analysis of these cases is consistent with the courts' observations that defendant class actions have been used frequently for securities
cases and for constitutional challenges. These two categories alone account for fifty three percent of the defendant class action cases. There
are, however, more extensive uses of class actions than typically ac21.
Id. at 220. In this particular case, plaintiffs sought to certify as a class all McDonald's
under Title Ill of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court did not certify a defendant class
because "the individual members of the defendant class have been non-uniform in their noncompliance with such policies." Id. The court speculated that:
Had plaintiffs alleged, for example, that McDonald's and its franchisees adhered to a
company-wide policy of providing just one handicapped parking space in restaurant parking lots, or of installing no "grab bars" in restaurant toilet stalls, then one could imagine
why injunctive relief-against the defendants as a class-might be appropriate to redress
such violations.
Id. at 220-21.
22. Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass'n of Ill., Inc., 97 F.R.D. 668, 674 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (citations omitted). Thillens went on to read:
Several rules, useful in unilateral as well as bilateral defendant class actions, emerge from
In re Gap and similar cases: (1) A defendant class will not be certified unless each named
plaintiff has a colorable claim against each defendant class member; (2) A defendant
class will not be certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) without a clear showing that
common questions do in fact predominate over individual issues; (3) The requirement
that each named plaintiff must have a claim against each defendant may be waived where
the defendant members are related by a conspiracy or "juridical link."
Id. at 675-76. Netto notes that the defendant class action device "is more frequent in lawsuits involving civil rights, disputes challenging constitutionality of state and local law and practices enforced
by public officials, and suits against unincorporated associations, e.g., labor unions. Defendants'
classes have also been certified in other contexts, such as patent infringement, antitrust, securities,
and environmental law." Netto, supra note 4, at 87.
23. Defendant classes sometimes emerge out of counter-claims in plaintiff class actions. I
have excluded them from this analysis, as they are not the focus of the paper.
24. The search was conducted in February 2008.
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knowledged. While declaratory judgments on property rights and benefits are similar to the constitutional challenge and security cases, ten percent of the cases concerned damages.

Table 1. Summary of selected cases in which defendant class action was proposed
Pct.
Number
Case Subject Matter
35.6%
63
Constitutional Challenge
17.5%
31
Securities
10.2%
18
Damages
9.8%
17
Property Rights
7.9%
14
Benefits - Insurance or Retirement
4.0%
7
Monopoly / Anti-Trust
3.4%
6
Taxes / Fees
4.0%
7
Patent
4
2.3%
Contractual
2.3%
4
Bankruptcy
2.3%
4
Other
1.1%
2
Copyright
NOTES: Defendant classes were not certified in all cases. The 177 cases
coded here were identified through searches in the LexisNexis database of All
Federal and State cases. See text for details of search procedures.

Both academics and judges have paid close attention to the nature of
the potential defendant class. Over twenty-five years ago, The Harvard
Note recognized the functional nature of many defendant class actions:
"The structure of certain types of defendant class actions virtually guarantees adequate representation. Suits against the members of a labor union or other unincorporated association, naming the officers as representative of the class, provide one example."2 5
When the relationship between defendants is clearly demarcated,
the courts see fewer barriers to certifying defendant classes. Analyzing
when courts are likely to certify defendant classes, Miller finds that
"[c]orrectional institutions, county magistrates, county sheriffs, local
prosecutors, and voting officials have all been certified and bound as
defendant classes." 26 Courts have developed the juridical links exception
25.
26.

The HarvardNote, supra note 3, at 642.
Miller, supranote 3, at 1379.
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to understand connections between defendant members of the class.
Courts have defined a juridical link "as 'some [independent] legal relationship which relates all defendants in a way such that single resolution
of the dispute is preferred to a multiplicity of similar actions."'27 Examples of such links include partnerships or joint enterprises, conspiracy,
and aiding and abetting. These terms denote some form of relationship or
activity on the part of the members of the proposed defendant class "that
warrants imposition of joint liability against the group even though the
plaintiff may have dealt primarily with a single member." 28
In a similar vein, Holo sees defendant class actions as more likely
when the defendants are connected through some superior authority.29
Holo provides examples of courts certifying defendant classes in securities fraud cases, and suits against groups of state/local officials. 30 It is
important to note here that in these cases, the courts look backwards to
see if a relationship existed between the potential defendant class members prior to the allegations. When a juridical link already exists, courts
are willing to see the group dynamics. But they do not see how they
could actually create such links in the future via their judgments in the
present case; there is no forward looking jurisprudence.
The courts' analyses in these cases bear some resemblance to the
search for a conspiracy or coordinated action. In a 1990 opinion, Federal
District Judge D. Brock Homby recognized this connection in a footnote,
in which he quotes Holo and states that:

27. Follete v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (alteration in original) (quoting
Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 676).
28. Id. at 508 (quoting Akerman v. Oryx Commc'ns, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)). In his Note, Miller stated: "The test suggested by this Note minimizes the dangers inherent in
class heterogeneity by certifying only those defendant classes whose members share a relationship
predating the litigation, and whose role in the litigation derives from their membership in the preexisting group. Courts have characterized such classes as 'juridically linked."' Miller, supra note 3, at
1394-95. "When the defendant class is juridically linked these courts miss the mark. In such cases
individual relief is subordinate to class relief. Traditional party relationships should be far less significant than the general nature of the interclass dispute." Id. at 1400-01. Courts do not always agree
on whether sufficient juridical links exist. In Funliner ofAlabama, L.L.C. v. Pickard,the Alabama
Supreme Court focused on a lack of written agreement as determinative:
In In Re Activision Securities . . . the Court found that the defendants, who were all un-

derwriters and members in a securities syndicate, had entered into a written agreement .... We do not find the facts of Activision analogous to those of the instant case.
There has been no finding that the defendants in this case entered into a written agreement or that they agreed to be bound to a common course of conduct; the trial court did
not even note that the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among the defendants. Thus, the juridical-link exception found in Activision is missing here.
873 So. 2d 198, 215-16 (Ala. 2003).
29.
Holo, supra note 3, at 239 ("All the defendants are bound together because of their common obligation to adhere to a particular state law or policy.").
30. "For example, modem securities fraud litigation often involves a plaintiff class of investors suing a defendant class of securities underwriters." Id at 227. Holo also notes the usefulness of
defendant class action in the context of state/local officials who are illegally discriminating. "By
binding all members of a defendant class to a single judgment, widespread discriminatory practices
can be brought to a halt more quickly and efficiently." Id. at 228.
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I leave to the plaintiffs determination of how properly to join the
dealers as named defendants. I recognize the complexities in joining
a large number of defendants or, as suggested at oral argument, creating a defendant class. Commentators have wondered: "Can the existence of a conspiracy be proven in a single proceeding representing
the entire defendant class, or does proof of a conspiracy depend upon
proving each defendant's participation in the alleged conspiracy, an
inherently individual question that must be answered separately for
each defendant?"31
One additional rule courts have introduced in analyzing the relationship of potential members of a defendant class is a membership ratification theory. 32 "Under [the membership ratification] theory dealing with
individual proof of illegal conduct becomes unnecessary. Rather, a presumption arises that all members of the association joined in the alleged
conspiracy." 33 It is essentially a 'guilty by association with the Association' rule. Functionally, this is telling individual defendants that they
should have asked questions up front and should have monitored their
association, or otherwise contracted ex ante to avoid this liability.3 4 Like
the juridical links rule, however, the membership ratification rule looks
back to earlier relationships between potential class members. But even
though the courts are backwards-looking here, we can see in their jurisprudence the roots for more functionally effective legal rules. For instance, laying down a 'guilt by association with the Association' rule
would likely have a strong future deterrent effect on the behavior of individuals in that Association.

B. FinancialIncentives & Free Riding
The most frequently noted motivational problem with defendant
class actions is the lack of adequate incentive for defendant class representatives to fully litigate. This basic insight was offered over two decades ago:
Defendants generally oppose motions to certify them as class representatives. The major reason for their opposition presumably is a desire to avoid a possible increase in litigation expenses if they represent a class, in light of the fact that no source of funds is available to
pay for any additional costs. 35

In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp., 307 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 n.7 (D. Me. 2004) (quot31.
ing Holo, supra note 3, at 258).
Holo, supra note 3, at 259.
32.
Id.
33.
34.
See Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 139 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir.
1943).
The HarvardNote, supra note 3, at 648.
35.
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This point has been reiterated since then in most discussions of defendant class actions. 3 6 As discussed by Hamdani and Klement, when the
defendant class wins, "the defendants owe nothing to the plaintiff-no
money changes hands." 37 Thus, there is no money to pay counsel for the
class representative because no single member of the defendant class has
the proper financial incentives to litigate the defense fully.38
The incentive problem is connected to a free-rider problem: defendant class members who are not litigating stand to benefit without cost
from a successful class defense. 3 9 Unlike plaintiff classes, where litigation costs can be subtracted out of a settlement, it is more difficult to
extract money from passive defendants in the class. 4 0 Analysts have been
41
grappling with this problem-and how to correct it-for many years.
Dwelling on the comment that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
"devise a method to tax such 'free riders,"' the 1978 The HarvardNote
observes that:
[A]ssuming that all the class members or collateral estoppel beneficiaries could be identified, there would still be problems of determining how much to charge each individual. Only the common issues
will have been litigated if the defendant class prevails, and the court
will therefore have no knowledge of the magnitude of total liability
avoided or of the proportion attributable to each class member....

36. See, e.g., Netto, supra note 4, at 92 ("There are three foremost concerns related to the
choice of adequate representation in defendant class actions: (i) the choice of the representative is
made by the plaintiff; (ii) the absence of incentive for any defendant to bear the expenses of defending a lawsuit on behalf of the entire class when the costs of litigation are disproportionate to the
representative party's stake; and (iii) the difficulty of compensating class counsel for the benefits
conferred upon the class."); see also Brandt, supra note 3, at 919-20 ("In comparison, a defendant
class representative will seldom be able to take advantage of the same fee incentives as a plaintiff
representative.... Consequently, the defendant representative must be prepared to assume some, if
not all, of the economic burden of the litigation.").
Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 691.
37.
An important exception, discussed infra Part IIB. 1, is when there are "dominant players"
38.
in the class.
See The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 648 ("[Tlhere might seem to be a certain unfair39.
ness to the defendant class representative even if his defense of the class entails no extra costs; if the
common question is resolved in favor of the defendant class, absentee members will have received a
benefit at the representative's expense without having to compensate him for it."); see also Miller,
supra note 3, at 1385 ("Further, party heterogeneity increases the legal fees and administrative costs
associated with coordinating a defense. The defendant class representative cannot expect to recoup
these additional costs . . . .").
40. The ability to correct for the free-rider problem, as discussed in Part II.D, depends heavily on the nature of the group dynamics within the defendant class.
41.
See The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 652-53 (The Note argues for expanded use of
what it terms "expanded common question defendant class action." They suggest that courts frame
the question "not in terms of what each individual class member owes but rather in terms of what
formula should be used to allocate the total liability." Unfortunately, after this interesting discussion,
the Note suggests that, "[o]f course, in any of these 'fully litigated' defendant class actions a final
stage of individualized hearings is needed-whether conducted along with the class suit or entirely
separately from it.").
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[T]he class members would need to be taxed according to their po42
tential liability, a figure difficult if not impossible to determine.
Aware of the incentive problems with defendant class actions, some
courts have refused to certify defendant classes on the grounds that the
parties representing the class do not have the proper incentives to litigate
fully. 43 This issue of free riding and funding optimal defendant class representation is a topic I take up at length in the system design section of
this Article.
C. Funding Defendant Class Actions
Recognizing the free-rider problem, several funding schemes have
been proposed. Some of these proposals involve a tax-like levy on defendant class members. To fund the defendant class action, the court
could choose "to tax the expenses attributable to the class action to the
plaintiff, to tax them to the absentee defendants, or to refuse to certify the
class on any questions not perfectly common to the class members."44
This proposed solution is to tax the absentees "with a proportionate share
of at least the class-action-related expenses of the named defendant."45
A common alternative is to find some organization with deep pockets and make them a party as well. 4 6 Plaintiffs bringing the suit are typically in a position to identify the deep pocket class members on the other
side. In the securities case Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis v.
Fox & Co.,4 7 the plaintiffs sued the class of Fox partners in addition to
Fox itself "in order to assure recovery of the substantial judgment likely
to issue if plaintiffs succeed in proving their claims." 48 Courts have recognized that financial stakes will motivate defendants to mount adequate
defenses. In ConsolidatedRail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park,49 the court
held that "[b]y including as [defendant] class representatives the 10 highest tax collectors from Conrail . . . the district judge created a fair group
42. Id. at 648-49 & n.96.
43.
See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n for Mental Health, Inc. v. Califano, 717 F.2d 1451, 1458 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (The defendant university, U.S.C., said explicitly in testimony that "it was 'unwilling to expend the effort and funds necessary to defend itself in this action, let alone represent the interests of
a large group.' . . . The school's position was supported by the affidavit of one of its administrators,
who stated: 'Due to the minimal amount of its alleged liability in this action, the University of
Southern California does not intend to defend this action on behalf of itself or any others."').
44.
The HarvardNote, supra note 3, at 656.
Id. at 657.
45.
46. See, e.g., Holo, supra note 3, at 271 (Holo's solution is for the judge to bring in some
defendant with the money: "Nevertheless, the judge may, in her discretion, assign additional defendants to act as corepresentatives, thus lessening the financial burden on any one defendant and at the
same time preventing any defendant from shirking his duties."); see also The Harvard Note, supra
note 3, at 656 (arguing that adequate representation (aligning incentives) might be accomplished in
some instances by requiring "the plaintiff to name as an additional defendant a trade organization
whose membership coincided with that of the class").
47.
102 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
48. Id. at 510.
49. 47 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 1995).
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of representative parties who presumably have the greatest financial motivation to defeat Conrail's case." 50 Where plaintiffs do not already include deep pocket defendants, the court can also find the necessary parties. Holo suggests that, "a court can require a plaintiff to join additional
defendants as class representatives and can also permit associations or
other institutional representatives to join as representative defendants."
In other words, the court can look to kick a private market into motion to
fund the class defense. In In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., 52 the
Tenth Circuit did just this, naming Fidelity as the defendant class representative against Integra because the Fidelity Capital Appreciation Fund
was the largest Integra shareholder when Integra spun off (thus bringing
on the litigation).
D. Aggregation, Opt-Out, and Deterrence
The benefits of aggregating claims in order to enjoy economies of
scale is discussed at several points in previously published literature.
Netto writes that amongst courts and academics today, "[i]t is a general
consensus that the primary advantage of class actions is to override the
transactional cost of low stake claims, which would not be individually
prosecuted because the costs of litigation . . . supersede the expected
utility from the adjudication." 54 The primary point, as noted by Holo, is
that aggregation "allows the defendants to pool their resources, decide
who among them would be the most fit representative, and present a
strong, united front against their opponents." 5 The spirit of these comments, in favor of aggregation, is the same spirit animating David
Rosenberg's arguments in Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants
Have and Plaintiffs Don 't.5 6 In Rosenberg's analysis of plaintiff class
actions he recognizes that defendants are able to enjoy the benefits of
scale in defending themselves, while plaintiffs-unless they have a class
device-cannot. 57 Here, in the case of defendant class actions, plaintiffs
start with pooled resources that defendants do not have. The defendant
class action serves as a tool to address this imbalance.
The majority of analyses on defendant class actions have argued for
an opt-out option based on fairness and due process concerns.8 But the
50. Id. at 484.
51.
Holo, supra note 3, at 234.
52. 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2001), affd, 354 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).
53. See id at 1096.
54. Netto, supra note 4, at 98; see also Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 711-13.
55.
Holo, supra note 3, at 268.
56.
David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't,
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 393, 394-97, 399-402 (2000).
57. See id. at 393-94, 400-02, 407-08, 412.
58. See, e.g., Brandt, supra note 3, at 911-13; see also Netto, supra note 4, at 98 ("In fact,
some circumstances will actually create incentives not to opt out of a defendant class. For example, a
plaintiff who commences a defendant class against a group of underwriters of a new stock offering
may also threaten and be able to commence litigation against each of the underwriters individually.
Given the certainty of having to make a choice between remaining in a defendant class or defending
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cost of opt-out (and unraveling the defendant class) is significant. Simpson and Perra explain the rationale for not allowing opt out:
[O]rdinarily no one wants to be a defendant, so that defendant class
members who have an opportunity to opt out can be expected to do
so . . . . Massive opt-out undermines the breadth and finality of
judgments, increases the possibility of duplicative litigation, and
59
lessens the probability of giving plaintiffs full relief.
The empirical data on how the opt-out option is used in practice is
lacking. As observed by Morabito, "there is little information available
concerning the percentage of class members who have opted out of defendant class proceedings, after being offered the opportunity to do so
following the certification of defendant classes."6 0 Morabito found only
three U.S. cases in which opt-out rates were discernible: "3 defendants
opted out of a class of 91; no one exited another defendant class; and in a
third proceeding, 115 defendants opted out." 6 1
The deterrence objectives of class action litigation have also been
raised several times in the existing literature. 62 In the deterrence view,
"the primary purpose of class litigation is not so much to redress injured
plaintiffs as to deter wrongful conduct on the defendant's part by forcing
him to disgorge his unlawful gains or by restructuring his behavior
through the use of injunctions."63 Hamdani and Klement have focused
extensively on deterrence, and their proposal will be discussed more in
depth in the next few sections.
individual litigation, the economics of a joint defense considerably outweighs those of defending an
individual action, and defendant class members would have an incentive to remain in the class.").
59. Simpson & Perra, supra note 3, at 1334 (alteration in original); see also Holo, supra note
3, at 266 (considering proposal of a no-opt-out rule before moving away from the suggestion). Although Holo doesn't stick with it, he actually considers proposing a no-opt-out rule as well:
One more possible modification would be to eliminate the 23(c)(2) opt-out provision for
proposed members of a defendant class. Some courts have worried that any defendant
named in a 23(b)(3) defendant class action would promptly opt out, thus rendering the
class action device useless, but this modification would successfully resolve that problem.
Id. In the next line, he moves away from this suggestion, but the logic was there. Id. ("In the final
analysis, however, these measures also would be inadequate.").
60. Morabito, supra note 3, at 226 (footnotes omitted).
61.
Id.
62. See Simpson & Perra,supranote 3, at 1319 (suggesting the possibility of using defendant
class actions to solve the problem of holding the firearms market liable). As they ask at the outset:
[H]ow can municipalities and other "representative organizations" summon each allegedly culpable firearms industry player to the table? How can these suits be structured to
ensure that each participant in the manufacturing, advertising and distribution channels is
held accountable for its tortious behavior? How can a plaintiff, who has suffered damages
potentially caused by 191 different firearms manufacturers, hundreds of wholesalers and
over 80,000 retailers nationwide, join these potential defendants in a manner that ensures
that each suffers its proportional share of damages caused?
Id. Simpson & Perra structure their article, however, around the language of Rule 23, demonstrating
how the four requirements can be met-not discussing why it would be a good thing to have defendant class actions. Id. at 1324-29.
The HarvardNote, supra note 3, at 654.
63.
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E. Formalistand ProceduralistConcerns
While there are strains of functionalist thinking throughout the literature on defendant class actions, the bulk of the literature still grounds
itself in proceduralist concerns. Although some of these authors acknowledge deterrence objectives, they fall back on a position articulated
by Miller, that the "usual incentive for defendant class certification rather
is not economic utility but social justice.' '64 This-* focus on social justice is
accompanied by a focus on due process and fairness.
In the context of defendant class actions, the concerns of commentators and courts are often those of due process. 5 The court in Thillens,
Inc. v. Community Currency Exchange Association of Illinois, Inc.66
noted, "Fundamental fairness to absentee members must be balanced
against judicial savings. Where representative adjudication occurs pursuant to a defendant class, due process concerns not inherent in plaintiff
class actions arise. The crux of the distinction is: the unnamed plaintiff
stands to gain while the unnamed defendant stands to lose." 67 The court
in Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co. 68 arrived at the same point, arguing that "[i]n
the final analysis, the propriety of a class action-plaintiff, defendant or
both-depends upon a finding that due process will be accorded the
members of the class who are not before the court." 69 This Article argues
in the next Part that courts' analysis of gain and loss should include not
only unnamed parties, but also future potential parties with deterrence in
mind.
Exceptions, such as the juridical links exception just discussed, are
used by courts to address due process concerns. 70 Fairness, usually to
64.
Miller, supra note 3, at 1387 (footnote omitted).
65. See In re the Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("[Parsons and
Starr have] reviewed the use of defendant class actions in environmental litigation and . . . carefully
explored the due process problems posed by defendant class adjudications" and have observed, "The
basic constitutional dilemma of defendant class actions arises out of the due process rights of absent
members of the defendant class. Fundamental to due process is the notion that the authoritative
determination of a personal liability, obligation or right of a defendant requires the court's in personam jurisdiction over that party.") (quoting Parsons & Starr, supra note 3, at 888); see also Netto,
supra note 4, at 105-06 ("[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate the due
process principle . . . [and] deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
court.") (quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). See generally Downs, supra note 17, at 627-30 (discussing due process in class actions).
66. 97 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
67. Id. at 674 (citation omitted).
68.
312 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
69.
Id. at 991.
70.
Scott Douglas Miller states:
A defendant class member would consent to representative adjudication only if he perceived, or might reasonably be expected to perceive, that the savings resulting from another party's representation would exceed any liabilities-monetary or otherwiseresulting from the representation. An absent defendant would only prefer representative
action where he perceived himself as adequately represented. The perceived probability
of loss would then be no greater in representative than in individual adjudication, but
there would be a net savings of litigation costs. Only if the defendant class is juridically
linked would absent members be so confident.
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absentee defendants, is another way of discussing due process.71 These
fairness concerns are rooted in the belief that we should treat class actions in the same way we would treat one-to-one litigation. Bassett argues that:
[T]here is no reason to believe that a court has the power to issue a
binding judgment upon a defendant-even if that defendant is part of
a defendant class-where that defendant has no nexus to the forum
and her purported consent to suit is based on her failure to opt out of
the class. Accordingly, there is no reason to treat members of a defendant class any differently than a defendant in a non-class lawsuit . . . .72

Due process issues can be summarized in what one court has labeled the
'Rubik Cube' puzzle: "[E]ach plaintiff does not have a cause of action
against each defendant."73 When faced with this situation, courts may be
hesitant to certify the defendant class because they look backwards for
pre-existing connections.74 I argue that this view, articulated in different
forms by most courts, fails to recognize the intra-group dynamics that a
class device introduces. I therefore argue that in cases where there are
sizeable enough informational and incentive benefits to be gained from
classing a group of defendants, there is every reason to treat members of
the class differently-although collectively the same-than we would
treat them if they were a stand-alone defendant.

Miller, supra note 3, at 1399. Brandt, trying to reconcile defendant class actions with due process
concerns, proposes a complicated measure:
In order to protect the due process rights of absent defendant class members, Rule 23
should be revised in two respects. First Rule 23 should ensure that absent defendants will
not be bound by a class judgment unless they receive actual notice of the pendency of the
action. This protection should be extended so that it applies not only to actions under
23(b)(3) but also to defendant class actions maintained under 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).
Brandt, supra note 3, at 944-45.
The Harvard Note, for instance, introduces the subject by arguing that defendant class
71.
actions should not be "purchased at the expense of fundamental unfairness to persons who are not
before the court that binds them." The HarvardNote, supra note 3, at 632.
Bassett, supra note 3, at 76. Bassett continues that this means "that minimum contacts
72.
with the forum state would be necessary in order to bind the defendant class member to the judgment, and if minimum contacts were not established, the class judgment would be unenforceable
with respect to that defendant." Id.
73.
Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The Rubik Cube problem can be
considered "in terms of standing, typicality, or commonality," but underlying it is concern with due
process. Id. at 120. The Thillens court noted the same thing: "There is great judicial reluctance to
certify a defendant class when the action is brought by a plaintifclass. The primary concern with
bilateral actions, antitrust or other types, is a fear that each plaintiff member has not been injured by
each defendant member." Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass'n of Ill., Inc., 97 F.R.D. 668,
675 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
74. In LaMar v. H.B. Novelty & Loan Co. in 1973, the Ninth Circuit considered the issue:
[W]hether a plaintiff having a cause of action against a single defendant can institute a
class action against the single defendant and an unrelated group of defendants who have
engaged in conduct closely similar to that of the single defendant on behalf of all those
injured by all the defendants sought to be included in the defendant class.
489 F.2d 461, 462 (9th Cir. 1973).
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II. DEVELOPING A GENERAL THEORY OF DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS

With the groundwork now laid, the Article picks up on its three central principles, and develops a general theory of defendant class actions.
A. ForwardLooking Deterrence

To build a general theory of defendant class actions, a preliminary
question about the purpose of tort law must be addressed. This Article,
like Netto (2007), adopts the initial position taken by Fried and Rosenberg, that "tort liability should be seen as part of the imperfect and partial
system serving the goals of compensation and deterrence."7 This approach follows a line of scholarship that focuses on maximization of
76
social welfare as the goal of law generally, and of tort law specifically.
In the context of mass torts and collectivized adjudication, the Article
follows Rosenberg's (2002) premise that when government and firstparty insurance are not adequate, a "need exists for 'optimal tort deterrence' to prevent unreasonable risk of accident and for 'optimal tort insurance' to cover residual reasonable risk."n This position has not gone
uncontested; scholars such as Richard Epstein and Richard Nagareda
have criticized this approach in exchanges with Rosenberg and others. 78
The Fried and Rosenberg approach rests on an appreciation of the
ex ante perspective.7 9 The ex ante perspective is one which seeks to un75.
FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 2. The authors discuss these three functions at
length in Chapter 3, and justify them in Chapter 2. In addition to deterrence, Fried and Rosenberg
identify "optimal insurance, and related appropriate redistribution of wealth" as goals of the tort
system. Id. at 37. I consider redistribution and insurance issues in Part IlIl.A.I.
76. See generally David Rosenberg, Mandatory-LitigationClass Action: The Only Option For
Mass Tort Cases, I15 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg 2002]. Rosenberg relies on
several works for "theories of deterrence, insurance, law enforcement, rational choice analysis, and
welfare economics." Id. at 831 n.1; see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998);
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shav-

ell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).
77. Rosenberg 2002, supra note 76, at 832.
78. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical
Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 2-5, 49-50 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Class
Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475 (2003) [hereinafter
Epstein, Class Actions]; Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort
Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002). In criticizing Rosenberg's position, Epstein argues
that:
Even if we reject (as current law manifestly does) the view that ex post compensation is
irrelevant, powerful implications still flow for the governance of class action litigation.
This position presupposes that the judgment should be collective and not individual, such
that a person who objected to the strategies pursued by the class would be required to remain a class member on the ground that the economies of scale in running the class action would leave him better off than before. There is obviously a powerful paternalistic
streak in this argument.
Epstein, Class Actions, supra note 78, at 494. Because the larger debate has been carried out elsewhere, this article will not review it in detail here.
79. Aside from this paragraph's brief discussion, this Article does not elaborate on the details
of the Fried & Rosenberg framework. Those details can be found in Chapter 2 of their book. FRIED
& ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 13-36.
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derstand an individual's preferences "under conditions of uncertainty, at
a point in time before the person knows which of possible alternative
fates will come to pass." 80 In this ex ante state, "each individual internalizes all possible fates of all possible people." 8 ' Because the individual
internalizes all possible states of the world, the individual rationally desires a legal system that maximizes welfare in all possible situations the
individual may find himself. In a 2002 article, Rosenberg emphasized the
importance of the ex ante perspective as central to the argument for mandatory class action for mass torts:
Essentially, this argument addresses the fundamental disjuncture between an individual's preferences ex ante-that is, before knowing
whether one will suffer tortious injury, and if so, how strong the related claim will be-and ex post-after learning the "luck of the
draw." Understanding how individual preferences change over time,
particularly as individuals acquire knowledge, is central to the argument for mandatory mass tort class action.82
In the context of defendant class actions, the starting point for an ex
ante approach is recognizing that ex ante, an individual does not know
whether he/she will be on the plaintiff or defendant side, or whether
he/she will be part of a large firm or in a large class of individuals. Thus,
in the ex ante world, a rational, social-utility maximizing individual
would have no reason to favor either 'plaintiff or 'defendant' classes. In
the context of music downloading, for example, an individual does not
know if they will be an RIAA employee, a musician, a downloader of
copyrighted music, a non-downloading user of the Internet, or some
other individual that might be affected by a class action against those
who download copyrighted music. In the context of corporate fraud, an
individual does not know if they will be on the corporate board, working
in the corporation's mailroom, holding stock in the corporation, or purchasing services produced by the firm. In the context of mass copyright
violation (e.g., hundreds of thousands of pirated DVDs being sold across
the globe), one does not know where in the supply chain they will be
located.
Hamdani and Klement's analysis fails to consider this ex ante position. As a result, Hamdani and Klement's core thesis does not plant its
roots as deeply as it could. Hamdani and Klement's "core thesis is that
the fundamental justification for consolidating plaintiff claims applies
with equal force to defendants."8 Their fundamental justification is, "[i]n
the plaintiff case, the cost of bringing a suit might dissuade victims from
suing wrongdoers . . . [and this] failure to litigate undermines justice and
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Rosenberg 2002, supra note 76, at 831.
Hamdani & Klement, supranote 9, at 689.
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deterrence." 84 This fundamental justification, however, is not adequate.
Justice and deterrence may be undermined if plaintiffs cannot bring their
case, but it may also be that something other than a plaintiff class action
will generate optimal deterrence for similarly-situated defendants. We
need a more general theory to understand in what contexts the defendant
class action is likely to be effective for achieving optimal deterrence.
The lack of a general theory is evident in Hamdani and Klement's
choice to ground their analysis in the "standard justification for class
The authors implicitly acknowledge their choice of the stanactions.
dard justification in a footnote. Citing the work of Rosenberg, they note,
"The standard justification for class actions focuses on claims for insignificant amounts that would not be filed individually. However, that class
actions are desirable even for larger claims as long as the common defendants enjoy economies of scale . . . .86 Beyond this citation, however,
the authors do not discuss the Rosenberg position and why even large
claim class actions may be desirable.
Nicole Johnson's recent extension of the Hamdani and Klement argument also fails to adequately consider fundamental principles. Johnson
"takes the Hamdani and Klement proposal a step further and suggests
that the class defense has a more expansive applicability, not only for
achieving economies of scale and overcoming collective action problems
in litigation, but perhaps more importantly in obtaining settlements."
The new settlement possibilities produced by aggregation of claims are
important, but we need more general discussion of when such possibilities are likely to occur, and thus, when courts should look toward defendant class certification.
Nelson Netto has advanced the defendant class argument on the basis of Rosenberg and Fried's theory of collectivizing claims. Netto argues that "the optimal economy of scale for investment in litigation requires the compulsory reunion of the defendants and their defenses."8 8
Similar in spirit to Netto's argument, I start from the ex ante perspective
and build a series of propositions about what defendant class actions
should seek to do.

84. Id. at 689-90.
85. Id. at 689 n.14.
86. Id. The authors cite David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARM. L. REV. 831 (2002).
87. Johnson, supra note 4, at 218. Additionally, Johnson notes:
In the recently settled suit between NTP and RIM, a consumer class defense would have
allowed consumers, including large corporate firms that rely on BlackBerry devices for
critical communication, to protect their interests and take action in their own defense.
BlackBerry users might have obtained an earlier settlement or might have been assured
that they could reach a settlement regardless of a standoff between the parties.
Id. at 224.
88. Netto, supra note 4, at 98.
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In light of great uncertainty in the ex ante world, what can we say
about individual preferences for design of a legal system? First, we can
say that an individual will desire to maximize his utility "across all possible states of the world."89 Since an individual could end up either as
defendant or plaintiff, this leads to the corollary that in the context of
class actions, the individual will seek to maximize utility by maximizing
total utility of defendant and plaintiff In the case of traditional plaintiff
class actions, this means that we are not only concerned with the reduction in harm to the plaintiff class, but also the cost of reducing harm as
paid by the defendant. In the case of defendant class actions, the same
logic is applicable; we should consider not only the harm/risk-reduction
to the plaintiff, but also the cost of precautions to the defendant class. 90
Second, we can say that defendant class actions should be considered in light of their future deterrent effect. I label this "forward looking"
in order to distinguish it from jurisprudence and commentary that looks
"backward" at pre-existing links between potential defendant class members. My position can also be seen, however, as going "all the way back"
to the ex ante position. Regardless of which conception one usesforward looking or a return to the ex ante world-the important point for
defendant class actions is that we are not concerned primarily with existing or previous relationships between individuals/firms, but rather with
the likely future relationships between similarly situated individuals/firms that will resultfrom a particularlegal ruling.91
A corollary of this second point is that courts should ask the following question: Will classing this group of individuals/firms be more effective for optimal deterrence than would the alternatives of individual proceedings or joining under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? If the answer is "yes," then the court should certify the defendant
class. If the answer is "no," then the court should deny certification.
By posing the question this way, the analysis invites a comparison
to joinder. Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that defendants can be joined if "any right to relief is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;
and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action." 92 Courts look to the number of defendants to determine whether

89.

FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 17 (emphasis added).

90. In principle, this bears some resemblance to Learned Hand's famous negligence calculus:
finding someone negligent when B < PL, where B = the "burden of precautions," P is the "probability of harm" and L is the "gravity of harm." Both formulas emphasize a type of cost-benefit analysis.
Current or previous relationships between individuals and firms would be important to the
91.
extent that they help us predict what would happen in the future. But, they should not be, in and of
themselves, the standard for evaluating a defendant class.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)-(B).
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joinder is impracticable.93 Presently, if the number of defendants is
greater than forty, then joinder will generally be presumed to be impracticable.94 Courts often look to class devices as an alternative if joinder is
not possible.9 5 As the U.S. District Court reasoned in Flying Tiger Line,
Inc. v. Central States,96 "[b]efore the Court takes the drastic step of certifying a defendant class; however, the joinder alternative should be investigated more thoroughly." 97 While courts have made the focus of their
joinder analysis the number of defendants, I argue in the next section that
we should compare the two options on the basis not only of numerosity,
but also on the basis of more general group dynamics.9 8
My proposed approach also makes clear that the defendant class action is not necessarily-as seems to be suggested by Hamdani and Klement-a device to go after the "little guy." 99 In deciding whether or not
to class the corporate executives of a failed financial firm, for instance,
the approach advocated in this Article might well lead to the conclusion
that they too should be classed. The reason would not be that they are too
numerous or incapable of being joined under other rules, but rather that
treating them as a class would better deter similarly-positioned executives in the future. If the executives know they will sink or swim as a
class, then they have greater incentive to internally check up on one another. This would create a mechanism of self-governance that should
improve deterrence. Forward-looking deterrence is not concerned with
parceling out causation within the group. Critics might argue at this point
that such an approach will fail to make the proper causal connections
between harm-causing parties' actions and sanctions. To see why this
will not be the case, we need to consider the second guiding principle,
which is dynamic effects.

93. See Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50,64 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
94. Id. at 66 ("[A] class of more than forty members raises a presumption that joinder is
impracticable.").
Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing FED R. Civ. P. 23(a)).
95.
96. No. 86-304 CMW, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17409 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 1986).
97.
Id. at *16.
98. This distinguishes my analysis from Netto, who writes that "[t]he defendant class action,
certified on behalf of the defendant requirement, is superior to mandatory joinder, because mandatory joinder is impractical when the number of defendants is extent and a defendant class action does
not need any drastic modification of actual statutes." Netto, supra note 4, at 105 n.186 (citing Charles Silver, Comparing Class Action and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495 (1991) and Edward
Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Methodfor Improving Patent Quality, 77 S. CAL. L.
REv. 683 (2004)).
99.
While not explicit on this point, the tone of Hamdani & Klement's article is that small,
dispersed defendants need a device to help them fight a potentially over-bearing plaintiff. The language of their article is not neutral in this respect. For instance, in building what seems to the specter
of groups like the RIAA, the authors write that "[m]ost alarmingly, plaintiffs can act strategically to
exacerbate the problem confronting each defendant, further diminishing the incentives to go to trial."
Hamdani & Klement, supranote 9, at 698.
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B. Dynamic Effects
The principle of dynamic effects holds that we should consider all
likely effects of the court's legal ruling. In the context of defendant class
actions, this means that we should pay particularly close attention to the
group dynamics that would operate if a court decided to class a group of
defendant individuals/firms. One of the most important, but overlooked,
dynamic effects of the class device is the creation of a new market for
information generation. Drawing on the work of Michael Abramowicz,
who has reviewed and made the normative case for integrating market
mechanisms into legal proceedings, this section focuses on how incentive
structures change when individuals are made members of a class. 100
1. Group Dynamics
In determining whether it is marginally beneficial to class a group
of individuals/firms as a defendant class, we have to know what the
"baseline" group dynamics are; i.e., if the court did nothing to class the
defendants, how would they likely act in the face of individual lawsuits?
Up to this point in the Article, the proposed theory has laid out only similarities between plaintiff and defendant class actions. This is consistent
with the argument that at a conceptual level, there is little to distinguish
plaintiff and defendant classes. In contrast to the conceptual and theoretical similarities, however, at the level of group dynamics, defendant and
plaintiff class actions have markedly different baselines. Specifically, I
argue that individual plaintiffs are (without any judicial intervention) less
likely than individual defendants to establish a "market relationship"
with others in their group.
I define "market relationship" as broadly as possible. I take market
relationship to mean any sort of relationship in which individuals/firms
act (or react) either directly or indirectly in response to actions (or reactions) by other individuals/firms. This concept of market relationship
considers not only traditional market elements such as collective action
and price adjustments, but also social psychological elements such as
herd mentality and the fundamental attribution error (where we fail to
recognize the effects of situation in determining human behavior). It also
emphasizes the ability of the market to produce information, and most
importantly, information on relative contributions to harm by defendants
or relative harm experienced by plaintiffs.
Defendant class actions have been promoted in the past few years as
a solution to dispersed defendants each generating a small amount of
damage through new technological means. Netto argues, for instance, in
favor of mandatory defendant class actions as a response to mass produc100. See generally Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-MarketsMovement, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
327, 408-30 (1999).
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tion and a "technologically savvy society with the propensity for massive
unlawful behavior."' 0 While defendant class actions may be useful in
this context, it is important not to view the defendant class device narrowly as only a response to technological innovation. A defendant class
may be useful more generally as an auction-like mechanism to produce
information about relative contributions to harm.
Auction mechanisms are already used in a variety of legal contexts.102 Auctions and exchange can serve important informational purposes. For instance, if plaintiffs are allowed to sell their claims to bidders, "[tihe price at which such shares trade in the secondary market provides an indication of the plaintiffs expected recovery at trial and thus
may dampen parties' abilities to puff in pretrial settlement bargaining."10 3
In the context of patent buy-outs, Michael Kremer has proposed that an
auction be used to determine the value of the patent.' 04 Applying similar
reasoning to defendant class actions, the class action device may be useful as a means of generating information about relative harms. 1os That
information can then be used for settlement purposes.
To illustrate how this information production might play out, consider a simple case in which two firms, A and B, are both defendants in a
case where negligence has caused 100 units of damage. The plaintiff firm
knows that it experienced damage of 100, but it does not know that Firm
A caused thirty percent of the damage and Firm B is responsible for seventy percent of the damage. To see how collectivization can be useful
even with just two firms as defendants, examine the pay-off matrices
with and without the defendant class device that are presented in Table 2.
Without knowing relative contributions to harm, and without joint
and several liability, Firm B will have an incentive in the settlement
stage to settle for fifty percent of the damage because Firm B knows that
if it goes to trial, it will be shown liable for seventy percent of the harm.
Firm A, however, faces a different incentive structure. Firm A would
rather litigate than settle for 50 because litigation will lead to liability for
only 30 units of the harm. If Firm A and Firm B are treated separately,
then the plaintiff (who we assume here knows nothing of the actual relative contributions) will likely settle with Firm B and proceed to litigate
101.
Netto, supra note 4, at 59.
102. See generally Abramowicz, supra note 100, at 335-52. Over twenty years ago, Marc
Shukaitis proposed a market for personal injury tort claims. Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal
Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 329-30 (1987).
103. Abramowicz, supra note 100, at 359-60.
104.
Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 1137, 1146-47 (1998).
105. The informational benefits of defendant class actions were recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1990, which noted that "[a] class suit may be especially useful in a case where putative class members refuse to identify themselves or deliberately act to avoid being controlled in
law." Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho, 556 N.E.2d 157, 164 (Ohio
1990).
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with Firm A. The non-class result, shaded in gray in Table 2, is thus a
transfer of 80 from the two firms to plaintiff.
Now consider what happens if the two firms are considered a single
class, held jointly and severally liable for the damage. Knowing that they
face a total payout of 100 if they litigate or settle, the choice will be to
settle. But now in the settlement stage, Firm A has an incentive to make
clear its contribution to harm, either through proceedings against Firm B
(more likely) or through negotiations with Firm B. Whichever route is
taken, information will be generated about relative contributions to harm;
information that would not have been generated in the world without
class certification.

Table 2. Pay Off Matrices With and Without Defendant Class Action

NO CLASS ACTION
Firm B
(70%)

Litigates
Settles

Firm A (3 0%)
Settles
Litigates
-50, -70
-30, -70
-30, -50
-50, -50

WITH DEFENDANT CLASS ACTION
Defendant Class: A + B (100%)

Litigates

Settles

-100

-100

The 2 x 2 matrix is admittedly greatly over-simplified, but it suggests a general point that incentives amongst the defendants change when
they are held liable as a class, and not just as individuals. For a group of
N defendants, the N defendants in the class have an incentive to work out
their proportional liability to the plaintiff. Of course, enforcement remains a challenge, and I will address that challenge in Part III of the paper on system design.
I should emphasize that my suggested approach does not always
lead to defendant class action certification. Rather, it looks for the marginal value that the class device potentially offers. In cases where all
defendants are jointly and severally liable, the class device will not significantly change the incentive structure already in place. A defendant
class device may also not be useful if all defendants are already bound
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through a single party. For instance, in Gaunt v. Brown,' 06 the U.S. District Court correctly concluded that since the case was being brought
against the Attorney General, there was not a need to certify a class of
local boards of elections (in a case challenging the age requirement for
elections). 07 In this case, since the entirety of the defendant class was
bound by law to follow the Ohio Attorney General's directives, the marginal value of the class device was zero. os
2. Comparing Defendant and Plaintiff Group Dynamics
I now consider a broader set of possible plaintiff and defendant dynamics. As a basis for discussion, Table 3 considers the possible combinations that might occur in a world where there are four types of groups:
(1) single firms/individuals, (2) a single dominant firm/individual, (3) an
intermediate number of firms/individuals, and (4) a large number of
firms/individuals. I assume that each group could find themselves either
on the plaintiff (harm bearing) or defendant (harm causing) side. This
generates 16 scenarios to consider. I sketch out what I believe would be
the "baseline" result; the likely result if there was no judicial certification
of a class on either side. I then offer my suggested "class outcome." In
other words, what would likely happen if the court decided to certify a
defendant class, a plaintiff class, or both?
The table reinforces that our focus should be on the difference between the baseline and class outcome columns. This is the marginal
value added by class certification. I have arranged the table so that every
other row flips the defendant and plaintiff sides. To make the table easier
to read, and to isolate the differences between defendant and plaintiff
class actions, I have highlighted the rows where defendant class actions
would be a possibility.

106.
341 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
107. Id. at 1193. The court argued:
We agree that if plaintiffs prevail this would be an appropriate case to designate as a
plaintiff class action. However, we are not persuaded that it should be designated as a defendant class action if plaintiffs prevail, inasmuch as the Secretary of State of the State of
Ohio is a party-defendant, and his duties are to advise members of local boards of elections as to proper methods of conducting elections. Also, the Secretary of State has the
further duty to "compel the observance by election of officers in the several counties of
the requirements of the election laws." Since the Secretary has the duty and power over
all the members whom plaintiffs would have us include in a defendant class action, the
need for a defendant class action is not apparent.
Id at 1192-93 (citations omitted).
108.
See id.
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Table 3. Comparison of baseline and predicted
class-outcomes for selected configurations of plaintiff and defendant groups
No.

PLAINTIFF
SIDE

DEFENDANT
SIDE

Who is sufferthe
ing
harm/damage
?

Who is causthe
ing
harm/damage
?

BASELINE

With no judicial class certification, what
do we expect
to see?
Single firm / Traditional tort
outcome: single
individual
party vs. single
party

I

Single firm /
individual

2

Single firm /
individual

Dominant firm,
controlling
>50% market
share

3

Dominant firm,
controlling
>50% market
share

Single firm / Dominant firm
will prosecute
individual
fully, defendant
the same

4

Single firm /
individual

Intermediate
number
of
firms, control<50%
ling
market share

Case against the
dominant firm,
dominant firm
litigate
will
fully

will
Plaintiff
enjoy
economies of scale;
Defendants
likely to bind
together
because they will
be joined as
named defendants (maybe
conspiracy
alleged),
and
will see benefits
of
collective
defense

CLASS
OUTCOME
What changes
if the court
classes defendants, plaintiffs, or both?
Optimal deterrence achieved
baseline;
at
class certification provides
no additional
value
Optimal deterrence achieved
at
baseline;
class certification provides
no additional
value
Optimal deterrence achieved
at
baseline;
class certification provides
no additional
value
If court certifies defendant
class
action,
optimal deterrence will be
achieved; But
even without
court certification,
defendants may bind
together when
they are sued
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Intermediate
Single firm /
number
of individual
firms, controlling
<50%
market share

6

Single firm
individual

/

Large number
of firms / individuals, each
controlling
very
small
market share

7

Large number
of firms / individuals,
each
controlling
small
very
market share

Single firm /
individual

8

Dominant firm,
controlling
>50% market
share

Dominant firm,
controlling
>50% market
share

9

Dominant firm,
controlling
>50% market
share

Intermediate
number
of
firms, control<50%
ling
market share

If firms cannot
overcome collective action
problem, they
will either drop
the case, or will
bring a case
without enough
resources
to
litigate
fully;
Defendant will
be able to enjoy
economies of
scale
If
plaintiff
cannot figure
out who is
causing
the
harm, may not
be able to bring
enough suits;
Defendants,
when sued, will
not be able to
match
resources
with
the plaintiff b
Plaintiffs will
not be able to
overcome collective action
problem
(the
traditional
plaintiff class
action); Defendant will enjoy
economies of
scale
Dominant firm
on both sides
should be able
to kick their
market
into
gear
Dominant
plaintiff
has
resources and
incentive
to
bring suit; defendant firms

[Vol. 88:1
if court certifies
plaintiff
class
action,
optimal deterrence will be
achieved a

If court certifies defendant
class
action,
optimal deterrence achieved
(so long as
ineconomic
centive issues
are corrected
for) b

If court certifies
plaintiff
class
action,
optimal deterrence will be
achieved

Optimal deterrence achieved
at
baseline;
class certification not necessary

if court certifies defendant
class
action,
optimal deterrence will be
achieved; But
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Dominant firm,
Intermediate
number
of controlling
firms, control- >50% market
ling
<50% share
market share

11

Dominant firm,
controlling
>50% market
share

12

Large number
of firms / indieach
viduals,
controlling
small
very
market share

Large number
of firms / individuals, each
controlling
small
very
market share

Dominant firm,
controlling
>50% market
share

will likely find
it beneficial to
work together
as named defendants in the
same suit
If firms cannot
overcome collective action
problem, they
will either drop
the case, or will
bring a case
without enough
resources
to
litigate
fully;
Defendant firm
will kick market into gear
if
plaintiff
cannot figure
out who is
causing
the
harm, may not
be able to bring
enough suits;
Defendants,
when sued, will
not be able to
rematch
with
sources
the plaintiff b
Plaintiffs will
not be able to
overcome collective action
problem
(the
traditional
plaintiff class
action); Defendant will be
able to defend
itself and generate informational market

103
without
even
court certification, defendants
may bind together
when
they are sued
If court certiplaintiff
fies
class
action,
optimal deterrence will be
achieved; but
class certification may not be
necessary

If court certifies defendant
class
action,
optimal deterrence achieved
(so long as
economic

in-

centive issues
corrected
are
for)b

If court certiplaintiff
fies
class
action,
optimal deterrence will be
achieved

104
13

14

15
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Intermediate
number
of
firms, controlling
<50%
market share

Intermediate
number
of
firns, controlling
<50%
market share
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Indeterminate.
Both sides may
face collective
action
problems, but both
have a chance
to
overcome
them.

Class
action
certification, on
either side, will
promote optimal deterrence
if
collective
action
problems are serious.
Intermediate
Large number Large number of Certification of
number
of of firms / indi- defendants
both defendant
firms, control- viduals, each makes it more and
plaintiff
ling
<50% controlling
difficult
for classes
may
market share
very
small plaintiffs
to lead to optimal
overcome collec- lead t opia
market share
tive action prob- deterrence
lems
Large number Intermediate
Plaintiffs
are Certification of
of firms / indi- number
of not likely to plaintiff class
viduals,
each firms, control- overcome col- would promote
controlling
ling
<50% lective action optimal detervery
small market share
problems
rence; Defenmarket share
dants may need
class certification as well

16

Large number Large number Neither
side Certification of
of firms / indi- of firms / indi- will be able to both classes is
viduals,
each viduals, each overcome col- required
to
controlling
controlling
lective action obtain optimal
very
small very
small problems
deterrence
market share
market share
NOTES: a. See Rosenberg (2000), supra note 32. b. See Hamdani & Klement
(2005), supra note 6.

Perhaps the most interesting (and contentious) action in Table 3 occurs when we compare rows 4-5 and rows 9-10. In each case, we are
flipping the "intermediate" number of firms from the defendant to the
plaintiff side. The crux of my argument is that it is more likely for this
mid-size group to overcome collective action problems when they are on
the defendant side. The reason for this logic is straightforward; on the
defendant side, parties do not have to initiate the proceedings. In fact, if
the plaintiffs name them all as defendants in a suit, they have had much
of the informational work of identification done for them. To the extent
that this happens, defendants already take concerted actions when sued
by a plaintiff. The court's class certification would be functionally redundant, and the marginal value of class certification would be minimal.
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Defendant class actions are likely to have more value when defendants are less capable of somehow binding themselves together. This
failure is most likely to happen in two scenarios: (1) when identification
and monitoring is not possible or practical, or (2) when enforcement of
group "rules" is not possible or practical. Both challenges open the door
for significant free riding. In Section III, on system design, I consider
both of these issues and possible legal remedies to correct for them.
3. A Closer Look at What Binds Individuals in a Potential Defendant Class
Another way to think about the difference between plaintiff and defendant class actions is to see that in the plaintiff class action case, the
individual plaintiffs are passive harm-takers. In the defendant class action cases, the individual defendants are active harm-makers. This distinction leads to important differences between plaintiff and defendant
classes in terms of the ex ante market relationships that may develop.
Three types of relationships are likely to exist between individual defendants: (1) they are all conducting market transactions with a single (or
small set of closely related) firms; (2) they are all legally bound in a government organization; (3) they are all voluntarily bound in an organization of their own making. In the first case, adjustments can be made via
price levels. In the second and third cases, contracting can be worked out
through the governing organizations. It is only when none of these relationships exist that we see a need for defendant class actions.
What distinguishes the harm caused by small defendants, as opposed to the harm caused by large firm defendants, is the indirect nature
of the small defendants' action. In almost every case where defendant
class actions seem apt, there is a "market" intermediary. For instance, in
the context of securities fraud, the defendant security underwriters were
not hired by individual plaintiffs, but were working through some firm.
In the context of other corporate fraud, middle managers and others in
the firm who acted wrongly were all bound via contract to the same employer. In the context of state/local officials, they are causing harm by
virtue of their role within the state government/legal system. In the context of music downloading, individuals are working with the help of several intermediaries: their Internet Service Provider, their software maker,
etc.
To make this argument clearer, consider these two contrasting hypotheticals. First, consider a standard plaintiff class action in which a
firm has a poorly constructed factory, which sits on the corner of a busy
intersection. Everyday bricks fall off the building and cause damage to
passing cars. Because the damage is always minor, the cars never stop,
and no potential plaintiff ever brings a case. A plaintiff class action
would be necessary here because there is likely no ex ante market relationship between those who have been harmed. They were each harmed
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directly by the firm, with no intermediary; the brick fell directly on their
car.
Now consider a second hypothetical. A big firm has an old factory
that they no longer use. The factory, however, has bricks that are very
valuable if taken and re-sold. Imagine that individuals go up to this factory and remove one brick at a time. No single person takes more than
one brick. Setting aside, for now, the question of what precautions the
firm could take to stop this, let's consider the relationship between these
individual brick-stealers. It could be that each brick-stealer randomly
wandered up to the factory, in the same way that the car drivers randomly drove past the brick-drop intersection. But it is more plausible that
the brick-stealers share common traits; common traits that make them
more likely to belong to one of the three types of ex ante markets laid out
above. In this case, they are probably all selling their bricks on similar
markets. They could also belong to a brick collector's society.109
When relationships such as these exist between defendants, the defendant firm can find convenient entry points for litigation. It need not
necessarily resort to a defendant class action because it can go after the
agency, organization, or other binding agent between the defendants. For
example, when authors and publishers of the American Society of Composers tried to move against the Girl Scouts for copyright infringementfor singing copyrighted songs around the campfire-the plaintiff authors
and publishers did not have to go after thousands of young Girl Scout
members nationwide." 0 Instead, the plaintiffs went directly to the national organization that binds the girl scouts together."' The push toward
potentially making Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") liable in illegal
music downloading can be understood in a similar vein." 2
C. Aggregate Analysis
The aggregate analysis principle adds an extra layer to both the forward-looking deterrence and the dynamic effects principles. The aggregate analysis principle holds that we should look at deterrence and dynamic effects at an aggregate, system-wide level. In this section I will

show how the analysts discussing both the Internet and corporate fraud
examples have missed this aggregate picture.

109. The hard case, a version of which I consider in the system design section, would be if they
each found the brick valuable for some reason that didn't require re-sale, e.g., as a mantle piece.
I 10. See Ken Ringle, ASCAP Changes its Tune; Never Intended to Collect Fees for Scouts'
Campfire Songs, Group Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1996, at C03.
Ill. See id.
112. See, for example, In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003),
where Judge Posner upheld the grant of a preliminary injunction against a website that provided filesharing services that were ultimately used for violation of federal copyright law by individual members of the public.
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1. Cost Benefit Considerations
At the outset, a distinction should be made between (1) an overall
cost-benefit valuation; i.e., do we want to reduce the activity or care levels of downloading of copyrighted material? And, (2) a comparison of
the cost of precautions versus the benefit of harm reduction associated
with that precaution. Conflating these two distinct evaluations may lead
to some confusion. To make each stage clear, I will label the first costbenefit analysis process "valuation" and the second (applying the
Fried/Rosenberg framework), "determining optimal precautions."
In both stages, an aggregate perspective is important. At the valuation stage, aggregation means we must determine overall how much utility is being lost, and how much utility is being gained from a particular
activity which individuals or firms are engaging in. Class actions factor
into this analysis in a preliminary way; it is more likely that we will have
aggregate analysis when there is a class action then when there is not.
The reason is that courts will have to consider welfare/utility across all
members of the class, not just the ones listed on the court documents as
representatives. When adjudicating, courts will weigh both sides at the
aggregate level.
2. Aggregate Analysis of Internet Governance
When discussions of Internet governance are raised, popular (and to
a large extent academic) discussion has focused on illegal file sharing.113
Jonathan Zittrain argues that such a narrow focus is greatly misguided:
"Current scholarship about 'Internet governance' largely fails to appreciate this larger picture, rendering most of its deliberations absurdly narrow, with public policy recommendations that have a near-uselessly short
shelf life ....

"ll4 Zittrain is announcing an aggregate analysis principle,

suggesting that analysts should be considering more than simply the issue immediately before them.
The aggregate analysis principle has great bite in the Internet context because of the Internet's great "generativity." Zittrain defines "generativity" as a function of (1) how deeply a technology leverages a set of
possible tasks; (2) its "adaptability to a range of different tasks"; (3) its
"ease of mastery"; and (4) its "accessibility."' The Internet provides a

113.
For a summary of this literature, see generally JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). The three cases in this area cited most often are: MGM
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Aimster, 334 F.3d 634; A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
114. Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet-And How to Save It 30 (Feb. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Denver University Law Review) (draft version 1.6 of the Zittrain's book published in 2008).
115. Id. at 1981.
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new "generative grid" whose potential is still being realized. 11 6 What
does talk of a generative grid, or of the Internet so generally, mean for
defendant class actions? It means that our analysis of defendant class
actions in the Internet context cannot rest solely on the costs of filesharing. Rather, it must also consider how file sharing may contribute to
generative goods.
Hamdani and Klement provide an example of analysis that stops
short. They introduce considerations of overall social welfare in their
analysis of a proposed class defense mechanism, but do not carry out an
aggregate analysis. In considering a hypothetical lawsuit from the RIAA
against an individual, for instance, Hamdani and Klement detail how an
individual's incentive will be to settle for $3,000, even when they have
done nothing illegal.1 17 They argue, correctly, that "the ex post settlement
decisions of defendants impact the ex ante decisions of other Internet
users" whether to download music.' But it does not necessarily follow,
as they argue in the next sentence, that "[w]hen defendants settle even
when they may have a good defense, there is a considerable risk of excessively deterring music downloads by .

.

. Internet users."'

The rea-

son it does not necessarily follow is that optimal deterrence must be determined at an aggregate level. In other words, we may want to deter
perfectly legitimate uses of file-sharing (and therefore make some innocents pay $3,000) if we believe that it will benefit society overall (by
keeping the bad guys out of the game). By the same logic, we may want
to allow illegal file-sharing by some crooks, if we believe that it will
benefit society overall (by letting the good guys stay in the game).
This Article takes no substantive position on what the legal rule
should be about file sharing; i.e., whether we should hold Internet Service Providers (ISPs) liable, or whether the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA") properly assigns liability.120 This Article does, however,
116. The generative grid phrase is Zittrain's. See id. at 1975. Scholarship is emerging to try and
assess the myriad of effects the Internet has had on our lives. See, e.g., Eugene Borgida & Emily N.
Stark, New Media and Politics: Some Insights From Social and Political Psychology, 48 AM.

BEHAV. SCIENTIST 467, 467 (2004) (investigating "the extent to which the Internet is providing ...
an important and increasingly influential forum for acquiring politically relevant information").
117.
Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 701. The reason is that they face a decision between
settling for $3,000 or going through a lawsuit for $50,000 just to avoid payment.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
The DMCA was signed into law in 1998, and among other things, holds ISPs liable for
their users' illegal actions if the ISPs do not follow guidelines laid out by the Act (e.g. removing
offensive material, reporting violations, etc.). See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 1also take no view here
as to whether it is in the Record Company's best long term interest to prosecute file-swappers. Some
have suggested that alternative strategies may be better suited:
Coverage of the lawsuits could hurt as much as help the anti-piracy crusade. Anthony
Prapkanis, a University of California-Santa Cruz professor of social psychology, says that
while people may be sympathetic to the music industry's plight, "the image is out there of
the bully ganging up on people with the least amount of money, the rich taking from the
poor."
Jefferson Graham, RIAA Lawsuits Bring Consternation, Chaos, USA TODAY, Sept. 10, 2003, at 4D.
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argue that we should assess the DMCA, and related decisions such as In
re Aimster Copyright Litigation,121 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc.,'22 and MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,123 under the aggregate
analysis principle. At a minimum, this will involve incorporation of several strands of literature such as economic analysis of the effects of individuals' copyright infringement,124 as well as analysis of actual usage of
a file-sharing program, especially estimates of usage for illegal versus
legal purposes. 125 More importantly, such aggregate analysis also demands that courts take seriously the technological aspects of the cases
they are dealing with. In the context of file-sharing, for instance, the future is not in limiting the ability to trade, but in limiting the ability to
play, via Digital Rights Management ("DRM"). 12 6 Mark Stefik has observed that despite the fact that "[e]veryday experience with computers
has led many to believe that anything digital is ripe for copying . . .
[b]ehind the scenes . .. technology is altering the balance once again."l27

121.
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
122. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
123.
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
124.
In the context of music file-sharing, there remains an empirical debate over the effect of
illegal file sharing on music sales. See, e.g., Kai-Lung Hui & Ivan Png, Piracy and the Legitimate
Demand for Recorded Music, 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y (2003), available at
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol2/issl/artll/ ("[T]he demand for music CDs decreased with piracy, suggesting that 'theft' outweighed the 'positive' effects of piracy. However, the
impact of piracy on CD sales was considerably less than estimated by industry."); Stan J. Liebowitz,
File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction? 32 (Ctr. for the Analysis of Prop.
Rights, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004), available at http://som.utdallas.edu/centers/capri/
documents/destruction.pdf (finding that the evidence seems compelling that file-sharing is responsible for the recent large decline in CD sales for which it has been blamed); Felix Oberholzer &
Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (Mar. 2004),
available at http://www.unc.edul-cigar/papers/FileSharing March2004.pdf (unpublished working
paper) ("Downloads have an effect on sales which is statistically indistinguishable from zero, despite
rather precise estimates. [But], these estimates are of moderate economic significance and are inconsistent with claims that file sharing is the primary reason for the recent decline in music sales.");
Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement,
and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10874, Oct. 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0874.pdf ("[D]ownloading
reduces their per capita expenditure (on hit albums released 1999-2003) from $126 to $100 but
raises per capita consumer welfare by $70."); Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Effect of Online
Music Piracy on Music Sales (2004), available at http://economics.uchicago.eduldownload/

musicindustryoctl2.pdf (unpublished working paper) (finding that peer-to-peer usage reduces the
probability of buying music by an average of 30 percent, and that without file sharing, sales in 2002
would have been around 7.8 percent higher).
Some evidence from Russia suggests that even amongst young people, use of the Internet
125.
for illegal file-sharing is not a common activity. Oxana Palesh, Kasey Saltzman & Cheryl Koopman,
Internet Use and Attitudes Towards Illicit Internet Use Behavior in a Sample of Russian College
Students, 7 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAv. 553, 553 (2004) ("Among Internet users, most reported
having Internet access either at home or at a friends' home, and 16 % reported having Internet access
from work, school, or a computer center. Among Internet users, the main purpose was for schoolrelated activities (60%), followed by e-mail (55%), entertainment (50%), chatting (24%), and searching for pornography (6%).").
126.
For an introduction, see ROB FRIEDEN & CHRISTY CARPENTER, DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT 2, 6 (2004).
Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCI. AM., Mar. 1997, at 78, 78.
127.
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If courts are not aware, or deliberately choose to avoid discussion of
what's going on "behind the scenes," then their rulings and analyses are
not only likely to be out-dated, but also could be seriously flawed. For
instance, what if DRM technology had already advanced to a stage where
recording artists could protect (with great assurance) everything they
wanted to, but courts (unaware of this development) went ahead with a
legal regime that severely limited file sharing? The result would be overdeterrence. On the other hand, if courts errantly believed that DRM had
reached a point where the state-of-the-art was to produce files incapable
of being pirated (when in fact this was not the case), they would underdeter file-swapping. The substantive analysis is beyond the scope of this
Article, but I have aimed to demonstrate that if courts do not take technological considerations into account, they violate the aggregate analysis
principle, and likely produce sub-optimal outcomes as a result.
3. Aggregate Analysis of Corporate Wrongdoing
At first glance, the high-profile corporate wrongdoing over the past
few years may seem an odd place to think about defendant class actions.
The defendants are not numerous, hard to identify, or judgment proof.
Why, then, should we consider defendant class actions a potentially useful tool? The answer, as it did in the Internet context, centers on the realization that there is something more going on here than simply the actions of the named defendants. In the Internet case, that "something
more" is more readily identifiable: complex and changing technologies
are clearly tied into the cases at bar. In the corporate fraud cases, the
"something more" is subtler.
Drawing on social psychology and research on the corporate environment, the "something more" that a defendant class action can aim its
reach at is the "situation" or "corporate climate" that may contribute
mightily to fraud and wrongdoing.128 There is a longstanding consensus
amongst social psychologists that we commit a "fundamental attribution
error" in attributing actions to individual choices, rather than to situational pressures. As articulated by Phillip Zimbardo and Michael
Leippe, "we tend to look for the person in the situation more than we
search for the situation that makes the person."l 29 The value of a defendant class action is that it has the potential to get at the "situation" because it will implicate virtually everyone working in the office.
128. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction To The Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, And Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 129, 201,
221-30 (2003) (providing an introduction to social psychology literature in the corporate law context); see also Christopher W. Williams, Paul R. Lees-Haley & J. Randall Price, The Role of Counterfactual Thinking and Causal Attribution in Accident-Related Judgments, 26 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2100, 2109-10 (1996) (providing an introduction to the implications of the attribution
theory in the legal arena).
129.
PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATrITUDE CHANGE AND
SOCIAL INFLUENCE 93 (199 1).
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Research and expert commentary on the corporate environment
suggests that situational pressures to commit wrongs are indeed intense.
When he talked about the "numbers game" that corporate executives
sometimes play, former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt suggested "that
almost everyone in the financial community shares responsibility . . .
[and] [clorporate management isn't operating in a vacuum. In fact, the
different pressures and expectations placed by, and on, various participants in the financial community appear to be almost selfperpetuating."13 0 One of the most comprehensive studies of moral action
in the workplace is Robert Jackall's study, Moral Mazes.131 Jackall engaged in extensive case studies of two firms, and found that most middle
managers would sacrifice their own morals in order to fit in: "Team play
also means . . . 'aligning oneself with the dominant ideology of the mo-

ment,' or. . . 'bowing to whichever god currently holds sway."'l32

If it is the case that it is not just a few top executives that are contributing to the harm caused by the firm, then a legal regime which points
liability solely toward those CEOs is not likely to achieve optimal deterrence. Consider Federal Insurance Co. v. Tyco International Ltd.,3

where separate actions were brought against former Tyco CEO Dennis
Kozlowski, former chief lawyer Mark Belnick, and former CFO Mark
Swartz.1 34 From a deterrence perspective, members of society (and most
especially Tyco shareholders) did not care who actually cooked the
books. What society wants is for this sort of firm behavior not to happen
again in the future, by Tyco, or by any otherfirm. In order to achieve that
deterrence objective, we must have an understanding of the causal factors for the fraud. To the extent that it was not just a few "bad apples,"
but instead is in part driven systematically by certain kinds of corporate
cultures, we want a legal device that can possibly change those cultures.
A defendant class action might do that. In operation, if future members
of a firm knew that they could be held liable (as a defendant class member) for any harm caused by the firm, it seems more likely that they
would stand up to their bosses when asked to do illegal tasks.
4. Additional Comments on Aggregate Analysis
In response to likely concerns, two additional comments should be
made in regards to aggregate analysis. First, is aggregate analysis too
much for the courts to handle? I believe not, as courts (themselves and in
conjunction with administrative agencies) already engage in substantial,

130. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the New York University
Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998).
131.
SIMON JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988).
132. Id.at 52.
133.
422 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
134. Id. at 360.
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aggregate cost-benefit analysis.' 35 It can also be said that even if courts at
present are not well-equipped to handle these sorts of analyses, there may
be other parts of the system that courts can out-source to carry out the
analysis. The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") frequently
engages in these sorts of analyses.
My final comment is one that bends in a normative direction. When
taken together as a pair, the Internet and corporate fraud examples make
it clear that defendant class actions are not designed to go after a particular kind of group, i.e., "the little guy" or the "big, bad corporation."
Rather, the defendant class action is a neutral tool that can be employed
whenever it is needed to kick-start informational markets into gear.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section of the paper identifies the major challenges courts face
in implementing defendant class actions. Although the challenges are
significant, I build on the proposals made by Netto and put forth a number of system design elements which may make defendant class actions
more feasible and more capable of achieving the objective of optimal
deterrence.
In addition to the Internet and corporate fraud examples which I
have already discussed, this section will also address a third, more difficult, type of case: the case where there are defendants who appear to
have no connection to each other. To make this hard case concrete, let's
consider the following scenario. One-hundred thousand individuals
across the world illegally sneak a camera into their local movie theatre
and digitally record a blockbuster movie. They then show this digital
movie to their friends and family, who consequently do not pay for either
movie admission or for the DVD when it is released. This is a case where
there is no discernible "market" relationship between any of the defendants. Note that it is not the size of the class that matters, but the relationship between them. There could be one million illegal tapers of the
movie, but if they all acted independently there would still be no easy
way to tie them together as a class. As I proceed with my discussion of
system design, I will return to this hard case and how the general theory
of defendant class actions should be applied to it.
A. PreliminaryConsiderations
A discussion of defendant class action implementation must begin
with a discussion of principles. In this Section I lay out several funda135. See Robert W. Hahn, Policy Watch: Government Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of
Regulation, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 201-10 (1998) (discussing the cost-benefit analysis in the
government context); see also David Whiteman, The Fate of Policy Analysis in Congressional
Decision Making: Three Types of Use in Committees, 38 W. POL, Q. 294, 297 (1985) (discussing
aggregate principles used in the legislative decision-making process).
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mental functions of tort law that the defendant class action must serve.
To be sure, these are not the only functions of tort law. Nevertheless,
they serve as a useful starting point for constructing, from the bottom up,
a system in which the defendant class action can play a central role.
1. Insurance and Redistributive Functions of Tort Law
The tort system serves an insurance and redistributive function as
well as a deterrence function.' In the context of defendant class actions,
if the harm to the plaintiff can be identified, it does not seem that having
a large number of small harms (as opposed to a single large harm) should
affect insurance availability or premiums. If there were a market for
these insurance claims, this situation might be different because having a
larger number of smaller claims would make it more difficult for insurers
to get paid.137 Questions of redistribution are taken up again under the
issue of fee-shifting and making sure that class defendants have proper
economic incentives to fully litigate a defense for the entire class.
2. Deference to the Market and Legislative Bodies
I adopt the position that as a guiding principle, courts should be deferential to the market they find in operation. As Fried and Rosenberg
observe, "[n]o logical impediment exists to the market's serving as a full
substitute for legal intervention to achieve the social objective of ensuring optimal precautions."l 38 Because the cost-benefit calculations, especially at the aggregate level, can be quite complicated, I also take the
position that courts should be deferential to legislatures and administrative bodies that have conducted research on particular issues. Where
courts see that legislatures are captured by interest groups whose goals
may not be based on objective analysis and research, and when legislatures are not adhering to the principle of aggregate analysis, then they
should take more independent actions.
3. Activity and Care Levels
Throughout considerations of system design, it is important to keep
in mind the distinction between activity levels and care levels. This is a
point seemingly missed by Hamdani and Klement. Using the Hamdani
and Klement example, individuals may react to RIAA litigation in one of
two general ways. First, they may simply reduce their activity level. This
is the only possibility that the authors consider.139 But second, individuals may react to RIAA litigation by increasing their care level. They may
136. See FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 55, 69-70.
137. David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in
Tort Claims I (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus. Discussion Paper No. 395, 2002),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/. I leave this question for another day,
as currently such a market does not exist.
138. See FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 45.
139. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 724.
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take extra measures to insure that they are not found liable. This care
level adjustment may take one of two forms. It may take the traditional
form of trying to avoid the harm; i.e., downloading only with approved
programs. But it may also take another form of trying to avoid detection.
The distinct possibility of this "circumvention care" is particularly important to consider in the context of defendant class actions involving
technology.
B. Identification & Monitoring
Identifying exactly who is generating the harm/risk may arise as an
acute problem in the defendant class action context. Initially, there are
several distinctions to make. First, in order to work effectively, class
members need to identify not only who is causing the harm, but also how
much marginal contribution is being made by each member. Monitoring
can be introduced here as a form of "repeated identification"-reevaluating on a regular basis who is in the market and what their market
share is. Depending on the stability and fluidity of the market, this monitoring may be more or less costly.
A second distinction to make is between "ability" and "feasibility"
to identify harm/risk producers. Prohibitively high identification costs
may make it infeasible for identification to occur in some situations
when it is theoretically possible (in a costless world). Putting these two
concepts together, the identification problem can be considered along a
continuum. Table 4 provides a rough outline of the scope of this problem.

Table 4. The Scope of the Identification Problem
Perfect ID

Strong ID

Mid-Strong
ID

Mid-Weak
ID

Weak ID

No ID

Know who
caused the
harm and
each party's
marginal
contributions

Know who
caused the
harm, a
little less
sure of
marginal
contributions

Not entirely
sure who
caused
harm, but
can narrow
it down, and
can do the
same for
marginal
contributions

Know the
general
"group" of
people who
caused the
harm, but
not the
specific
individuals
in the
"group,"
and know
nothing of
marginal
contributions

Not entirely
sure which
"groups"
are responsible, and
have no idea
of marginal
contributions to
harm

Do
not
know
who
caused
the
harm
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1. Legal Tools to Address the Problem of Identification
Looking at Table 4, the goal of the legal system should be to enable
parties to move as far as possible to the left, toward the ideal of perfect
identification. There are three plausible ways that the legal system might
improve identification of defendants and their relative contributions to
harm. As a first cut, the legal system can use sub-classes to reduce its
workload. Sub-classes will be most beneficial when it is easier to identify
the marginal causal contribution of some members of the defendant
class, relative to others. In practice, courts have carved out sub-classes in
larger defendant class actions since at least 1968.140 By breaking up the
larger class, the court reduces the number of individuals on the right
hand side of the table. In an Alabama case, where all state registrars of
voters were made into a defendant class, the court administered its ruling
on the basis of different sub-classes. 14 1 The "harm" in this Alabama case
was to convicted felons who were thrown off the voter rolls.142 The court
found that some counties had done more harm than others, and appropriately tailored their remedy. 143 The same logic can be applied by courts in
other defendant class action contexts.
The second option courts can undertake is to create incentives for
self-identification by adjusting presumptions on marginal contribution to
harm, and then allowing for rebuttal of that presumption with sufficient
evidence. To flesh this out, it is helpful to consider the numerical example in Table 5. Let's assume that a plaintiff has experienced total harm of
500, and has won in court. The defendant class is composed of 100 individuals, and neither the plaintiff nor the court knows which defendants
produced what amount of harm. Each individual defendant does not
know the other defendant's contribution to harm, but he knows his own.
He knows how many people are in the class, so he knows that the average harm is 5. Let's say that the distribution is as presented in Table 5.

140. See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 725-27
(N.D. Ill. 1968) (finding a defendant class appropriate in a patent infringement case, and in administering it, creating several sub-classes).
141.
Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
142. See id.
See id. at 367-68.
143.
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Table 5. Hypothetical: Contributions to Harm
6
5
4
3
2
[A] Individual con-
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8

10

TOTAL

tribution to harm:

[B] Number of individuals:
[A] x [B]

5

25

25

15

10

10

10

100

10

75

100

75

60

80

100

500

=

[C] Sub-Total
Harm:

of

The puzzle is this: if we cannot directly observe their contributions
to harm, how do we get the various sub-groups to volunteer, ex post,
information about their contributions to harm? Courts may be able to use
damage assignments as a carrot-and-stick. In this example, instead of
setting the average damage payment for defendants at 5, courts could set
it at 8. Initially such a move would strike off over-deterrence because
total damages would equal 800. But courts could, at the same time they
set damages to 8, offer defendant class members a chance to reduce their
liability to 6 if they can show that they contributed less than 8 to harm. In
this example, 80 people would rationally come forward to get their liability reduced by 2. The 10 in the "8 category" would break even, and the
10 in the "10" category would get away with 2. Total damages would
thus be 800 - 160 = 640. There is likely some over-deterrence here, but it
should be noted that the over-deterrence is the cost of identification.
Over time, courts could calibrate their carrot-and-stick game.
A third option, which is probably quite costly and therefore not as
practical, is for the court to appoint a guardian or special master specifically for the purpose of determining marginal contributions to risk.
Guardians have been a frequent topic of discussion in the class action
context.144 Here, "special master" may be a more appropriate title, but the
person charged with the responsibility of looking at contributions to
harm will also likely be faced with questions of settlement and infighting as well.
In addition to these mechanisms, courts must also recognize that
their choice of representative can affect information production.145 A

144. See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring
Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 26-28 (2002) (discussing private lawyers' roles in the
"guardian" class-action context and who should supervise those lawyers); see also Edward Brunet,
Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
403, 466 (2003) ("The theory of appointing a guardian ad litem is deceptively simple. The guardian
will represent the interests of the absent class members and thereby monitor the behavior of class
and defense counsel during settlement negotiations.").
145. Courts have long recognized the problem of defendant class representation, but not usually through the lens of information production. In In re the Gap Stores Sec. Litig., the court noted as
follows:
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common problem with large defendant classes is how many and which
defendants should be assigned as class representatives. Courts have encountered what I call the "red rover" problem; just as in the game red
rover, where kids seek to run through the weakest link on the other side,
plaintiffs want to pick the weakest link as the defendant class representative. Such was the case in Leon N. Weiner & Assocs., Inc. v. Krapf,146
where a corporate lot owner sought to name just one lot owner as representative of a class of 203 lot owners.1 47 The corporate owner sought
declaratory judgment that its property was not subject to restrictions, and
the alleged "harm" the corporate owner experienced was the potential
restrictions on the land as carried by other lot owners.148
Faced with this situation, the court recognized that the single named
defendant was not in a position to adequately produce information on the
many possible restrictions that might arise from the deeds of other lot
owners.149 The court concluded that the plaintiff corporate owner "selected one neighbor to represent the property interests of 203 lot owners,
many of whom will likely have different interests and views. The effect
of Weiner's motion is to place the costs of notice, discovery and litigation on the shoulders of the Krapfs."150 Such costs would make it virtually impossible for the defendant representative to engage his peers and
kick-start the information market.' 5 1
C. Enforcement
Even in some situations in which identification and monitoring are
practical, enforcement may not be. Here, "enforcement" means getting
other defendant class members to contribute to (i) the litigation costs, and
then (ii) if necessary, the damage costs as well. Enforcement is difficult
because without a well-working network between defendants (i.e., without an umbrella organization), no single class member (or even a small
pocket of class members who may be strongly connected) can achieve
Commentators have frequently criticized the potential for inadequate representation of
defendant classes. Because the named defendant generally does not seek his representative status and often vehemently opposes it, a court may fear that an unwilling representative will necessarily be a poor one. Related to this concern is the fear that the plaintiff
will exercise his power of selection to appoint a weak, ineffective opponent as class representative. "It is a strange situation where one side picks out the generals for the enemy's
army."
79 F.R.D. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citations omitted).
146.
No. 8938, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988).
147. Id. at *L.
Id. at *4.
148.
149. Id. at *8-9.
150. Id. at *9.
A similar analysis was made in a case in Illinois where a single owner of a Shell gas
151.
station was proposed as representative of a class of all Shell gas owners in the state. In rejecting this
proposed representative, the court reasoned, "The entire economic burden of defending the present
suit was thrust upon one man, Razowsky. His financial stake in the outcome of the suit was not
shown to be greater than that of any other of the hundreds of Shell dealers in Illinois." Gaffney v.
Shell Oil Co., 312 N.E.2d 753, 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
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the economies of scale required to effectively enforce group-wide policies. In the face of such an enforcement problem, individuals ex ante
would look to the legal system to provide mechanisms for making enforcement feasible.
On this enforcement point Hamdani and Klement offer a useful
analysis with their class defense proposal. They propose a "class defense" mechanism, a "defendant-initiated procedure designed to create
parity between a single plaintiff and a group of similarly positioned defendants." 5 2 With help from the court (via fee-shifting), a defendant
could use Hamdani and Klement's class defense procedure to reach out
and essentially force contributions from the entire class.' 5 3 Hamdani and
Klement's proposal allows defendants to class themselves with less judicial intervention than would currently be required. Legal tools that make
it easier for aggregation of claims promote the aggregate analysis principle, and thus the forward-looking deterrence principle as well.
Hamdani and Klement's proposal runs into trouble, however, when
we reach the hard hypothetical case of the blockbuster movie DVDs.
Suppose that through some investigation, the movie's production studio
is able to identify 100 of the 100,000 people who illegally taped the
movie. Suppose too that the movie studio then asks for certification of a
defendant class for all illegal recorders (which they have estimated at
100,000 based on lost revenue from movie tickets and DVD sales). The
problem at this point is that even if the defendants "class" themselves, no
single defendant is in a position to serve as a representative for the entire
class. Even when the hundred identified defendants put their resources
together, it is not going to scale up enough to match the movie studio's
legal resources. This is a problem because the issues may not be fully
litigated. For instance, perhaps the movie studio made some contribution
to the harm, which would not come out unless the defendant class had
better representation.
To deal with this hard case, it is helpful to recall that a forwardlooking court hopes to minimize similar harms like these from arising in
the future.15 4 In order to arrive at optimal deterrence, we need to conduct
aggregate analysis. In this hard case, the only way to achieve fully litigated aggregate analysis would be for the court to incur tremendous costs
and essentially fund a legal team for the defendant class. The great majority of the defendant class remains anonymous, and thus would not
contribute to a pool to fund the legal fees. Given these prohibitive costs,
and the requirement of aggregate analysis which fails in this hard case,
152.

Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 7 10.

153.
The procedure assumes that identification and monitoring are possible. If a defendant has
no idea who else is in his class, he will not obtain maximum benefits from classing himself.
154.
"Fairness" to this particular group of movie tapers or to the production company is not, in
the general welfare framework of this article, at issue.
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the general theory of this Article suggests that here, defendant class actions will not be an optimal legal tool.' 55
While defendant class actions are not optimal in these hard cases, it
should be emphasized that such cases are very rare in practice. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, for instance, usually seems to find
a few "big players" or some other market mechanisms by which to identify representatives for the diverse parties involved in litigation. The actual cases where defendant class actions have been certified also point to
consistent findings of links between defendants. 156 More generally, it is
difficult to find frequently occurring instances in which there are no
market relationships between defendants in a potential defendant class.
D. Free Riding
The free riding problem is the result of identification, monitoring,
and enforcement failures. Examining the defendant class action, there are
two types of free rider problems we need to consider. The first is most
analogous to the hypothetical case already discussed in Section I. It is
where a class-wide defense would be beneficial to all defendants, but no
single defendant can fund the defense adequately because they cannot
extract payments from the free-riders in their class. As Netto has pointed
out, "Only economy of scale in investment in the lawsuit can overcome
the problem of the reluctance of defendants to assume the litigation as
class representative. This objective is achieved with incentives for the
class counsel through an optimal mechanism of compensation for his
performance."' 57 In these cases, an individual ex ante would desire that
the legal system provide a means by which the defense can be properly
funded. Individual defendants would desire a mast-tying device.
But a second sort of free-riding problem may also exist. This second
type of free-riding problem arises when the defendants would not be
better off if they all stopped causing the harm. Rather, it is society that
would be better off because the utility that the defendants are deriving

Although they arrived at the conclusion by different means, the court in Angel Music, Inc.
155.
v. ABC Sports, Inc., a copyright case with a large potential class of copyright infringers, denied class
certification. 112 F.R.D. 70, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The Angel court based its ruling on the lack of
connections between defendants, and issues of standing. Id. at 77. The plaintiff, Angel Music, argued
that "the members of the defendant class have engaged in a common violation of the Copyright Act
which places their actions within the juridical link exception to LaMar," but the court recognized
that no such relationship existed. Id. at 75-76. What the court could have also said was that when
confronted with this hard case of copying infringement, a class device was not likely to create links
between future defendants in similar situations.
In a defendant class action brought under the Sherman anti-trust laws, for instance, Co156.
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) targeted the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) in order to get at the numerous defendant
musicians and performers in the proposed class. Broad. Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979).
Netto, supranote 4, at 93.
157.
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from their harmful behavior is not equal to the dis-utility they cause others (the plaintiff).
The ex ante perspective is crucial for understanding this second free
riding problem. Once an individual knows if he will be in the defendant
class, it is no longer in the individual's interest to maximize utility over
both states (plaintiff and defendant) of the world. To see how these interests can diverge once we move out of the ex ante world, consider this
numerical example.
One hundred defendants each cause 5 in harm to the plaintiff when
they steal a brick, for a total of 500 harm. They derive only 3 in utility
from each harm, by selling the brick, for a total of 300 utility. Plaintiff
cannot identify every member of the class, but when they are identified,
plaintiff knows that the marginal contribution to harm is 5. Overall, we
want to deter the defendants if we can do it for less than 200. Let's say
plaintiff can find 20 of the wrongdoers, and every time wins against them
for their marginal contribution, 5. When we look overall at defendant and
plaintiff (Table 6), we see that optimal deterrence is not achieved because the defendants wind up 200 better off, while the plaintiff is 400
worse off. The harm producers do not bear the loss.
Table 6. Social outcomes without a Certified Defendant Class
Initial gain / loss

Defendant Class

Plaintiff

Society Overall

100 people gaining 3 utility each
their
from

100 wrong-doers
causing
each
plaintiff 5 in:

-200

wrong-doing = +
300

-500

Subsequent legal
gain / loss

20 people get Successfully
sued and lose 5 suing 20 people
for 5 gain each:
each: -100

Final Result

+200

No change

+100

-400

-200
with harm proNOT
ducers
bearing the loss,
so sub-optimal
deterrence

OVERLOOKED UTILITY

2010]

121

Table 7. Social outcomes with a Certified Defendant Class
Initial gain / loss

Defendant Class

Plaintiff

Society Overall

100 people gaining 3 utility each
from
their

100 wrong-doers
causing 5
in
harm a piece: -

-200

wrong-doing = +

500

300

Subsequent legal
gain / loss

20 people get
sued, and get
certified
as
Defendant Class,
so must pay the
entire harm, lose

Successfully
suing the defendant class: +500

No change

0

-200
with harm producers bearing
the loss, so opdetertimal
rence

500 total: -500

Final Result

-200

Now consider how a defendant class action would change the final
results (Table 7). If the 20 defendants were certified as a defendant class,
they would be liable not only for their marginal contribution (the 100),
but for the entire 500 in harm. This would benefit society overall because
it would create the proper deterrent effect, but it would not benefit the
defendant class. Thus, one's desire for a defendant class would depend
on whether one knows if they will be in the class or not.
Courts encountering this issue-making some defendants liable for
the harms of the entire class-have been wary of pushing forward. In In
re the Gap Stores Securities Litigation,'5 8 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California suggested:
[A] defendant class action may be simply an inappropriate method of
adjudicating any case where the combination of punitive damages
and joint and several liability threaten to transform a statutory
scheme for personal accountability into ready martyrdom for the unlucky defendant whose deep pocket will pay for the sins of the multitude. 159

158.
79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
159. Id. at 295. A New Jersey court echoed a similar sentiment in a defendant class action case:
[lit is noted that the New Jersey Antitrust Act, under which relief is requested, contemplates joint and several liability. The accumulated damages, trebled pursuant to statute,
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The court's focus solely on the "unlucky defendant" is misplaced,
for there is also an "unlucky" plaintiff who has experienced harm. The
court should look to the good of both plaintiff and defendant, using aggregate analysis to consider the overall social welfare implications of its
legal rule.
My argument for aggregate analysis is distinct from Hamdani and
Klement's approach. When they propose the "class defense" mechanism,
they fail to recognize that whether it is a plaintiff who wants to certify a
defendant class or defendants who want to certify themselves, our
evaluation of the merits of that class certification should rest upon the
determination of overall benefit to society. If one's primary social objective is maximizing overall utility, then focusing solely on maximizing
plaintiffs' or defendants' utility is misguided.
1. Solving the Free Riding Problem with Fee Shifting
The free rider problem is one of the most difficult challenges to
overcome in successfully carrying out a defendant class action. The
problem, however, has been addressed through various fee-shifting proposals. Most on point is Netto's proposed solution, drawing on the English rule for attorney fees:
Defendant-favoring fee shifting is considered fee-shifting on a oneway (or one-side) basis, granting fees only to the defendant's attorney
when the defendants prevail in the lawsuit, but not awarding fees to
the plaintiffs lawyer even if he wins the case....

The advantages of the defendant-favoring fee-shifting system
include: (i) overcoming the asymmetric costs between separate litigation and collective suit, aggregating the multitude of defendants, (ii)
compensating the class counsel by equalizing his investment in the
litigation with the amount of the fees award; and (iii) precluding nuisance value suits.160
The fee-shifting literature also provides other solutions relevant to
defendant class actions. Particularly useful is Joseph Miller's work on
the free rider problem faced by those who challenge the validity of a

recoverable by the entire class of mortgagors from the entire class of mortgagees, may
aggregate many millions of dollars. Yet, if the class recovery were allowed, each member
of defendant class, no matter how minor its participation in the scheme, would be individually answerable for the full amount of the judgment. We conclude that such a result
would constitute a major alteration in the substantive legal relations between the parties
and goes beyond the intent of class action policy.
Kronisch v..Howard Say. Inst., 335 A.2d 587, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (citing 3B JAMES

wM.

MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 23.45[3] (2d ed. 1996)).

160.

Netto, supra note 4, at 114-16.
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patent. 16' Miller begins his analysis by stating, "A court judgment that a
patent claim is invalid is a public good. And obtaining such a judgment
requires the expensive, up-front cost of patent litigation. These facts suggest that profit-maximizing firms will supply definitive patent challenges
at a less-than-optimal rate."1 62 A similar fact pattern is found in our context. When a defendant class is engaged in activity that (as determined by
aggregate analysis) is good for society, that is a public good. Fully litigating such a stance and showing that you are engaged in a public good
also involves substantial costs. Just as invalidating a patent invalidates it
for everyone, so winning the right to continue engaging in your actions
(i.e., file-swapping) allows everyone else to do the same. Given these
similarities, what can we learn from Miller's analysis? The first lesson is
one about theoretical approach. Miller sets the stage in this way:
Any bounty mechanism-in the patent context or elsewheredepends for its success upon when the bounty is awarded (or, put another way, what one must do to earn it), and of what the bounty consists (e.g., cash payment of $X, or enough money to cover expense
Y). A poor choice as to either feature reduces a bounty's effectiveness at encouraging the desired result, making these features the best
focus in assessing whether a proposed bounty is likely to succeed. 163
Miller's analysis, not detailed further here, considers two existing bounty
and fee-shifting proposals in the patent context.16 4 Like Miller, I believe
that, "[p]aying a successful patent challenger a cash bounty that need not
be shared with others who benefit from the patent's invalidation directly
counteracts the free rider problem . . . ."165 The questions then become:
(i) When should the bounty be awarded, and (ii) How much should the
bounty be?
For defendant class actions, the timing question is somewhat easier
than the parallel question in patent law.166 The bounty should be awarded
at the litigation stage. A litigation stage bounty should be awarded to
those defendants who step up to defend on behalf of the entire class. If
too many lawyers step forward, the court can adjudicate between them,
either on the merits or via a lottery. The timing of this bounty would encourage full litigation of the issues. To pay for the bounty, the court
could mix-and-match between (i) fee shifting provisions in the event of a
win by the defense, (ii) a mandatory "litigation tax" imposed on all
members of the defendant class, and (iii) a sliding "litigation investment"
in which defendant class members could contribute to the class defense,
161.

Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating

Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004).

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id at 688 (footnote omitted).
Id at 695-96 (footnote omitted).
Id at 696-704.
Id.at 704.
The reason for this is that the challengers to patent infringers must initiate the lawsuits.
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with a promise that they would receive their investment plus a percentage of the second-stage bounty. The amount of the bounty is something
that courts would have to determine based on the size of the class and the
issues involved.
Legislatures can be a partner in establishing and revising feeshifting programs. In Colorado in 1990, for instance, the company Terrestrial Systems sought to bring a class action suit against a class of television owners that they alleged were using certain equipment to gain
unauthorized access to broadcasts.' 6 7 Fee-shifting in the case was guided
by legislative mandate.16 8 Under Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-4702(3), "in any action for civil theft of cable television service the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award for his reasonable attorney
fees."' 69 The case illustrates the possibilities of fee-shifting to be designed for specific situations and to be put into practice. Legislatures
thinking about social good for the state or country can produce background fee-shifting rules that address the free-rider concerns inherent in
defendant class actions.
All of these funding options still leave open the possibility that lead
defense lawyers might be quick to settle, or might work out a sweetheart
settlement for themselves. Because they might be representing defendants who are not even known to the plaintiffs (thinking back to the identification problems), there seems a distinct possibility that whatever the
bounty or fee shifting regime, settlement incentives will remain askew.
To counter this, I propose making representation of defendant classes a
repeat game by looking favorably upon legal defense teams that have
successfully litigated in the past, and looking unfavorably upon those
who have lost, and especially unfavorably at those who have struck deals
that seemed to be of the sweetheart variety. Such repeat games are similar in spirit to proposals to use repeated auctions for informational purposes. 70 If law firms in these cases are one-time players, then this solution will do little. But in a world of consolidated firms, I suspect that we
would see many repeat players. Because they are now maximizing revenue not just in this particular case, but across all future cases, firms will
be less likely to engage in behavior that is not in keeping with the class
as a whole.
2. Solving the Free Riding Problem with Command-and-Control
If all else fails, full-blown government regulation in the form of
command-and-control may be necessary. This approach is likely to be
incredibly expensive. Terry Fisher has proposed such an approach for
167.
168.
169.
170.

Terrestrial Sys., Inc. v. Fenstemaker, 132 F.R.D. 71, 73 (D. Colo. 1990).
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 73 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-702(3) (2004)).
See Abramowicz, supra note 100, at 351-52, 378-79.
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copyright.171 In his proposal, Fisher suggests that ISPs pay royalties,
based on the level of downloads of particular pieces, into a governmentrun fund, which would then disperse those royalties to individual artists. 172
It should be observed that many potential defendant class actions
have already been addressed by government regulation. The "tragedy of
the commons" cases preempt class action lawsuits by using regulatory
agencies (fines, taxes, etc.) to deter socially detrimental conduct such as
littering. The government may be in the best position to identify, monitor, and deter the risk-creation of the large number of defendants. Where
the legislature has not already stepped in, however, courts may be more
hesitant to push for such regulation.173
E. Liability rules
While the legal rule may vary in some situations, the default rule
should be strict liability for the defendant class, with contributory negligence. Strict liability would have the benefit of eliminating in-fighting
within the defendant class. For instance, none of the members of the
brick re-sellers association could show that they had not stolen bricks
from this particular factory. This should theoretically create very strong
self-monitoring and self-policing incentives. The logic is that if you do
something illegal, we all pay for it, so we're going to try and make sure
that you do not do anything illegal. Or, perhaps more realistically, we are
going to take more care and screen our members to make sure that we
reduce our risk.
The tool of vicarious liability could also be used to bring in an existing organization that has been standing on the sidelines or to generate the
creation of a new organization that no one had the incentive to start yet.
wILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
171.
ENTERTAINMENT (2004).
172. Id. at 202-03. Fisher provides an overview of his compensation alternative and then uses
the rest of the chapter to elaborate in detail how such a system would operate.
A moderate, and potentially more cost-effective path for legislatures to take is to mandate
173.
defendant class actions in certain circumstances. An illustration is a Missouri law that required
certain annexation proceedings to proceed via a class action. Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.015(l)(5)(c)
(2010). In City ofSt. Ann v. Buschard,the court explained this law as follows:
[The] Sawyer Act passed by the 67th General Assembly . . . provides that before a city
may proceed to annex any area otherwise authorized by law, it must file an action in the
Circuit Court of the County in which such unincorporated area is situated praying for a
declaratory judgment authorizing such annexation. According to the Sawyer Act: "The
petition in such action shall state facts showing:
1. The area to be annexed;
2. That such annexation is reasonable and necessary to the proper development of said
city; and
3. The ability of said city to furnish normal municipal services of said city to said unincorporated area within a reasonable time after said annexation is to become effective.
Such action shall be a class action against the inhabitants of such unincorporated area under the provisions of Section 507.070 RS Mo."
299 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (citation omitted).
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In thinking at the aggregate level about deterrence-even though it might
be too late for the particular group on trial to create an organization that
could have better protected their interests-future groups in similar situations will look to this court's ruling and realize that the threat of individual liability is so great that they are not going to even enter the market
(i.e., not going to take a single brick) unless they are sure that there is
some sort of organization/agency/binding agreement that they can become a party to.
Allowing for contributory negligence makes sure that plaintiffs do
not get off the hook. It might be the case, for instance, that recording
artists made their work too easy to illegally obtain. Contributory negligence could be assessed to the extent that a firm is not up to the state-ofthe-art with certain technological precautions.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Article has synthesized existing knowledge about defendant
class actions and proposed a general theory of defendant class actions.
The argument of the paper rests on three principles: (1) forward looking
deterrence; (2) dynamic effects; and (3) aggregate analysis. Of these
three, it is the aggregate analysis principle that overshadows the other
two in importance. The Article provides some illustrations of these principles, and sketches out some ways in which these principles can be applied in system design. The proposals made in this Article challenge
courts and legislatures to broaden the scope of their legal reasoning beyond purely formalist concerns about the language of Rule 23.
There is much more to be considered in the defendant class action
context. It remains to be seen, for instance, how the proposed tools of
system design will hold up in practice. Because of the aggregate analysis
principle, more work needs to be done on bringing in additional data and
perspectives on the substantive issues at hand.
Despite these unanswered questions, it is my hope that this Article
has contributed to the literature by calling for scholars to frame their discussion of defendant class actions within a broader theoretical framework. What is it that one wants a defendant class action to do? Which
parties should we think about when adjudicating defendant class actions?
How much marginal value do we expect defendant class actions to have
in particular situations? Continuing to answer these questions in more
detail will enable courts to feel more confident in their ability to certify
defendant classes. That, ultimately, will lead to greater social welfare.
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions
Plaintiff/
Year
Cite
Case
Plaintiff
Class
CBS
441 U.S. 1 1979
Broad.
Music Inc.
v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc.

Notes

Defendant
Class
American
Society of
Composers,
Authors
and Publishers
(ASCAP)
and
Broadcast
Music,
Inc.
(BMI),
and their
members
and affili-

Decided
in favor of
defendant
class on
basis
of
Sherman
Act

ates

Zablocki
v. Redhail

434
374

1978

U.S.

1
I
I

Civil
rights suit,
statute
struck
down on
equal
protection
grounds

All Wis- All county
clerks in
consin
Wisconsin
residents
who have
minor
issue not
in
their
custody
and who
are under
an obligation
to
support
such minor issue
by
any
court order
or
judgment
and
to
whom the
county
clerk has
I
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Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class
refused to
issue
a
marriage
license
without a
court or-
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Defendant
Class

Notes

Various
Illinois
state officials

Civil
rights suit,
the Court
held that
the case
ought to
have been
dismissed
for other
reasons
and
the
question
of constitutionality
never
addressed
the
by
district
court

Seven
large
shareholders in
bankrupt
Integra
company
(instead of
6,000
individual
share-

The case
was
reviewed on
appeal,
the
and
district
court
settlement
agreement
was
upheld.

der

Trainor v.
Hemandez

431
434

U.S.

1977

In re Integra Realty
Res., Inc.

354 F.3d
1246
(10th Cir.)

2004

Tilley v.
TJX Cos.

345 F.3d
34
(1st
Cir.)

2003

Those
"who have
had
or
may have
their
property
attached
without
notice or
hearing
upon the
creditor's
mere allegation of
fraudulent
conduct
pursuant
to
the
Illinois
Attachment
Act."
Creditors'
trust

holders)

Graphic
artist

557 retailers
who
sold artist's work

Appeals
Court
overturned
District
Court's
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Plaintiff/
Year
Cite
Case
Plaintiff
Class
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Defendant
Class

Notes
certificaof
tion
defendant
class on
the
grounds
that
the
court
erred
in
certifying
a defendant class
under
Rule
23(b)(2)

Ute
S.
Indian
Tribe v.
Amoco
Prod. Co.

F.3d
2
1023
(10th Cir.)

1993

Indian
tribe

Oil companies,
lessees,
and well
operators.

Henson v.
E. Lincoln
Twp.

814 F.2d
410 (7th
Cir.)

1987

People
denied
due process when
applying
for wel-

770 Illinois local
welfare
departments not
receiving

Dispute
concerning
the
ownership
of coalbed
methane
Certificaof
tion
defendant
class not
allowed
under

fare

state aid

23(b)(2)

AFP Imaging
Corp. v.
Ross

780 F.2d
(2d
202
Cir.)

1985

AFP Imaging
Corporation

Twentynine
shareholders of
Xenon

Baker
Wade

769 F.2d
289 (5th
Cir.)

1985

Donald F.
Baker, a
homosexual

"[AIll
district,
county
and city
attorneys
in
the
State
of
Texas
responsi-

Securities
fraud case
under
10(b) of
the Securities Exchange
Act
of
1934
Challenged
constitutionality
of TX law
that proscribes
"engag[ing]

ble for the

in

v.

deviate
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Plaintiff
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Defendant

Notes

Class

enforcement
of
Texas
Penal
Code
Ann.
§

sexual
intercourse
with another individual

21.06 .

of

.

.

the

same sex"
as unlawful

Thompson
v. Bd. of
Educ. of
the
Romeo
Cmty.
Sch.

709 F.2d
1200 (6th
Cir.)

1983

"All
female
teachers
of
such
school
boards
who have
been since
March 24,
1972
or
will be in
the future,
denied the
benefits of
a
sick
leave
policy
which
treats
pregnancy
related
disabilities
the
same
as
other temporary
disabilities."

"All
school
boards in
the State
of Michigan
which,
since
March 24,
1972,
have
treated or
now treat
pregnancy
related
disabilities differently than
other temporary
disabilities, limited to the
school
boards in
districts
wherein
the MEA
has female
members
who have
been
or
will
be
subject to
such policies
or
oractices."

District
Court
certified,
but
Appeals
Court
reversed
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions
Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff l DefenPlaintiff
dant
Class
Class

Notes

Kerney v.
Fort Griffin Fandangle
Ass'n

624 F.2d
717 (5th
Cir.)

1980

Individual
injured
during a
theatrical
performance

Greenhouse v.
Greco

617 F.2d
408 (5th
Cir.)

1980

Black
children
attending
parochial
schools in
defendant
diocese

Parish
corporations holding title to
parochial
schools in
the
diocese;
Bishop of
the
diocese, the
superintendant of
diocese
schools,
and
the
diocese
itself

Marcera
v. Chinlund

595 F.2d
1231 (2d
Cir.)

1979

Pre-trial
detainees
in county
jails

Brooks v.
Flagg
Bros.

553 F.2d
764
(2d
Cir.)

1977

Individuals
who
had storage
in
defendant's
warehouse

42 county
sheriffs
who denied contact visits
in
their
jails
"[W]areho
usemen
doing
business
in
the
State
of
New York
and who

Officers
and members
of
unincorporated
theatrical
associa-

Suing
individuals and the
class for
injuries

tion

Appeals
Court
affirmed
the District
Court's
ruling that
the lack of
appropriate representatives
precludes
the
suit
from moving
forward as a
defendant
class action

impose

liens and
subject
goods to
sale

pur-

Detainees
wanted
more contact visits
allowed

Due process related
to liens on
stored
materials
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Defendant
Class
suant to
New York
Uniform
Commercial Code
209ss
210 (sic)
without
affording
the owner
of
the
goods
a
prior opportunity
to
be

Notes

heard."

Anastasia
v.
Cosmopolitan
Nat'l
Bank of
Chi.

Appleton
Elec. Co.
v.
AdvanceUnited
Expressways

527 F.2d
150 (7th
Cir.)

494 F.2d
126 (7th
Cir.)

1975

1974

"Those
persons in
Chicago,
Illinois,
except for

"Those
owners,
managers,
and operators
of
the own- hotels in
ers, man- Chicago,
agers and Illinois,
operators
who now
of hotels, have the
whose
personal
personal
property
property is of
the
now de- class
of
tained by plaintiffs
a
hotel detained
pursuant
pursuant
to
the to
the
Illinois
Illinois
InnkeepInnkeepers' Lien ers' Lien
Law."
Law."
"Appleton
1,400
carriers
Electric
Company
who
and
all "shipped
other per- goods in
sons simi- interstate
larly situ- commerce

Plaintiffs
challenged the
seizures as
violations

ated who .

between

merce

.

May

.

have

20,

of

both

the Fourteenth and
Fourth
Amendments.

Shippers
wanted
refunds
from carriers under
Interstate
ComCommis-
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Case

Year

Cite

Notes

Plaintiff / DefenPlaintiff
dant
Class

Class

shipped
goods
through
interstate
commerce
the
via
facilities
of
the
defen-

1968
through
August
29, 1969
within a
region
covered
by tariff
rates in-

dants

volved

. .

.

sion rules

in

Interstate
Commerce
Commission
Docket
No.
34971"

Brown v.
Kelly

244
F.R.D.
222
(S.D.N.Y.
2007),

2007

affd
in
part, vacated in
part, 609

F.3d 467
Cir.
(2d
2010)

Baksalary
v. Smith

No.
Civ.A. 76429,

2005

2005

All persons
arrested,
charged or
prosecuted for a
violation
of loitering for the
purpose of
begging in
the State
of
New
York from
October 7,
1992 onward

"[A]ll

Plaintiff
employ-

political
subdivisions
and
all
law
enforcement/pros
ecutorial
policymaking
officials in
the State
of
New
York with
authority
to arrest,
charge or
prosecute
a person
with
a
violation
under
New York
Penal
Law."
"[A]ll
insurance

ees,

carriers

Case

on

st,

4th

and

14 th

1

amendment
grounds;
bilateral
statewide
classes
and city
subclass
certified

Court
granted
the

insur-
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Case

Cite

Year

WL
1941319
(E.D. Pa.)

Pension
Transfer
Corp. v.
Benef.
Under
Third
Amend. to
Fruehauf
Trailer
Corp. Ret.
Fund No.
003
Matte v.
Sunshine
Mobile
Homes,
Inc.

319 B.R.
(D.
76
Del.)

Wyandotte Nav.
tion

214
F.R.D.
656
(D.

City

Kan.)

Kansas
City

of

2005

270
F. 2003
Supp. 2d
805 (W.D.
La.)

2003

Plaintiff /
Plaintiff

Defendant

Class

Class

"whose
workers'
compensation
benefits
had been
terminated
under the
§ 413(a)
automatic
supersedeas provision"

and selfinsured
employers
who had
invoked,
or would
in
the
future
invoke,
the automatic
supersedeas proceof
dure
section
413(a)."
All
the
beneficiaries of an
amendment to a
bankruptcy by
Fruehauf
Trailer
Corporation

ers' motion
to
vacate the
consent
decree.

282 manufactured
home
builders

Certification
not
allowed;
plaintiff
claims
dismissed

Pension
Transfer
Corporation

Owners of
mobile
homes
alleged to
be inherently defective
Indian
tribe

Notes

Bankruptcy;
alleged
that
amendment
to
the plan
a
was
fraudulent
transfer

Seeking
declaratory
ties
... judgment,
recovery
who
claimed
of possesof
an interest sion
any real propin
portion of erty
those
sections of
All individuals
and enti-

I land

at
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Cite
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Class
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Notes

Defendant
Class
in
issue
Wyandotte
County,
Kansas

Clark v.
McDonald's
Corp.

Mayo v.
Hartford
Life Ins.
Co.

2003

213
F.R.D.
198
(D.N.J.)

I

193
F.
Supp 2d
927 (S.D.
Tex.),
affd, 354
F.3d 400
(5th Cir.
2004)

I

2002

I

Disabled
individuals
who
were "denied the
full
and
equal
enjoyment
of
the
goods,
services,
programs,
facilities,
privileges,
advantages, or
accommodations
of any of
the
McDonald's"
Employees (and
former
employees) living
in Texas
who are
(or were)
insured
under the
COLI
policies
owned by
any of the
defendant
employers

Certification
not
allowed

"[A]ll
owner/ope
rators of
McDonald's brand
restaurants
throughout
the
United
States."

I

I

"Companies that
bought
insurance
policies
written by
AIG Life
Insurance
Company,
Mutual
Benefit
Life
Insurance
Company
or Hartford Life
Insurance
Company,
that insure
or insured

Argument
was that
companyowned life
insurance
policy in
the
employee's
name
violated
the Texas
insurable
interest
doctrine
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Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class

Silva v.
County of
Los Angeles

215
Supp.
1079
(C.D.
Cal.)

F.
2d

2002

Attorney

All
Los DisAngeles
missed;
Superior
alleged
Court
that
the
judges,
County's
payment
court
of benefits
commissioners
to judges
the
and Cali- and
fomia
judges'
Court of failure to
Appeal
disclose
justices
such payment deprived
Silva
of
his rights
to
due
process,
equal

Monument
Builders
of
Pa.,
Inc.
v.
Am.
Cemetery
Ass'n

206
F.R.D.
113 (E.D.
Pa.)

2002

Monument
Builders
of Pennsylvania,
Inc.,
a
trade association

All cemeteries and
cemetery
associations
throughout
the
Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania

Alleged
that cemeteries
inflated
the prices
of monuments

Canadian
St. Regis
Band of
Mohawk
Indians v.
New York

146
F.
Supp. 2d
170
(N.D.N.Y.

2001

Descendants of
Vilthe
lage of St.
Regis

New York
State defendants,
St. Lawrence and
Franklin
Counties,
Village of
Massena,
Town of

Dismissed
(Land
claim case
for
200
years of
dispossession)

Defendant
Class
the lives
of Texas
employ-

Notes

ees."

protection

)
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Year
Plaintiff/
Case
Cite
Plaintiff
Class

137

Defendant

Notes

Class

Massena,
Town of
Bombay,
Town and
Village of
Fort
Covington
Key
,
Bank of
Northern
New
York, the
Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company,
Niagara
Mohawk
Power
Corporation and
Canadian
National
Railways,
individually and
on behalf
of
all
other persons who
claimed
an interest
any
in
portion of
the subject
lands

Oneida
Indian
Nation of
New York
v.
State
County of
Oneida

199
F.R.D. 61
(N.D.N.Y.

)

2000

Oneida
Indian
Nation

Proposed
a class of
"approximately
20,000 or
more persons" who
"occupy
or have or
claim an

Class not
certified;
amendment
to
add
20,000 or
more individual
defendants

138
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Case
Cite
Year

ls Aios
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Class

Defendant
Class
interest in
any of the
subject

[Vol. 88:1
Notes

denied
(Land
claim case

lands . . .

for

and their
successors
and
as-

of
years
dispossession)

200

signs"

E.R.
Squibb &
Sons, Inc.
v. Accident
&
Cas. Ins.
Co.

82
Civ.
7327
(JSM),
1999 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
8333
(S.D.N.Y.
), aff'd in
part, rev'd
in
part
sub nom.
E.R.
Squibb &
Sons, Inc.
v. Lloyd's
& Cos.,
241 F.3d
154
(2d

1999

Squibb

Lloyd's
Insurance
Undercase,
seeking
writers
and
declaraLloyd's
tory
Underjudgment;
writing
Appeals
Syndicate
court
# 210 (and recomthe thou- mended
sands of defendant
individuclass acals
un- tion, saw a
derwrit23.2 unining)
corporated
association

1999

Gregory
Monaco

All local
criminal
court
judges;
"all sheriffs
or
other individuals
who
transport
incompetent
defendants
from jail
to OMH
psychiatric institutions"

Cir. 2001)

Monaco v.
Stone

187
F.R.D. 50
(E.D.N.Y.

)

Constitutional
challenge
of NY law
under
which
defendants
found
incompetent
to
stand trial
for minor
felonies
and misdemeanors
in
New York
State

are

OVERLOOKED UTILITY
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Case

. Defendant Class Actions

Cite

United
Cos.
Lending
Corp. v.
Sargeant

139

Year

20
F.
Supp. 2d
(D.
192
Mass.)

1998

K. Bell & 92
Civ.
Assocs. v. 5249
Lloyd's
(AJP)(KT
UnderD), 1998
writers
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS
7798
(S.D.N.Y.

1998

Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class

Defendant
Class

Notes

involuntarily
committed
to stateoperated
psychiatric hospitals.
United
Defaulting Sought
Compaborrowers declaratory
nies Lendjudgment
ing Corporation
that
a
Mass. law
was void
and unenforceable
K. Bell & "[C]onsort Dismissed
Associates ium
of for lack of
individual
subject
investors,
matter
known as jurisdiction
'Names,'
that
are
severally,

)

but

not

jointly,
liable for
their fraction of the
risk
on
[Lloyd's]
insurance
policy."

Leer
Wash.
Edue.
Ass'n

v.

172
F.R.D.
439 (W.D.
Wash.)

1997

All nonmember
public
school
district
employees
who were
or
are
"repre-

Court
"[A]ll
found
UniServ
Councils
certificaand local tion inapassociapropriate
tions af- under Fed.
R. Civ. P.
filiated
with De- 23(b)(1)(
fendant
A)
be-

sented

WEA

exclusively for

which
collect

there was
"no con-

purposes

agency

tract,

. . .

cause

140

DENVER UNI VERSITY LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 88:1

Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions

Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff /
Plaintiff

Defendant

Notes

Class

Class

of collective bargaining by
Defendants and
were subject
to
demands
for
or
collecof
tions
agency
for
fees
the WEA
and any of
its affiliates."
The Coalition For
Economic
Equity, et.
al.

fees from
nonmembers." (at
least 100
such local
affiliates)

agreement, or
enforced
system
between"
the defendants that
would
support a
finding of
a juridical
relationship.

Challenging
the
constitutionality
of Proposition 209.

"All persons who

All state
officials,
local govemient
entities or
other governmental
instrumentalities bound
by Proposition 209.
"All persons en-

Coal. for
Econ.
Equity v.
Wilson

122 F.3d
692 (9th
Cir.)

1997

Capital
Cit-

No.
942488-

1996

ies/ABC,

GTV,

have been

gaged . . .

tion:

v.
Inc.
Ratcliff

1996 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
14798 (D.
Kan.),
aff'd, 141
F.3d 1405
(10th Cir.
1998)

home
delivery
or single
copy
agents for
The Kansas City
Star Company pursuant to
an agency
agreement
since the
delivery

in
the
delivery in
the states
of Kansas
and/or
Missouri
The
of
Kansas
City Star
and/or
The Kansas City
Times
pursuant

whether
carriers
were entitied
to
employee
benefits
under the
Employee
Retirement Income
Security
Act
of
1974

agent

to

(ERISA),

an

Underlying ques-
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Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff / DefenPlaintiff
dant
Class

Notes

Class

system
agency
impleagreement
mented by with the
The Star" Kansas
after No- City Star
vember
Company
30, 1984, that proand on or vides or
prior
to provided
November that
the
30, 1994.
person is a
selfemployed
independent contractor and
not
an
employee
or servant
of
The
Star."

Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. v.
Midland
Bancor,
Inc.

158
F.R.D.
681
(D.
Kan.)

.1. __________

1994

.1. __________

National
Union
Fire
Insurance
Company
of Pittsburgh, Pa.

U__________

Class
1:
"all persons who
are or ever
were directors or
officers of
the Institutions,
who have
or may in
the future
make
claims
which
might fall
within the
scope of
coverage
of
the
Policy."
Class II:
"all person
or
entities
who have

I __________

Defendant
class not
certified;
wanted
declaratory
judgment
on liability policy

__________

142
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Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff/
Plaintiff
Class

Defendant
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Notes

Class

made or
may in the
future
make
claims
against the
directors
and officers of the
Institutions
which
might fall
within the
scope of
coverage
of
the
Policy."

United
States v.
Local
1804-1,
Int'l
Longshore
men's
Ass'n.

90
Civ.
0963
(LBS),
1993 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
15083
(S.D.N.Y.
), aff'd in
part, vacated in
part, 44
F.3d 1091
(2d
Cir.
1995)

1993

United
States

Amnesty
822
F.
Am.
v. Supp. 297
County of (W.D.

1993

Allegheny

Pa.), affd,

RICO
action

Amnesty
Intl.,
on
behalf of

Waterfront Employer
Class
(associations and
18 companies
which
specialize
primarily
in
the
maintenance and
repair of
marine
containers
and chassis
and
securing
and unsecuring of
cargo
aboard
shios)
Two
classes:
(1)
all

Jane Does

employees

Alleged

Certification
not
granted;
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Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class

172 F.3d
40
(3d
Cir. 1998)

Heffler v.
U. S. Fid.
& Guar.
Ins. Co.

Terrestrial
Sys.,

Inc.

+

No.
907126,
1992 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
3090
(E.D. Pa.)

132
F.R.D. 71

I

1992

1990

-I

Defendant
Class
(approximately 25
employees) of the
County
and City
who were
assigned
to
take
custody of
and process protestors; (2)
employees
(approximately 10
employees) who
were assigned to
take into
custody
and process female
protestors
I
All Penn- All
ISO
sylvania
members,
residents
subscribwho pur- ers
and
chased
service
from ISO purchasers
members,
that issued
subscribmotor
ers
and vehicle
service
insurance
purchasers policies in
motor
PA with
vehicle
certain
bodily
provisions
injury
at issue
liability
insurance
with provisions at
issue

Notes

violations
of

4 h

13t,

and

14

th

amendments;
related to
antiabortion
protesting

"

Terrestrial
Systems

Television

Jowners

I

Motion
denied;
alleged
that companies
unlawfully restricted
the availability of
intrafamily
coverage
by
introducing
a
family
limitation

Case dismissed in

144
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Case

Cite

v.
Fenstemaker

(D. Colo.)

Year

Plaintiff /
Plaintiff

Defendant

Class

Class

Notes

using
unauthorized

favor
defendants

equipment

pre-trial

Securities
case, alleged
misrepresentations
contained
in a pro-

of
in

Hammond
v.
Hendrickson

No. 85 C
09829,
1990 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
11071
(N.D. Ill.)

1990

James
Hammond

Underwriters
represented by
Kidder
Peabody
& Co

Alvarado
Partners,
L.P.
v.
Mehta
Winder
Licensing,
Inc.
v.
King
Instrument

130
F.R.D.
673
(D.
Colo.)
130
F.R.D.
392 (N.D.
Ill.)

1990

Alvarado
Partners,
L.P.

34
Underwriters

Securities
fraud case

1990

Winder
Licensing
Inc.

Manufacturers of
the
patented
product at

Patent
infringement case;
class certification

issue

denied

spectus

Corp.

.denied

Co

Luyando
v. Bowen

124
F.R.D. 52
(S.D.N.Y.
rev 'd
sub nom.
Luyando
v.
Grinker, 8
F.3d 948
(2d
Cir.
1993)

1989

Williams
v.
State
Bd.
of

696
Supp.
1574

1988

Elections

(N.D. Ill.)

NY Indi- "All perviduals
sons who
receiving
are combenefits
missioners
from Aid of social
to Fami- services
lies with districts in
DependNew York
ent Chil- State."
dren, but
have not
received
first $ 50
of
each
month's
support
payment
collected
periodically by

Challenging
$50
pass
through
law

HRA

F.

Illinois
voters

Five
classes:
All
per-

Voters'
suit about
judicial

sons

elections
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions
Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff
Plaintiff
Class

United
States v.
Rainbow
Family

F.
695
Supp. 294
(E.D.
Tex.)

1988

United
States

145

DefenNotes
dant
Class
elected (1)
in county
at-large
elections,
(2) elected
in suburban-wide
at-large
elections,
(3) in the
city-wide
at-large
elections
to seats on
the Circuit
Court of
Cook
County;
(4)
All
persons
elected or
appointed
to
the
Appellate
Court of
Illinois,
First District; (5)
All candidates for
judicial
vacancies
in Cook
County on
the
November,
1988 ballot.
Seeking
Rainbow
prelimiFamily
inits nary
and
members
junction
against
congregation without permit
in

national

[Vol. 88:1
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Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff /
Plaintiff

Defendant

Class

Class

Debtors
whose
wages
were garnished

Enforcement officer class:
all sheriffs, marshals,
constables,
or
others
empowered
to
enforce
income
executions
upon the
wages or
other
earnings
of judgment
debtors in
NY
Pension
funds to
whom
Tiger may
be liable
because of
its prior
ownership
of Hall's
Motor
Company
(up to 26
class
members)

Notes

forest

Follette v.

Vitanza

658
F.
Supp. 492
(N.D.N.Y.

1987

), vacated
in
part
sub nom.
Follette v.
Cooper,
671
F.
Supp.
1362
(N.D.N.Y.
1987)

I+

Flying
Tiger
Line, Inc.
v.
Cent.
States

No.
86304
CMW,
1986 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
17409 (D.
Del.)

1986

In re Activision
Sec. Litig.

No. C-834639(A)
MHP,
1986 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
18834
(N.D.

1986

Cal.)

I

Flying
Tiger
Line, Inc.

Stockholders

I

Underwriters

Suit based
on Consumer
Credit
Protection
Act

I

Tiger
sought
declaratory and
injunctive
relief that
Tiger
is
not
an
"employer"
and
is
therefore
not subject to the
MPPAA
Securities
action

147
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Cite

Case
Davis
Crush

Angel
Music,
Inc.
ABC
Sports,
Inc.

v.

646
F.
Supp.
1192
(S.D.
Ohio),
rev'd, 862
F.2d
84
(6th Cir.
1988)

i
I

V.

I
I

)

,

,

1986

Plaintiff

dant

Class

Class

Prelimi"Persons
nary
inpicketing
[the area junction
at issue] overwho have turned, no
been per- class certified
sonally
served
with this
order as
well
as
their officers,
agents,
servants,
employees, attorneys and
those
persons in
active
concert or
participation with
them who
receive
personal
service of
the order."
Class of "[T]elevisi Class
music
on
net- certification
depublishers works,
nied; Aland music television
leged
copyright
stations,
violation
owners
syndicathe
tions such of
as motion Copyright
Act,
17
picture
U.S.C. §
studios
and their 101
television
production affiliates, independent
television
program

Owner of
medical
clinic
where
abortions
are
performed

1986

112
F.R.D. 70
(S.D.N.Y.

Notes

Plaintiff / Defen-

Year

I

,

,
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Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff/
Plaintiff
Class

Defendant
Class
producers
and others
in
the
business
of creating
and selling television pro-

[Vol. 88:1
Notes

grams."

Emp'rs.
Ins.
of
Wausau v.
FDIC

112
F.R.D. 52
(E.D.
Tenn.)

1986

Insurers

Akron
Ctr.
for
Reprod.
Health v.
Rosen

110
F.R.D.
576 (N.D.
Ohio),
rev'd sub
nom. Ohio
v. Akron
Ctr.
for
Reprod.
Health
497 U.S.
502

1986

Reproductive health
clinic

1986

All qualifled black
and Hispanic
voters in
Jersey
City who
were re-

Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
(FDIC)
and individual
directors
and officers
against
whom
claims
were
made by
the FDIC
City
prosecutors
throughout
the
state
of
Ohio

Class
action
motion
denied

Constitutional
challenge
to parental
notification
by
physicians
who
intended to
perform
certain
abortions

(1990)

Vargas v.
Calabrese

634
F.
Supp. 910
(D.N.J.)

All district
board
workers
employed
throughout Jersey
City
on
June 11,

Defendant
class certification
denied
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Case

Mechigian
v.
Art
Capital
Corp.

Cite

612
F.
Supp.
1421
(S.D.N.Y.

Year

1985

Plaintiff/

Defen-

Plaintiff

dant

Classr

Class

quired to
produce
several
different
forms of
identification
in
order to
vote.
Purchaser
of original
artwork

1985 and
all
McCann
challengers
employed
then.

)

Green v.
Harbin

615
F.
Supp. 719
(N.D.
Ala.)

1985

Judgment
debtor

In re Consumers
Power Co.
Sec. Litig.

105
F.R.D.
583 (E.D.
Mich.)

1985

Investors
who purchased
common
stock in
Consumers Power

Rodriquez
v. Twp. of
DeKalb

No. 80 C
1509,
1984 U.S.
Dist.

1984

"[A]ll
former
and present investors in the
investment plan
or plans
conducted
by defendants."
Alabama's
circuit and
district
court
clerks

Three
classes of
underwriters
(approximately
300 total)

Notes

Brought
as a securities case;
claims
dismissed

Dismissed
as to some
defendants, but
not
all;
alleged
that
the
state's
garnishment laws
violated
the Due
Process
Clause
Securities
case

Company

LEXIS

Applicants for
welfare in
DeKalb
and Joliet

27 Illinois
townships

Due process claim
related to
receiving
general

150
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Case

Cite

Year

22302
(N.D. 111.)

Plaintiff /

Defen-

Plaintiff

dant

Class

Class

Notes

townships

assistance,
defendant
class not
certified

Akerman
v.
Oryx
Commc'n
s, Inc.

609
F.
Supp. 363
(S.D.N.Y.
), aff'd,
810 F.2d
336
(2d

1984

Investors
Oryx
in
Communications

unAll
derwriters
of Oryx

Securities
case

Alleged
that state
appointed
disproportionately
few
too
black
persons as
poll offiin
cials,
violation
of § 2 of
the Voting
Rights Act

Cir. 1987)

Harris v.
Graddick

593
F.
Supp. 128
(M.D.
Ala.)

1984

All black
citizens of
Alabama

All officials responsible
for
the
appointment of
poll officials (approximately
198 members)

Nw. Nat'l
Bank of
Minneav.
polis
Fox & Co.

102
F.R.D.
507
(S.D.N.Y.

1984

Banks
making
loans to
Saxon
Securities

All partners
in
auditing
firm Fox
& Comin
pany
designated
time pe-

In re Victor Techs.
Sec. Litig.

102
F.R.D. 53
(N.D.
Cal.),
aff'd, 792
F.2d 862
(9th Cir.

1984

Purchasers
of
in
stock
question

Securities
underwriters

Securities
case

1984

Individual
exposed to
chemical

"[M]anufa
cturers,
distribu-

Defendant
class not
certified

used

tors,

of

)

1965

Alleged
misrepresentations
about
Saxon
(which
went
bankrupt)

riod

1986)

F.
Klein v. 587
Council of Supp. 213
(E.D. Pa.)
Chem.
Ass'ns

in

and
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Case

Year

Cite

Plaintiff

Defen-

Plaintiff

dant

Class

Class

printing
process

In re Fortune Sys.
Sec. Litig.

No. C 833348(A),
1984 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
18090
(N.D.

1984

suppliers
of
the
offending
carcinogens,
acting
individually or in
concert or
conspiracy with
anone
other as
members
of various
trade associations
and lobbying
groups."
UnderInvestors
in Fortune writers of
Fortune
Systems
Systems

Notes

Securities
case

Cal.)

O'Connell
v. David

35
146
Pa.),
740
740

B.R.
(E.D.
affd,
F.2d
F.2d

1983

Chapter
13 trustee

1983

Illinois
Taxpayers

Cir. 1984)

Coleman
v.
McLaren

98 F.R.D.
638 (N.D.
Ill.)

Bank"[I]ndividu
als or busi- ruptcy
ness enti- action
not
ties
licensed to
practice
law
who
alwere
leged to be
counseling
or advising
debtors on
the preparation and
of
filing
bankruptcy
petitions."
Illi- Due procAll
and
nois coun- ess
ties other equal
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Plaintiff /
Cite
Year
Case
Plaintiff
Class

Defendant

[Vol. 88:1
Notes

Class

than Cook
County;
all Illinois
judges
do
who
not sit in
Cook

protection
claims

County

Cayuga
Indian
Nation of
v.
N.Y.
Cuomo

565
F.
Supp.
1297
(N.D.N.Y.

Thillens,
v.
Inc.
Cmty.
Currency
Exch.
Ass'n of
Ill., Inc.

97 F.R.D.
668 (N.D.
Ill.)

1983

Cuyaga
Indian
Nation

1983

Check
cashing
service

)

"[A]II
other persons who
assert an
interest in
any portion of the
Original
Reservation
lands"
(approximately
7,000
individuals
and

Land
rights case

entities)

"17
named
individual
defendants,
approximately
350
unnamed
individual
past and
current
members
the
of
[Community Currency
Exchange
Associaof
tion
Illinois,
Inc..1 and

Charged
conspiracy under
anti-trust
and RICO
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Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff/
Plaintiff
IClass

Defen-

Notes

dant
Class
the more
than 500
community currency
exchanges
owned by
those
members
and represented by
the Association."
The roy- Seeking
alty inter- declaraest owners tory
in
the judgment
Opelika
on meanGas Unit
ing of a
royalty

Wiggins
v. Enserch
Exploration, Inc.

743
S.W.2d
332 (Tex.
Ct. App.)

1987

Corporation and
company

Wash.
Educ.
Ass'n v.
Shelton
Sch. Dist.
No. 309

613 P. 2d
769
(Wash.)

1980

Gellantly
v. Chelan
Cnty.

534 P.2d
1027
(Wash.)

1975

Statewide
Statewide
organizaorganization repre- tion
of
senting
junior and
teachers in senior
the K-12 high
public
schools
school
for intersystem,
scholastic
local edu- athletic
cation
competiassociation, and
tions,
14 local
public
school
school
districts
women
coaches,
several
parents of
schoolage
daughters.
WashingSix WA
ton
tax- counties
payers
and their

provision

officers

Sex discrimination suit

Class not
certified,
challenging

levy
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Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class

State ex
rel. Erie
Fire Ins.
v.
Co.
Madden

515
S.E.2d
351
(W.
Va.)

1998

Individuals
who
signed
releases
with the
other insurance
companies
without
court ap-

Defendant

[Vol. 88:1
Notes

Class

Insurance
companies
in
West
Virginia
(approximately
300
companies)

limit
of
taxes
Dismissed, no
juridicial
links

___________

___________________________proval.

Planned
Parenthood
Ass'n of
Cincinnati, Inc.
v. Project
Jericho

556
N.E.2d
157
(Ohio)

1990

Health
clinic
offering
abortion
services

Dayton
Women's
Health
v.
Ctr.
Enix

555
N.E.2d
956
(Ohio)

1990

Health
clinic
offering
abortion
services

"[P]ersons
picketing
at
[area
issue] who
have been
personally
served
with this
order as
well
as
their officers,
agents,
servants,
employees, attorneys and
those
persons in
active
concert or
participation with
them who
receive
personal
service of
the order."
Protestors
of clinic

Seek
to
enjoin
class from
interfering
with
clinic's
work

Seeking
permanent
injunction
and damages
assessed
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Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff / DefenPlaintiff
Class

Female
teachers
who have
been denied use
of accumulated
sick leave
during
periods of
disability
relating to
pregnancy
or
child
birth
City and
redevelopers

"[AIll
school
districts in
Minnesota
who are or
were the
employer
of
the
plaintiff
class."

1984

of
State
Missouri

Members
of Kansas
City Firefighters
Local No.
(ap42.
proximately
700 members)

1983

Exxon

"[A]ll
taxing
jurisdictions
within the
State
in

Carlson v.
Indep.
Sch. Dist.
No. 283

370
N.W.2d
51 (Minn.
Ct. App.)

1985

Excelsior
Springs v.
Elms
Redevelopment
Corp.
State
ex
rel. Ashv.
croft
Kansas
City Firefighters
Local No.
42

18 S.W.3d
53
(Mo.
Ct. App.)

2000

672
S.W.2d 99
(Mo. Ct.
App.)

Exxon
Corp. v.
East
Brunswick

470 A.2d
(N.J.
5
Super. Ct.
App. Div.)

Notes

dant
Class

Timesharers in a
local hotel

which

against the
protestors
Alleged
discrimination by
denying
the use of
sick pay
for pregnancy and
child-birth
related
disability
during
maternity
leaves
to
Suit
eliminate
timesharers' property rights
in hotel
Seeking
civil remfor
edy
damages
against a
labor unto
ion
redress a
strike by
public
employees, only
applied to
12 named
defendants not
class
Tax court,
related to
taxing on
storage
tanks
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions

Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff/
Plaintiff

Defendant

Class

Class

plaintiff
owns or
leases
service
stations
having
underground
fuel storage
tanks."
Mortgagees under
federally
insured
residential
mortgages

Notes

Kronisch
v. Howard
Says. Inst.

335 A.2d
587 (N.J.
Super. Ct.
Ch. Div.)

1975

Mortgagors

Rochester

1983

City
of
Rochester

Chiarella

448
N.E.2d 98
(N.Y.)

Real
property
taxpayers
in Rochester

Leon N.
Weiner &
Assocs.,
Inc.
v.

No. 8938,
1988 Del.
Ch.
LEXIS 8

1988

Corporate
lot owner

lot
203
owners of
North
Hills Sub-

Class
certification
denied,
seeking
treble
damages
arising
from
an
alleged
conspiracy
in
restraint
of trade
under the
New Jersey Antitrust Act
Suit
to
prevent a
multiplicity
of
lawsuits
concerning
its
prior levy
of taxes in
excess of
constitutional
limits
Class not
certified,
seeking a
declara-

Krapf

(Del. Ch.)

division,

tory

V.
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2010]1

157

Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions

Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff/

Defen-

Plaintiff

dant

Class

Class
New Castle County

Notes
judgment
the
that
property
was
not
subject to
any
restrictions

Noteholders
(approximately 90
persons),
represented by
hedge
fund
Underwriters

Dispute
over
method
for calculating the
number of
shares of
common
stock
Securities
case

Debtor
(Broadhollow
Funding

Investorcreditors
of
the
brokerage

To determine
ownership

Corp)

business

perAll
sons who
played the
video
gaming
machines
over
a
period of
time

Two
classes:
(1) owners
of arcades
in which
there are
20
or
more
videogaming
machines
for
the
public's
use;
(2)
entities
that lease
the videogaming
machines
to certain

Regal
Entm't
Grp.
v.
Amaranth
LLC

894 A.2d
1104 (Del.
Ch.)

2006

Regal
Entertainment
Group, the
issuer of a
series of
convertible notes

Glosser v.
Cellcor
Inc.

No.
12725,
1995 Del.
Ch.
LEXIS 16
(Del. Ch.)
B.R.
66
1005
(Bankr.
E.D.N.Y.)

1995

Investors

1986

873 So. 2d
198 (Ala.)

2003

In
re
Broadhollow Funding Corp.
Funliner
Ala.,
of
LLC
v.
Pickard

Class not
certified
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Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class

Kadish v.
Ariz. State
Land
Dep't

747 P.2d
1183
(Ariz.)

1987

Arizona
taxpayers

In re Dehon, Inc.

298 B.R.
206
(Bankr. D.
Mass.)

2003

Plan administrator

re
In
Rusty
Jones, Inc.

128 B.R.
1001
(Bankr.
N.D. Ill.)

1991

Insurance
company

In re Cardinal Indus., Inc.

105 B.R.
834
(Bankr.
S.D.
Ohio)

1989

Debtors

[Vol. 88:1

Defendant

Notes

Class

businesses
throughout Alabama
"All present and
future
mineral
lessees of
state
lands."

All
current and
former
direct or
indirect
holders of
shares of
common
and/or
preferred
stock of
Dehon,
Inc.
(1,000+
members).
Wisconsin
auto rustproofing
warranty
holders

Seeking
declaratory
judgment
related to
revenues
from royalty
on
minerals
Bankruptcy
proceedings
to
subordinate
the
Stock
Repurchase
Claims to
the claims
of general
unsecured
creditors
Certificadetion
for
nied
lack
of
standing
and adequate
representation,
sought
declaratory
1 judgment.

"[A]ll
persons
and entities who
have
or

Certified
defendant
class for
the
sole
issue
of

obtain

declara-

a
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions

Case

Year

Cite

Plaintiff

Defen-

Plaintiff
Class

dant
class
mortgage
or
other
security

Notes
tory relief

interest in

Mojica v.
Automatic
Emps.
Credit
Union

F.
363
Supp. 143
(N.D. Ill.)

1973

Debtors

Samuel v.
Univ. of
Pittsburgh

56 F.R.D.
435 (W.D.
Pa.)

1972

Two female
graduate
students

Hodgson
v. Hamilton Mun.

349
Supp.
1125

F.

1972

United
States
Depart-

property
of a limited partnership in
which CII
or
a
whollyowned
subsidiary
is a general partner."
Creditors

Dismissed;
sought
declaratory
judgment
on automobile
repossession and
resale
provisions
in Illinois
Commercial Code
21 named ChallengUniversity ing financial
aid
defendants plus rulings
all other when
state and husband is
deemed to
staterelated
be out-ofstate
universities and
colleges in
PA
(71
members)

Ohio
courts,
*udges,

Related to
law
OH
on
gar-
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions
Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class
Court
(S.D.
ment
of
Ohio)
Labor
Smith v. No. C 75- 1976
Black
United
177, 1976
citizens
Bhd.
of U.S. Dist.
who were
CarpenLEXIS
denied
ters
and 15980
employJoiners of (N.D.
ment opAm.
Ohio)
portunities
within the
carpenter
construction indusIn
re
Bourns
Patent
Litig.

385
F.
Supp.
1260
(J.P.M.L.)

1974

Patent
owner

Pennsylvania v.
Local
Union
542, Int'l
Union of
Operating
Eng'rs

469
F.
Supp. 329
(E.D. Pa.)

1978

"[M]inorit
y workers
involved
in or desiring
admittance to
the operating engineer trade
in Eastern
Pennsylvania and
Delaware."

In re the
Gap
Stores
Sec. Litig.

79 F.R.D.
283 (N.D.
Cal.)

1978

Investors

Institu-

78 F.R.D.

1978

Institu-

Defendant
Class
and clerks
of court
All
employers
and/or
contractors within
the territorial jurisdiction of
the union
defendants

[Vol. 88:1
Notes

nishment
Alleged
discriminatory
employment practices

CompaCertificanies
ac- tion
not
cused of granted
patent
infringement
Local
Employunion,
ment dis1400 con- criminastruction
tion suit
contractors and
employers
receiving
referrals
through
union;
construction trade
associations for
the induction
of
new operating engineers.
13 cases
Underwriters
in
multidistrict securities litigation

"[D]irecto

Class
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions

Case

Cite

tionalized
Juveniles
v. Sec'y
Pub.
of
Welfare

413 (E.D.
Pa.)

United
States v.
Trucking
Emp'rs,
Inc.

75 F.R.D.
682
(D.D.C.)

Year

1977

Plaintiff

Defen-

Plaintiff

dant

tionalized
juveniles
in Pennsylvania
hospitals

rs of all certified
mental
health and
mental
retardation facilities
in
Pennsylvania
which are
subject to
regulation
by
the
defendant,
Secretary
of Public
Welfare."
Employ"[C]omm
on carriers ment disof general crimination case
commodity freight
by motor
vehicle
that employed
over-theroad drivers, were
parties to
or
were
bound by
the
national
master
freight
agreement

United
States

.

.

.

Notes

em-

ployed at
least 100
persons,
and
had
annual
gross
revenues
of at least
$1,000,00
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Plaintiff
Cite
Year
Case
Plaintiff
Class

Defendant

[Vol. 88:1
Notes

Class
0."

427
F.
Supp. 899
(D. Mass.)

1977

Mashpee
Tribe

Landowners in the
town
of
Mashpee

Property
rights

ContinenNo. 80 C
Ill. 2642,
tal
1980 U.S.
Nat'l
v. Dist.
Bank
Mohr & LEXIS
Sons
13040

1980

Debtors

Creditors

After
bankruptcy
proceedings

Named
defendants plus
owners
throughthe
out
city who
have employed
members
the
of
putative
plaintiff
class.
All companies that
manufactured
DES.

Class
certification
denied; Title
VII claim
the
and
Labor
Management Relations
Act claim

Mashpee
Tribe v.
New Seabury
Corp.

II

(N.D. Ill.)
Marchwinski v.
Oliver
Tyrone
Corp.

83 F.R.D.
606 (W.D.
Pa.)

1979

Women
cleaning
personnel

Payton v.
Abbott
Labs

83 F.R.D.
382
(D.
Mass.)

1979

Lynch
Corp. v.
Mil Liquidating
Co.

82 F.R.D.
478
(D.S.D.)

1979

All
women
exposed in
utero to a
chemical
supplied
by defendants
Lynch
Corporation

Missisv.
sippi
United
States

490
F.
Supp. 569
(D.D.C.)

1979

of
State
Mississippi

MII shareholders of
M-Tron
Industries
(290
members)

Defendant
class certification
denied on
typicality
and representativeness
Defendant
class certifled

U.S. and
all black
citizens
and black

Preclearance
for statutory reap-

registered

portion-
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Case

Marcera
v. Chinlund

Cite

Year

91 F.R.D.
579
(W.D.N.Y

1981

)

Joseph L.
v. Office
of Judicial
Support of
the Court
of Common Pleas
of
Del.
Cnty.

516

In re Itel
Sec. Litig.

89 F.R.D.
104 (N.D.

F.

1981

Supp.
1345

(E.D. Pa.)

1981

87 F.R.D.
760 (N.D.
Miss.)

Plaintiff

dant

Class

Class

Detainees
in
held
county
jails that
did
not
have
a
contact
visitation
program
"[A]ll
individuals whose
real property has
been sold
pursuant
to the Act
at a Delaware
County
tax sale."

Notes

voters in ment
Mississippi
qualified
to vote in
state legislative
elections
The sher- Defendant
iffs
in class certicharge of fled.
the jails

All
purchasers,
heirs, and
assigns, of
lands sold
at
Dela-

Class not
certified

ware
County
Treasurer's
tax
sales
pursuant to
72 P.S. §§
5971a ff.,
who
had
not
consummated
a quiet title
action
against the
property
owners at
the
time
that
this
action was
instituted

Underwriters

Securities
case

All county
jail prisoners

MS sheriffs,
boards of

Classes
not certified

statewide

supervi-

_I

Purchasers
of
securities

Cal.)

Stewart v.
Winter

Plaintiff / Defen-

1980
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions

Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff /
Plaintiff

Defendant

Class

Class

in MS

sors, and
county
health
officers
Underwriters

McFarland
v.
Memorex
Corp.

96 F.R.D.
357 (N.D.
Cal.)

1982

Purchasers
of
common
stock of
Memorex
Corpora-

in re Arthur
Treacher's
Franchise
Litig.

93 F.R.D.
590 (E.D.
Pa.)

1982

Franchisor

Doss
Long

93 F.R.D.
112 (N.D.
Ga.)

1981

"[A]ll
those who
are now or
will in the
future be
civil defendants
in Georgia
courts
operating
under the
fee
system, and
also those
threatened
with actions
in
those
courts."

Notes

Securities
case

tion

v.

All franchisees
who had
executed
written
contracts
with the
company
and failed
to make
royalty
payments
pursuant
the
to
terms of
the written
contracts
State
judges
(1,000+)

Refused to
certify
under
23(b)(2)

Challengfee
ing
system of
paying
judges by
the case
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Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions

Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff/

Defen-

Diamond
v. Charles

476
54

U.S.

1986

IClass

Class

Physicians
who performed
abortions

State's
Attorneys
in all the
counties
of
the
State
of

Bank of
N.Y.
v.
Janowick

470 F.3d
264 (6th
Cir.)

2006

Bank of
New York

Robinson
v.
Tex.
Auto.
Dealers
Ass'n
S.
Ute
Indian
Tribe v.
Amoco
Prod. Co.

387 F.3d
416 (5th
Cir.)

2004

Car
ers

151 F.3d
1251
(10th Cir.)

1998

Ute Indian
Tribe

Socialist
Workers
Party
v.
Leahy

145 F.3d
1240
(11th Cir.)

1998

Socialist
Workers
Party and
Florida
Green
Party

Consol.
Rail Corp.
v. Hyde
Park

47
F.3d
473
(2d
Cir.)

1995

Interstate
railroad,
Conrail

League of

999

F.2d

1993

Voters

Plaintiff

dant

Notes
Challenging abortion law

Illinois

buy-

Employeeclaimants
of stock
Texas car
dealerships

To settle
claims

All
persons, except
the
Tribe and
governmental
entities,
who claim
an ownership interest
in
coalbed
methane
All sixtyseven
Florida
county
supervisors
of
elections
Assessing
jurisdictions and
taxing
districts
around the
state

Resolve
ownership
of coalbed
mine

Class not
certified

Constitutional
challenge

Alleging
violations
the
of
Railroad
Revitalization Act
and Regulatory
Reform
Act

Texas

Voting

166
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Year
Plaintiff /
Cite
Case
Plaintiff
United
Latin Am.
Citizens,
Council
No. 4434

831
Cir.)

Defendant

[Vol. 88:1
Notes

Class

Class

and citizens'
league

officials
responsible
for
enforcing
a statute

Rights Act

1991

Planned
Parenthood

Abortion
protestors
outside
clinic

2007

Patent
holder

Realtors
accused of
patent
infringement

to
Seek
enjoin
class from
interfering
with
clinic's
work
Class
certificadetion
nied

(5th

V.
Clements

Bachelier
v. Hamilton Cnty.,
Ohio

Real Estate Alliance, Ltd.
v.
Sarkisian

No.
903725,
1991 U.S.
App.
LEXIS
8829 (6th
Cir.)
05No.
cv-3573,
2007 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
70339
(E.D. Pa.)

Albrecht
v. Treon

No.
1:06cv274
2007
,
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS
18613
(S.D.
Ohio)

2007

of
Next
of
kin
deceased

Moffat v.
Unicare
Midwest
Plan Grp.

No. 04 C
5685,
2006 U.S.
Dist.

2006

Individuals insured
under
UniCare

"[A]lI
county
coroners
and/or
medical
examiners
the
in
of
State
Ohio that
have removed,
retained,
and disposed of
body parts
without
prior notice
to
next
of
kin." (87
counties)
"UniCare
Defendants and
ERISA

314541

LEXIS

Midwest

Plans that I

Class
certified

Class not
certified
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Case

Cite

Year

16348
(N.D. Ill.)

Plaintiff

Defen-

Plaintiff

dant

Class

class

Plan
Group

received
claims
from participants
and beneficiaries
for Infusion Therapy from
Participating Providers and
who did
not
pay
that part
that
exceeded
Covered
Ex_1

penses."

No. 4:04cv-40270,
2005 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
2382
(S.D.
Iowa)

2005

Trade
association

Underwriters

Aid
for
Women v.
Foulston

327
F.
Supp. 2d
1273 (D.
Kan.)

2004

Health
care workers

All Kansas county
and district attorneys

Doe
Miller

216
F.R.D.
462 (S.D.
Iowa)

2003

ofSex
fenders
currently
living in

All county
attorneys
in Iowa

71
Supp.

F.
2d

1999

1015

(D.

Iowa
Ass'n
Bus.
Indus.
Efco
Corp.

of
&
v.

Notes

Dismissed,
claim was
under
Employee
Retirement Income
Security
Act
(ERISA)

v.

Iowa

Forbes v.
Woods

Arizona
physicians

Seeking
declaratory
judgment
on reportng
requirements
Constitutional
challenge
to
Iowa
statute

All
County

Constitutional

Attorneys

challenge

168
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Appendix Table 1. Defendn
Year
Case
Cite

ls Atos
Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class

Ariz.)

Defendant

Notes

Class

who have
the
authority
to enforce
A.R.S. §

of
law
related to
fetal
research

36-2303

Sebo
v.
Rubenstein

188
F.R.D.
310 (N.D.

1999

Patients

Urologists
and shareholders

Ill.)

Conspiracy
1

N.C.
Right To
Life, Inc.
v. Bartlett

No. 5:96CV-835BO(1),
1998 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
6443
(E.D.N.C.

1998

Political
organizations and
officers

District
attorneys
from all
39
state
prosecutorial
districts

Certification
denied

re
In
Chambers
Dev. Sec.
Litig.

912
F.
Supp. 822
(W.D.
Pa.)

1995

All persons who
are
or
were partners
of
Grant
Thornton
during the
class period.

Securities
case

In re Marion Merrell Dow
Inc., Sec.
Litig.

92No.
0609-CVW-6, 1994
U.S. Dist.
LEXIS
10053
(W.D.

1994

"All persons who
purchased
or
acquired
Chambers
Development
Company,
Inc., securities from
March 18,
1988,
through
October
20, 1992,
inclusive."
Purchasers
of
securities
of Marion
Merrell
Dow Inc

Underwriters

Securities
case

Deloitte
Noraudit

All member firms

Contractual case

of Deloitte

after

Mo.)

148
F.R.D.

Deloitte
Noraudit
A/S

v.

523

1993
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Aendix Table 1. Defendn
Case
Cite
Year

Deloitte
Haskins &
Sells

(S.D.N.Y.

Endo
v.
Albertine

147
F.R.D.
164 (N.D.

ls

169

Atns
Plaintiff

Defen-

Plaintiff

dant

Class

Class

Notes

Haskins & merger
Sells International;
Deloitte
Ross
Tohmatsu
Interna-

)

tional

1993

Stock
purchasers

Resolution Trust
Corporation

Underwriters

Securities
case

Ill.)

Resolution Trust
Corp. v.
KMPG
Peat
Marwick

No.
921373,
1992 U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
16670
(E.D. Pa.)

1992

In
re
Phar-Mor,
Inc. Sec.
Litig.

875
F.
Supp. 277
(W.D.
Pa.)

1994

Pabst
Brewing
Co.
v.
Corrao

161 F.3d
434 (7th
Cir.)

1998

Pabst
Brewing
Company

Retirees

Dale
Elecs.,
v.
Inc.
R.C.L.
Elecs.,
Inc.
LaMar v.
H&B

53 F.R.D.
531
(D.N.H.)

1971

Electronics business

Electronics corporations

Patent
infringement

489
461

1973

Customers
of pawn

All
pawn

Certification
de-

All
persons who
were partners
of
either
Main
Hurdman
or KMG
Main
Hurdman
in designated time
periods
Equitable
Coopers
Life As- &
Lysurance
brand
Society, et partners
al
and prin-

Suit alleging
wrongful
preparation
of
financial
documents

Fraudulent financial activities

cipals

Declaratory
judgment
penon
sions
under
ERISA

F.2d
(9th

the
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Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff /
Plaintiff
Class
Novelty & Cir.)
brokers in
Loan Co.
Oregon

~Oregon

__________

In

re

Catawba
Indian
Tribe Of
S.C.

Technograph
Printed
Circuits,
Ltd.

973 F.2d
1133 (4th
Cir.)

1992

285
F. 1968
Supp. 714
(N.D. Ill.)
V.

Methode
Elecs.,
Inc.

Weiner v.
Bank of

358
F.
Supp. 684

King

(E.D. Pa.)

of

Defendant
Class
brokers
licensed to
conduct
business
under the
laws
of

1973

Catawba
Indian
Tribe

Notes

nied

_____

Occupants
and holders
of
disputed
land

Holder of "Six subpatents in classes of
dispute
potential
patent
infringers;
Class
1:
All parties
who have
been
or
are manufacturing
printed
circuits
by
any
process
claimed in
United
States
Patent No.
2,441,960
or
who
have been
hereafter
and before
September
5, 1967,
notified
that they
have infringed."
Customers Named
and/or
banks plus
borrowers

[Vol. 88: 1

all

other

Certification
denied,
sought
writ
of
mandamus
Patent
infringement

Motion
dismissed
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ls Atns
Appendix Table 1. Defendn
C
as
d x
be
e Y.D
en ar t C a s c i n
Plaintiff /
Year
Case
Cite
Plaintiff
Class
of national
Prussia
banks in
this
court's
jurisdic-

171

Defendant
Cl ass&
national
banks
within
jurisdiction

Notes

All NFL
teams
which
require
their season ticket
holders to
purchase
tickets to
exhibition
games as
well as to
regular
season

Defendant
class not
certified

tion

1972

perAll
sons who
held season tickets
for regularly
scheduled
football
games
presented
by defendant football team

69 So.2d
650 (Fla.)

1954

Individual
who made
repairs to
church
building

B.R.
35
141
(Bankr.
E.D. Pa.)

1983

Bankruptcy
trustee

Coniglio
v. Highwood
Servs.,
Inc.

60 F.R.D.
359
(W.D.N.Y

Ross
v.
Gerung

O'Connell
v. David

.)

games

All members
of
unincorporated
religious
associa-

Seeking
damages
for unpaid
bill

tion

"[I]ndivid
uals and
variously
styled
business
entities,
none
of
which are
licensed
or regulated practitioners
of
law,
nor memin
bers
good
standing
of the Bar
of

this

Unauthorized practice of law

172
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Case

Cite

Year

Plaintiff
Plaintiff

Defendant

Class

Class

Notes

Court or
any other
court
in
the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania or
the District Court
for
the
Eastern
District of
Pennsylvania,
who have
engaged,
or in the
future will
engage, in
any of the
activities
set forth
in
our
Opinion."

Marchwinski v.
Oliver
Tyrone
Corp.

81 F.R.D.
487 (W.D.
Pa.)

1979

Female
employees

Research
Corp. v.
Pfister
Associated
Growers,

301
F.
Supp. 497
(N.D. Ill.)

1969

Holder of
patent

Over 400
seed corn
producers

Patent
infringement

500 F.2d
86
(9th
Cir.)

1974

Hotel
guests
(approxi-

Hotels
(hundreds)

Class not
certified

"[Tihirty
to
fifty
employers
in the City
of Pittsburgh who
are similarly situated
to
Oliver

Certification
not
allowed
on
Title
VII claims
as matter
of law

Tyrone."

Inc.

In re Hotel
Tel.
Charges

mately

40
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Cite

Case

Year

Plaintiff/
Plaintiff

Defendant

Class

Class

million)
Resident

101
N.W.2d
623 (Wis.)

1960

52 F.R.D.
162 (E.D.
Pa.)

1971

Operator
of closed
circuit
television
systems

v. 508 F.2d
Kline
226 (9th
Coldwell,
Banker & Cir.)
Co.

1974

Residential home
sellers

Danforth
v. Christian

F.
351
Supp. 287
(W.D.
Mo.)

1972

v.

68 F.R.D.

1975

Pipkorn v.
Village of
Brown
Deer
Mgmt.
Television
Sys., Inc.
v. NFL

Beneficiaries of a
water trust
Football
clubs who
are members of the
National
Football

Notes

Concerning illegal
transfer of
water trust
Antitrust
suit. Defendant
class certifled.

League

Mudd

All
real Class not
certified
estate
brokers
who were
members
of the Los
Angeles
Realty
Board
during the
4-year
period
prior
to
the filing
the
of
action
Seeking
"[A]ll
Attorney
declaraGeneral of officers
and other tory
Missouri
judgment
officials
the related to
of
state and voting
its politi- eligibility
cal subdivisions
charged
with enforcement
and application of
the challenged
state
laws."
All judi- Defense
Criminal
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Case
Cite
Year
Plaintiff /
Plaintiff

Defendant

Notes

Class

Class

pre-trial
detainees

cial officers
in
Indiana
Wardens,
jailers and
sheriffs in
the State
of
Alabama

class not
certified

Lenders
and
life
insurers

Defendant
class not
certified

City
of
Lebanon

Property
owners of
land
in
dispute

1957

City of St.
Ann

1973

Married
women
who are
affected
by law in
question

Property
owners of
land
in
dispute
All members
of
Boards of
Registrars
throughout Georgia.

Class not
certified,
seeking to
annex
land
Annexation case

1980

School

Busse

522 (N.D.
Ind.)

Washington v. Lee

263
F.
Supp. 327
(M.D.
Ala.)

1966

Turpeau
v.
Fid.
Fin.
Servs.,
Inc.
City
of
Lebanon
v. Holman

936
F.
Supp. 975
(N.D. Ga.)

1996

402
S.W.2d
832 (Mo.
Ct. App.)

1966

City of St.
Ann
v.
Buschard

299
S.W.2d
546 (Mo.
Ct. App.)
369
F.
Supp.
1342
(N.D. Ga.)

626

Kane v.
Fortson

[Vol. 88: 1

Current or
former
prisoners
of
Alabama
state,
county, or
municipal
penal
institutions
Borrowers
and
life
insurance
insureds

Challenging racial
segregation
of
prisoners

Challenging
law
that denies
married
women in
Georgia
the right
to establish
a
domicile
and residence for
voting
purposes
independent of that
of
her
husband

Adashu-

F.2d

State

and

Classes
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Cite

Year

nas
v.
Negley

600 (7th
Cir.)

Osborn v.
Pa.-Del.
Serv.
Station
Dealers
Ass'n

94 F.R.D.
23
(D.
Del.)

1981

United
States v.
TruckeeCarson
Irrigation
Dist.

71 F.R.D.
10
(D.
Nev.)

1975

Contract
Buyers
League v.
F & F Inv.

48 F.R.D.
7
(N.D.
Ill.)

1969

ls
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Plaintiff / DefenPlaintiff

dant

Class
children
with specific
learning
disabilities who
were not
receiving
adequate
special

Class
local
educational
agency
members

Notes
not certifled

education

All
persons residing
in
Delaware
and Pennsylvania
who
attempted
unsuccessfully
to
purchase
gasoline
from
a
member
of
the
defendant
class during
the
boycott
United
States

All service station
members
of
the
PennsylvaniaDelaware
Service
Stations
Dealers
Association
(3,700
members)

Anti-trust

Truckee
River
Permittees
and Newlands
Project
certificate
holders
who are
members
of
the

Water
rights case

TCID

Minority
buyers of
houses
under land

Home
sellers and
mortgage
lenders

Defendant
class not
certified,
alleged
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Cite
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Plaintiff /
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Defendant

Notes

Class

contracts

612 F.2d
848 (4th
Cir.)

1980

Campbell

Pregnant
public
school
teachers in
VA

Benzoni

54 F.R.D.

1972

Buyers of

v. Greve

450

shares

(S.D.N.Y.

Sequoyah
Industries

Paxman v.

)

"[A]ll
persons
who were
or
are,
during the
period
December
6, 1969 to
June 25,
1975,
members
of a public
county or
city
school
board of
the Commonwealth of
Virginia
which
required
that
a
pregnant
school
teacher
cease her
teaching
at
some
time durthe
ing
period of
pregnancy
other than
a time of
her own
choosing."
There are

in three

ac-

in
tions
this case:

I)Ben-

fraud
in
the sale of
houses
under land
contracts.
Class
action
reversed
on appeal

Securities

case
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Class
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DefenNotes
dant
Class
zoni:
Sequoya
h,
Merril
I
Lynch
and
15
members
of the
syndicate
of
Under
writers,
and
ten of
the
selling
stockholders
who
signe
d the
registr
ation
statement.

2)
Gold
man
No. 1:
Sequoya
h,
Merril
I

Lynch
, and
ten of
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Notes
Defendant
Class
the
selling
stockholders
who
signe
d the
registration
statement.
3)Gold
man
No. 2:
Sequoya
h,
Greve
person
ally
and as
a representative
of the
selling
stockholders,
and
Merril
1
Lynch
individually
and as
a representative
of the
under-
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Plaintiff /
Year
Cite
Case
Plaintiff
Class

Notes
Defendant
Class
writers.
ChallengMayors
Indigent
re- ing constiand
prisoners
tutionality
corders
the
of
throughout
the practice
of authorized
state
state
by
AL
statute of
confining
indigent
prisoners
to jail in
order to
allow
them
to
work out
fines
which
they were
unable to
pay
Securities
Buyers of Undercase
writers
stock

Tucker v.
City
of
Montgomery
of
Bd.
Comm'rs

F.
410
Supp. 494
(M.D.
Ala.)

1976

Guarantee
Ins.
Agency
v.
Co.
MidCont'1
Realty
Corp.
Hopson v.
Schilling

57 F.R.D.
555 (N.D.
Ill.)

1972

418
Supp.
1223
(N.D.
Ind.)

F.

1976

All indigent persons in the
state

Ragsdale
v.
Turnock

625
Supp.
1212

F.

1985

Physicians
perform-

ChallengState's
attorneys
ing state
for all of law

ing

the

(N.D.

Ill.)

or

All township trustees in the
state that
were responsible
for administering
the state's
welfare

Certificaof
tion
defendant
of
class
township
trustees is
granted
based on
common
juridical

laws

link.

coun-
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Endo
v.
Albertine

147
F.R.D.
164 (N.D.
Ill.)

1993

Ruocco v.
Brinker

380
F.
Supp. 432
(S.D. Fla.)

1974

Dudley v.
Se. Factor
&
Fin.
Corp.

57 F.R.D.
177 (N.D.
Ga.)

1972
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Defendant

Notes

Class

Class

desiring
to
perform
abortions
in
the
state
of
Illinois
Stock
purchasers

ties in the
state.

Underwriters

All
real All clerks
property
of
the
owners in judicial
the State circuits in
of Florida the State
whose
of Florida
real property has
or may be
encumbered by
a Claim
of Lien
under the
Mechanics' Lien
of
Law

Defendant class
certified
only as to
the issue
of
materiality of the
alleged
misstatements and
omissions
Bilateral
class action
is
granted.
Plaintiff
deand
fendant
classes
are certified.

Florida

Receiver
the
for
Insurance
Investors
Trust
Company

All
present and
former
shareholders of
SEFAF
who

re-

Case may
proceed
as a class
action;
defendant
class certified.
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Plaintiff
Class
Class
ceived
preferred
shares of
stock in
Atlantic
Services

Notes

REIMAGINING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARD GLOBAL
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
RACHEL J. ANDERSONt
INTRODUCTION

Existing human rights law, the body of law that delineates the contours of legal protections for human rights, does not do enough to prevent or provide remedies for corporate-related human rights abuses.'
Transnational corporations are generally excluded from direct responsibility under international human rights law.2 The state-centered nature of
modern human rights law is inconsistent with the actual power and influence of many transnational corporations. 3 Current human rights law has
been conflated with international human rights law and so looks almost
exclusively to states to create laws to protect human rights and mechanisms to enforce those laws.4 However, many modern transnational corf Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of
Law; J.D. 2005, University of California, Berkeley School of Law; M.A. 2002, Stanford University
International Policy Studies; Zwischenpriifung 1998, Humboldt-UniversitAt zu Berlin. Research for
this article was supported by Dean John V. White. I would like to thank Larry Catd Backer, Monica
Bell, Richard Buxbaum, David Caron, Linda Edwards, Mary LaFrance, Andrew Guzman, Fatma
Marouf, Saru Matambanadzo, Audrey McFarlane, Ann McGinley, Tom McAffee, David Millon, Jay
Mootz, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Janewa Osei-Tutu, Nancy Rapoport, Paulette Reed-Anderson.
Jean Stemlight, Asmara Tekele, Marketa Trimble, the participants at the Lytle Workshop at the
University of Kentucky School of Law in June 2010, the participants at Junior Scholars Workshop at
the Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual meeting in August 2010, and the participants at
the Vulnerability and the 'Corporation' Workshop as part of the Feminism and Legal Theory Project
at Emory University School of Law in October 2010 for their comments and suggestions. I am
indebted to Jeanne Price and David McClure at the Wiener-Rogers Law Library for their outstanding
assistance and support. I also would like to express my deep appreciation to the editors at the Denver
University Law Review for their hard work, excellent editing, and consistent professionalism.
1. See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 9
(2004); see also Edward L. Rubin, Response to Comments, 9 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 167, 173 (2003)
("[Hluman rights discourse fails to reflect the conceptual structure and practical realities of the
modern administrative state."). See generally JOSEPH, supra note I (analyzing human rights litigation against transnational corporations).
See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporationsand Interna2.
tionalLaw: Where From Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2003) ("[S]ince the existing international
mechanism was not designed to apply to [transnational corporations], its inadequacy is exposed.").
3. See id. ("States no longer enjoy the monopoly as violators of human rights and no longer
solely bear the duty to protect human rights."). States are at the center of international human rights
law because they are at the center of international law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-58 (5th ed. 1998).

4. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www2.ohchr.orglenglish/law/ccpr.htm
("Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may
be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."); see also, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter ICESCR], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm ("Each State Party
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porations have achieved a level of power, wealth, and influence that rivals that of states.s Failure to regulate the power, wealth, and influence of
transnational corporations is a weakness in human rights law that should
be remedied.6
This Article argues that transnational corporations require specialized and targeted regulations and laws, and that the conflation of human
rights law and international human rights law should be reversed to allow
the advancement of other forms of human rights law. It makes two proposals. First, reimagine human rights law and international human rights
law as separate categories. Specifically, classify international human
rights law as a sub-category of human rights law. This distinction highlights the need to encourage the development of other forms of human
rights law, for example, global human rights law and national human
rights law. Second, establish global human rights law as a sub-category
of human rights law. Specifically, create a new global human rights regime with three main elements: a Global Law Commission, global laws
and regulations, and universal civil jurisdiction.
In the summer of 2009, the U.S. news media was dominated by reports about the BP oil spill.7 The United States Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator described it as "the largest environmental disaster
in American history." 8 But although similar events have occurred many
times over in developing countries, they have not captured the attention
of the U.S. media in the same way. 9 For example, a major oil spill the
size of the Exxon Valdez disaster has occurred every year for half a cen-

to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures."). However,
"international legal institutions typically only have advisory powers and are unable to 'make' states
take particular action." Angela M. Banks, CEDA W, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights Enforcement in Sub-SaharanAfrica, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 781, 782 (2009).
5. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 1; Hope Lewis, Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in Critical Race Feminist Perspective, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 510, 519 (2003) ("Many [transnational
corporations] have more economic resources at their disposal than the entire budget available to
some developing countries; they can exert influence that approximates that of a state in some circumstances.").
6. See Deva, supra note 2, at 3 ("[T]he approach of indirect regulation has failed to deliver
the desired results.").
7.
For example, a search on July 3, 2010 for "BP oil spill 2010" in Google news resulted in
22,100 hits.
8.
Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator Jackson: Keep Moving America Forward into Energy
Independence, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://blog.epa.gov/administrator/2010/06
/08/administrator-jackson-/oe2%80%9ckeep-moving-america-forward-into-energy-independence
/e2%80%9d/ (last updated Oct. 27, 2010). However, others contend that the "Dust Bowl" of the
1930s may be the largest environmental disaster on U.S. territory. See, e.g., Ed Stoddard, Is Gulf
Spill the Worst Ecological Disaster in US. History?, REUTERS ENVIRONMENT FORUM (June 22,

2010, 10:09 AM), http://blogs.reuters.com/environment/2010/06/is-gulf-spill-the-worst-ecologicaldisaster-in-u-s-history/.
9. A search for "Niger Delta oil spill" in Google news on July 3, 2010 resulted in 154 hits.
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tury in the Niger Delta.'0 Environmental disasters overseas often involve
a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, as was the case in the Bhopal disaster
in which toxic gas leaked from a pesticide plant, killing an estimated
2,100 people and injuring over 200,000 others. 1' Nonetheless, oil spills
in the Niger Delta and other developing countries-and the harms they
cause- do not receive the same level of attention in the U.S. media.' 2
Environmental catastrophes like the 2010 BP oil spill and the decades of oil spills in other places like the Niger Delta impinge upon human rights-such as the rights to life, health, adequate food and housing,
and clean water.' 3 Life, health, and other human rights are enumerated,
for example, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and
other human rights documents.1 4 In the BP oil spill, eleven people were
killed in the explosion.' 5 In some cases in the Niger Delta, oil drilling
and associated gas flares have made entire villages uninhabitable.16 Oil
drilling and gas flares have had devastating effects on both the environment and human health, and have led to convulsions, chromosomal dam-

10.
Adam Nossiter, Far From Gulf a Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html ("The
Niger Delta, where the wealth underground is out of all proportion with the poverty on the surface,
has endured the equivalent of the Exxon Valdez spill every year for 50 years by some estimates.").
For details of the amount of oil spilled in the Niger Delta between 1976 and 1996, see Odjuvwuederhie Emmanuel Inoni, Douglason Gordon Omotor & Felicia Nkem Adun, The Effect of Oil Spillage
on Crop Yield and Farm Income in Delta State, Nigeria, 7 J. CENT. EUROPEAN AGRIC. 41, 43
(2006), available at http://www.agr.hr/jcealissues/jcea7- I/pdfljcea7I-6.pdf.
In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 634 F. Supp.
11.
842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affdand modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
A search for "Niger Delta oil spill" on July 3, 2010 resulted in less than one percent of the
12.
hits for "BP oil spill 2010" on the same date although the search is narrower and there has been the
equivalent of a major spill in the Niger Delta every year for at least 50 years.
See U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General, Protect, Respect & Remedy: A
13.
Frameworkfor Business & Human Rights: Second Addendum, 3, 29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.2
(May 23, 2008) [hereinafter Protect, Respect & Remedy], available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doclUNDOC/GEN/G08/136/61 /PDF/G0813661 .pdfOpenElement.
ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6; ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 7, 12; Universal Declaration
14.
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(lll) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR]. However, there continues to be disagreement about the legitimacy and enforceability of
economic, social, and cultural rights. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Rethinking Human Rights, 9 INT'L
LEGAL THEORY 5, 5-6 (2003) (discussing the controversy associated with the extent to which social,
cultural, and economic rights are accepted).
Bradley Blackbum, BP Oil Spill: Families Gather to Honor II Who Died, Express Frus15.
tration With BP, Transocean, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bp-oil-spilltransocean-holds-memorial-l I -lost/story?id=10739080.
16. Factsheet: Shell's Environmental Devastation in Nigeria, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS.,
http://ccjustice.org/leam-more/faqs/shell%2526%2523039%3Bs-environmental-devastation-nigeria
[hereinafter CCR] (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). The devastation was so extensive that Ken SaroWiwa, the leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, described the oil drilling
operations as "an ecological war against the Ogoni." Fifth Amended Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial
1, 53, Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum, No. 96 Civ. 8386 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009),
http://ccrjustice.org/files/3.16.09%205th%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Wiwa Fifth
Amended Complaint].
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age, birth defects, and other serious illnesses.17 The U.S. news was filled
with pictures of the extreme damage of BP's spills and yet most people
in the United States are completely unaware of the Niger Delta disasters.
However, environmental catastrophes are not the only way that the
operations of transnational corporations like BP negatively affect human
rights." Transnational corporations, as "economic entit[ies] operating in
more than one country or [as] a cluster of economic entities operating in
two or more countries," help shape the economic, political, social, and
legal environments in which they operate.' 9 Transnational corporations
are a subset of corporations and, therefore, much of the discussion of
transnational corporations in this Article also applies to domestic corporations, although there are, of course, important differences. 20
Transnational corporations also impinge on human rights in the labor context.21 One well-known example is the Nike scandal in the 1990s,
when Life magazine exposed Nike's involvement with the use of child
labor in the production of soccer balls by publishing a picture of a child
assembling Nike soccer balls in Pakistan. 22 More recently, underpaid
workers, including child workers, produced the soccer balls used in the
2010 World Cup. 2 3 This case of corporate-related human rights abusethirteen years after the initial Nike scandal-received only minimal media attention.
A 2007 U.N. study reviewed 320 alleged cases of corporate-related
human rights abuses and concluded that corporations affect "the full
range of human rights" through their acts or omissions. 24 The study fo17. CCR, supra note 16.
18. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2; Protect,Respect & Remedy, supranote 13, at 2.
19. Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm'n on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Rep. on its 55th Sess., July 28-Aug. 15, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,
2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12
.Rev.2.En. The influence of transnational corporations is discussed infra in Part II.
20. See, e.g., Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The ExtraterritorialApplication of United
States Law and The Protection of Human Rights: Holding MultinationalCorporationsto Domestic
and InternationalStandards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 126-27 (1996) (discussing "the
vastly different standards that exist under U.S. law that give [transnational corporations from the
U.S.] license to treat U.S. citizens in one manner, but allow foreigners to be treated in a completely
different (and inferior) way").
21.
JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2; Protect,Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.
22. Richard M. Locke, The Promise and Perils of Globalization: The Case of Nike II -13
(Mass. Inst. of Tech. Indus. Performance Ctr. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 02-007, 2002),
availableat http://web.mit.edulipc/publications/pdfl02-007.pdf.
23.
See Michelle Chen, FIFA 's World Cup Having a Ball with Child Labor, COLOR LINES
(June I1, 2010, 10:42 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2010/06/south-africas-worldcup brims
with broken_promises.html; James Rupert, World Cup Profits Bypass Asian Soccer-Ball Stitchers
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 9,2010,4:39 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-06-09/world-cup-profits-bypass-asian-soccer-ball-stitchers-updatel-.html; Trina Tocco,
World Cup Soccer Balls Missed the Goal Set 13 Years Ago: Child Labor, Poverty Wages, Tempo-

rary Workers, COMMONDREAMS.ORG (June 7, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://www.commondreams.org/
newswire/2010/06/07-6.
24. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 1-3, 29. The cases were posted on the
Business and Human Rights Resource center webpage (http://www.business-humanrights.org),
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cused on the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and International Labour Organization Core Conventions. 25 These include
"civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and labor
rights." 26 The study found that corporate-related human rights abuses
take place in all industrial sectors and in all regions of the world.27 In
some cases, the harms include loss of life.28
Although corporate-related human rights abuses are not proportionately represented in the U.S. media, scholars and decision-makers are
aware of the issue.29 So, if scholars and decision-makers have been aware
of corporate-related human rights abuses for decades at the very least,
why are there still such wide-scale problems with corporations negatively affecting human rights? This Article argues that the answer is not
simply a lack of regulations or a lack of enforcement. Instead, it argues
that part of the answer lies in the conflation of human rights law with
international human rights law, and the ways that human rights law intersects with corporate law and foreign direct investment law. 30
Addressing the complex problem of human rights abuses by transnational corporations requires a comprehensive framework. 31 One avenue toward a comprehensive framework is international law; another
avenue is global law. International law is the law between nation-states

which "is the most comprehensive" and "objective" resource on the intersection of business and
human rights. Id. at 6.
25. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2. See generally ICCPR, supra note 4;
ICESCR, supra note 4; UDHR, supra note 14; INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOuR
ORGANIZATION'S
FUNDAMENTAL
CONVENTIONS
8
(2002),
available at

http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms
095895.pdf. There are eight core International Labour Organization conventions: Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29);
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No.
138); Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182); Equal Remuneration Convention,
1951 (No. 100); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. Il l). Id.
26. Protect,Respect & Remedy, supranote 13, at 2.
27. Id. Based on the cases reviewed in the U.N. study, the regional breakdown of alleged
human rights incidents is as follows: Asia & the Pacific - 28%; Africa - 22%; Latin America - 18%;
Global - 15%; North America - 7%; Europe - 3%; and Middle East - 2%. Id at 8.
28. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2-4.
29. See generally, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 1; Locke, supra note 22; Protect,Respect & Remedy, supra note 13.
30. For a parallel argument addressing the question of why transnational corporations do not
have obligations under international human rights law, see Iris Halpern, Tracing the Contours of
Transnational Corporations' Human Rights Obligations in the Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 129, 131 (2008) (positing that the omission of transnational corporations is "a
product of the systemic separation between international economic development, human rights
enforcement, and the regulation of private players").
31.
See id. at 134 ("The international legal system must be refashioned so as to be capable of
simultaneously regulating all the numerous important actors vis-A-vis their human rights behavior.").
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and, as such, it does not directly regulate transnational corporations. 32
Instead, it regulates the regulators, the nation-states, thereby concentrating on nation-states and marginalizing issues that do not directly implicate nation-states.33 Since transnational corporations are (by definition)
not nation-states, they do not fall within the natural scope of international
law. Further, since transnational corporations operate in multiple jurisdictions, the laws of any one jurisdiction are not sufficient to govern their
activities.34
Global law is an emerging legal order. It is a next iteration of law,
following the law of nations and international law.35 Global law is neither superior nor inferior to other legal orders. 36 Instead, it presupposes
the interconnection and interdependency of all legal orders of the world,
including international law and national law. Human rights are a core
value of global law. 3 8 There are multiple sources of global law, including
specific economic or other subsectors, and organizational and functional
networks. 39 Lex mercatoria,also known as commercial law, transnational
law, or the New Law Merchant, is an example of global law. 4 0 Through
various means, global law provides an opportunity to address corporaterelated human rights abuses, in part because it is not state-centered.
This Article is part of a larger project. My previous article, Toward
Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing Foreign Direct Investment

Law, argued that the asymmetry and fragmentation of foreign direct in-

32.

See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1-2 (1956). As early as 1956, Philip Jessup

noted the inadequacy of using "international law" to address issues that arise within the "complex
interrelated world community." Id. at 1. Instead, Jessup used the term .'transnational law' to include
all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers." Id. at 2 ("Both public and
private international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard
categories."). For a more detailed discussion of the term "transnational," see generally id. Transnational law, thus, may regulate "individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other
groups." Id. at 2-3.
33.
See id at 11.
34. See id at 4-5; see also Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing ForeignDirect Investment Law, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2009).
35.

RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW, at xiv (2010); see also Harold J. Berman,

World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617, 1617 (1995). For more on national human rights law, see
generally UNITED NATIONS, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF NHRI PRACTICES

(2008), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/OHCHR-National-Human-Rightslnstitutions-practices-Apr-2008.doc.
36.

See DOMINGO, supra note 35, at 147.

38.

DOMINGO, supra note 35 , at 142-44.

39.

Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL

37. Id.; see also Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447 (2007) (arguing that "the dichotomy of anational law and state law
is false").

LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3-4 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). See generally id for a discussion of
global law.

40.

Id. at 3. Lex mercatoria is also defined as "the transnational law of economic transac-

tions." Id; see also ANA M. L6PEZ RODRIGUEZ, LEX MERCATORIA AND HARMONIZATION OF
CONTRACT LAW IN THE EU 90 (2003) (defining global law as "a body of rules, different in origin

and content, created by the community of merchants to serve the needs of international trade").
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vestment law encourages excesses by transnational corporations.4 That
article proposed transforming the theories and practices of voluntary
Global Corporate Citizenship into a mandatory legal framework and developing a legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship that reconceptualizes the role of transnational corporations in the global economy. This Article builds on Toward Global Corporate Citizenship and
attempts to reimagine human rights law.42 It argues for the development
of a global law regime as a sub-category of human rights law, distinct
from international human rights law, and proposes a global institution,
global laws, and global enforcement to regulate transnational corporations and help fill gaps in human rights law. 43 This Article makes that
argument in three stages.
Part I, Limits of a State-Centered Human Rights Regime, argues for
the re-remembering of human rights law as the super-category and international human rights law as one of several possible sub-categories of
human rights law. In the wake of the dramatic expansion of international
human rights law in the post-World War II era, it came to be thought of
as synonymous with human rights law. This conflation of human rights
law and international human rights law has inhibited the development of
other sub-categories of human rights law such as global human rights
law and national human rights law. Although international human rights
law has achieved significant progress, the state-centered human rights
regime is limited, and, in the absence of other forms of human rights law,
leads to the under-regulation of transnational corporations as a result of
state resistance, impotency, and complicity. Part I proposes decoupling
and distinguishing between human rights law and international human
rights law to allow for the development of other forms of human rights
law, including global human rights law.
Part II, Transnational Corporations Need Dedicated Regulation,
posits that transnational corporations require dedicated regulation under
human rights law that goes beyond the ambit of international human
rights law. International human rights law requires states to enact and
enforce laws to protect human rights within their jurisdiction. However,
international human rights law alone is an insufficient tool with which to
regulate transnational corporations when their economic, political, and
41.
See Anderson, supranote 34, at 6.
This article attempts to respond to the challenge identified by Philip Alston in The 'Not-a42.
Cat' Syndrome: Can the InternationalHuman Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in
NoN-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 4 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) ("The challenge that [the
state-centered focus of the international human rights regime] lays down is one of re-imagining, as
the social scientists would put it, the nature of the human rights regime and the relationships among
the different actors within it. Lawyers, not being noted for their willingness to depart from precedents, might prefer to see the task in terms for re-interpreting existing concepts and procedures rather
than re-imagining.").
43. Sarah Joseph has argued, "Ultimately, a preferable approach might be for all nations to
agree on international minimum human rights standards for TNCs, which could be incorporated into
national legislation and enforced by domestic courts." JOSEPH, supranote 1, at 153.
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legal influence exceeds that of the countries in which they operate. The
interests of states in preserving sovereignty inhibit the development of
comprehensive multijurisdictional international human rights enforcement mechanisms. Finally, the importance of human rights as core values
contrasted with the inadequacy of international human rights law as the
sole tool to protect them at the global level, demonstrate the need for
protection and enforcement of these rights in multiple forms of human
rights law.
Part III, Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, sets out a
proposal for the development of global human rights law as a subcategory of human rights law that could address the problem of corporate-related human rights abuses. This proposal has three main components: creation of a Global Law Commission, development of global
laws, and implementation of universal civil jurisdiction. A primary purpose of the Global Law Commission would be to develop global human
rights law regulations and legislation to prevent and address corporaterelated human rights abuses. The Global Law Commission would develop model global regulations and laws informed by theories of Global
Corporate Citizenship and promote their enactment. Global regulations
and laws could be enforceable via multiple avenues, including national
courts, alternative dispute resolution, and universal civil jurisdiction for
corporate-related human rights abuses. However, this proposal does not
preclude the creation of a global court or other global mechanism for
adjudication or alternative dispute resolution.
I.

LIMITS OF A STATE-CENTERED HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME

International human rights law categorizes all actors on the global
stage as either state actors or non-state actors.44 For the purposes of international human rights law, non-state actors can be defined only by
their relationship to the state. 45 This state-centered focus inhibits an accurate analysis of corporate-related human rights abuses and limits the development of measures with which these issues can be addressed. 46 In
light of these weaknesses, this Article argues for the development of
other forms of human rights law.
Although states are no longer assumed to be the only actors in the
international arena, modern human rights law remains state-centered. 47
44.
Alston, supra note 42, at 3.
45.
Id. at 3-4.
46.
See id at 4 ("[S]uch a uni-dimensional or monochromatic way of viewing the world is not
only misleading, but also makes it much more difficult to adapt the human rights regime in order to
take adequate account of the fundamental changes that have occurred in recent years.").
47. See Deva, supra note 2, at I ("The conventional international framework for protection of
human rights is state-centric; it obligates primarily states to promote, and not violate, human
rights."); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 209
(7th ed. 1997) ("[E]very individual has certain inalienable and legally enforceable rights protecting
him or her against state interference and the abuse of power by governments."); see also Rafael
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This means that when we think of human rights law, we think primarily
of internationalhuman rights law. Modem international human rights
law is anchored in the series of international declarations and conventions that were generated in the decades following the fall of the Third
Reich and the end of World War 11.48 The atrocities perpetuated by the
Nazi state against its own citizens and those of other countries were still
fresh in the minds of the policy makers who organized the Nuremburg
trials and drafted and signed the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 4 9 This explains, in part, the post-World War II focus on state action.
However, although corporations were often complicit and, in many
cases, actively involved in human rights abuses under the Nazi regime
and in many other contexts, the emerging international human rights
regime did not incorporate direct rules governing transnational corporations.50 Although some argue that the primary focus of international decision-makers in the post-World War II period was responding to the
atrocities of the Nazi regime, the reasons more likely lie in the complexities of political machinations and conflicts of interest set in a particular
historical context. 5' The exclusion of transnational corporations from
international human rights law is not inevitable, but rather results from
historical events, flawed assumptions, and lack of political will among
some influential policy makers. 52

Domingo, The Crisis of InternationalLaw, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1543, 1549-50 (2009). For
a discussion of the nation-state paradigm and its history, see id. at 1556-66.
48. See Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and Development of
Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 296-97 (2007). The post-World War 11 period
marks the beginning of broad international action in the area of human rights. See MALANCZUK,
supra note 47, at 209. Prior to World War II, actions addressing human rights concerns tended to be
focused on specific regions, groups, or abuses. Id.
49. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1990).
50.
See Halpern, supra note 30, at 130-31.
See Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950, 47 HISTORICAL
51.
J. 379, 380, 397 (2004) ("It does no service to the cause of human rights to disguise the political
struggles and conflicts of interest that accompanied their emergence into the international arena. On
the contrary, a better understanding of that story, their relationship to prior rights regimes, and their
dependence on the international balance of power may help us recognize their true weight and
worth."); see also Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 AM. HIST. REV. 117,
119 (2004) ("While university-based historians such as Paul Lauren, Lynn Hunt, and Jeffrey
Wasserstrom have addressed the subject, journalists, legal scholars, political activists, and political
scientists have still done far more of this history writing. The field remains refreshingly inchoate.").
See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
52.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 111-14 (2004) (arguing that modem international law is deeply and fundamentally shaped by imperialism and colonialism). Colonial trading companies, the predecessors of
modem transnational corporations, were arms of the state and, therefore, did not require a separate
body of governing law. Their purpose was to further political, legal, economic, and social goals. For
example, the Dutch West India Company was "started as a move in the war game" and "[t]he aim
and objective of the Company had from the first been to carry on active war with Spain." Hugh E.
Egerton, The Transference of Colonial Power to the United Provinces and England 728, 749, in 4
THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 749 (A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero &
Stanley Leathes eds., 1906). The shareholders of the Dutch West India Company were five Dutch
government institutions, the Dutch legislature made annual payment to the Dutch West India Corn-
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Protected from the reach of international human rights law, transnational corporations continue to impinge upon human rights. The most
common labor-related rights that the operations of transnational corporations affect include "the right to work (34%), [the] right to just and favorable remuneration (30%), the right to a safe work environment (3 1%),
and the right to rest and leisure (25%)."s3 For example, in the late 1990s,
an Ernst and Young 54 report on a Nike subcontractor in Vietnam claimed
that concentrations of a chemical solvent, chemical releases, and excess
dust in the shoe plant (in each case, many multiples above the allowed
levels) had caused extensive harm to the workers' human rights.55 Specifically, workers suffered from respiratory ailments and skin and heart
disease that were allegedly caused by the health and safety violations at
the factory.5 The Ernst and Young report also stated that the employees
were forced to work more hours than allowed by Vietnamese law.57
As mentioned above, not only do corporate-related human rights
abuses take place in the labor context, they are also linked to environmental harms. Those human rights affected include the right to physical
health and to an adequate standard of living, and the right to life, liberty
and personal security.58 Corporate-related human rights harms are often
caused by pollution, contamination, and environmental degradation.59
For example, the plaintiffs in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC6 0 alleged that Rio
Tinto's Panguna Mine in Papua New Guinea polluted the KawerongJaba River with waste and poisoned the air with dust and emissions from
a copper concentrator. 6 ' The plaintiffs asserted that this air and water
pollution led to an increase in respiratory infections and asthma, and that
the decreased food supply due to crop damage and the deaths of traditional sources of food like fish led to health problems in the local populapany, and the Dutch legislature promised to provide the Dutch West India Company with a fleet of
ships in the event of a serious war. Id. at 749-50.
Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 11.
53.
54. Ernst and Young is a global accounting firm that provides assurance, tax, transaction, and
advisory services. See About Us, ERNST AND YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/US/en/About-us

(last

visited Oct. 28, 2010).
55.
Locke, supra note 22, at 13; see also Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam is
Called Unsafe for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1997/11 /08/business/nike-shoe-plant-in-vietnam-is-called-unsafe-forworkers.html?scp-l &sq
=nike%20shoe%20plant/o2in%20vietnam%20is%20called%20unsafe&st=cse.
56. Locke, supra note 22, at 13.
57. Greenhouse, supra note 55 (stating that employees were forced to work 65 hours a week
for $10). Over 9,000 workers were employed at the factory. Locke, supra note 22, at 13.
58. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.
59. See id.
60. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 456
F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on reh 'g in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2007), reh'g en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). On October 26, 2010, an en bane panel
of the Ninth Circuit referred the case to a mediator to "explore the possibility of mediation." Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, 02-cv-56256 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2010). The mediator is scheduled "to report to the en banc
court within twenty-eight (28) days as to whether mediation should proceed or whether this case
should be returned to the en banc court." Id.
Id.at1124&n.31.
61.
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tion. 62 Corporate-related human rights abuses harm not only individuals
but also entire communities.63
In addition to direct abuses such as under-compensation or chemical
spills, abuses by transnational corporations create ripple effects that lead
to additional harms." For example, exploitative compensation practices
can contribute to harassment and sexual abuse of women.6 ' The use of
child labor affects enjoyment of the right to education and, in some
cases, the rights to health and even life. By way of illustration, children
between the ages of five and seventeen are employed at vanilla orchards
in Madagascar. 67 They are among the twenty-eight percent of children in
68
Madagascar who are employed in the agriculture and fishing industries.
These children are unable to enjoy the right to education because they
work six to seven hours a day for approximately twelve cents a day.69
Corporations also contribute to or benefit from indirect involvement
in human rights abuses by third parties-including governments, other
businesses, and individuals.70 For example, the Swedish Company
Lundin Oil AB, together with Sudapet Ltd.-which is wholly owned by
the Sudanese government-has been accused of complicity in war
crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by government security
forces. Most of the indirect cases are alleged in Africa, Asia and the
Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Even though we tend to think of human rights in terms of international human rights law-that is, in a post-1948, post-Universal Declaration of Human Rights context-human dignity and other concepts underlying human rights predate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and even predate the nation state. Louis Henken, a leading international
62.
Id.
Protect,Respect & Remedy, supranote 13, at 4, 29.
63.
64. Id. at 3, 29.
Lewis, supra note 5, at 519 ("Transnational corporations exploit the low-wage status of
65.
women (often women of color) and, in doing so, create new avenues for sexual abuse and harassment."); see also Nike Admits Abuse at Indonesian Plants, BBC NEwS (Feb. 22, 2001, 13:55 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/l 184103.stm (reporting that underpaid workers in a Nike
plant in Indonesia, who are 85% women, have reported being coerced into sex and being fondled by
managers).
66. Protect,Respect & Remedy, supranote 13, at 3.
67.
Dan McDougall, Bitter Plight of the Vanilla Trade Children, THE SUNDAY TIMES (Mar.
14, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article7060962.ece.
68. Id.
69. See id
Protect,Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 4.
70.
71.

EUROPEAN COAL. ON OIL IN SUDAN, UNPAID DEBT: THE LEGACY OF LUNDIN, PETRONAS

AND OMV INBLOCK 5A, SUDAN 1997-2003, at 10 (2010), availableat http://www.ecosonline.org/
reports/2010/UNPAIDDEBT fullreportweb.pdf. ("[T]here are grounds to investigate whether the
Consortium provided fimancial and material support to the security agencies that were responsible
for the commission of international crimes and gross violations of human rights.").
Protect,Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 15.
72.
73.
Louis Henkin (1917-2010) was a professor of law at Columbia University, a president of
the American Society of International Law, and held many important positions over the course of his
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law and human rights scholar, defined human rights as "legitimate, valid,
[and] justified claims" of individuals and communities upon society.74
Although human rights are claims or entitlements that can be asserted,
they are not always coexistent with legal rights. 75 Human rights arise on
the basis of a person's humanity and do not require anything more than
the nature of a human being to exist; legal rights are government created
and require a government or other institutional act to exist.76 Thus, human rights may exist, even when law does not yet protect them.
A. Underregulationof TransnationalCorporations
Modern human rights law does not generally directly regulate transnational corporations. International human rights agreements are-by
definition-agreements between nation-states.77 International human
rights documents range from recording understandings of human rights
and human dignity, to setting out aspirational goals, to establishing requirements and guidelines for state actors. 8 The idea is that state signatories of international agreements will enact laws that protect human
rights. 79 Such laws would also apply to domestic and transnational corporations where appropriate.80
The exclusion of transnational corporations from the international
human rights regime puts the burden on states to enact and enforce laws
that protect human rights." However, this expectation, although arguably
correct in principle, does not account for realities that make state en-

life, including at the State Department, the United Nations, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Louis Henkin, COLUM. L. ScH., http://www.iaw.columbia.edu/facILouis-Henkin (last visited Dec.
20, 2010). Henkin was a prolific and influential scholar and was "credited with founding the study of
human rights law and inspiring generations of legal scholars." Louis Henkin: Preeminent Scholar in
Constitutional
and
International
Law,
COLUM.
L.
SCH.,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/louis henkin/55703 (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
74. HENKIN, supra note 49, at 2; see also id. at 2-5 (providing a more detailed discussion of
this conception of human rights); Rubin, supra note 14, at 9 ("[H]uman rights must be rights, that is,
they must represent some claim or entitlement that can be asserted by the human beings in question.").
75. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 9 for a discussion of the difference between human rights and
legal rights.
76. See id at 8-9.
77. See Domingo, supra note 47, at 1549 (quoting HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 320
(Max Knight trans., 1967)).
78. For example, at the time it was passed by the United Nations General Assembly, most
states did not regard the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as legally binding. MALANCZUK,
supra note 47, at 213. However, in the time since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
passed some of its provisions may have become binding customary international law. Id. (discussing
the resolution passed at the United Nations Conference on Human Rights at Teheran in 1968 "proclaiming, inter alia, that 'the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... constitutes an obligation for
the members of the international community."' (alteration in original)).
79. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 2.
80. See Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 273, 305 (2002) (suggesting that, under the ICESCR, states will be held responsible
for controlling non-state actors "over which they exercise jurisdiction").
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 2.
81.
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forcement improbable at best and completely unrealistic at worst.82 For
example, developing countries have a disincentive to enact and enforce
laws to protect human rights and remedy abuses because "developing
countries compete among themselves for a limited pool of investment."8
This environment of competition leads governments to make different
choices about legislation and enforcement than might be the case if they
were working in concert with other governments. 84 This situation leaves
transnational corporations under-regulated.
Under-regulation of transnational corporations is problematic because it encourages decision-making that results in corporate-related
human rights abuses.85 Although transnational corporations are subject to
the laws of multiple jurisdictions, the decisions that guide the acts of
transnational corporations are, in practice, rarely exposed to judicial
scrutiny. 6 Only a small percentage of alleged corporate-related abuses
make it into court, and even fewer result in an outcome that would create
incentives for corporations to change their business practices to reduce
negative effects on human rights.87
There are at least five ways to address the problem of corporaterelated human rights abuses: laws, pressure by consumers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), self-regulation, socially responsible
investment, and enforcement.88 These can be categorized into legal and
non-legal remedies. Nonetheless, in their current forms, each of these
avenues is insufficient.
Legal measures include legislation and litigation. While domestic
and international laws do exist, they are fragmented and are often not
enforced.89 In addition, many plaintiffs do not have the financial resources to pursue legal remedies. As a result, most cases of alleged violations never make it to court. Reaching a settlement often first requires the
incentive of a pending court case. Even then, there is a possibility that

See Deva, supra note 2, at 3 ("[T]he approach of indirect regulation has failed to deliver
82.
the desired results."); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, Ill YALE L.J. 443, 448 (2001) ("Without some international legal standards, we will
likely continue to witness both excessive claims made against such actors for their responsibility and
counterclaims by corporate actors against such accountability.").
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity
83.
ofBilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 674 (1998).
84. See id (suggesting that the environment ofcompetition influences the policies adopted by
developing countries).
85.
See JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 153 (arguing that measures are needed to incentivize transnational corporations to adopt better practices with regard to human rights).
86. See id. (explaining that the human rights abuses by transnational corporations actually
subjected to transnational litigation represent "only the tip of the iceberg").
87.
See id.
88.
See id.
89. See id.at 8-12.
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the plaintiffs may not meet all jurisdictional, substantive, and evidentiary
hurdles-which are often substantial in these types of cases.90
Non-legal measures can contribute to filling the gaps in law and enforcement. These measures include external incentives, such as public
pressure and socially responsible investment, and internal incentives,
such as self-regulation.91 Pressure by consumers and NGOs has achieved
some high profile successes.92 However, this option is limited by the
need for abuses to be sufficiently widespread or public, or both, to come
to the attention of consumers and NGOs, at which point substantial
harms have often already occurred. 93 Socially responsible investment
offers shareholders an opportunity to avoid financing transnational corporations with questionable practices. 94 However, socially responsible
investment itself does not prevent other people from investing in companies that are less socially responsible. In addition, the effectiveness of
socially responsible investment remains disputed. 9 5
The good works for goodwill model underlies more recent developments in scholarship such as corporate citizenship and enlightened
shareholder value.9 6 The essence of the good works for goodwill model
is that, although good works may be more costly from a short-term perspective, they have a beneficial effect on profits from a long-term perspective. 97 The good works for goodwill model harkens back to issues
raised in cases like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.," A.P. Smith Manufactur-

90.
For a discussion of some of these hurdles, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social
Responsibility in an Era ofEconomic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 764-71 (2002).
91.
JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 153.
92. See Halpern, supra note 30, at 135 ("Currently, the most acute pressure felt by TNCs to
modify their behavior results from concerted NGO and consumer action campaign activity.").
93.
For example, in the Nike case, the underpayment of the workers in Indonesia "became
publicized through the skillful use of media by several NGOs" and reported in "The New Republic,
Rolling Stone, The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and The Economist." Locke, supra note 22, at
10- 11. However, this practice had gone on for several years before it was brought to the attention of
the public. See id. (noting that the practice was taking place in the early 1990s and was not discontinued until the mid-I 990s). For a discussion of other examples of successful applications of pressure by consumers and NGOs, see id. at 18-19.
94.
See Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern FinancialMarkets: The Conflicting
Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681, 690 (2002).
95.
See PAUL HAWKEN & THE NATURAL CAPITAL INSTITUTE, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INVESTING: How THE SRI INDUSTRY HAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO PEOPLE WHO WANT TO INVEST
WITH CONSCIENCE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO CHANGE IT 16 (2004) [hereinafter HAWKEN &

NCI],
available
harkin.pdf.

at

http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/sri/report-

96.
See generally DAVID LOGAN, DELWIN ROY & LAURIE REGELBRUGGE, GLOBAL
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: RATIONALE AND STRATEGIES (1997) (discussing Global Corporate Citi-

zenship); David Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the Redefinition
of CorporatePurpose Without Law (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 2010-11, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=1625750
(discussing enlightened shareholder value).
97.
See Millon, supra note 96, at 1-2.
98.
170 N.W. 668, 683-84 (Mich. 1919) (examining when shareholders challenged the
authority of the board of directors to prioritize philanthropic contributions over profit maximization).
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ing Co. v. Barlow,9 9 and Shlensky v. Wrigley 00 with which U.S. law students and corporate law scholars alike are familiar.101 The good works
for goodwill model essentially shifts the framework from a short-term to
a long-term emphasis but retains a focus on profit-maximization as a
primary goal. 102
Finally, the level of judicial review of business decisions in the
United States has global implications because approximately one-fifth of
the top 100 non-financial transnational corporations are located in the
United States. Currently, the main forum for corporate-related human
rights abuse cases is also the United States. 1 03 U.S. courts subscribe to a
doctrine of minimal judicial review of the substance of business decisions called the business judgment rule.1 04 This rule presents a particularly problematic hurdle for enforcement in cases of corporate-related
human rights abuses because it means that they, too, are subjected to
only minimal judicial review.
B. State Resistance, Impotency, and Complicity
To date, international human rights law has had a limited trickledown effect on corporate-related human rights abuses. Not all countries
have signed on to all international human rights agreements. For example, the United States has ratified only seventeen of fifty-one international human rights agreements, and five of the agreements ratified by
the United States relate to terrorism.105 In addition, ratification of an in99. 98 A.2d 581, 585-87 (N.J. 1953) (discussing shareholders who challenged the authority of
the board of directors to make a contribution to a university).
237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (discussing shareholders that challenged the
100.
authority of the board of directors to act "for a reason or reasons contrary and wholly unrelated to the
business interests of the corporation").
It is worth noting here that Geoffrey P. Miller argues that although the narratives of these
101.
situations are often told as charitable corporate giving cases, these narratives did not accurately
reflect the underlying motives and issues in these cases. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Narrative
and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate CharitableGiving Cases (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-56, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract id-1495069.
102. See generally Millon, supra note 96, at 4 (discussing corporate purpose and the shift from
short-term shareholder value to be broadened to encompass nonshareholder interest as well).
103. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 21 ("Most of the transnational human rights cases against corporations have arisen under the Alien Tort Claims Act [ATCA] in the United States."). However, the
ability to bring claims against corporations under the Alien Tort Statute was recently called into
question in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that (1)
customary international law governs the scope of Alien Tort Statute liability, (2) in matters of first
impression, the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over claims against corporations, and
(3) corporate defendants were not subject to Alien Tort Statue liability because corporations were
not subject to liability under customary international law).
104.
The business judgment rule is based on the presumption that directors possess more expertise than judges when it comes to making business decisions and so should not be second-guessed
by judges as long as appropriate procedures have been followed in the decision-making process. See,
e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361-62 (Del.Ch. 2000); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del.
1981).
105. See Ratification of InternationalHuman Rights Treaties - USA, U. MINN. HUM. RTS.
LIBR., http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-USA.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
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ternational human rights agreement does not automatically ensure that a
country will enact comprehensive laws to implement the agreements to
which it is a party. o0
Further, even if enacted, such laws may not achieve the goals of the
agreement under which they were mandated. For example, the United
States ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1994.107 However, in its October 2000 report on efforts made to implement the CERD, the U.S. government admitted that enactment of laws has been insufficient to fulfill
the goals of the CERD.'0 8
There are numerous factors that affect states' ability to protect human rights.' 09 These include historical, economic, and institutional constraints as well as weak legal systems, regime change, wars, politics, and
geopolitical power plays.i"0 Some states-for example, failed states
(states that have collapsed and can no longer perform basic functions)are unable to protect human rights."' In some cases, developing countries do not have the political will or legal processes to protect human
rights. 112
In other cases, states actively resist the development, implementation, and enforcement of the international human rights regime." 3 Even
at the inception of the modern international human rights regime, politi106. See Mazower, supra note 5 1, at 379 ("To many people, [human rights] are honoured in
the breach, an ideal which statesmen pay lip-service to but flout in practice.").
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Reports Submitted by States
107.
Paties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Third Periodic Reports of States Due in 1999, 1 3, U.N.
Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter United States 2000 CERD Report], available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100294.pdf (combining the first three periodic
reports of the United States). It may seem surprising that the United States has ratified CERD since
the United States has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Ratification ofInternational
Human Rights Treaties- USA, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR., http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/research
/ratification-USA.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). It is worth noting that this exception-U.S.
ratification of an international human rights agreement-was prompted by the very public presentation of petition to the United Nations in 1947 by W.E.B. Du Bois on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Mazower, supra note 51, at 395.
United States 2000 CERD Report, supra note 108, at 18-21. Reasons given in the report
108.
for the inadequate implementation of the CERD include inadequate enforcement of existing laws,
inefficient use of data, economic disparities, and lack of access to educational opportunities, technology, and high technology skills. Id. at 19-20. In addition, the report notes that persistent discrimination is a primary factor affecting the implementation of laws designed to eliminate discrimination. Id. at 19-21. Ironic. However, it is worth noting that the section on factors affecting implementation has been reduced to less than a page in the 2007 report and no longer gives discrimination
as a reason for persistent discrimination despite the enactment of laws. See Periodic Report of the
U.S., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Periodic Report of the U.S., 11 5254 (April 2007), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83517.pdf.
109.
See Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What 's the Relationship?,36
GEO. J. INT'L L. 809, 943-44 (2005).
110.
See id.
111.
Seeid at858.
JOSEPH, supra note 1, at I1.
112.
113.
See Mazower, supra note 51, at 393.
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cal decision-makers attempted to limit the scope, implementation, and
enforcement of international human rights law. 114 For example, during
the establishment of the United Nations in the 1940s, the U.S. Congress
actively took steps to protect U.S. domestic jurisdiction and prevent direct applicability of the U.N. Charter's human rights provisions.
As a result of U.S. and British concerns about national jurisdiction,
a domestic jurisdiction clause was incorporated into the U.N. Charter.116
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."' 17 The inclusion of this domestic jurisdiction clause effectively circumscribed the ability of the U.N. Charter to serve as a direct
basis for effective implementation and enforcement of the emerging
post-World War II international human rights regime.
The state-centered focus of international human rights law relegates
to the periphery complex relationships between public and private actors-as well as relationships between private actors, and individuals and
communities. 119 For example, the real and perceived need for foreign
capital creates incentives for states to establish an investment climate that
is attractive to transnational corporations.120 In response, states that are
looking to foreign direct investment to provide capital and know-how for
infrastructure development may choose not to monitor or enforce laws
and regulations that would increase the cost of operating within their
borders. 121
In some cases, states are also complicit in corporate-related human
rights abuses 122 and, therefore, have a disincentive to implement and enforce protection from and remedies for human rights abuses. For example, in response to the Niger Delta disasters discussed above, Ken SaroWiwa, a businessman, novelist, television producer, and former government official, spoke out against land appropriation, pollution, and other
alleged negative effects of the acts of multinational oil companies, including Royal Dutch/Shell.123 In November 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and
114. See id. ("The higher human rights moved up the agenda, the greater the pressure for a
further limitation on the new [United Nation]'s ability to intervene in the domestic affairs of member
states." (emphasis added)).
See id.
115.
116. See id. at 393.
117. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
118. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 393 (discussing how Article 2 undermined the scope and
effectiveness of the U.N. Charter's ability to serve as the basis for an effective human rights regime).
119. See Hope Lewis, Transnational Dimensions of Racial Identity: Reflecting on Race, the
Global Economy, and the Human Rights Movement at 60, 24 MD. J. INT'L L. 296, 306 (2009).
120. See id. at 306-07.
121.
See id.
122. See generallyWiwa Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 16.
See id.at 2.
123.
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five other men were beaten, and denied food, water and bedding for several days. 124 On November 10, 1995, the six men were hanged after a
"special military trial" based on fabricated charges.12 5 The Royal Dutch
Shell consortium had knowledge of these acts and gave its consent and
support.126 Royal Dutch/Shell made payments to the military police, contracted for the purchase of weapons supplied to the Nigerian police and
military, exchanged information with and provided logistical support to
the Nigerian police and military, and participated in the planning and
coordination of raids and terror campaigns in Ogoni and the Niger
Delta.12 7 At one point, the Nigerian subsidiary, a member of the Royal
Dutch Shell consortium, publicly praised the working relationship between the subsidiary and the Nigerian Police Force.128
Even in cases in which states are not acting in collusion with transnational corporations, the state-centered human rights regime does not
provide sufficient incentives for transnational corporations to respect
human rights. In the 2007 U.N. study of cases of alleged corporaterelated human rights abuses discussed above, two of the main contexts in
which transnational corporations impinged upon human rights were labor
and the environment. 129 In most of the cases reviewed in the U.N. study,
each alleged instance of corporate-related human rights abuse affected at
least one hundred people, and the numbers were often much higher.130
For example, in one case, one alleged instance of corporate-related human rights abuse affected approximately 60,000 people.' 3'
Although the international human rights regime has made progress
since the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, state resistance continues to inhibit development of an implementable and enforceable human rights regime domestically and internationally.132 States, which bear the responsibility for
implementing and enforcing international human rights law, fail to ade124. See id. at 3, 17.
125. Id. ("Defendants Royal Dutch/Shell, together with the military regime governing Nigeria,
acting through the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited . . ., and acting with
other agents and co-conspirators have, in the past and continuing through the present, used force and
intimidation to silence any opposition to their activities in Nigeria which includes the exploitation of
the petroleum resources of the Delta and spoliation of the environment there.").
126. Id. at 2 ("The executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa, John Kpuinen, Saturday Doobee, Felix
Nuate, Daniel Gbokoo, and Dr. Barinem Kiobel and the imprisonment and torture of Michael Tema
Vizor by the Nigerian military junta and the campaign to falsely accuse them were carried out with
the knowledge, consent, and/or support of Defendants Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell
Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., . . . and their agents and officers, as part of a pattern of
collaboration and/or conspiracy between [Royal Dutch/Shell] and the military junta of Nigeria to
violently and ruthlessly suppress any opposition to Royal Dutch/Shell's conduct in its exploitation of
oil and natural gas resources in Ogoni and in the Niger Delta.").
127. See id. at 8-9.
128. Id. at 13.
Protect,Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.
129.
130.
Id.atl3-14.
131.
Id. at 13.
132. See Peerenboom,supra note 109, at 824.
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quately do so. At the same time, the focus on international human rights
law diverts attention and energy that could be used to develop alternative
areas of human rights law. State resistance takes many forms including
non-ratification, reservations to international agreements, noncompliance, and even withdrawal from international agreements.1 33 The
extent to which states make reservations to international human rights
treaties undermines the effectiveness of those treaties.134
C. ExtraterritorialApplication ofDomestic Law

The combination of sovereignty and territorial integrity imbues
states with jurisdiction within a state's territories.135 Generally, under
modern international law, sovereign states have the jurisdiction to make
and enforce laws within their own territories.' 36 This also means that,
generally, states may not interfere in affairs that are within the jurisdiction of another state or in another state's exercise of its authority within
its jurisdiction.137
States also exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.1 38 In fact, there is an
increasing trend toward extraterritoriality. 139 Familiar examples include
exterritorial application of antitrust, securities, and merger and takeover
laws.14 0 However, the extraterritorial application of domestic laws is
problematic.141 For example, the checks and balances that develop out of
mutual obligations, such as those embodied in international treaties, do
not constrain extraterritorial application of domestic law. 142 Individual
nations are able to use their domestic laws to influence international policy in a non-transparent manner. 143 Such laws are not first subjected to

133.

Id.

134. See id. However, ratification alone is not inherently correlated with increased protections
for human rights.
135. For a discussion of sovereignty, territoriality, and jurisdiction, see Domingo, supra note
47, at 1556-76.
136.
See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW:
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 175 (1993).

137. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
138. See BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 175-77 (discussing the bases for extraterritoriality).
Blumberg differentiates between home and host country territoriality. Id. at 177-91. For examples of
home and host country extraterritoriality, see generally id. For a brief history of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the international criminal context, see Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The
Myopia ofU.S. v. Martinelli: ExtraterritorialJurisdictionin the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REV. 1, 3-11 (2007).
139. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming InternationalLaw from Extraterritoriality,93 MINN. L.
REV. 815, 818 (2009). For a discussion of U.S. attempts to regulate transnational corporations, see
Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American Multinational
Enterprise,20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 89, 107-18 (2001).
140. BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 192-93.
141.
See Parrish,supra note 139, at 820.
142. Id. at 846. For a response to arguments that extraterritorial laws encourage international
lawmaking, see id. at 871-72.
143.
See id. at 846, 857, 860, 862.
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public debate and discourse at the global level, which poses a threat to
democratic sovereignty and to international cooperation and stability.14 4
The extraterritorial application of domestic law also tends to make
enforcement of human rights dependent on private litigation. 14 5 On its
face, private litigation has certain benefits because it affords potential
plaintiffs an opportunity to pursue a remedy for their harms. However, as
mentioned above, many plaintiffs do not have the significant financial
resources necessary to pursue remedies through private litigation. Further, even if private litigants have the resources to successfully pursue
litigation against a corporation, there is no guarantee that those plaintiffs
would have the financial resources to enforce the judgment. After all,
large transnational corporations have comparatively infinite time and
resources with which to oppose litigation and the enforcement of judgments.
In addition, "[e]xtraterritorial laws undermine international
law...."146 Domestic litigation can divert energy toward short-fixes
with limited scope that could be better concentrated on working toward
comprehensive laws and enforcement with long-term effects.147 For example, when decisions are not recognized and enforced abroad, battles
won in one domestic court must then be re-litigated over and over again
in all of the jurisdictions around the world to achieve truly international
protections and remedies.
The state-centered human rights regime is characterized by an emphasis on domestic jurisdiction. 148 Thus, laws governing the protection
and enforcement of human rights are at the whim of the prevailing political will or lack thereof in any given country at any given time. Arguably,
it might be possible to fill gaps in the human rights protections and enforcement of one country with the extraterritorial application of the domestic laws of another country. However, as this Part I demonstrated,
such extraterritorial application of domestic law is problematic and can
undermine the international human rights law regime.149
This Part I highlighted the weaknesses of the state-centered international human rights regime and its inability to respond to the realities of

144. See id.
145. See id. at 862-63.
146. Id. at 865. However, this is not to suggest that the territorial jurisdiction of a state is holy
and should be protected from any and all encroachments. See BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 201
("[T]he extraterritorial assertion of national law inherent in the application of enterprise principles to
components of multinational groups inevitably will engender international confrontation and disrupt
international trade and relations."); Domingo, supra note 47, at 1575-76 (arguing that universal
harms should be resolved in a universal way).
147. See Parrish,supra note 139, at 865-66.
148. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
149. See Parrish,supra note 139, at 865-66.
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modem transnational corporations." 0 State resistance, impotency, and
complicity lead to under-protection of human rights.' 5' Extraterritorial
application of domestic laws is insufficient to fill these gaps and can
have far-reaching detrimental effects." 2 Although the weaknesses of the
existing regime are well-known and well-documented, the question of
how to comprehensively address these issues remains unanswered.
This Article argues that this question is unanswered largely because
the conflation of human rights law and international human rights law
has inhibited the evolution of human rights law in other directions. The
development of new forms of human rights law could address the underprotection of human rights that results from an over-reliance on international human rights law. One issue that new forms of human rights law
could address is corporate-related human rights abuse. Part II argues that
human rights law should be extended directly to transnational corporations because the intersection of human rights and transnational corporate activity is special and, therefore, requires a specialized regulatory
regime.
II.TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS NEED DEDICATED REGULATION

Alternative forms of human rights law are needed because international human rights law is inadequate to enact and enforce comprehensive protections from corporate-related human rights abuses. The intersection of transnational corporations and human rights presents particular
challenges which existing legal regimes are ill-equipped to regulate. One
reason for this is the combination of the nature of transnational operations and the importance of human rights. Many transnational corporations have achieved a level of wealth and influence that strain the regulatory competence of nation-states. 5 3 Transnational corporations operate
and cause or contribute to harms in multiple jurisdictions, which challenges the effectiveness of traditional territorial jurisdiction. Finally, human rights represent a special set of societal values that require a level of
regulation that may exceed those deemed sufficient in other areas of the
law. This Part II analyzes each of these characteristics of corporaterelated effects on human rights in turn.

150. See Erika R. George, The Place of the Private TransnationalActor in InternationalLaw:
Human Rights Norms, Development Aims, and Understanding Corporate Self-Regulation as Soft
Law, 101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 473, 474 (2007).

151.
152.

See Peerenboom, supra note 109, at 943-44.
See Parrish,supra note 139, at 866.

153.

See generally JOEL BALKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF

PROFIT AND POWER 3 (2004) (examining the strength and wealth of transnational corporations).
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A. Wealth and Influence of TransnationalCorporations

Transnational corporations have achieved vast wealth and immense
influence. 154 They exercise economic, political, and legal influence in
home countries, the country of incorporation, and host countries-the
country in which assets or operations are located.' 55 This exercise of influence inhibits the ability of states to prevent and redress corporaterelated human rights abuses.156
1. Economic Might of Transnational Corporations
Foreign direct investment, which takes the form of owning, operating, or managing a business in host countries, is an important component
of transnational corporations' operations.1 57 States allow foreign direct
investment by transnational corporations within their borders for a variety of reasons. Two of the main reasons that host countries allow-and
more importantly encourage-foreigndirect investment are to gain infusions of capital and know-how in the short term and to achieve economic
prosperity in the long term. 58
In 2007, there were approximately 77,000 transnational corporations.159 The foreign assets of the top twenty transnational corporations
amounted to over $2,904,995 million.160 The majority of the largest
transnational corporations are incorporated in more developed countries. However, at least since the European occupation of Africa and
other former colonies, transnational corporations have chosen to own,
operate, and manage business operations in countries in which they are
not incorporated, and they continue to do so today in increasing numbers.162 In some cases, the wealth of a transnational corporation may ex-

See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Universe ofthe
154.
Largest Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/2 (2007) [hereinafter
UNCTAD], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20072_en.pdf (compiling a list of the
100 largest non-financial transnational corporations and the top fifty transnational corporations from
developing countries).
155. Jemej Lemar Cemic, Corporate Human Rights Obligations under Stabilization Clauses,
11 GER. L.J. 210, 218 (2010); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 962-63 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the ability of corporations to exert
political influence through political speech and election contributions).
156. Cemic, supra note 155, at 211.
157. UNCTAD, supra note 154, at 3 (stating that 770,000 foreign affiliates of transnational
corporations have globally generated an estimated $4.5 trillion in value since the early 1990's).
Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Coun158.
tries, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1999, at 34-36, availableat http://www.imf.org/extemall
pubs/ft/fandd/1 999/03/pdflmallampa.pdf.
UNCTAD, supra notel38, at 3.
159.
160. Id. at 40.
Id. at 4. The European Union, Japan, and the United States are the home countries for
161.
eighty-five percent of the top one hundred transnational corporations. Id. The number of transnational corporations incorporated in less developed economies is growing but only a handful have
entered the ranks of the world's largest. Id. at 15-16.
162. See Cemic, supra note 155, at 211.
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ceed the wealth of the host country itself.'6 3 The wealth of transnational
corporations gives them room to influence the abuse or enjoyment of
human rights by individuals and communities in both home and host
countries.'6
2. The Siren Song of Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment by transnational corporations is considered to be a significant source of private external financing for developing countries.1 65 In 2008, approximately forty-three percent of all inward
foreign direct investment flowed into transitional and developing countries. Foreign direct investment is also important to developing countries as an opportunity for innovation, technology transfer, human capacity development, and access to various forms of corporate governance.
The need (real or perceived) for foreign capital makes many host countries dependent on it for development and, therefore, susceptible to the
influence of transnational corporations.168
In addition to potential economic benefits, foreign direct investment
by transnational corporations also exerts socio-cultural, political, and
legal influence in host countries.169 In some countries, transnational corporations may reinforce gender hierarchies by paying, or allowing their
subsidiaries to pay, women less than men for the same work. 170 The effects of foreign direct investment may also be indirect and unexpected.
Between 1989 and 1992 in Papua New Guinea, for example, increased
income resulting from foreign direct investment was linked to increased
Halpern, supra note 30, at 144 ("[T]he process of economic globalization has allowed
163.
many TNCs to accumulate vast sums of resources and power, often times in excess of the host
state's own."); see also Baker, supranote 139, at 94.
JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 1-2.
164.
165. Mallampally & Sauvant, supra note 158, at 35; see also, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, World Investment Directory: Volume X Africa 2008, at 1, U.N. Doc.
UNCTADITE/IIT/2007/5 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20075_en.pdf
("The ratio of FDI inflows to the region's gross fixed capital formation ... [was] 20 per cent in
2006.").
166. See Inward & Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows, UNCTADSTAT,
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?Reportld=88 (last visited Oct. 29, 2010)
(calculated using 2008 data available on UNCTADSTAT).
Mallampally & Sauvant, supra note 158, at 35-36.
167.
168. See id. at 36.
Baker, supranote 139, at 89 ("[Transnational corporations are] potentially more economi169.
cally powerful than Stalin's Soviet Union, and with more broad-based political influence than The
Third Reich.").
170. See U.N. Secretary-General, The World's Women 2005: Progress in Statistics, 54, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.K/17 (2006), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products
/indwm/ww2005_pub/EnglishlWW2005 text completeBW.pdf. For a discussion of the gendered
effects of foreign direct investment, see generally Rachel J. Anderson, Foreign Direct Investment
and DistributionalEquity for Women, 31 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. (forthcoming 2010). See also
Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital:A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 74-80
(2009) for a more comprehensive discussion of women's work and DOUGLAS BRANSON, No SEAT
AT THE TABLE: How CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM

(2006) for a discussion of implicit male bias in corporate governance and the effects of this bias on
women's rights.
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consumption, which was linked to increased rates of polygamy.' 7' Men
with more income were able to take more wives.172
3. Political Influence of Transnational Corporations
Transnational corporations exert political influence in both home
and host countries. This influence may be direct or indirect or both. In
home countries, for example, transnational corporations exert political
influence through lobbying and campaign contributions.173 When a
transnational corporation exerts political influence, it affects government
decision making in a way that encourages government action or inaction.174
Transnational corporations may also use their political influence in
their home country to influence decisions in host countries. For example,
transnational corporations incorporated in countries like the United
States pressure their home governments to pressure governments in developing countries to provide protections for the corporations' intellectual property. 7 5
4. Legal Influence of Transnational Corporations
Transnational corporations are often able to influence the application and enforcement of laws in the countries in which they operate. For
example, Nike's Korean suppliers operating shoe factories in Indonesia
in the early 1990s successfully petitioned for and received an exemption
from the minimum wage.' 76 The companies claimed that paying mini171.

See Glenn Banks, Globalization, Poverty, and Hyperdevelopment in Papua New Guinea 's

Mining Sector, 46 FOCCAL-EUR. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 128, 135 (2005).

172. See id.
173. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 881-86 (2010). This recent U.S. Supreme
Court case ensured the ability of corporations, whether domestic and foreign, to exert political influence through political speech and election contributions. Id.; cf 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting foreign nationals from directly or indirectly making contributions or independent expenditures in connection with a U.S. election). However, the majority opinion does not address whether
the "[g]overnment has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from
influencing" the domestic political process. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. Further, the majority
does not consider the issues in this case in the context of transnational corporations. Id. at 936 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174.
Id. at 961-63.
175. See Peter Straub, Farmers in the IP Wrench-How Patents on Gene-Modified Crops
Violate the Right to Food in Developing Countries, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 193
(2006). For example, U.S. companies have tried to "'invent restrictions that do not exist within
international law and compel developing countries to accept them through U.S. trade pressures.'
Special 301 Review Public Hearing: Hearing Before the Special 301 Subcommittee ofthe Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative,at 104 (2010) (from testimony given by a representative from Doctors Without Borders) available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/1726.&nbsp. Strong intellectual property rights can have detrimental effects on human health and life. Id. at 97-98 ("People in
developing countries are dying because medicines do not exist due to inadequate incentives for their
development or because they're unavailable due in part to patent barriers and high costs."). For a
more comprehensive discussion of the intersection of trade and human rights, see BERTA
HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW COVENANT LINKING TRADE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009).

176.

Locke, supra note 22, at 10.
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mum wage would be a hardship for them.177 The local minimum wage at
the time was approximately $1 per day (2,100 rupiah) and covered only
70% of the basic needs of one individual.178 This arrangement allowed
factories producing Nike products to underpay more than 25,000 workers
without violating the letter of the law in Indonesia-the host country. 179
This practice was discontinued on Nike's request in the mid 1990s-an
example of transnational corporations' ability to prevent human rights
abuses by their subsidiaries and suppliers, if they choose to do so.'80
One important way that transnational corporations affect the legal
regimes in host countries is through investment agreements between the
state and one or more investors. Investor-state investment agreements are
agreements between host states and investors to set rules, standards, and
even determine the laws that will apply to the transaction that is the object of the contract.'8 1 Investor-state investment agreements are problematic for the protection of human rights because they insulate "projects
from standards of protection of basic rights that apply elsewhere in a host
country; and [they] shrink[] certain remedies that victims would otherwise have."l82 Investment agreements between states and transnational
corporations are common, for example, in the extraction sector.183
Investor-state investment agreements highlight a key problem associated with transaction-based law and policymaking that takes place outside of a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework. This is signaled
by the fact that investor-state investment agreements are commonly referred to as international investment agreements.1 84 This nomenclature
supports claims that some transnational corporations have amassed previously unknown influence over the law and policymaking power of
these agreements. In the international investment agreement, transnational corporations become quasi-states that enter into agreements with
nation-states, and they imbue the transnational corporations with rights
and powers that allow them to encroach upon prerogatives of the public
177.
Id.
178. Id.
179.
See id.
180. Id. at I1. Nike first denied the ability to affect the practices of companies in its supply
chain and then only did so after substantial bad press. Id. at 10-11.
181.
See Sheldon Leader, Human Rights, Risks, and New Strategiesfor Global Investment, 9 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 657, 703-04 (2006) (discussing the types of clauses in investment contracts and
international investment contracts in conjunction with human rights); see also Wendy N. Duong,
Partnershipswith Monarchs-Two Case Studies: Case One, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1171,1265
(2004) ("In various forms, the [Stabilization] Clause restricts the host jurisdiction's exercise of
'permanent sovereignty' by contractually preventing the nation-state from subsequently modifying
the governing law of the investment contract."). Concession agreements between early transnational
corporations, formerly colonial trading companies, are the predecessors of modem international
investment contracts. See ANGUE, supra note 52, at 233-34.
Leader, supra note 181, at 700.
182.
See id. at 661, 696 (discussing the BTC pipeline connecting the Caspian and Mediterra183.
nean Seas and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline agreement).
This is a post-World War II development in international law. ANGHIE, supra note 52, at
184.
230.
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domain.1s Taking this one step further, international investment agreements even have the potential to trump both domestic and international
-law.186
These investor-state agreements are, thus, not subject to domestic
law but rather a legal system of a different kind.' 8 7 Generally, these
agreements are considered to be subject to "an international law system."188 Thus, although the agreement is not between two nations, it is
treated as inter-national if one of the parties is a developing country and
one of the parties is a transnational corporation, but not if the country
involved is a "developed" country.' 89 As internationalagreements, arbitration of disputes is subject to international rather than national law.' 9 0
However, the shifting of transnational corporations into a quasistate status glosses over important distinctions. Transnational corporations are not states and, although the line between public and private is a
topic for debate, according them a quasi-state status contributes to the
obfuscation of problematic trends related to transaction-based law and
policy making. Transaction-based law and policy making is not subjected
to the scrutiny accorded a more public deliberative process, and the immediate interests of the parties are narrower than would be the case, for
example, if third parties with differing interests were directly involved.
States are at a greater disadvantage when entering into investment
agreements than may be apparent at first blush. Initially, it might seem
that the state has all the power since it is a sovereign nation and is the
maker and enforcer of law and policy within its territories. However, the
reason that states enter into investment agreements with investors is that
they do not have the domestic capacity, whether public or private, to
achieve the purpose of the agreement.191 Thus, they need to attract one or
more foreign investors, although they may not necessarily need to attract
a specific foreign investor. Depending on the industry, the number of
potential foreign investors may be extremely limited due to high barriers
to entry. For example, only a limited number of corporations have
equipment readily available to dedicate to drilling oil, and corporations
that want to enter this market must have sufficient capital to lay out in

185. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 232.
186. See Cemic, supra note 155, at 218 (analyzing the language of the 2005 Mineral Development Agreement between the National Transitional Government of Liberia and Mittal Steel Holdings AG).
187. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 231.
188. See id.
189. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 231-32 (quoting Derek Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach, 59 BRITISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 49, 51 (1988)).
190. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 1.L.R 389, 433 (Arb. Trib.
1977).
See generally Leader, supra note 181, at 657-694 (discussing investment contracts).
191.
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advance to purchase the expensive equipment necessary for oil drilling.192
Investment agreements between transnational corporations and host
countries create special legal regimes of limited duration with potentially
substantial effects. 193 These special legal regimes can weaken legal protections for individuals and communities in host countries. 94 For example, existing human rights standards may be affected indirectly or are
limited directly by the terms of the international investment contract.,9 5
When this happens, the host state may effectively lose its ability to enforce otherwise applicable human rights laws and standards.' 9 6
Most investor-state investment agreements include stabilization
clauses.' 97 A stabilization clause is "contract language which freezes the
provisions of a national system of law chosen as the law of the contract
as of the date of the contract, in order to prevent the application to the
contract of any future alterations of this system." 98 The purpose of stabilization clauses is to protect transnational corporations from unfavorable
and perhaps unfair changes in legislation or regulations after they are
locked into the contract and have sunk money into the project.199 These
stabilization clauses can, for example, prevent host states from applying
laws that come into existence after the contract is signed to the transaction that is the object of the contract.200
On their face, stabilization clauses make sense because they mitigate the risk to a transnational corporation that the other party to the contract, a sovereign state with law-making power, might change the laws
for its own benefit at any time. However, a broad stabilization clause
may also have the effect of depriving individuals and communities in the
host country of human rights protections that may become enforceable
by law after the date of an investment contract. In fact, stabilization
192. See id.at 682-83.
193. See id. at 660. Although the duration is limited, it still extends for the life of the investment project, which is often as long as seventy years. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Cemic, supra note 155, at 220-21 (discussing the stabilization clause in the Host
Government Agreements between a consortium of oil corporations and the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey regarding the Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project).
196. Leader, supranote 181, at 671.
197. Cernic, supra note 155, at 213. There are various forms of stabilization clauses. Id. at 214.
See J. Nna Emeka, Anchoring Stabilization Clauses in InternationalPetroleum Contracts, 42 INT'L
LAW. 1317, 1318-20 (2008) (discussing the rationale for and the origin of stabilization clauses); see
also Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements, 29 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 317, 321 (1988) (describing both stabilization and governing-law clauses in an investment
agreement).
198.
Cernic, supranote 155, at 213; see also Curtis,supra note 197, at 346-47 (discussing the
nature of stabilization clauses); Sang-Jick Yoon, Comment, Critical Issues on the Foreign Investment Laws ofNorth Korea for Foreign Investors, 15 WIS. INT'L L.J. 325, 364-65 (1997) (describing
how stabilization clauses are "grandfathered exceptions to the new law").
199. See Cemic, supra note 155, at 213-14.
200. See Leader, supra note 181, at 672-681 (discussing stabilization clauses in international
investment contracts).
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clauses are sometimes structured so that the entry into an international
agreement to protect human rights by a host state can make the host state
liable to the transnational corporation for profit lost due to the need to
comply with laws protecting human rights. 201
B. Complexities of MultifurisdictionalRegulation and Enforcement
The complex structure of transnational operations often triggers
questions of jurisdiction and impedes transnational enforcement.202 It
also creates a need for the development of comprehensive global regulation. Although there are jurisdictional challenges, there are also options
that offer promising alternatives to address existing jurisdictional hurdles.
1. Territorial Jurisdiction
Territorial jurisdiction, also known as national jurisdiction, state jurisdiction, domestic jurisdiction, and sovereignty, is the power a state has
to make laws that govern its territories and the power of its courts to ex203
ercise jurisdiction within the bounds of its territories. Territorial jurisdiction is one of the oldest, most fundamental, and accepted forms of
jurisdiction.204 Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits states from
interfering in the territorial jurisdiction of other states, further protects
the territorial jurisdiction of states.205
Territorial jurisdiction makes it possible, at least theoretically, to
enact and enforce laws governing transnational corporations in the jurisdictions in which they are incorporated, operate, or have assets. 206 In
part, this is because respect for state sovereignty remains a central tenet
of international human rights law. 207 Thus, domestic tax, labor, business,
and antitrust laws, etc., primarily govern transnational corporations. This
is not to suggest that these laws do not sometimes have extraterritorial
201.
202.

See Leader,supra note 181, at 673-75.
Jurisdiction is the power to regulate and to enforce. See generally GARY B. BORN,

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2009); Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Juris-

diction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 7-25 (1987) (discussing judicial
jurisdiction in the international context).
203. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts,
in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 168, 171-72 (Stephen Macedo, ed., 2004); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 39, 40 (Stephen Macedo

ed., 2004); cf Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 138, at 12 (discussing two types ofjurisdiction: "rulemaking and rule-enforcing jurisdiction," which take three forms: "prescriptive or legislative, adjudicative, and enforcement").
204. See Bassiouni,supra note 203, at 40.
205.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
206. See JESSUP, supra note 32, at 74-76 (discussing territorial jurisdiction governing transnational corporations and the past resentments between the judicial authorities of the United States and
Canadian companies).
207. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 824 (discussing one reason for this central tenant-fears of
some scholars, theorists, and policy makers that international law has more democratic legitimacy
than domestic law). See also MALANCZUK, supra note 47, at 17-18 and Domingo, supra note 47, at
1556-65 for a discussion of the theory, doctrine, and concepts of sovereignty.
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reach, but rather that-in most cases-they are dependent on domestic
enforcement. 208 However, in practice, territorial jurisdiction has proven
to be a limited tool. Transnational corporations often operate in the context of a multinational enterprise, which includes multiple entities incorporated in multiple jurisdictions working with various partners and sup209
pliers.
In the case of lawmaking to protect human rights, territorial jurisdiction generally determines which state and law-making bodies have
prescriptive jurisdiction, also known as legislative jurisdiction.2 10 In addition, as discussed above, prescriptive jurisdiction may determine the application of international law and extraterritorial application of domestic
law. For example, bilateral investment treaties are forms of international
lawmaking that govern foreign direct investment.211 However, domestic
and international laws, when they exist, are often fragmented and not
enforced. Recall the minimum wage exceptions granted by the Indonesian government to Nike suppliers.212
When corporate-related human rights abuses occur in the context of
a multinational operation, multiple states may have the right to exercise
jurisdiction. Domestic conflict of laws rules can be used to determine
which of the states that have the right to exercise jurisdiction should exercise that right in a particular case.213 Although this may seem to offer
plaintiffs multiple jurisdictions and thus multiple opportunities to pursue
redress for their claims, in practice this can work to the disadvantage of
potential plaintiffs. For example, the courts in the home country of a defendant transnational corporation may-based on their own national conflict of law rules--decide not to assert jurisdiction under the principle of
forum non conveniens. In dismissing a case for forum non conveniens,
the court finds that another forum, the host country for example, would
be a better suited-more convenient-alternative forum. At the same
time, the plaintiffs claims may be blocked for political or other reasons in
the host country. Therefore, if such a claim is dismissed, the effect in
practice is often that potential plaintiffs are left without a forum in which
to bring their claims. This is particularly true for claims dismissed in the
United States since it is one of the primary-and only-forums in which

208.
See Parrish, supra note 139, at 820, 846 for a discussion of the rise of extraterritorial
domestic law and associated problems.
209.
See Anderson, supra note 34, at 2.
210. See Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalLaw Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 271-72 (2009) (discussing the international law implications
for foreign investors responsible for human rights abuses in developing nations in which they do
business).
211. See generally Leader,supra note 165, at 660-70.
212.
Locke, supra note 22, at 10-11.
213. See JESSUP, supra note 32, at 35-39 (discussing the difference between international law
and conflicts of law and which one holds the power in a particular problem).
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is possible to bring claims for corporate-related human rights violations.2 14
2. Other Forms of State Jurisdiction
In addition to territorial jurisdiction, there are numerous other types
of jurisdiction in the transnational context. The least controversial form
ofjurisdiction is where there is a tie between the prescribing or enforcing
state and the party who is the object of this prescription or enforcement.
The traditional bases of prescriptive jurisdiction, the power to make rules
and regulations, are territory and citizenship.2 15 As discussed above,
countries commonly make laws that govern their citizens and people
within their territory. 216 These are also generally accepted as a matter of
217
customary international law.
Forms of judicial jurisdiction, the power of a court to exercise junisdiction, include personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction based on effects,
consent, nationality, and property.218 However, the recognized forms of
judicial jurisdiction are not uniform and vary from country to country.
For example, the United States recognizes tag or transient jurisdiction,
whereby the courts may assert personal jurisdiction even if the defendant
is passing through their jurisdiction on a wholly unrelated matter.219
French courts will generally grant jurisdiction in any case that involves a
French national on either side. 220 German courts grant jurisdiction in
cases involving property located in Germany whether or not the owners
have any other ties or connections to Germany.221
3. Universal Jurisdiction
In addition to the various forms of jurisdiction recognized by different countries, there is also jurisdiction that stems from the nature of the
conduct. Universal jurisdiction allows courts to exercise jurisdiction
based on the type of conduct alone without any other connection to the
state that is exercising jurisdiction.222 Often, people think only about
214. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 4-5.
215.
Paul B. Stephan, Symmetry and Selectivity: What Happens in InternationalLaw When the
World Changes, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 91, 105 (2009).
216. See Ramsey, supra note 210, at 284.
217. Id.
218. See Born, supra note 202, at 1-3, 14-20.
219.
Id. at 12, 36 n.147.
220. See Bom, supra note 202, at 14 (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art 14-15 (Fr.)).
221.

See Born, supra note 202, at 14-15 (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE] Sept. 12, 1950, § 23 (Ger.); Christof von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and
Commercial Matters Under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 INT'L LAW. 671,678 (1982)).
222.
Peter Weiss, Universal Jurisdiction:Past, Present and Future, 102 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 406, 407 (2008) (citing PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES] ("[U]niversal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such juris-
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criminal universal jurisdiction when they think about universal jurisdiction.
Criminal universal jurisdiction applies to conduct that falls within
one of the following categories: "piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, torture, and 'perhaps certain acts of terrorism."' 223 Although much of the discussion about universal jurisdiction
focuses on criminal cases, universal jurisdiction can also apply in civil
contexts. 224 Despite a lack of consensus as to whether human rights are
universal, it may be possible to reach a consensus that human rights
should be protected from private actors. However, universal civil jurisdiction for corporate-related human rights abuses is not yet an established principle of law.
C. Human Rights and Core Values in Crisis

Alone, the power and influence of transnational corporations may
not be sufficient to justify developing alternative regulatory and enforcement options. Even coupled with the challenges of multijurisdictional regulation and enforcement, it may be difficult to convince many
scholars and policy makers that additional administrative and regulatory
mechanisms are necessary to restrain and harness the power and influence of transnational corporations. However, the nature of human rights
as core values and the history of corporate-related human rights abuses
lend support to arguments for the need to regulate transnational corporations at a global level.225
In western cultures, the idea of human rights as an individual's
claim that can be asserted against society (whether or not there is a legal
right) has its roots in the medieval era.226 The western origins of civil and
political rights as protections against government have their roots in the
227
However, protection of human
Renaissance and the Reformation.

diction.")). Universal jurisdiction is one of the most controversial forms of jurisdiction. See Henry J.
Steiner, Three Cheersfor UniversalJurisdiction-orIs It Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
199, 224-26 (2004) (describing reaction from other states to the potential exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by Belgian courts).
223.
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of UniversalJurisdiction,47 VA. J. INT'L L. 149,
151 (2006) (citing United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); see also
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supranote 222, at 29; Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdic-

tion: In Absentia Signaling Over ClearlyDefined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 537, 578-603 (2005).
224. See Weiss, supra note 222, at 407.
See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets PrivateLaw Harmonization: The Com225.
ing Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 304 (2005) ("From a compliance point of view, what is most
distinctive about human rights law is that it requires extraordinarily high compliance levels.").
226. Rubin, supranote 14, at 10 (discussing the origins of the doctrine of natural rights). For a
justification for a rights approach, see Barbara Stark, Women's Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 341-44 (David P. Forsythe, ed., 2009) (arguing that the benefits of a rights approach include
the moral weight carried by rights rhetoric, the provision of a theoretical framework, a wellestablished infrastructure, and the power and flexibility of rights as a tool).
227. Id. at 35-37 (discussing the origins of civil and political rights).
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rights through law emerged out of religious and public policy considera-228
tions.
Historically, rules and laws protecting human dignity and human
rights were often articulated in response to extreme power and influence
combined with encroachments upon those rights and dignity. Crisis is
often the catalyst that prompts change. There are many examples of these
times of crisis and change, including in the history of the Catholic
Church, the American Revolution, and the post-World War II creation of
the international human rights regime. 229
Religious institutions have espoused human rights-albeit under
another name-as core values for centuries. The predecessor of early
western human rights theory, natural rights theory, emerged at a time
when the Catholic Church exercised enormous power.230 This time of
crisis is exemplified by the tension between the growth of the Franciscan
Order after its recognition by Pope Innocent III in 1209 and the Inquisition's increasing violence, including torture.231 Under the doctrine of
natural rights, there are certain "claims that can be asserted by all human
beings." 2 3 2 These ideas are captured in the writings of William von Ockham, author of the first Western theory of natural rights and a follower of
the Franciscan philosophies.233 They have also been delineated in the
Catholic social doctrine.2 34
Human rights have been articulated as core values as part of the
creation of nations. In the eighteenth century, the American Declaration
of Independence, one of the most famous articulations of individual
rights as a political idea, was signed in the context of economic oppression by the British government of its American colonies.2 35 This crisis is
exemplified by oppression in the form of, for example, the Sugar, Stamp,
and Townshend Acts. These acts imposed taxes and import restrictions
228.

Id. at 168.

229.
See generally THOMAS D. WILLIAMS, WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR?: PERSONALISM AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 31-52 (2005), for a historical perspective of the Church's atti-

tudes concerning human rights.
230. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 10.
231.

See id. at 12; Inquisition, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/

08026a.htm#HlA (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
232.
Rubin, supra note 14, at 10.
233.
Id. at 13-14; see id. at 14-17 (discussing Ockham's writings).
234.

See generally JAY P. CORRIN, CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS AND THE CHALLENGE OF

DEMOCRACY 41 -81 (2002) (describing the development of Catholic social action and the principles
of Rerum Novarum (On Capital and Labor)); RICHARD W. ROUSSEAU, HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE
COMMON GOOD: THE GREAT PAPAL SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS FROM LEO XIII TO JOHN PAUL 11 (2002)

(describing the eight major papal encyclicals on the Church's social teaching); JOHAN D. VAN DER
vYVER, LEUVEN LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND RIGHTS

91-116 (2004) (discussing economic and social human rights and Pope Leo XIII and the Rerum
Novarum, the "Magna Carta of Catholic social teaching"). See generally MODERN CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING 72-174 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2005) for an extensive discussion of the economic, legal, political, cultural, and social context leading to the creation of the Catholic social
doctrine.
235.

See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1.
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upon colonists who did not have a voice in the government and were
backed by the threat of and acts of violence. The Declaration of Independence posits that all human beings, or at least all men, possess "certain unalienable Rights," including "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Hap,236
piness.
The international community has championed human rights as core
values. Modern international human rights documents delineating the
rights of individuals and communities against abuses of state power
flourished in the wake of the Nazi-driven horrors of the last century.237
This time of crisis is exemplified by the genocide committed by the
German National Socialist government against Jewish, black, Sinti and
Roma, and other peoples as well as political dissidents. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in the wake of these
238
atrocities.
Private economic actors and international organizations have endorsed human rights as core values. The crisis of corporate-related human rights abuses has been detailed above and there is increasingly
broad recognition that transnational corporations should be subject to
human rights law.239 Many corporations are reconsidering their role in
respecting human rights.24 o Voluntary codes of conduct have proliferated. 24 1 At the international level, the U.N. Global Compact promotes
core human rights and other principles in the context of global business
activities.242 However, to effectively regulate transnational corporations,
regulations and regulatory control must be comprehensive and enforceable.243 Part III looks towards the development of a comprehensive
global legal framework for regulating transnational corporations.

236. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1; see MALANCZUK, supra note 47, at 209. However, some
237.
scholars argue that the Nazi's human rights abuses are less central to the development of the intemational human rights regime than is often ascribed to them. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 381 ("As
for Nazi evil, we know now that the Holocaust as such was much less central to perceptions of what
the war had been about in 1945 than it is today.").
238.
HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1.
239. See Deva, supra note 2, at 1 ("The international community is realizing that in order to
achieve fuller and wider realization of human rights, the umbrella of human rights obligations and
their enforcement should cover MNCs."); see also Ratner, supra note 82, at 446-47 (providing
examples of human rights violations in different regions and the response toward transnational
corporations operating there).
240. See George, supranote 150, at 474-75.
George, supra note 150, at 475; Ratner, supra note 82, at 448. See generally Lisa M.
241.
Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility
Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 771-826 (2007), for a discussion of the behavioral significance of
corporate rhetoric.
242. See JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 7-8; Anderson, supra note 34, at 17; George, supra note 150,
at 475.
BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 200-01 ("The reality of the matter is that effective regula243.
tion of corporate groups or their activities inevitably requires control of all the components participating in the enterprise. ... [I]t is essential that the legal structure match the economic structure of
the enterprise subject to the regulatory system."); see also Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the
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III. GLOBAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

This Part III sets out a proposal for the global regulation of transnational corporations. This proposal has three parts that address existing
institutional, legislative, and enforcement weaknesses in current regulation of transnational corporations. Specifically, it proposes the creation
of a global institution, development of uniform model laws, and implementation of universal enforcement mechanisms for corporate-related
human rights abuses.
A global regulatory scheme has the potential to be more successful
than a political one. In recent years, regulatory cooperation has successfully developed international rules. 244 In part, this is explained by economic assumptions that regulations are needed in the case of market failure; for example, when sovereign national governments cannot regulate
global actors or where market failures are combined with government
failures. 245 As discussed in Parts I and II, in the context of corporaterelated human rights abuses, regulation by national governments is inadequate for a number of reasons-including the power and influence of
transnational corporations.
To be successful, a regulatory system for transnational corporations
should meet several criteria. Regulation should be truly global so that
transnational corporations cannot avoid responsibility and accountability
by jurisdiction hopping or forum shopping. Global regulations and laws
also have the potential to reduce the incentives for states to allow standards that are so low that they encourage human rights abuses in order to
encourage foreign direct investment. If laws and regulations are global
and set a globally adhered to minimum standard, this would not eliminate
competition between states but it could increase the enactment and enforcement of human rights laws.
Global regulation should include rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement components.2 46 Rulemaking would define appropriate conduct
for transnational corporations and protections for potential victims of
corporate-related human rights abuses. Providing for global adjudication
options would increase access for potential plaintiffs to bring a claim for
Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 83 (2001) ("The
recognition of human rights may be won by the activism of social movements, but this victory must
be secured by the development of legal concepts that can be understood and used by public decision
makers."); Aneel Karani, The Case Against CorporateSocial Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,
2010 (arguing that voluntary measures fail when they conflict with financial goals).
244. David Zaring, InternationalLaw by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
FinancialRegulatory Organizations,33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281, 282 (1998).
245. John-ren Chen, Global Market, National Sovereignty and International Institutions, in
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN GLOBALISATION: THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM 1,

I (John-ren Chen ed., 2003).
246. See generally David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 563-611 (2008), for a discussion of rulemaking, adjudication, and
the increasing importance administrative institutions at the global level.
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harms before an adjudicatory body. Global enforcement would create an
avenue by which successful plaintiffs could obtain remedies anywhere in
the world. Ideally, a global regulatory system should not only create disincentives for harmful behavior, but should also encourage beneficial
behavior. Further, it should be informed by other prior and current efforts
to create global and transnational regulatory bodies and rules.247 It should
also be compatible with existing structures like the U.N. Framework
wherever possible.
Creating a global regulatory framework and component mechanisms will not happen overnight. This is a multi-stage, multi-component
proposal comprised of short-term, medium-term, and long-term elements. In the short term, developing a global institution is a matter of the
first order. As the proposed site for the drafting of uniform model laws, a
global institution is a pre-requisite for the medium-term element of creating a body of uniform model legislation. In the medium term, this proposal foresees the drafting of model uniform laws that can be adopted in
toto or with some variations by the nations of the world.248 In the long
term, this proposal envisions adjudication of claims in domestic courts or
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or both and enforcement of remedies for successful plaintiffs.

247. Earlier attempts include the failed UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights and the comparatively
successful OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, SubComm'n on the Promotion and Prot. Of Human Rights, Rep. on its 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (August 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Norms]. See generally Larry Cata
Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporationsas a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in
InternationalLaw, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 287, 292-93 (2006) (discussing the U.N. Norms
as evidence of an increasing trend toward mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility); Surya Deva,
UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: An
Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493 (2004) (discussing the
strengths and weaknesses of the U.N. Norms); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 901-08 (2003) (discussing the background and drafting
history of the U.N. Norms). Most prior attempts to extend human rights law to transnational corporations were usually unsuccessful. Other attempts include, for example, the 1983 Draft United Nations
Code of Conduct on TransnationalCorporations,the 1958 Abs Shawcross Proposed Convention to
Protect Foreign Investment, and the 1957 Draft International Conventionfor the Mutual Protection
ofPrivate Property Rights, U.N. Comm'n on Transnat'l Corps., Draft U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transnat'l Corps., E/1983/17/Rev.1 (1983). Arguably, one main reason these attempts failed is that
they were trying to work within the internationalsystem, which suffers from an aggregated lack of
incentives for states to enforce human rights laws as discussed above. As long as states have a disincentive to reform, such attempts face an uphill battle that almost dooms them to failure from the
start.
248. Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoriaand the Harmonization ofthe Laws ofInternationalCommercial Transactions,2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 317, 323 (1984) ("The
model law process represents a compromise between the treaty process and purely unilateral action
by nations."). However, variations to model laws should not be for the purpose of limiting their
scope as is often the case with the use of reservations in the adoption of international treaties but
rather, for example, for the purpose of integrating the model laws and the existing national legal
system.
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This proposal differs from earlier attempts in important ways. It is
not set within the internationalpolitical system, which suffers from an
aggregated lack of incentives for states to enforce human rights laws as
discussed above. Instead, it is structured as a global regulatory proposal.
This will avoid some of the reasons that states have a disincentive to
reform and sidestep the uphill battle that has doomed some prior efforts.
This proposal envisions a global institution that, among other things,
should be structured in a way to allow it to explicitly address the needs of
developing countries from a developing country perspective, which is not
the case for most international institutions.249 This proposal draws on
theories of Global Corporate Citizenship, which are a recent development of the past decade. However, Global Corporate Citizenship is currently voluntary and this Article is proposing mandatory regulations. 2 50 it
also proposes universal civil jurisdiction for corporate-related human
rights abuses, which extends beyond current understandings of universal
-251
civil jurisdiction.
A. Global Law Commission
The first component of this proposal is a global institution, specifically, a Global Law Commission. This is an initial proposal that will be
expanded and refined in a future article entitled Global Law Commission: Institutionalizing Global Human Rights Regulation of Transnational Corporations (working title). This Section sets out some of the
options and challenges for a Global Law Commission.
A Global Law Commission would facilitate effective and simulta252
neous regulation of transnational corporations in multiple jurisdictions.
One goal of the Global Law Commission would be to provide countries
with well-conceived, well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to this critical area of the law. The Global Law Commission could
contribute to protecting human rights and providing access to remedies
for corporate-related human rights abuses. Among other things, the
Global Law Commission should explicitly address the needs of developing countries. This Subsection sets out in broad brushstrokes basic contours of a proposal, including formation, membership, level of institutionalization, funding, selection of representatives, transparency of deci-

249.

Kunibert Raffer, Some Proposals to Adapt InternationalInstitutions to Developmental

Needs, in THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN GLOBALISATION: THE CHALLENGES OF

REFORM 81, 81 (John-ren Chen ed., 2003) ("Most international institutions were not drafted for the
specific needs of so-called 'developing countries' .....
250. Anderson, supra note 34, at 29.
251.
See generally Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of
Universal Civil Jurisdiction,100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (2006) (discussing universal civil jurisdiction).

252. See Mark Tushnet, Keeping Your Eye on the Ball: The Significance ofthe Revival of
Constitutional Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1997) ("It seems obvious that only
transnational political institutions are likely to be in a position to control transnational corporations.").
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sion-making, and the role of the Global Law Commission as an advocate.253
1. Formation
The Global Law Commission should be formed in a manner that allows it to act independently of the international legal system while at the
same time recognizing the interdependent nature of all legal systems. For
example, like international financial regulatory organizations, the Global
Law Commission could be informally constituted.254 It should not be
created through international treaties, as it is not intended to be a creature
of international law. 255
Instead, the constituting documents of the Global Law Commission
could be a constitution (or similar document) and bylaws. This is a
model that has been employed in the creation of successful international
financial institutions including the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions.2 56
Domestically, it is also the constituting structure of the U.S. National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("U.S. Uniform
Law Commission"). 257 This structure would facilitate the operation of the
Global Law Commission as a global administrative and regulatory institution rather than a political institution. It would also allow the bylaws to
be "broad and flexible."258
2. Membership
The membership of the Global Law Commission should be composed of commissioners who represent the people of the world. In the
Global Law Commission, states would not be members. 2 59 This SubsecDavid Zaring, Informal Procedure,Hardand Soft, in InternationalAdministration,5 CHI.
253.
J. INT'L L. 547, 569-71 (2005) (developing a model of regulatory cooperation on which these categories are based). Instead of Zaring's term "proselytizer," this Article uses the term "advocate."
254. See id at 569-71 (discussing a model of regulatory cooperation based on common features of international law of the Basle Committee, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, and their successors).
255.
See id.
256. See Zaring, supra note 244, at 282. International financial regulatory cooperation is one
area in which institutions and rules have been successfully developed. Id. at 282; see also David
Zaring, Three Challengesfor Regulatory Networks, 43 INT'L LAW. 211, 211-17 (2009) (discussing
the evolution and effectiveness of regulatory networks); Zaring, supra note 253, at 549 (discussing
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions).
257. The Uniform Law Commission has existed in the United States for over 100 years. Unif
Law Comm'n., NCCUSL HOME, at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). The
Uniform Law Commission "provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of the law." Id. Historically, the Uniform
Law Commission has made numerous contributions including resolving conflict-of-law issues,
facilitating commerce, and advancing reciprocity and remedies between states. Chato Hazelbaker,
National Legislation, One State at a Time, 66-DEC BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 23 (2009).
258. Zaring, supra note 253, at 570 (stating that "many treaties that create traditional international organizations" are "specific, detailed, and constraining").
259. See id. at 569.
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tion discusses initial proposals for the selection of members of the Global
Law Commission. Other issues that will need to be addressed include
determining criteria for membership and the size of the Global Law
Commission, specifically the minimum and maximum number of members.
One option is to allow only national governments to appoint or
nominate commissioners in a process that is similar to that used for the
U.S. Uniform Law Commission or the International Law Commission.260
A downside to this membership structure is individual countries' ability
to interfere in the process by simply refusing to appoint or nominate
commissioners. However, this could be remedied by giving the Global
Law Commission the power to request the body that regulates the legal
profession in that country to make appointments or nominationsassuming that the body regulating the legal profession is able to act independently. More significantly, it is inherently inconsistent and problematic to base membership selection on the international legal system since
the global law system is intended to function in parallel with but not be
dependent on the international legal system. If national governments
appoint or nominate the commissioners, then they are arguably representatives of countries even if the Global Law Commission is structured to
ensure them as much independence as possible.
Instead, one alternative for membership selection is proportional
representation. The Global Law Commission would have a fixed or
flexible-within a certain range-number of members. The commissioners could be allocated proportionally, for example, by continent according to population or other criteria and the allocation could be reviewed
and revised at set intervals. This would reflect the nature of the Global
Law Commission as a global institution rather than an international institution.
Commissioners could be nominated by national governments,
NGOs, bodies that regulate the legal profession, as well other institutional actors. To be elected, nominees would need to meet the criteria set
for membership in the Global Law Commission. Institutions that are
given the right to nominate could also constitute the body that elects the
commissioners from those nominated based on a one-entity, one-vote
principle. One challenge associated with this option is determining which
institutions and groups would have the right to make nominations. A
benefit of this mode of selection would be to expand the pool of nominators and, thus, the pool of potential nominees. It would also serve to deUNIFORM LAW COMMISSION CONST. art. 11,available at http://www.nccust org/Update/
260.
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=18; UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION, 8-17 (Vol. 1, 2007); JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 10-12 (2000); and SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION 13-21 (1987).
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crease the level of control by national governments but recognize the
importance of national governments and the interconnection and interdependency of all legal orders of the world.
Another issue that will need to be addressed is the possibility of
creating multiple forms of membership, such as ex officio membership in
addition to elected membership, and the advantages and disadvantages of
these alternative forms. Having different forms of membership would
make it possible to select commissioners in more than one way. For example, some percentage of the commissioners could be nominated and
elected among national governments, some could be nominated and
elected by NGOs and other institutional actors, and some could be nominated and elected by bodies that regulate the legal profession. Allocating
certain percentages of commissioners to certain interest groups such as
national governments would help garner support from those groups for
the Global Law Commission's work. However, this might expose the
Global Law Commission's work to becoming more political than regulatory.
3. Institutionalization
The Global Law Commission should meet at regular intervals, for
example annually, to draft model uniform laws in key human rights areas
affected by transnational corporations. In addition, it is likely that the
Global Law Commission would need to continue work on ongoing projects in committees. Committees could be determined based on substantive areas or type of tasks. Substantive committees offer an advantage
because they allow the clustering of substantive expertise. However, task
oriented committees may present a better option because the make-up of
the committee would bring together people with varying substantive expertise who, together, have the skills and knowledge to achieve the
committee's assigned tasks.
The Global Law Commission should have a permanent presence.
Either a small permanent presence or a more substantial permanent presence would have their benefits. A small permanent presence would keep
costs, and thus the need for funding, low. 2 6 ' A more substantial permanent presence would cost more but would allow the Global Law Commission to operate year-round. However, an increased need for funds
amplifies questions about sources of funding and the level of influence of
governments and intuitions providing those funds.
4. Funding
Funding will be a significant factor in the size and success of the
Global Law Commission's administrative apparatus. The level of fundZaring, supra note 253, at 571 (stating that international financial regulatory organizations
261.
"have little permanent presence" and "[t]heir annual budgets are minute").
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ing required will depend in large part on whether the Global Law Commission has a large or small permanent presence. The larger the permanent presence, the greater the need will be for funding.2 62 However, funding will be a less significant factor if the commissioners work on a volunteer basis and are not compensated. Nonetheless, some minimal funding would be necessary, even for volunteer commissioners, to defray
expenses.
Contributions from interested parties such as national governments
are one likely source of funding for the Global Law Commission. States
would need to have an incentive to contribute to the Global Law Commission. One incentive for states would be that they could receive legal
expertise in the form of drafting of uniform laws worth millions of dollars. Many individual states could not otherwise afford the cost of this
type of legal expertise.2 63
5. Transparency
Ensuring a high level of transparency can help the Global Law
Commission gain and maintain legitimacy. One question is whether
meetings of the commission should be open to the public.2 6 Open meetings may increase accessibility for those who have the time and financial
resources to attend. However, on a global scale, open meetings may also
create and legitimize preferential access for more influential actors and
exclude interested parties with fewer resources. In addition, open meetings may stifle open and frank discussion.
Instead, the Global Law Commission should have a forum for publicizing drafts and accepting comments from interested parties.265 The
Global Law Commission should also commit to making a wide range of
relevant documents available online.266 Ensuring an opportunity for public comment on drafts via the Internet will increase transparencyassuming that the opportunity to comment is widely publicized in a manner that reaches interested parties.

262. See id. This discussion is intended only to raise the complex and fundamental issue of
state support, in particular financial support. The question of securing state support will be analyzed
in greater detail in a future article entitled Global Law Commission: InstitutionalizingGlobal Human
Rights Regulation of TransnationalCorporations(working title).
263. FinancialSupport, NCCUSL, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?
tabindex=0&tabid=1 I (last visited on Oct. 31, 2010) (drawing from the Uniform Law Commission
model).
264. This draws from the U.S. Uniform Law Commission model. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION.
art. XLI. In contrast, international financial regulatory organization meetings are generally not open
to the public. Zaring, supra note 253, at 571 ("[International financial regulatory organizations]
generally operate through closed meetings .. .. ").
265. See Zaring, supra note 253, at 571 ("[T]he Basle Committee and [International Organization of Securities Commissions] . . . make an effort to invite comment from interested parties on
their most significant regulatory efforts.").
266. Id. at 571-72 (discussing a practice that has become common among international financial regulatory organizations).
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6. Advocacy
Model laws drafted by the Global Law Commission can contribute
to the development of both soft and hard law. Like other documents written by international organizations and NGOs, model laws drafted by the
Global Law Commission may influence soft-law norms and contribute to
the enactment of hard law. Model laws drafted by the Global Law Commission for domestic implementation would need to be passed by national governments to be enforceable in domestic courts. This could
change if, at a later stage, a global court is established or countries sign
onto conventions to enforce alternative dispute resolution or universal
civil jurisdiction for claims related to corporate-related human rights
violations.
Encouraging national governments to implement draft laws in their
267
jurisdiction will be an important role for the Global Law Commission.
Like international financial regulatory organizations, the Global Law
Commission would need to work actively to disseminate best practices.
In addition, the Global Law Commission could advocate for and play a
role in drafting conventions to enforce forms of alternative dispute resolution or universal civil jurisdiction as well as the creation of a global
court.
Implementing the Global Law Commission will not be simple or
without challenges. One of the key challenges is how to get countries on
board with the Global Law Commission and enact the model laws developed by the Global Law Commission. However, there are examples that
can provide insights into avenues that may lead to success. For example,
forty-two countries adhere-more or less-to the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises.26 8 An examination of the strengths and weaknesses of that process can provide valuable insights. Further, an analysis
of why the United States became a member of the United Nations but not
the League of Nations, and why the United States signed onto the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade but not the International Trade Organization offers an opportunity to identify factors that may encourage
countries like the United States to support-or at least accept-the
Global Law Commission.
B. Global Laws and Regulations
The second component of this proposal is the development of global
laws and regulations by the Global Law Commission informed by a the267. Id. at 572 (discussing the proselytizing roles played by international financial regulatory
organizations).
Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter268.
prises: Frequently Asked Questions, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en 2649_34889_2349370_III_1,00.html (last visited
on Oct. 31, 2010).
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ory of Law and Global Corporate Citizenship. 269 This is an initial proposal that will be expanded and refined in a future article entitled A Legal Theory of Global CorporateCitizenship: Reimagining Global Regulation of TransnationalCorporations(working title). Existing legal theory does not provide a viable framework in which to adequately address
the effects of corporate activities on human rights. In addition to the
weaknesses in international human rights law discussed above, theories
of corporate law and foreign direct investment law are also inadequate to
comprehensively theorize and regulate the intersection of transnational
economic activity and human rights. 270 Because there is not an adequate
theoretical framework to address issues raised by the effects of transnational corporations on individuals' and communities' enjoyment of their
human rights, corporate-related human rights abuses remain on the periphery of law and theory.
In corporate law and theory in the United States, corporations are
generally depicted as economic entities that should be regulated by the
market through economic incentives and mechanisms. 271 This position is
solidly established at the heart of American corporate legal theory.2 72
However, there is a minority in the United States that argues that corporations are economic and social entities.273 This minority often identifies
with the Corporate Social Responsibility movement.274 This line of argument does not limit the means of controlling corporations to economic
incentives. Nonetheless, it remains on the periphery of U.S. corporate
legal theory and is not likely to become a central tenet of U.S. corporate
law and theory anytime in the near future.
Lacking traction in corporate law and theory, we might logically
turn to the web of domestic laws, bilateral investment treaties, and other
international law that govern foreign direct investment. However, foreign
269.
Although the development of model global laws does not reduce the need for plaintiffs to
have the financial capacity to bring suits, adherence to human rights-related laws and norms by
transnational corporations can reduce the need for plaintiffs to bring suits by reducing the occurrence
of corporate-related human rights abuses. See Backer, supra note 247, at 351-54.
270.
Similar arguments can be made for other areas of law and theory, for example, law and
development.
271.
Backer, supra note 247, at 296-98 ("The state was to define the parameters within which
this flexible framework could be effected and policed, but otherwise the market was to provide the
mechanism for regulating corporate activity.").
272. Id. at 296-99 (tracing this position back to the acceptance of arguments made by Adolph
Berle in a debate with E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930s); see also A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (discussing the impact of corporate actions
taken serve to benefit its shareholders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145-47 (1932) (discussing the purpose and function of the
corporate structure).
273.
See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporations Theory and Corporate Governance Law: Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 716

(2002).
274. The exact scope and contours of Corporate Social Responsibility are disputed within the
U.S. legal discourse. See id. at 711-20 (categorizing positions taken on CSR in the U.S. legal discourse).
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direct investment is generally thought of as a primarily economic activity
and the laws governing such activities reflect those assumptions.2 75
Purely domestic laws often fall prey to lax enforcement in the face of
government goals to bring in funds and promote economic development
through foreign investment.276 Bilateral and other international agreements between countries tend to focus on protecting their own natural
and legal citizens' foreign investments from expropriation and naturalization without appropriate compensation.277 It is unlikely that the protection of the rights and interests of non-citizens will be given a higher priority than the protection of a state's own citizens and economic interests
in foreign direct investment law. Thus, the regulation of the negative
environmental and human rights effects of corporations is likely to remain on the periphery of foreign direct investment law and theory.
However, theoretical advancements have been made in other disciplines. Global Corporate Citizenship is a body of theoretical work initially developed in the management and business literature in the late
1990s that could provide a strong basis for developing global laws to
regulate transnational corporations.2 78 Over the past decade, a robust
Global Corporate Citizenship literature has developed in the business and
management fields. 279 This literature argues for voluntary initiatives by
transnational corporations. 280 The rationale for transnational corporations
275. See Dr. Elfraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto
MultilateralAgreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 328 (2009).
276. This problem should be addressed in part by universal civil jurisdiction, which would
allow plaintiffs to bring cases in courts of countries with a record of more consistent enforcement.
See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 251, 142-46 ("[U]niversal jurisdiction provides a mechanism
for enhancing accountability.").
277. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, BilateralInvestment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and
the Rule of (International)Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 805, 808 (2008) ("Most BITs contain a common core of substantive promises to investors,
including rights to some combination of 'most-favored nation,' national, 'non-discriminatory,' or
'fair and equitable' 'treatment'; rights to 'full protection and security'; rights to 'prompt, adequate,
and effective' compensation in the event of expropriation or of government measures 'tantamount to
expropriation'; and the right to transfer investment assets or proceeds out of the host state in convertible currency.").
278.
279.

See LOGAN, ROY & RUGELBRUGGE, supra note 96, at 13, 16.
See, e.g., LOGAN, ROY & RUGELBRUGGE, supra note 96, at 6-7; James E. Post & Shawn

L. Berman, Global CorporateCitizenship in a Dot.com World: The Role of OrganisationalIdentity,
in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 66, 66-67 (J~rg Andriof & Malcolm McIntosh eds.,

2001); Jeanne M. Logsdon & Donna J. Wood, Business Citizenship: From Domestic to Global Level
ofAnalysis, 12 BuS. ETHICS Q., no. 2, 2002, at 155; James E. Post, Global Corporate Citizenship:
Principles to Live and Work By, 12 BuS. ETHics Q., no. 2, 2002, at 143, 148-49 [hereinafter Principles to Live and Work By]; James E. Post, Movingfrom Geographic to Virtual Communities: Global
CorporateCitizenship in a Dot.com World, 105 Bus. & Soc. REV. 27, 27-29 (2000); Klaus Schwab,
Global Corporate Citizenship: Working With Governments and Civil Society, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 107,
107-108 (2008); Sandra Waddock & Neil Smith, Relationships: The Real Challenge of Global
Corporate Citizenship, 105 BUS. & SOC. REv. 47, 47-49 (2000); Grahame Thompson, Tracking
Global Citizenship: Some Reflections on Lovesick' Companies 1-2 (Inst. for Int'l Integration Studies, Discussion Paper No. 192, 2006), available at https://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/
discussion/pdfs/iiisdpl 92.pdf.
280. See generally Schwab, supra note 269, at 107-18 (discussing participation and benefits in
engaging in global corporate citizenship and corporate social responsibility).
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to undertake these initiatives is that they have economic benefits for the
corporations in addition to being beneficial for society. 28'
However, one danger of relying on voluntary measures is that they
themselves often rely on the flawed assumptions of a purely economic
analysis of business management. Purely economic analyses of business
choices are susceptible to over-reliance on quantitative tools. 2 82 Overreliance on quantitative tools is often accompanied by a disregard for moral
and cultural factors, which artificially limits our understanding of issues
and the range of corresponding regulatory options.28 3 Instead, some
scholars argue for a "deeply human-centered conception of business"
that "depend[s] on the exercise of virtue, respect for dignity, and a shared
sense of the common good."284 Voluntary measures are also problematic
because the self-interests of transnational corporations may not always
align with societal interests. In such situations, voluntary measures are
often-at most-a minimal but not dispositive incentive.
Global Corporate Citizenship literature builds on corporate citizenship literature by expanding it to the global sphere. Global Corporate
Citizenship initiatives have garnered the attention and support of transnational corporations.285 At the international level, the Global Compact, a
United Nations initiative, has promoted a set of values that are aligned
with theories of Global Corporate Citizenship.286 However, the voluntary
nature of these initiatives exposes them to the same weaknesses as other
voluntary measures-transnational corporations can pick and choose
among measures. From a business perspective, this is beneficial because
it allows managers and directors to choose measures that suit their context and that fit their business modes.2 87 From a human rights perspective, this is a disadvantage because voluntary norms and standards do not
require transnational corporations to consider, recognize, or adhere to
any domestic or international norms or standards such as international

281.
See Principles to Live and Work By, supra note 279, 143-44, 148.
282. Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View from a
Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 735, 746-47 (2010) (stating that the
trend of increasing mathematization of science "is not as suitable for examining a broad range of
phenomena-such as institutions, values, culture, and traditions-that clearly have an enormous
bearing on economic life.").
283.
Id. at 747 (quoting WILHELM ROPKE, A HUMANE ECONOMY: THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK

OF THE FREE MARKET 247 (Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1960) (lamenting the decline of morality in
economics)).
284. Id. at 752-53 ("[The] human-centered conception of business is supported by a long
tradition of thought common to ancient cultures.") (citing SAMUEL GREGG, THE COMMERCIAL
SOCIETY: FOUNDATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL AGE 9 (2007)).

285.

Anderson, supra note 34, at 22-23.

286.
The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited on Oct. 31, 2010).

287. Cf Jackson, supra note 282, at 758 (stating that reactionary corporate social responsibility
measures may be disadvantageous when companies are "placed under strict accountability, compliance, and enforcement demands in utter disregard of the type and character of the business at hand
the conditions under which it might prosper").
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human rights law. 288 Further, such voluntary measures are often reactionary and piecemeal rather than proactive and comprehensive.2 89
Although Global Corporate Citizenship is well developed in the
management and business literature, it is not yet firmly established in
legal scholarship.2 90 In the business and management context, it is an
evolving voluntary practice. Businesses are supposed to be good corporate citizens because it makes business sense-there are economic benefits. In the legal context, mandatory Global Corporate Citizenship is
more appropriate when core values such as human rights are at issue.
Mandatory laws and regulations are better suited to ensuring compliance
and recourse to enforcement than voluntary ones. Thus, it is important to
develop mandatory regulations in addition to voluntary initiatives.
There are four principles of Corporate Citizenship: Minimize Harm;
Maximize Benefit; Accountability and Responsiveness to Key
Stakeholders; and Strong FinancialReturn.29 ' The first principle of Corporate Citizenship is Minimize Harm, which is defined as:
Work[ing] to minimize the negative consequences of business activities and decisions on stakeholders, including employees, customers,
communities, ecosystems, shareholders and suppliers. Examples include operating ethically, supporting efforts to stop corruption,
championing human rights, preventing environmental harm, enforcing good conduct from suppliers, treating employees responsibly, ensuring the safety of employees, ensuring that marketing statements
are accurate, and delivering safe, high-quality products. 292
The second principle of Corporate Citizenship is Maximize Benefit,
defined as:
"Contribut[ing] to societal and economic well-being by investing resources in activities that benefit shareholders as well as broader
stakeholders." Examples include participating voluntarily to help address social issues (such as education, health, youth development,
economic development for low-income communities, and work force
288. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 251, at 145.
289. See Jackson, supra note 282, at 758 ("Under the 'corporate social responsibility' approach, the province of 'business ethics' gets denigrated to harum-scamm stratagems formulated as
reactions to alarms sounded by 'stakeholders' that are in turn dictated by galleries of activists purporting to be their appointed representatives."). Jackson critiques such measures and argues that such
measures are often aimed at "promoting politically correct agendas." Id.
290. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 23-24.
291.
E-mail from Susan Thomas, Assistant Dir., Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship, to Sarah Millard, Executive Editor, Denver University Law Review (Sept. 16, 2010, 15:59
MDT) (on file with Denver University Law Review) (This was originally posted in on the Boston
College Center for Corporate Citizenship website as What is Corporate Citizenship?, BOSTON
COLLEGE CENTER FOR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP.) [hereinafter Boston College]. These principles are

no longer listed on the Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship website. However, I continue to use them here because I believe they set out a solid initial framework for corporate citizenship.
292. Id.
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development), ensuring stable employment, paying fair wages, and
producing a product with social value. 293
The third principle of Corporate Citizenship is Accountability and
Responsiveness to Key Stakeholders, which has two parts.

294

The first

part of the third principle is "[b]uild[ing] relationships of trust that involve becoming more transparent and open about the progress and setbacks businesses experience in an effort to operate ethically." 295 The
second part of the third principle is "[c]reat[ing] mechanisms to include
the voice of stakeholders in governance, produce social reports assured
by third parties, operate according to a code of conduct and listen to and
communicate with stakeholders." 296 Examples include creating mechanisms to include the voice of stakeholders in governance, producing social reports assured by third parties, operating according to a code of
conduct, and listening to and communicating with stakeholders.29 7
Finally, the fourth principle of Corporate Citizenship is a Strong FinancialReturn; this is defined as "return[ing] a profit to shareholders." 298
Business and management scholars have expressed the view that the responsibility of a company to return a profit to shareholders must always
be considered part of its obligation to society.2 99
Developing uniform model laws informed by principles of Global
Corporate Citizenship will require, among other things, transforming
voluntary guidelines and standards into mandatory and enforceable rules
and regulations. 30 0 The first principle of Corporate Citizenship, Minimizing Harm, requires transnational corporations to minimize negative effects on all categories of stakeholders. 301 In many ways, a legal standard
of Minimizing Harm could parallel this standard as it is set out in the
business and management literature. However, in a legal framework,
Minimizing Harm and sector-specific standards would be legally mandated. These would need to be enforceable under law to encourage compliance and provide legal avenues for redress. Such standards already
exist in a variety of areas such as the environment and labor law. In some
ways, developing laws to address this element are the easiest because
they fit easily into existing models that prohibit harmful behavior. Laws

293.
Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id
297. Id
298. See id.
299. H. Jeff Smith, The Shareholders v. Stakeholders Debate, 44 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REv. 85,
85-86 (2003) (discussing the rationale for profit in both shareholder and stakeholder theories of
management).
300. Options for lawmaking will need to be worked through in detail but this goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
301.
Boston College, supra note 291.
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in this category could include and build on concepts developed in the
context of Corporate Social Responsibility.
As a legal standard, the second principle of Corporate Citizenship,
Maximizing Benefit, would require by law affirmative steps on the part of
transnational corporations to contribute to societal and economic well
being. This would go beyond the investment of resources in activities
that benefit various groups of stakeholders. Laws requiring Maximizing
Benefit(s) would need to be informed by research that explores what
kinds of laws create positive incentives. One way to maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment is for transnational corporations to exert
302
property
positive influence over things like water and sanitation,
rights,303 and entrepreneurial skills and capabilities.30 4 This may be one
of the most controversial principles of corporate citizenship in a legal
context, particularly from the perspective of U.S. scholars and decision
makers.
The third principle of Corporate Citizenship, Accountability and Responsiveness to Key Stakeholders would require standards and transparency in a legal context.305 It would differ from the business and management perspectives because it would not focus on developing trust, which
is an essential goal of voluntary businesses relationships. Instead, it
would stem from the idea that transnational corporations have duties and
obligations to specific groups of stakeholders and to society as whole. In
a mandatory legal framework, this principle could encompass the setting
of standards for ethical business operation. It would also include core
principles of corporate citizenship in the business and management literature, such as stakeholder participation and third party monitoring306
Laws in this category could include and build on those developed in the
context of Corporate Social Accountability.
For a mandatory legal framework, this Article proposes a substantive change to the fourth principle of Corporate Citizenship. Rather than
a Strong Financial Return, a legal framework could instead require a
Competitive Financial Return. This would be a shift from traditional
profit-maximization models, which go further than the goal of a Strong

302.
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2008:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE, at 140 , U.N. Sales No.

E.08.II.D.23 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/does/wir2008 en.pdf (discussing the
effects of the lack of water and sanitation on child mortality, maternal health and gender equality).
303. See, e.g., Leslie Kurshan, Rethinking PropertyRights as Human Rights: Acquiring Equal
PropertyRights for Women Using InternationalHuman Rights Treaties, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 353, 357-59 (2000).
304.

See OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS,

MINIMIZING COSTS 14-15 (2002) (discussing potential for multinational corporations to enhance
entrepreneurial capacity in developing countries), availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/51/
1959815.pdf.
305. Boston College, supra note 291.
306. See id.
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Financial Return.307 Achieving a Strong FinancialReturn is a goal for a
corporation and its officers and directors. 308 It is an internal guideline.
Achieving a Competitive FinancialReturn is a standard that can be balanced against industry norms and practices as well as the other three
principles of corporate citizenship. A Competitive FinancialReturn standard would allow corporations to consider the interests of stakeholders
other than shareholders. In contrast to a Strong FinancialReturn, a Competitive Financial Return is an external standard that should be determined with consideration of external factors. In a legal context, appropriate legislation would need to be enacted to give transnational corporations an incentive to balance economic goals with socio-political goals.
This proposal is structured to be compatible with the U.N. Framework. Transnational corporations' effects on human rights have been the
focus of recent work by John Ruggie's team under the auspices of the
United Nations. 3 09 Ruggie and his team have developed a "protect, respect, and remedy framework," also known as the U.N. Framework, that
can serve as a foundation for further work in this area. 310
Integrating Global Corporate Citizenship into the U.N. Framework
will allow for the development of a more robust and comprehensive system. Imagine then a matrix in which to classify global lawmaking. The xaxis would be populated by the categories of protect, respect, and remedy
from the U.N. Framework. The y-axis would be populated by the four
principles of corporate citizenship. Laws would be classified by their
position at the intersection of the x- and y-axes.
Simply drafting model global laws has the potential to create soft
law and encourage practices that reduce or prevent corporate-related
human rights abuses. However, without hard law, potential plaintiffs
would not be able to seek judicial or other enforcement of their rights.
The next Section sets out an initial proposal for enforcement, the final
element of this proposal.

307. See Smith, supra note 299, at 85 ("As Milton Friedman wrote, 'There is one and only one
social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase
its profits so long as it . . . engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud."'
(alteration in original)).
See Boston College, supra note 291 (articulating principle of "support[ing] strong finan308.
cial results" using normative rather than binding language).
309. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: FurtherSteps
Toward the Operationalization of the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/27 (April 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-andmaterials.org/Ruggie-report-201 0.pdf; Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008)
(by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.
310. Id.
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C. Global Enforcement
The rights of victims of corporate-related human rights abuses are
under-enforced and, therefore, the third component of this proposal is the
expansion of adjudicatory and enforcement options. 3" This expansion
should help compensate for the fact that some states enforce and adjudicate fewer claims or adjudicate less consistently than others. This proposal envisions adjudication of claims of corporate-related human rights
abuses in domestic courts and universal civil jurisdiction for corporaterelated human rights abuses.3 12 However, it does not exclude the possibility of a global court or convention on enforcement of alternative forms of
313
dispute resolution in the future. This is an initial proposal that will be
expanded and refined in a future article entitled Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Adjudicating Corporate-RelatedHuman Rights Abuses (working
title). Universal civil jurisdiction would allow civil claims of corporaterelated human rights abuses to be brought in domestic courts regardless
of the nationality of the parties or the location and effects of the conduct.3 14
Universal civil jurisdiction should be established for the limited
scope of corporate-related human rights abuses. In a multinational context, jurisdiction is generally determined by domestic and international
rules.315 Universal civil jurisdiction would make it possible to bring a
civil suit against a transnational corporation for corporate-related human
rights abuses by any plaintiff in a domestic court in any country. One
issue raised by universal civil jurisdiction is how to prevent unfairly
overburdening the courts of any one jurisdiction.

311.
This is an initial proposal that I am expanding and refining in a forthcoming article entitled Toward Global Adjudication and Enforcement of Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuses
(working title).
312.
See Beth Van Shaack, Justice Without Borders: Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 99 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 120, 122 (2005) (arguing that "[s]upranational mechanisms will never supplant domestic proceedings, so domestic courts will continue to play a central role in enforcing
international law"); see also Dubinsky, supra note 225, at 306 (arguing that "[b]ecause much that is
productive has come out of human rights adjudication to date, because the phenomenon is still fairly
recent, and because there is not much that suggests it is harmful, we should go forward with a series
of rebuttable presumptions: that victims of fundamental human rights treaty violations should not be
beyond effective judicial protection; that alleged perpetrators should not enjoy impunity; that courts,
as institutions best designed to provide fair process and decision-making insulated from political
pressure, are appropriate for dealing with guilt, punishment, liability, and compensation").
See Dubinsky, supra note 225, at 307-12 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of
313.
international vs. domestic courts).
314. See Menno T. Kamminga, Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is it Legal? Is it Desirable?,99
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 123, 123 (2005) (defining universal civil jurisdiction as "the principle
under which civil proceedings may be brought in a domestic court irrespective of the location of the
unlawful conduct and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim, on the grounds
that the unlawful conduct is a matter of international concern").
See generally Born, supra note 202, at 11-22 (conducting comparative assessment of
315.
jurisdiction determinations among national courts facing transnational controversies).
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Existing international law does not explicitly authorize universal
*
316However, universal civil jurisdiction also is not incivil *jurisdiction.
consistent with international law. 31* Thus, an expansion of universal civil
jurisdiction is not precluded under international law. The Global Law
Commission could contribute to ensuring the enforceability of universal
civil jurisdiction by helping establish and advocating for soft-law norms
that eventually could become customary international law. Another way
to establish universal civil jurisdiction would be via an international convention. This would not undermine the development of global law but
rather would reflect the interconnectedness and interdependency of
global law and international law.
A Global Law Commission and the uniform model laws promulgated by the Global Law Commission should define the types of conduct
to which universal civil jurisdiction would apply. The scope of relevant
conduct should be broader than the types of tort claims that have been
permitted, for example, under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute.318 In addition,
it should explicitly apply to conduct by and claims against transnational
corporations. 319 However, it would not have to include every form of
conduct that impinges on a human right enumerated in uniform model
laws as drafted by the Global Law Commission. Further, universal civil
jurisdiction should not prevent tort claims from being brought in proceedings based on universal criminal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

One of the most important issues in human rights law today is the
role of corporations. The crisis of corporate-related human rights abuses
demands a response. Corporate-related activities continue to cause harm
316. See Kamminga, supra note 314, at 123-24 (claiming that "[n]o rule of international law
specifically authorizes let alone obliges the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction in respect of
human rights offenders").
317. See id. at 124 (discussing the lack of objections to U.S. courts' exercise of universal civil
jurisdiction for alien tort claims); cf Shaack, supra note 312, at 120 (claiming that "[i]ntemational
law authorizes universal civil jurisdiction").
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Sosa v. Alverez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004) (requir318.
ing ATCA claims "based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms [the Court has] recognized," namely violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy). See generally William S. Dodge, Which Torts in
Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 351 (2001) for a discussion
of the types of torts that are actionable under the Alien Tort Statute. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum & David D. Caron, The Alien Tort Statute: An Overview of the Current Issues, 28 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 513 (2010) for issues in Alien Tort Statute jurisprudence.
319. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,149 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that
Alien Tort Claims Act does not apply to corporate defendants). See generally David A. Dana &
Michael Barsa, Three Obstacles to the Promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility by Means of
the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Sosa Court's Incoherent Conception of the Law of Nations, The
'Purposive' Action Requirement for Aiding and Abetting, and The State Action Requirement for
at
available
REV.
(forthcoming),
ENVTL.
L.
Liability,
FORDHAM
Primary
http://ssm.com/abstract-l711934, for a discussion of obstacles inhibiting successful claims against
transnational corporations.
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around the world in every area of human rights. This Article has argued
that the current state-centered international human rights regime is inadequate to respond comprehensively to this pressing problem.
At least three questions are central to determining whether corporate-related human rights abuses present a problem of sufficient importance and consequence that they can be adequately addressed only with a
new legal and regulatory regime. First, is there a deficit in domestic and
international regulation of transnational corporations? Second, what are
possible explanations for this deficit? Third, what are the effects of this
deficit? This Article has attempted to answer each of these questions as
well as others. However, there are many questions that remain unanswered that will be explored in more depth in a series of future articles.
Understanding corporate-related human rights abuses, their causes,
and the reasons they persist requires the analysis of a series of secondary
questions. These include questions that focus on existing structures as
well as questions that are forward looking. What is the current system for
regulating transnational corporations, who makes the rules, and who controls implementation and monitoring? What are the goals of the current
system and is it achieving those goals? What are the assumptions underlying the current system and are they accurate? How does the system
work and what parts are working or not working? If the system is not
working, why is it not working? Are the parts that are not working important, who does this affect, and how?
What needs to be done to improve the regulation of transnational
corporations? Do we need new laws, a new system, or even to change the
way we theorize the regulation of transnational corporations?
This Article has made two main proposals: (1) decouple and distinguish human rights law and international human rights law, and (2) create a global human rights law system. This Article argued that it is necessary to understand human rights law as a super-category and intemational human rights law as a sub-category rather than as synonyms. This
reclassification highlights a deficiency in the development of human
rights law and creates a space in which to generate and advance other
areas of human rights law. This Article then proposed global human
rights law as a new area of human rights law that is well suited to address
corporate-related human rights abuses.
Of course, the creation of a new regulatory framework is neither
simple nor easy. It requires consideration of multiple constituencies with
a wide range of-sometimes competing-interests. Proposals for increasing regulation may be met with resistance from many directions,
including states that fear the loss of capital and other benefits from foreign direct investment, bureaucrats who fear the loss of power, and companies that fear increased costs. Decision makers may worry about insti-
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tutional competence, administrability of rules, and overburdening existing enforcement mechanisms.
This Article made several specific proposals for the development of
a global human rights law regime: a Global Law Commission, uniform
model laws and regulations, and universal civil jurisdiction. The emphasis of this proposal on global law rather than international law sets it
apart from many earlier attempts to comprehensively regulate the activities of transnational corporations. Although implementation of this proposal would take time and would need to be achieved in stages, forward
progress can be made in all three components of this proposal simultaneously.
One possible critique of this Article stems from the assumptions it
makes about the role of morality and ethics in theorizing business practices, assumptions that are disputed in the U.S. legal academy, and in fact
represent a minority perspective in the United States. However, part of
the value of an academic discourse is the dialogue itself and the dissection, agreement, disagreement, and refinement of ideas. Therefore, if, in
the United States, this Article simply sparks further discussion about
global law and Global Corporate Citizenship among U.S. legal scholars
and policy makers, it will have achieved one of its purposes.
Future articles will need to respond to a number of questions about
prior and existing measures and attempts in greater detail. First, what
attempts have been made to account for social considerations in the regulation of transnational corporations? Second, what can we learn from
prior successes and failures? Third, are global law and Law and Global
Corporate Citizenship new names for existing initiatives pulled together
in a systematic way or do they represent completely new frameworks or
something in between? This Article and earlier articles have begun answering some of these questions.
An exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of prior and existing regulatory efforts can be facilitated by answering another set of secondary questions. These include questions that focus on an assessment of
specific measures. What is the status quo in academic literature and policy making? Is Global Corporate Citizenship already influencing law and
policy and, if so, where and how? Which aspects are working or not
working? What other types of measures and regulation have been tried in
the past? Are there successful examples that we can draw from? Are
there steps that we can take to avoid past failures? Where different approaches have been used, why were they chosen, what can be gleaned
from a comparison? Can models that are developed and implemented in
different countries be adapted to work in other countries or at a global
level?
Finally, there are three questions that are arguably central to developing a new regulatory framework built on a foundation of global law
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and Law and Global Corporate Citizenship. First, what should be the
values and goals of a new legal regime? Second, what form should the
implementation of a new framework take and who should play a role in
the implementation? Third, how will the new laws and regulations be
enforced? This Article proposed initial responses to these questions,
which will be explored in more depth in a series of future articles.
Moving toward a more comprehensive regulatory framework will
require the analysis of a final cluster of secondary questions. These are
set out in sub-groups below. Some questions aim to flesh out values and
goals. Who should decide what values should inform the new framework
and from what sources can we draw such values? What steps should be
taken in the short-, mid-, and long-term? Are there stages or can all parts
of a new system be implemented simultaneously?
Other questions aim to assess what is needed to achieve the creation
of a new regulatory regime. Is the existing literature sufficient or do we
need more research? What types of data and studies would be useful?
What is required to garner sufficient state support and participation in a
global system? Who will fund a global legal system? Will this new
global law system require new institutions and laws and, if so, what form
should they take?
Some questions focus on roles and responsibilities. Who would be
responsible for developing a Global Corporate Citizenship approach?
What institutions will be involved? Is there a role for corporations in the
development of a new framework and, if so, what is it?
Further questions would address the purpose of a new regulatory
system and those who would benefit from or oppose such a framework.
What would be the purpose and goals of a new institution and laws?
Who would benefit from the new regulatory regime? Are there groups or
institutions on which the new framework would have a detrimental effect? Who would be opposed to this approach and why?
Finally, it is also necessary to address questions of administrability.
How would we administer and monitor the effectiveness of this approach? What structures should be set up to carry out this evaluation?
How much will this approach cost and how can we achieve sustainability? What would be some of the stumbling blocks and how could we
address them?
Some people may find the conclusion of this Article with more
questions than answers unsatisfying. They may be even more unsatisfied
to learn that the many questions noted here are not exhaustive. However,
I believe this reflects the fact that this is the beginning of a large project
and this Article does not aspire or attempt to comprehensively explore all
relevant questions.
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As is always the case when proposing a new or different regulatory
regime, one opens oneself up to critique. For example, when one suggests revisiting the relationship between human rights law and international human rights law, as is the case with this Article-one question that
does or should follow is, if we ask a different question, then are we asking the right one. This Article argues that the question of whether international human rights law is able to or even should be the sole or primary
system of laws to govern corporate-related human rights abuses is pivotal-although there may also be other "right" questions that should be
asked.
The goals of this Article are both ambitious and modest. They are
ambitious because the proposal of a new or different regulatory regime
can almost always be described as ambitious. At the same time, global
law is attracting increasing attention in non-national legal scholarship.
Global Corporate Citizenship is not new but was developed in other
fields and in practice, and enjoys the support of international institutions.
Nonetheless, the proposal to develop a systematic framework for regulating transnational corporations in the area of human rights is ambitious.
Therefore, the proposal set out in this Article is necessarily rudimentary
and will require fleshing out over time in future articles.

OUTSOURCING DEMOCRACY: REDEFINING PUBLICPRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
GILDA R. DANIELSt
INTRODUCTION

"We are left with a system in which almost every state still outsources its elections to what are actuallyprivate organizations."
In 2008, during a hotly contested presidential campaign, legions of
private individuals, nonprofit organizations, political parties, and candidates embarked upon canvassing, registering and assisting citizens, and
monitoring voting problems in a historic presidential election .2 Certainly,
the 2000 election debacle-in which the world watched as our election
process seemed to implode with butterfly ballots, hanging chads, and
disproportionate disenfranchisement in the minority communityprompted extreme criticism of how the United States handles elections. 3
Since the 2000 election, we have witnessed an increase in private
participation in elections. The level of private involvement spanned from
registering voters, to getting citizens to the ballot box through get out the
vote campaigns ("GOTV"), assisting limited English proficient ("LEP")
citizens, and monitoring Election Day activities.4 This increased int Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, J.D. 1990, New York
University School of Law. Thanks to Michele Estrin Gilman, Henry L. Chambers and Darren
Hutchinson for their helpful comments; a special note of gratitude to my Research Assistants, Anne
Wilkinson and Latoya Francis-Williams, for their incredible work. This Article was supported by a
summer research stipend from the University of Baltimore School of Law.
1. Phil Keisling, To Reduce Partisanship, Get Rid of Partisans, N.Y. TIMES, March 22,
2010, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/opinion/22keisling.html?_r-1 (former Oregon Secretary of State arguing for the elimination of primaries and stating that "[w]ith the
approval of the Supreme Court, the parties have the authority to exclude independent voters or other
non-members who might seriously challenge their partisan shibboleths or taboos").
During the 2008 election, nonpartisan organizations chronicled numerous voting irregu2.
larities in voter registration, felon disenfranchisement, long lines at the polls, poll watcher challenges, and unwarranted challenges to student voters and deceptive practices. See, e.g., Hearing on
Lessons Learnedfrom the 2008 Election Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. I (2009) (statement of Tova Andrea
Wang, Vice President, Research, Common Cause); Id. (statement of Hillary 0. Shelton, Washington
Bureau Chief, NAACP); see also Protecting the Right to Vote: Oversight of the Department of
Justice's Preparationsfor the 2008 General Election: Hearingbefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I10th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Gilda R. Daniels, Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law).
3. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd.,
531 U.S. 70 (2000); Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000); Edward B. Foley, Refining the Bush
v. Gore Taxonomy, 68 OHIo ST. L.J. 1035 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v.
Gore, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2007).
4. For example, nonpartisan organizations, such as Election Protection, self-described as
"the nation's largest non-partisan voter protection coalition," used more than 10,000 volunteers and
received over 200,000 calls to its hotline during the election season and more than 80,000 calls on
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volvement has been criticized on many fronts; critiques range from the
involvement of the media 5 to voting machine manufacture6 to voter registration,] In some instances, government has outsourced its obligations
to private entities. 8
Private partisan involvement in elections has hit troubling levelsfrom partisan election administrators at the highest rank to federal government officials tasked with enforcing and protecting voting rights
laws. 9 The government has outsourced its authority to private groups,
particularly private partisans, who use public authority for private political gain. Governments outsource in a wide variety of areas, such as education, prisons, and the military.' 0 The increase in private partisan
Election Day. Election Protection, Election Protection 2008: Helping Voters Today, Modernizing the
System for Tomorrow: Preliminary Analysis of Voting Irregularities 1 (2008), available at
http://www.866ourvote.org/tools/documents/files/0077.pdf; About Us, ELECTION PROTECTION,
http://www.866ourvote.org/about(last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
5. James Brown & Paul L. Hain, Private Administration of a Public Function: The News
Election Service, 2 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 389, 389 (1980) ("In the case of election administration,
however, the public officials have abdicated responsibility for election night aggregation of the
national Vote totals to a private organization, News Election Service, which is owned by five major
news organizations. This private organization performs without a contract, without public compensation, and without supervision by public officials. It makes decisions concerning its duties according
to its own criteria. The questions of responsibility and accountability have not arisen in part because
of the private organization's performance record and in part because the responsibility was assumed
gradually over a lengthy period without ever being evaluated as an item on the public agenda.").
John C. Bonifaz, Our Voting Re-Public, in REBOOTING AMERICA: IDEAS FOR
6.
REDESIGNING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY FOR THE INTERNET AGE 133, 134 (Allison Fine, Micah L.

Sifty, Andrew Rasiej & Josh Levy, eds., 2008), availableat http://rebooting.personaldemocracy.com
/files/JohnBonifaz.pdf ("[A] small handful of private companies (including, but not limited to, The
Election Systems & Software Company, Diebold Election Systems, now known as Premier Election
Solutions, and Sequoia Voting Systems) have gained enormous profit and influence marketing their
electronic voting systems to states and municipalities as the answer to the 'hanging chad' fiasco in
Florida.").
7. In recent years, state governments have placed limits on private entities, particularly in the
area of third party voter registration and assistance at the polls. A 2008 Brennan Center report noted
that:
Americans have run voter registration drives to register their fellow citizens to vote for
decades, but until very recently often had to be deputized by the state to do so. This
"deputy registrar" system left drives at the mercy of county or state officials who could
deny that deputization to disfavored groups, or restrict the number of people who could
take part.
Restrictions on Community-Based Voter Registration Drives, Brennan Center for Justice 1 (Aug. 4,
2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/ca85dbcf2d2acG45ff awm6iviui.pdf. For suggestions on modernizing
the voter registration process, see, e.g., Wendy Weiser, Michael Waldman & Renee Paradis, Voter
Registration Modernization: Policy Summary, in VOTER REGISTRATION MODERNIZATION:
COLLECTED BRENNAN CENTER REPORTS AND PAPERS 9, 9-15 (Wendy Weiser ed., 2008), available
at http://brennan.3cdn.net/329ceaa2878946bal7 kwm6btu6r.pdf.

8. See Developments in the Law-State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250-51 (2010) [hereinafter Public/PrivateDistinction]; see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000).
9. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 125 (2009) (suggesting ways to address partisan election administrators in the next wave of election reform); Pamela S. Karlan, Lessons Learned: Voting Rights and
the Bush Administration, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 17 (2009) (arguing that the Bush
administration's Department of Justice Civil Rights Division displayed partisan objectives in the

enforcement of voting rights).
10. See infra Part 1.
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groups' participation in unique government roles follows the recent trend
toward outsourcing and privatization in all aspects of government operations." While private involvement often garners support for government
ideals, such as promoting and encouraging voter participation, the use of
private partisan voter challenges have different objectives: promoting
one's candidate,12 voter suppression,' 3 or the less sinister but just as effective voter frustration and confusion.14
Private partisan activity, primarily voter caging'5 and voter challenges,16 tends to undermine the very right it was designed to protectnamely, free and equal voter participation. 17 Since the states determine

11.
See Developments in the Law-State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250-51 (2010) [hereinafter Public/PrivateDistinction];see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547 (2000).
12. See Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("The poll-watcher performs
a dual function on Election Day. On the one hand, because he is designated and paid by a political
party, his job is to guard the interests of that party's candidates. On the other hand, because exercise
of his authority promotes an honest election, the poll-watcher's function is to guard the integrity of
the vote. Protecting the purity of the electoral process is a state responsibility and the poll-watcher's
statutory role in providing that protection involves him in a public activity, regardless of his private
political motive.").
See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578-79
13.
(D. N.J. 2009). After the 2008 election, the Democratic National Committee ("DNC") and the Republican National Committee ("RNC") sought to modify a consent decree limiting the RNC's "ballot security measures." Id. at 579. The court noted that, "The RNC produced thousands of pages of
newspaper articles and other sources documenting alleged incidents of voter fraud over the past 27
years, while the DNC did the same with respect to voter intimidation." Id. at 578.
14.
See, e.g., WENDY WEISER & VISHAL AGRAHARKAR, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
BALLOT SECURITY AND VOTER SUPPRESSION: INFORMATION CITIZENS SHOULD KNOW 1 (2010),

available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/e2d20eec819018aa49 xpm6iixxd.pdf.
15.
See Chandler Davidson et al., Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security Technique, 34
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 533, 537-38 (2008) ("[V]ote caging is defined as a three-stage process
designed to identify persons in another political party or faction whose names are on a voter registration list, but whose legal qualification to vote is dubious, and then to challenge their qualification
either before or on Election Day. Ostensibly, caging is an attempt to prevent voter fraud. In practice,
it may have the effect of disenfranchising voters . . . ."). There are a few theories on the origin of the
term, one being that caging lists seem to have originated in the direct-mail fund-raising business.
Because the term is so new, a formal definition cannot be found in a traditional print dictionary but
can be found on websites such as Wikipedia or the Double-Tongued Dictionary. Id. at 537. However, according to Wikipedia, fundraisers will hire third-parties to handle the processing of responses
to direct mail, which may include "processing payments, compiling product orders, correcting recipient addresses, processing returned mail, providing lockbox services and depositing funds received into the hiring organization's bank account, and all of the associated data entry for each of
these services." Caging (DirectMail), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caging
(direct mail) (last modified July 17, 2010). The term "caging" itself may be a derivative of the
financial teller cage, since a number of operations related to lockbox services involve the control and
protection of funds. Another explanation involves the "old postal 'cages,' the hundreds of cubby
holes that fronted postal desks for sorting." Ed Brayton, GOP Has a History of Voter 'Caging,'
According to Democrats' Lawsuit, THE MICH. MESSENGER (Sept. 17, 2008, 8:10 PM),
http://michiganmessenger.com/4479/gop-has-a-history-of-voter-caging-according-to-democratslawsuit.
16.

See infra Parts I-IV.

17. See Mont. Democratic Party v. Eaton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (D. Mont. 2008) ("Eaton and the Montana Republican Party are abusing the process the State of Montana has provided to
ensure the accuracy of voter rolls (indeed, they are using the process designed to protect the integrity
of the political process to undermine it) . . . .").
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the time, places, and manner for elections,' 8 they also develop the rules
for allowing voter challenges. No federal law governs voter challenges;' 9
as such, laws explaining who can challenge and what authority they are
given vary from state to state. Most states call the individuals who conduct voter challenges "poll watchers," 2 o "challengers," 2' and/or "observers" 22 and allow them to observe the casting of ballots, the counting of
absentee ballots, and in some instances, challenge the poll workers han23
dling of the process.
The often related voter caging or vote caging occurs when a political party sends registered mail to addresses of registered voters. 2" If the
mail is returned as undeliverable-because, for example, the voter refuses to sign for it, the voter isn't present for delivery, or the voter is
homeless-the party uses that fact to challenge the registration, arguing
that because the voter could not be reached at the address, the registration is fraudulent.2 5 The private group then prepares a caging list, which
"is a list or database of addresses, updated after a mailing program is
completed, with notations on responses received from recipients with
corrections for addresses that mail has been returned as" undelivered or

18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing
Senators.").
See Frank Emmert, Chirstopher Page & Antony Page, Trouble Counting Votes? Compar19.
ing Voting Mechanisms in the United States and Other Selected Countries, 41 CREIGHTON L. REV.
3, 30-34 (2007). The authors argue that some of the problems in past U.S. elections occurred because of lack of uniform and transparent laws guiding elections at the national level and that the
United States needs to make improvements in its election procedures and laws. Id.
20. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-312(a)(2) (2009) ("poll watcher" or "representative");
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19362 (West 2003) ("poll watchers").
21.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:427 (2004) ("watchers"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 168.730-.734 (West 2005) ("challenger"); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 115.105-.107 (1997) ("challenger" and "watcher"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 666:4-:5 (2010) ("challenger"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:7-5 (West 1999) ("challengers"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-45 (2010) ("observers"); OHIO REV.

CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (West 2010) ("observers").
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-604(1) (2010) ("observers");
22.
§§ 29A.04.630 (West 2005) ("political parties" and "elections observers").

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

23. A few states explicitly allow challengers to question an election official's performance.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:427 (2004) (allowing a watcher to contest "any infraction of the
law"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.730 (West 2005) (allowing challengers to question election
workers and procedures).
24. See Davidson et al., supra note 15, at 538.
25. See Jo Becker, GOP Challenging Voter Registrations:Civil Rights GroupsAccuse Republicans of Trying to Disenfranchise Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at AS. Jo Becker, a
reporter for the Washington Post, stated that in 1981 "the [RNC] sent letters to predominantly"
African-American neighborhoods in New Jersey. Id. When 45,000 of these letters were returned as
undelivered, the RNC attempted to challenge the voters whose mail was returned and have his or her
name removed from voter rolls. Id. In 1986, the RNC attempted to do the same to 31,000 people in
Louisiana. Id. Similarly in 2004, the RNC challenged voters in Ohio for undeliverable mail. Id. In
that same year, Republicans also sent mail to 130,000 voters in Philadelphia neighborhoods, whose
residents are predominantly black and Democratic. Id. In reference to attempted voter purges and
influencing voter rolls, Republicans said their actions had nothing to do with partisanship and had
"nothing to do with race." Id.
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forwarded.26 A political party then uses the "caging list" to challenge the
validity of a voter's registration.27 In order for the voter's provisional
ballot to be counted, the voter may have to defend and prove his or her
eligibility. 28
Voter caging and voter challenges have been used to target racial
minorities and to otherwise disrupt the voting process. The use of abusive voter challenges was evident after the 2008 Presidential election
when voters in New York suffered suppression of the right to vote.29
Attorneys present at the polls "documented efforts to suppress minority
voters."30 The attorneys reported:
Some of the suppressive actions . . . included an armed

man with police shield escorting around alleged poll watchers
throughout various polling sites during voting hours; repeated
blanket challenges to minority voters at a particular polling location . . . and a widespread challenge to nearly 6,000 Democratic voters who allegedly did not live where their voter registration information claimed they did.
A New York Times reporter characterized the suppression activities
as "chaotic." 32 The New York legislature subsequently introduced legislation to outlaw these practices. 33 In another example, while the Republican National Committee (RNC) was defending a lawsuit in Louisiana, it
26. Caging (DirectMail), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caging (direct mail) (last
modified July 17, 2010). Caging lists seem to have originated in the direct-mail fund-raising business. See id. Fundraisers will hire third-parties to handle the processing of responses to direct mail,
"which may include processing payments, compiling product orders, correcting recipient addresses,
processing returned mail, providing lockbox services and depositing funds received into the hiring
organization's bank account, and all of the associated data entry for each of these services." Id. The
term caging "may be a derivative of the financial teller cage, since a number of operations related to
lockbox services involve the control and protection of funds." Id.
27. See Becker, supra note 25. During the 2008 presidential election, the Republican Party in
Macomb County, Michigan proposed using foreclosure lists to challenge voters at the polls. Earthe
Jane Melzer, Lose Your House, Lose Your Vote, MICH. MESSENGER (Sept. 10, 2008, 6:42 AM),
http://michiganmessenger.com/4076/lose-your-house-lose-your-vote. The party quickly backtracked
from its proposed strategy, but even the mere proposition that foreclosures would be used to intimidate and potentially disenfranchise voters is reprehensible and problematic. Eartha Jane Melzer,
Republicans Recant Plans to Foreclose Voters but Admit Other Strategies, MICH. MESSENGER
(Sept. 11, 2008, 3:41 PM), http://michiganmessenger.com/4231/republicans-recant-plans-toforeclose-voters-but-admit-other-strategies.
28. See, e.g., Act of June 20, 2005, ch. 277, § 24, 2005 Fla. Laws 2614, 2643 (allowing a
voter to provide evidence of eligibility to the county canvassing board and providing that "a provisional ballot shall be counted unless the canvassing board determines by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person was not entitled to vote"). State laws provide the opportunity for private
actors to "challenge" a voter's eligibility to participate in the election process. See, e.g., Act of June
20, 2005, ch. 277, § 27, 2005 Fla. Laws 2614, 2646. In order to exert a challenge, most states do not
require any threshold finding of ineligibility. See, e.g., id. (requiring only a "good faith" belief).
29. See S. 2554, 232d Ann. Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009), available at
http://www.open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S2554B (giving the justification of the original bill).
30. Id.
31.
Id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
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released a memo from one of its party officials indicating its intentions to
suppress the minority vote. 34 The pertinent part of the memo read: "I
would guess that this program will eliminate at least 60-80,000 folks
from the rolls .

. .

. If it's a close race . . . which I'm assuming it is, this

could keep the black vote down considerably." 35
Additionally, in a hotly contested 2003 mayoral election in Philadelphia, involving an African American incumbent, voters in predominantly African American areas of the city were systematically challenged by
men canying clipboards and driving a fleet of approximately 300 sedans with
decals designed to look like law enforcement insignia.36 During that election,
local judges heard numerous allegations of voter intimidation and harassment
and ultimately issued orders in two city polling places prohibiting Republican
poll watchers from requesting registration and identification materials from
voters. 37
Voter challenges and vote caging serve as yet another new millennium mechanism to disenfranchise minority voters. 38 Historically, the
disenfranchisement devices were clearly race based.39 More contemporaneously, however, partisan actors have proclaimed that the challenges
were meant to prevent voter fraud and target party affiliation, more so
than race. Indeed, recent assertions merely use "partisan" as a proxy for
race. 40 In spite of these assertions, whether the actions are motivated by
34. See Thomas B. Edsall, 'Ballot Security' Effects Calculated: GOP Aide Said Louisiana
Effort 'Could Keep the Black Vote Down', WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1986, at Al.
35. Id (omissions in original).
36.

PEOPLE FOR THE AM.

WAY &

NAACP, THE LONG SHADOW

OF JIM CROW: VOTER

INTIMIDATION AND SUPPRESSION IN AMERICA TODAY 4-6 (2004), available at http://www.pfaw.org

/sites/default/files/thelongshadowofimcrow.pdf.
37. Clea Benson, Cynthia Burton & Jacqueline Soteropoulos, Chaotic Day Marks End of
Tense Campaign, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 5, 2003, at Al.

38. This Article is the third that examines various new millennium mechanisms that are used
to disenfranchise minority voters. See also Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343
(2010) (discussing the need for enforcement and penalties for voter deception); Gilda R. Daniels, A
Vote Delayed Is a Vote Denied. A Preemptive Approach to Eliminating Election Administration
Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57 (2008) (calling for
a proactive approach to potentially disenfranchising election administration measures).
39. See infra note 107-09 and accompanying text.
40. The use of partisanship as a proxy for race is seen most often in the redistricting process.
In Bartlett v. Strickland, Justice Souter wrote in his dissent:
If districts with minority populations under 50% can never count as minority-opportunity
districts to remedy a violation of the States' obligation to provide equal electoral opportunity under § 2, States will be required under the plurality's rule to pack black voters
into additional majority-minority districts, contracting the number of districts where racial minorities are having success in transcending racial divisions in securing their preferred representation. The object of the Voting Rights Act will now be promoting racial
blocs, and the role of race in districting decisions as a proxy for political identification
will be heightened by any measure.
129 S. Ct. 1231, 1250 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also Bush v. Vera, 517
U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting
is performed with consciousness of race. . .. Electoral district lines are 'facially race neutral,' so a
more searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting
cases than in cases of 'classifications based explicitly on race."' (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,213 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added)).
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racial animus or partisanship, the result is the same. Racial minorities are
targeted for vote challenges and those private actions constitute unconstitutional state action.
When private partisans are allowed to challenge voters in the polling site, they are engaged in determining voter eligibility, which is a
governmental function.41 Moreover, when private partisan organizations
are involved in the electoral process, their allegiance to a certain candidate or outcome is different than the governmental goal of ensuring access and applying the laws impartially, regardless of who the voter is
perceived to support. Allowing private partisans to participate in voter
eligibility decisions-which occur with the use of voter challenges-can
confuse voters and blur the lines between appropriate public and private
behavior.42 In the election administration context, little has been written
to assess whether the government has given too much of its authority to
private actors at the expense of the exercise of the fundamental right to
vote.43 The abusive and intimidating use of voter challenges, however,
has prompted legislation prohibiting or altering the practice.4 Accordingly, the state statutes governing voter challenges and the private actor's
access to Election Day voters require a closer look to ensure that they
properly protect against discriminatory actions. A void currently exists in
an analysis of this type of election administration activity. This Article
attempts to fill that void with clear and thorough analysis of how voter
challengers act as adjuncts of the state when issuing voter challenges and
how courts should treat their actions as "state action."45
This Article explores the level of public-private "partnership" in
election administration and takes a particular look at private partisan's
manipulation of state voter challenge laws. This Article argues that the
private partisans use of government authority in determining voter eligibility constitutes state action and could subject not only the private partisan-but also the state-to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. In Part I, this Article explores the use of
outsourcing government functions to private organizations and discusses
how the public-private divide has a different dynamic than other outsourced areas, such as education or welfare reform, when juxtaposed against
41.
See Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("No activity is more indelibly a public function than the holding of a political election .... ).
42. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369
(2003); Public/PrivateDistinction,supra note 12, at 1250-51.
43. See, e.g., Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America's Polling Places:How
They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 401, 434-36 (2002) ("[T]he states have
delegated to the counties the responsibility for conducting the election and maintaining order in the
polls, and by doing so, the states have abdicated their responsibility for preventing bad things from
happening to voters in the polls on election day.").
44. See, e.g., S. 6134, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (authorizing canvassing boards to
impose civil penalties for improper voter challenges).
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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the fundamental right to vote. Part II examines the level of race-based
targeting in voter challenges and vote caging. Part III discusses legal
concerns and applies the state action framework to these new millennium
mechanisms and cautions that states can be held liable for private partisan voter challenges. Scholars have argued both sides of the issue regarding whether poll watchers engage in state action.46 This Article provides
clarity to this discussion. Part IV recommends the elimination of voter
challenges, or in the alternative, suggests a means to ensure that the private partisan's role does not cede government authority.
I. THE CEDING OF AUTHORITY: PRIVATE INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC
FUNCTIONS

"Privatization is now virtually a national obsession. Hardly any
domestic policy issue remains untouched by disputes over the scope of
",47
privateparticipationin government ....

The public-private divide has become a blur in many areas. Private
actors perform government functions in, inter alia, the military, education, welfare reform, and public safety. 4 8 Arguably, privatization is fueled by two primary arguments: efficiency and lower costs and a "democratizing" effect that returns the power to local communities. 49 One
can readily make an argument that the government can cut its costs if it
outsources the welfare benefits program to a private company, creates a
charter school, or allows a private company to build and run a prison. For
example, an argument for privatizing education centers on providing a
choice for students from low-income families to apply public school
funds to private school tuition. 50 Further, it is argued that the competition
46.
Compare Jason Belmont Conn, Of Challengers and Challenges, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 1021,
1032-33 (2006) (exploring the role of and the decisions of poll watchers in Ohio during the 2004
presidential election, and maintaining that the poll watchers were indeed state actors by virtue of
their engaging in poll challenging, which is traditionally a state action), with Heather S. Heidelbaugh, Logan S. Fisher & James D. Miller, Protecting the Integrity of the Polling Place: A Constitutional Defense of Poll Watcher Statutes, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 233-34 (2009) (arguing that
placing poll watchers in polling sites is not state action but rather a licensing process).
47.
Metzger, supra note 42, at 1369.
48.
See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 571-73 (2001); Kenneth J. Saltman, Putting the Public Back in Public Schooling: Public Schools Beyond the CorporateModel, 3 DEPAUL J. FOR Soc. JUST. 9, 9-10 (2009) ("1
consider how the corporatization of public schools redistributes economic control and cultural control from the public to private interests. I argue that these intertwined redistributions of power undermine public democracy (the possibilities for the development of a more participatory and deeper
democracy), just social transformation, and critical citizenship while exacerbating material and
symbolic inequality."); Ian Traynor, The Privatisationof War, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2003, 2:28
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/10/politics.iraq/print.
49.
See Gilman, supra note 48, at 596 ("Privatization advocates . . . contend that private
companies can deliver services with greater efficiency and innovation than government at a lower
cost. . . . Yet another strand of the privatization movement sees privatization as a democratizing
force that returns power from the government to local communities and their mediating institutions,
such as churches, neighborhoods, and voluntary organizations, which are better situated to address a
community's needs.").
50.
See Julie Huston Vallarelli, Note, State Constitutional Restraints on the Privatizationof
Education, 72 B.J. L. REV. 381, 395-96 (1992).
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between private and public schools will create better schools for all students regardless of income."' Additionally, the private school's ability to
provide a quality education is governed by its capacity to provide a competitive product. 52 Arguably, "privatization of welfare converges 'the
free market ideology of the right and the citizen participation/empowerment objectives of the left.'" 53 While each of these examples are subject to strong criticism, 5 4 including whether the law can hold
private companies accountable in the same manner as the government,
they tend to fit neatly into the costs-democratizing paradigm.
Most scholarship has focused on private contracts for public functions, such as Medicare and Medicaid services or building prisons and
education. In these service contracts, the debate has raged over whether
the government has granted too much power to private parties and
whether the public benefits from the agreement.5 7 Nonetheless, private
contractors, particularly not-for-profit entities, presumably have a similar
goal as the government, i.e., to improve services or outcomes, such as
improving the educational system.
Conversely, when private partisans are involved in the public function of election administration, it is somewhat of a misnomer to describe
the relationship between the public governmental agencies and the private group as a partnership. Partnership is the wrong characterization,
since it would normally connote two or more groups working towards
the same goal. In the election administration context, the government
51.
See Saltman, supranote 48, at 27-28.
52.
Vallarelli, supra note 50, at 384-85 ("To remain open, schools must attract studentconsumers by providing equal or better services than competitors. Costs are reduced as each school
responds to economic pressures and maximizes the services it can offer.").
53.
Gilman, supranote 48, at 596.
54. See, e.g., Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best
Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029, 1058-60
(2007) (arguing that allowing private companies to collect and disburse child support payments is in
conflict with the best interests of the child); Saltman, supra note 48, at 9 (arguing that the privatization of schools is detrimental to education and democracy).
55.
See Gilman, supra note 48, at 603 (analyzing the detrimental effects of privatizing welfare
benefits on the recipient's due process rights).
See id. at 578-79 (examining private contracts for providing welfare).
56.
57. See, e.g., Daniel L. Hatcher, Collateral Children: Consequence and Illegality at the Intersection of Foster Care and Child Support, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1333, 1377-79 (2009) (arguing for
the elimination of foster care recovery programs, which are often administered by private entities,
because they serve no benefit to the children in foster care).
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's Guidebook on Successful Practices for Poll
58.
Worker Recruitment, Training,and Retention [hereinafter Successful Practices]lists the "Pitfalls and
Challenges" of partnering with political parties to recruit poll workers as follows:
* Some political parties use Election Day poll service as a patronage job for the party
faithful, not necessarily appointing those most qualified and willing to serve.
* Party representatives may be tempted to work for the success of a particular candidate.
* Political party lists may be submitted too late to be of use.
* Political parties often want members and others to serve as observers.
* Political party poll workers may want to work only in high-stakes elections and may
not be reliable components of a long-term election team.
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has a uniquely constitutional function to ensure that elections are held in
a fair and impartial manner. 59
Voting, however, is different from other outsourced functionssuch as education and welfare. Voting is a fundamental right, 61 and the
United States Constitution mandates that the federal and state governments administer all aspects of elections. The democratic process is at its
best when all three levels of government-federal, state, and localwork together to protect access and integrity. 62 No contractual relationship exists between the private groups and the governmental agencies,
and in most instances, the private organizations are working to improve
the democratic process by increasing the number of eligible voters
through voter registration drives or delivering eligible voters to the
63
polls.
The political partisan, however, has a different goal in mind through
his or her participation in the electoral process; to get a particular candidate elected or ballot measure passed.64 Once the private partisans use
statutory authority to achieve the goal of political gamesmanship and
influence governmental decisions on voter eligibility, the government
has ceded its authority to private partisans at the expense of the eligible
voter.
In order to understand how private partisans are assuming governmental power, one must first understand what authority the government
has under the Constitution and other federal statutes in regards to elections-as well as how the authority is divided amongst the federal, state,
and local governments.

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, GUIDEBOOK ON SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES FOR POLL WORKER
RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, AND RETENTION 49-50 (2007) [hereinafter SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES],

available at http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/AssetManager/Successful%20Practices%20for%/ 20Poll
%20Worker%2ORecruitment%20Section%201 %2ORecruitment.pdf.
59. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1992) ("[A] government has ... a compelling interest in securing the right to vote freely and effectively .. . .").
60. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) ("It is beyond cavil that 'voting is of
the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure."' (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections
v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979))).
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (proclaiming that voting is regarded
61.
as a fundamental political right).
62. See generally Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, One Person, One Vote: Protecting Access to the
Franchise Through the Effective Administration of Election Procedures and Protections, 40 URB.
LAW. 269 (2008) (discussing ways that public and private entities can work together to ensure fair
elections, focusing on advancing participation in the language minority community and Section 203
of the Voting Rights Act).
63. Id. at 278.
64. See Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (1979) ("The poll-watcher performs a dual
function on Election Day. On the one hand, because he is designated and paid by a political party,
his job is to guard the interests of that party's candidates. On the other hand, because exercise of his
authority promotes an honest election, the poll-watcher's function is to guard the integrity of the
vote.").
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A. The Federal Government
The federal, state, and local governments share in the administration
of elections. 5 On the federal level, government agencies enforce various
voting rights statutes 66 and Constitutional amendments. 6 Notwithstanding state authority to develop election administration laws governing
"The Time[], Place[] and Manner of elections," Congress-under the
Elections Clause-maintains authority to "make or alter" state regulation
of federal elections.6 8
It is widely understood that the Constitution contemplated that federal and state governments would coordinate election administration issues, with any federal decisions reigning supreme. 69 Recent cases interpreting the Elections Clause reinforce Congress's broad authority to
regulate all aspects of elections.70 Accordingly, Congress has the power
to develop and supersede state election regulations. Additionally, in
Smiley v. Holm, 7 1 the Court noted that Congress's Elections Clause
power allows it to "supplement .
own."

.

. state regulations or . . . substitute its

72

65. However, elections are primarily a local government function. See Note, Toward A
GreaterState Role In Election Administration, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2314, 2323 (2005) [hereinafter
GreaterState Role]; see also Weinberg & Utrecht, supra note 41, at 434-36 ("If the states do not
assume the responsibility for conducting effective elections when the counties fail to do so, then the
United States Congress should consider whether federal civil rights voting laws should be expanded
to include the deprivations of voting rights at the polls . . . and should consider similarly expanding
the unquestionably successful federal observer program.").
66. Federal agencies enforce various statutes that pertain to voting, such as the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973
et seq. (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 15511 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9 (2006). Additionally, the Help
America Vote Act spawned the Election Assistance Commission, which provides guidance and best
practices for state and local election administrations and provides funds for improving the election
process. 42 U.S.C. § 15381 (2006).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1-2 ("The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.").
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators."). Congress can regulate the elections of Representatives and Senators. United States v.
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 482 (1917); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1879); United States
v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 287 (W.D. La. 1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O'Connell,
181 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Ky. 1944).
69. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 384 ("[T]he power ... may be exercised as and when Congress sees
fit to exercise it. When exercised, the action of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the
regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them. This is implied in the power to 'make or alter."').
70. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24 (2001) ("[The Elections Clause] encompasses
matters like 'notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and
corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication
of election returns."' (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932))).
71.
285 U.S. 355 (1932).
72. Id. at 366-67. In Smiley v. Holm, Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
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Together, the federal and state governments have the constitutional
authority to regulate the election process, which includes voter eligibility. While Congress has used its constitutional power to implement laws
that govern aspects of election administration,7 3 it is the states' responsi74
bility to implement those laws in a nondiscriminatory and fair manner.
B. The State Government
In election administration matters, state and local governments bear
the lion's share of the responsibility. Article I, Section IV of the United
States Constitution grants the ability to administer elections to the
states,75 which provides extensive obligations to ensure that elections are
conducted impartially and accurately. 76
Perhaps one of the most powerful and important responsibilities of
state administrators is to make an accurate and almost instantaneous determination of the eligibility of a citizen to cast a ballot. In most instances, a voter ID, signature, or other form of verification is all that is
needed.77 When a voter is challenged, the process changes tremendously,
shifting the power from the state to the challenger and placing the voter
on the defensive. The local administrator is tasked with the on the spot
determination and the responsibility of communicating any problems to
the county and state administrators, who, if needed, will also communicate with federal government agencies for assistance. Accordingly, federal offices also communicate any problems with the state, and local
election administrators; in some instances, correcting for clear discriminatory practices, and in others, leaving the voter stranded on the road to
full political participation.78
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a
complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation
to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud
and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making
and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numemus requirements as to
procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the
fundamental right involved.
Id. at 366.
73. Congress utilized its Elections Clause authority when it enacted the NVRA and HAVA.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §4, cl. 1.
74. The National Voter Registration Act demands that its measures are implemented in a
nondiscriminatory manner. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b)(1) (2006).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); Greater State
Role, supra note 65, at 2323.
76. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. See generally J. Kenneth Blackwell & Kenneth A. Klukowski, The Other Voting Right: Protecting Every Citizen's Vote by Safeguarding the Integrity of the
Ballot Box, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 107 (2009); Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the
Secretary: The Crucial Role of State Election Administrators in PromotingAccuracy and Access to
Democracy,27 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 355-61 (2008); Raquel A. Rodriguez, Reflections of
Another Bush v. Gore Lawyer, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 631, 636 (2010).
77. See, e.g., Voter Identification Requirements, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsi.org/LegislaturesElections/ElectionsCampaigns/StateRequirements
forVoterlD/tabid/1 6602/Default.aspx#in (last updated Sept. 30, 2010).
78. Voting Rights Act: Sections 6 and 8 - The Federal Examiner and Observer Program:
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Most states refer to the persons primarily responsible for the Election Day experience as poll workers. 79 The poll workers, inter alia, open
the polling sites, welcome voters, and provide the necessary voting materials-such as actual ballots or access to the electronic system employed
in the jurisdiction.80 Once the polls close, the poll workers must secure
the actual ballots and/or the voting machines and deliver the machines
and ballots to the central facility for the official Election Day count." For
all their hard work, poll workers are only paid approximately $100 for a
more than 12-hour day in some cases.82
On the local level, poll workers protect the overall integrity of the
voting process. A well-trained poll worker is aware of state and federal
election regulations, as well as how to fairly administer and handle any
potential disputes. Poll workers must consistently apply fair and egalitarian principles in a nondiscriminatory way and avoid the appearance of
impropriety. They must also know clearly how to administer the ballot
and provisional ballots, determine voter eligibility, and have a superior
familiarity with voting procedures and voting technology.83 In this new
millennium, particularly with the advent of the electronic voting machine, computer literacy is crucial to a smooth voting process.
The public and private entities must work together in order to facilitate a smooth election process. It has become evident, however, that not
all entities are working toward the same goal.84 The unique placement of
private partisans inside the polling place with the authority to challenge
voters-and as such, determine whether a person is eligible to votealigns the private actions with government authority.85

HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th
Cong. 17-19 (2005) (statement of Barry H. Weinberg, Former Deputy Chief and Acting Chief,
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't. of Justice) (stating that federal observers are the
"eyes and ears of the Justice Department"). For a discussion of the relationship between federal
observers and the election process, see infra Part IV.C.
79. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 12302 (West 2010) (allowing the state to recruit student poll
workers). In New York, they are referred to as "inspectors" and "poll clerks." N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3420 (McKinney 2007). In Alabama, poll workers are referred to as "inspectors" and "clerks." ALA.
CODE § 17-8-5 (2007).
80.
See SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES, supranote 58, at 7.
81.
See generally id.
In Alabama, clerks and inspectors are paid at least $75 and $100 per day respectively for
82.
statewide elections. ALA. CODE § 17-8-12 (2007); cf N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-420 (McKinney 2007)
(poll workers are paid $200 for working on election day and an additional amount for attending poll
worker training); WIS. STAT. § 7.03(l)(a) (2004) (election officials are paid "a reasonable daily
compensation"). In Madison, Wisconsin, "a reasonable daily compensation" is presently $11.66 per
hour. MADISON CITY CLERK'S OFFICE, SERVING AS AN ELECTION OFFICIAL IN THE CITY OF

MADISON, available at http://www.cityofmadison.comlelection/pollWorkers/documents/Election
OfficialBrochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
83.

See SUCCESSFUL PRACTICES, supra note 58, at 7.

84. See Emmert et al., supra note 19, at 8 (detailing the ineffective administration of elections
in the United States).
85. See id. at 24-25.
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C. Voter Challenge/Poll Watcher Statutes
State statutes determine who may remain inside a polling site to observe the electoral process. Poll watcher eligibility is determined by
state laws that allow persons of various positions, i.e., political party,
political candidate, or concerned citizen, to view the actual voting process.87 Some statutes are extremely liberal, allowing "[a]ny member of the
public," except a candidate, to observe the election," while others limit
the observers to voters and election officials.89
Like most states, Florida law allows one poll watcher from each
party and one poll watcher representing each candidate to view the voting process. 90 Further, a Florida poll watcher may challenge any voter's
right to vote if done "in good faith," 9' provided the challenger signs an
oath that details the challenger's name, address, political affiliation, and
reason for the challenge. 92 Once offered, the challenged voter is allowed
to cast a provisional ballot. 93 Although filing a frivolous challenge is a
first-degree misdemeanor in Florida, an exception is given for electors or
poll workers making the challenge "in good faith."94
The process of issuing a challenge is rather involved. If a challenge
is offered, the poll workers then engage in a time-consuming process,
which takes them away from the business of processing eligible voters.95
In some states, the challenger has to make his challenge in writing on a
form that is provided for the purpose of challenging, and the challenged
voter must respond with an affidavit. In most instances, the challenged
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-8-7 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 102.031(3) (2008). Scholars have
argued that states have failed to undertake their responsibilities in this arena by delegating the duty
to maintain order at elections to counties. See Weinberg & Utrecht, supra note 41, at 434 (arguing
that the states need to use their authority to regulate the activity of elections today to stop future
problems).
87. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-8-7 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 102.031(3) (2008).
88. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 7.41(1) (2004) ("Any member of the public may be present at any
polling place ... except a candidate whose name appears on the ballot at the polling place . .. .").
89. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 3-31-37(a) (2010) ("[N]o person, other than the election officers
and voters going to the election room to vote and returning therefrom, may be or remain within three
hundred feet of the outside entrance to the building housing the polling place while the polls are
open.").
FLA. STAT. § 101.131(l) (2008).
90.
91.
FLA. STAT. § 101.111(2)(2008).
92.
FLA. STAT. § 101.11 (1)(a) (2008).
FLA. STAT. § 101. 111 (1)(b)(1) (2008).
93.
94.
FLA. STAT. § 101.111(2) (2008) ("[E]lectors and poll watchers shall not be subject to
liability for any action taken in good faith and in furtherance of any activity or duty permitted of
such electors and poll watchers by law."). This exception essentially allows questionable challenges
to stand without criminal repercussions. Id. For other examples of disenfranchising methods that
avoid criminal prosecution, see generally Daniels, supra note 38.
95.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 223 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a voter ID law increases the likelihood of delay at the polls since any minor
discrepancy between a voter's photo identification card and the registration may lead to a challenge).
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:15-18.1 (West 1999) (permitting a challenged voter to
96.
establish a right to vote by a signed affidavit detailing voter qualifications or a presentation of a
suitable identifying document); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-85(b) (2008) (requiring a challenge made in
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voter may vote if it is determined by a majority vote of the poll workers
that the voter is eligible.9 7 Once a challenge is issued, a poll worker must
resolve the challenge before the person can vote.9 8 Thus, the poll workers
decision regarding voter eligibility is reliant upon the private declaration
of ineligibility. It then forces the voter to prove her identity. The inability
to do so, could disenfranchise an eligible voter not because she is ineligible but for a myriad of reasons unassociated with eligibility, such as lack
of an ID when the jurisdiction does not require identification.
D. PrivateActors
Private partisan involvement in the exercise of the franchise is not
new. Prior to the Civil War, most states did not require voters to prove
their eligibility prior to Election Day. 99 One scholar has noted:
Until 1888, political parties printed and distributed the ballots in
each of the United States. Besides discouraging split-ticket voting
and encouraging strong party organizations . . . the party ballot in-

sured illiterates the right to vote. Nevertheless, reformers, who were
more concerned with eliminating fraud than safeguarding the rights
of illiterates, instituted the secret ballot .... .0o
Voters arrived at the polls with required documentation, including
witnesses that could attest to their eligibility.o During this period, Republicans feared voter fraud promoted voter registration, while Democrats argued for extending voting hours. 102 During the Jim Crow era, the
federal government had to step in to protect the right to vote as a result of
the Black Codes, Jim Crow laws, and death threats.
As chronicled in Burson v. Freeman,'03 once the country moved
from oral vote to paper ballots, private partisan involvement began to
writing, under oath, and on prescribed forms); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-86(d) (2008) (permitting a
challenged voter to appear at a hearing in person or through affidavit).
97. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (West 2006) (providing that the election
judges shall provide a provisional ballot to a person whom a majority of the judges believe is not
entitled to vote), held unconstitutional by Boustani v. Blackwell, 460 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Ohio
2006) (holding that provisions requiring that naturalized citizens present a certificate of naturalization upon challenge or otherwise cast a provisional ballot violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.19 (West 2006) (providing that if a challenged
person shows up to vote and establishes to the satisfaction of the judges that he or she is entitled to
vote, he or she shall be permitted to vote).
99.

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY

INTHE UNITED STATES 151 (2000). During the colonial era, the vote was reserved for white men and
in some states only those men who owned property. See id. at 5. The later requirement of voter
registration was due in part to the increase in urban areas where "voters were less likely to be known
personally to election officials." See id.at 152.
100.
J. MORGAN KoUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 51 (1974).

101.
See KEYSSAR, supranote 99, at 151.
102.
See id. at 152. In post Civil War Chicago, Republicans hired individuals to "check polling
places" and offered a $300 reward to those who would assist in convicting persons who voted illegally. But, all those who were accused were acquitted. Id. at 153-54.
103.
504 U.S. 191 (1992).
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overly influence and destroy the free exercise of the right to vote.
Court wrote:

04

The

Within 20 years of the formation of the Union, most States had incorporated the paper ballot into their electoral system. ... Wishing to
gain influence, political parties began to produce their own ballots for
voters. These ballots were often printed with flamboyant colors, distinctive designs, and emblems so that they could be recognized at a
distance. State attempts to standardize the ballots were easily
thwarted-the vote buyer could simply place a ballot in the hands of
the bribed voter and watch until he placed it in the polling box. Thus,
the evils associated with the earlier viva voce system reinfected the
election process; the failure of the law to secure secrecy opened the
door to bribery and intimidation.105
While the practice of vote caging dates back to the 1950s, the use of
race-based voter challenges can be traced to the post-Civil War era. Beginning in the 1860s, Republicans enacted vote challenging mechanisms
with the mission of addressing fraud, while the Democrats responded
with arguments that the Republican passed laws were "an act of hostility
to the Democratic party." 106
Still, the race-based voter targeting was both blatant and widespread.
As an example, in 1865, the Florida legislature instituted measures designed for the sole purpose of denying the franchise to freed Blacks.' 0 7
Likewise, after record black enfranchisement in 1867, white legislators
adopted a statute that granted poll watchers the ability to challenge voter
eligibility, stating:
If any person offering to vote shall be challenged, as not qualified, by
an inspector or by any other elector, one of the board shall declare to
the person challenged the qualifications of an elector. If such person
shall claim that he is qualified, and the challenge be not withdrawn,
one of the inspectors shall administer to him an oath prescribed by
law. 108
In Tiryak v. Jordan,'0 9 the court found that, although the state is responsible for the administration of elections, "[t]he statutory scheme in
certain instances delegates aspects of that responsibility to the political
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 200-01.
Id.
KEYSSAR, supra note 99, at 155. Beginning in 1866, the Republican and Democratic

parties set the stage for partisan battles over access and integrity for centuries to come. See id. at

152-53.
107.
See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, REPORT TO STATE AND LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS ON
THE URGENT NEED FOR INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTISAN POLL WATCHERS (2004), available at
Racial voting restrichttp://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/AP-VSchallenge.pdf.
tions are as old as the Confederacy. See id. (citing FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. VI, § I (limiting the
right to vote to white males)).

108.
109.

Id. at 108.
472 F. Supp. 822 (1979).

2010]

OUTSOURCING DEMOCRACY

253

parties. This delegation is a legislative recognition of 'the critical role
played by political parties in the process of selecting and electing candidates for state and national office.""' 0 The "critical role" begins to impede upon government authority in the area of partisan poll watchers.
II. RACE BASED CHALLENGES AND VOTER CAGING

As discussed, supra, voter challenges have been used to target racial
minorities. The practice of partisan voter challenges rests upon the discriminatory selection of voters based on geography, i.e., racially segregated neighborhoods and racial identification. As a first step, political
operatives utilize voter caging to capture the voters and ultimately question their eligibility.
Although gaining recent prominence, caging is not new. The political tactic was used as a so-called "ballot security" measure as early as the
1950s. "' Voter caging often goes hand in hand with voter intimidation' 2
and deception tactics." 3 For instance, as discussed, supra, while the Republican National Committee was defending a lawsuit in Louisiana, a
memo released from a party official indicated its intentions to suppress
the minority vote. The relevant part of the memo read: "I would guess
that this program will eliminate at least 60-80,000 folks from the rolls . . .
If it's a close race . . . which I'm assuming it is, this could keep the
110. Id. at 823-24 (quoting Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 195 (1979)).
Ill.
See Davidson et al., supra note 15, at 559. Voter caging was recognized in Arizona in the
1950s and 1960s as a Republican political tool to exclude African Americans and Mexican Americans. Id. at 543. The Arizona example also implicated former Chief Justice William Rehnquist
during his confirmation hearings. See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD

STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 271 (2001). In 1962,
the Republican National Committee expanded this approach and engaged in a national voter caging
campaign named "Operation Eagle Eye," which targeted minority voters in urban areas in battleground states. See CHANDLER DAVIDSON ET AL., REPUBLICAN BALLOT SECURITY PROGRAMS: VOTE
PROTECTION OR MINORITY VOTE SUPPRESSION-OR BOTH?: A REPORT TO THE CENTER FOR

VOTING RIGHTS & PROTECTION 25 (2004). For example, in the 1960s in Chicago the RNC planned
to have more than 10,000 poll-watchers for the 3,552 voting precincts. Id. at 26 n.5 (citing 250,000
Accredited to Watch City Polls, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS, Nov. 2, 1964, at 1, 14).
112. Democratic Nat'1 Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578-79
(D.N.J. 2009) ("Voter intimidation presents an ongoing threat to the participation of minority individuals in the political process, and continues to pose a far greater danger to the integrity of that
process than the type of voter fraud the RNC is prevented from addressing by the Decree."); Jo
Becker, GOP Challenging Voter Registrations:Civil Rights GroupsAccuse Republicansof Trying to
Disenfranchise Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at A5 (introducing evidence that Republicans have "used tactics that were aimed at intimidating minority voters and suppressing their
votes.").
113.
See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note Il l ("There are several noteworthy characteristics of
these [vote caging] programs. They focus on minority precincts almost exclusively. There is often
only the flimsiest evidence that vote fraud is likely to be perpetrated in such precincts. In addition to
encouraging the presence of sometimes intimidating Republican poll watchers or challengers who
may slow down voting lines and embarrass potential voters by asking those humiliating questions,
these programs have sometimes posted people in official-looking uniforms with badges and side
arms who question voters about their citizenship or their registration. In addition, warning signs may
be posted near the polls, or radio ads may be targeted to minority listeners containing dire threats of
prison terms for people who are not properly registered-messages that seem designed to put minority voters on the defensive."). See generally Daniels,supra note 38.
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black vote down considerably.""l 4 Similarly, in 1981, "the Republican
National Committee sent letters to predominantly black neighborhoods in
New Jersey, and when 45,000 letters were returned as undeliverable, the
[RNC] compiled a challenge list to remove those voters from the
rolls."" 5 More recently, prior to the 2004 presidential election the Republican National Committee used vote caging methods to compile a list
of approximately 35,000 persons."' 6 The RNC gathered its voter challenge list of 35,000 persons "by sending letters to registered voters in
precincts with a high concentration of minorities, in this case inner-city
areas in Cleveland, and recording the names of those voters for whom
the letter was returned as undeliverable."" 7
In Spencer v. Blackwell,' "8 a recent voter challenge case, African
American voters sought and obtained a preliminary injunction against
Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell, seeking a court order prohibiting voter challenges inside the polling place.'" The plaintiffs alleged
that voter challenges would be used to discriminate against African
American voters in Hamilton County, Ohio.1 20 They asserted that the
Hamilton County Board of Elections and the Hamilton County Republican Party were working together to discriminate against African American voters on Election Day.121 The Hamilton County Republican Party
had petitioned to have hundreds of poll challengers present during the
2004 presidential election to challenge voter eligibility and prevent
fraud.122 Tim Burke, Chair of the Hamilton County Board of Elections,
testified that two-thirds of the poll challengers were designated for predominately African-American precincts.123 The court found that the Ohio
statutes governing voter challenges and the Secretary of State's guidance
114. See Edsall, supranote 34 (omissions in original).
115.
Becker, supra note 112. The Democratic National Committee and Republican National
Committee entered into a Consent Decree in 1982 in which the RNC agreed to:
[R]efrain from undertaking any ballot security activities in polling places or election districts where the racial or ethnic composition of such districts is a factor in the decision to
conduct, or the actual conduct of, such activities there and where a purpose or significant
effect of such activities is to deter qualified voters from voting; and the conduct of such
activities disproportionately in or directed toward districts that have a substantial proportion of racial or ethnic populations shall be considered relevant evidence of the existence
of such a factor and purpose.
Consent Order at 2(e), Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'1 Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575
(D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982) (No. 81-3876).
116.
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 582 (D.N.J.
2009).
117.
Id.
118.
347 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
Id. at 529. In Ohio, poll watchers must take an oath, be a resident of the state and a "quali119.
fied elector." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (LexisNexis 2010). See Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at
529-30.
120.
Id. at 529.
121.
Id.
122.
See id. at 530.
Id The court heard evidence that "14% of new voters in a majority white location will
123.
face a challenger. . ., but 97% of new voters in a majority African-American voting location will see
such a challenger." Id.
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imposed a severe burden on Ohio voters and was not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest. 124 The court opined that "questionable
enforceability of the State's and County's policies regarding good faith
challenges and ejection of disruptive challengers from the polls, there
exists an enormous risk of chaos, delay, intimidation, and pandemonium
inside the polls and in the lines out the door."l 25
In the 2010 midterm elections, reports of voter intimidation, voter
suppression and increased challenges were numerous. 26 The outcome of
these types of measures are a decrease in voter participation. The threat
of voter challenges and voter caging can deter eligible voters from going
to the polls.1 2 7 Additionally, the heightened scrutiny associated with
voter challenges also has a deterrent and intimidating effect.128
When election officials accept voter challenges that exhibit a pattern
of race, ethnic, or national origin discrimination, the practice could be
found volatile of the Equal Protection Clause and other statutes.129 Much
like discriminatory peremptory challenges in jury selection, 13 0 the current
voter challenge system has created a sort of peremptory voter challenges.
In this regard, voter challenges are similar to peremptory challenges used
in criminal and civil trials and should be considered peremptory voter
challenges because of their use to eliminate voters based solely on race
and the ability to utilize the challenges without proffering a basis for the
strike.

124. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
125. Id. at 535. The Court has repeatedly recognized that "as a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process." Id. at 534 (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)).
See, e.g., Krissah Thompson, Some Complaints Surface Amid Stepped-Up Efforts to
126.
Monitor Voting Fraud,WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2010 ("In Minnesota, where conservative groups had
run radio ads and offered $500 rewards to those willing to tum in anyone prosecuted for voter fraud,
a few poll watchers aggressively challenged voters until they were confronted by election protection
volunteers, lawyers monitoring the election reported."); see also Ian Urbina, Reports ofIntimidation
and Electronic Problems Surface at PollsAcross the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, ("'One of the
most worrisome things we're seeing is an uptick in voter intimidation and misinformation compared
to prior elections,' said Wendy Weiser, director of the voting rights and elections project at the
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University.")
127. Voter Registration and List Maintenance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of
the H. Administration Committee, I10th Cong. (2007) (statement of Joseph D. Rich, Director, Fair
Housing Project) ("Targeted at traditionally disenfranchised voters, this practice relies on voter
'challenge' laws to blindly question the ability of eligible voters to cast a ballot. While dressed in the
garb of protecting against the 'voter fraud,' caging is really a cynical way to undermine the most
fundamental right of all Americans - the right to participate freely in our democracy - for partisan
gain. It is especially pemicious because it has almost invariably been used to suppress the vote of
minority voters.").
128. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 590
(D.N.J. 2009) (discussing partisan intimidation tactics including those associated with voter challenges).
129. See generally id.
130. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986).
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In Batson v. Kentucky,' 3 ' the Supreme Court found that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude racial minorities from serving on a jury violated the Equal Protection Clause.' 3 2 In a subsequent
case, the Court focused its attention on whether the defendant, when exercising peremptory challenges, should be considered a state actor under
the Fourteenth Amendment.' 33 The court held that the defendant should
be considered a state actor because the defendant used the peremptory
challenge procedures with "the overt, significant assistance of state officials." 34 The dissenters in the case argued that the use of peremptory
challenges equaled private action because the decision to use the peremptory challenge is left to the defendant's discretion.'3
In many ways, voter challenges are similar to peremptory challenges due to the lack of an evidentiary standard before denying a fundamental right.136 Once the government allows private actors to make an
assertion regarding whether a citizen lives at a certain address or has a
"belief' that the person is otherwise ineligible, it has outsourced its
authority and granted the private actors governmental power.
III.

PRIVATE PARTISAN ACTIONS AS STATE ACTION

"The timing of the challenges is so transparentthat it defies common sense to believe the purpose is anything but politicalchicanery."1
In elections, private partisans participate to the extent that the law
allows, i.e., laws governing electioneering, private access to the polls,
and what voters can wear to the polls.' 3 8 States should become wary of
allowing voter challengers. In the exercise of race based or racially targeted voter challenges, where partisanship is used as a proxy for race,
courts have implied liability for both public and private entities.'39 Private partisan racially targeted voter challenges could leave public
authorities liable for their involvement in denying citizens the right to
vote.

131. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
132. Id. at 83-84.
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991).
133.
Id. at 622 (quoting Tulsa Prof'I Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988)).
134.
Id. at 631-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Burger and
135.
Justice Scalia dissented arguing that the challenge allows private parties to exclude potential jurors
and is left wholly within the discretion of the litigant, and considered it "an enclave of private action
in a government-managed proceeding." Id. at 632-34.
136. See supranotes 134-35.
Mont. Democratic Party v. Eaton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1081 (D. Mont. 2008).
137.
Kimberly J. Tucker, "You Can't Wear That to Vote ": The Constitutionalityof State Laws
138.
Prohibiting the Wearing of Political Message Buttons at Polling Places, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
61, 61-62 (2006) (arguing that the state statute that bans private partisans access to political buttons
at polling places is unconstitutional because it violates free speech).
139. See Mont. Democratic Party, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 1078. The Montana Democratic Party
sought a temporary restraining order to stop the Montana Republican Party from challenging 6,000
registered voters who were predominately young and registered Democrats. Id.
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The Supreme Court has applied the notion that a private actor performing a governmental function can be deemed a state action in the area
of election law-most notably in areas of race discrimination. In the first
of the white primary cases,140 the Supreme Court found that a Texas statute that excluded blacks from participating in the state primary that was
run by the state Democratic Party constituted a state action in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.14 1 In the landmark case Smith v. Allwright,142 the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he [political] party takes the
character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are
performed by a political party." 4 3
A. Nexus between the State and the PrivateAction
The state's ceding of authority to private parties in the area of voter
eligibility places governmental power in the private partisan and strips
the challenged voter of her rights and the expectation of participating in
the electoral practice free from discrimination. In determining whether
state action has occurred, the Supreme Court looks at two distinct issues:
whether "the deprivation . . . [was] caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
state or by a person for whom the State is responsible," and whether "the
party charged with the deprivation . . . [is] a person who may fairly be

said to be a state actor."l 44
Under this test, the function of voter challenges can be deemed state
action: It is the state statutes that provide for voter challenges, and, the
action itself is derived from an inherently public-private relationship. In
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,1 45 the Court found that "[a]lthough
private use of state-sanctioned private remedies or procedures does not
rise, by itself, to the level of state action, our cases have found state action when private parties make extensive use of state procedures with
'the overt, significant assistance of state officials."'l 46 In Tiryak, a § 1983
case involving voter challenges, the court found that "[nlo activity is
more indelibly a public function than the holding of a political elec-

140.
See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 467-70 (1953) (holding that excluding blacks from
"pre-primary elections" constituted unconstitutional state action under the Civil War Amendments);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944) (the Court found that "delegation to a party of the
power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make
the party's action the action of the state"); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927) (striking
down the Texas statute that denied blacks an opportunity to participate in a state primary).
141.
Nixon, 273 U.S. at 540-41.
142. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
143. Id. at 663.
144. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
145. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
146. Id. at 622 (citation omitted).
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tion . .. cases make it clear that the conduct of the elections themselves is
an [e]xclusively public function." 4 7
The crucial question is whether enough governmental involvement
exists to convert private discrimination into state action. The Supreme
Court has held that an activity constitutes state action when the State
exercised "coercive power"t48 or when a private actor operates as a "willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." 49 Once the
government allows private actors to make an assertion regarding whether
a citizen lives in a certain address or "believes" that the person is otherwise ineligible, it has outsourced its authority and granted the private
actors governmental power. It is the government's responsibility to determine whether a voter is eligible to vote, not a private party's.
Notwithstanding the use of peremptory electoral challenges, the
state action doctrine should serve as a deterrent to those who wish to use
public power in a discriminatory manner. 50 The Supreme Court has
found that even peripheral involvement could equate to an Equal Protection violation.' 5 ' The state's bestowal of authority, here, allows persons
other than the state to determine the eligibility of voters. In the landmark
case Smith v. Allwright, the Supreme Court found that "the [political]
party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it
by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because
they are performed by a political party." 52 More contemporaneously, in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n,153

the Court found state action where the private actor received its power
from the state. 154 Here, it is the state that allows private actors to serve as
voter challengers and challenge voters-thus, granting power to the private actors.

147.

Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted).
148.
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
149.
150. The Supreme Court has held that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate." Harper v.
Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (outlawing the poll tax).
151.
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966) ("This is not to say, however, that
the involvement of the State need be either exclusive or direct. In a variety of situations the Court
has found state action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause even
though the participation of the State was peripheral, or its action was only one of several cooperative forces leading to the constitutional violation.").
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944).
152.
531 U.S. 288 (2001).
153.
154. Id. at 290-91, 296 ("We have treated a nominally private entity as a state actor when it is
controlled by an 'agency of the State,' when it has been delegated a public function by the State,
when it is 'entwined with governmental policies,' or when government is 'entwined in [its] management or control."') (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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In cases where the court has not found state action, it acknowledged
the difficulty in making the designation. 5 5 The courts have neglected to
find a state action violation primarily in the area of inner affairs of political parties.1 56 The Supreme Court and lower courts have found that the
political party's decision on the seating and selection of delegates does
not constitute state action.157 Here the discrepancy does not lie between
the political party and its internal rules governing delegate selection or
primary dates, but the party's manipulation of state laws to discriminate
against voters on the basis of race. The use of the state statute to provide
access to the voters and to allow the parties to challenge voters based on
a list that was developed on a discriminatory premise, and the State's
approval of the individual challenges such that voters eligibility is questioned and in some cases disallowed, clearly places the political party in
the position of acting on behalf of the State and its actions can be attributed to the State.
B. PrivatePartisansPerforming Governmental Functions
The Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that the act of regulating voting is a governmental responsibility.' 8 The Federal Constitution grants the authority to administer elections to the federal and state
government, which convenes the responsibility to register, monitor, and
count ballots pursuant to the rules, regulations and statutes those governmental entities prescribe.' 59 Clearly, administering the vote and access
to the voting process is an exclusive governmental function.
Determining whether a particular voter is eligible, therefore, is
likewise a governmental duty. The use of voter challenges outsources
155. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) ("What is 'private' action and what
is 'state' action is not always easy to determine. Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so
entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.") (citation omitted); see also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 571-74 (1974) (failing to find state action because the
record was not conclusive on whether the nonexclusive use of recreational facilities by all-white
private schools, private school-affiliated groups, and all-white non-school organizations was enough
state action to warrant judicial intervention on constitutional grounds).
156. See Max v. Republican Comm. of Lancaster Cnty., 587 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2009)
(holding that a political party's involvement in a primary election did not constitute state action but
instead constituted internal party affairs which are not subject to § 1983 enforcement).
157. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (holding that the First Amendment protects
a national political party's delegate selection rules); Bachur v. Democratic Nat'l Party, 836 F.2d 837,
843 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that a challenge to the gender allocation rule was not permitted for
delegate selection); Ripon Soc'y., Inc. v. Nat'l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause was not violated when a national party did not make presidential nominations based on a defined constituency of one person-one vote).
158. United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 283, 285-86 (W.D. La. 1963) (holding that
the "manner of holding elections" has been understood as covering the entire election process, from
voter registration to the counting ofballots); see also Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (finding
Congress's Elections Clause authority "well settled . . . to override state regulations" involving
federal election administration matters); ExparteCoy, 127 U.S. 731, 755 (1888).
159. The Supreme Court described the state's abdication of responsibility as an "evil." Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 477 (1953).
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this responsibility to private actors. The voter challenger's use of discriminatory means to develop the list of voters to oppose promotes race
discrimination and can make the state responsible for the private party's
actions; thus, the private partisans are involved in a governmental function.
C. Scrutinizing Voter Challengers: Addressing the Vote FraudClaim
While this Article fervently argues that the use of racially targeted
voter challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause, it also recognizes
that the level of scrutiny applied and the case-by-case analysis that the
courts employ will determine whether a violation has occurred.160 A governmental or private agency would argue that it narrowly tailored its
voter challenge statutes and had a compelling state interest in allowing
voter challengers in the polling place and that state and federal authorities would require adherence to the law. 16 1Moreover, it would assert that
the private party's actions did not constitute state action under the Equal
Protection Clause. In this instance, even under the most forgiving standard, it is difficult to ascertain how the state could meet its burden.162
Additionally, proponents of voter challenges will argue that the
challenges serve as a voter integrity measure that helps prevent fraud. 6 3
160.
In Nat 7 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 179-81, 195 (1988), a state
university imposed disciplinary sanctions against its basketball coach in compliance with National
Collegiate Athletic Association rules and recommendations. The Court found that this action did not
turn Association's otherwise private conduct into "state action," and thus Association could not be
held liable for violation of coach's civil rights. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 526-27, 547 (1987), the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and
the International Olympic Committee brought suit under the Amateur Sports Act against a California
corporation and various individuals to restrain their use of the term "Olympics" to describe an athletic competition they sponsored. The Court said that the USOC was not a government actor.
161.
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992). "The Court also has recognized that a
State 'indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process."' Id.
(quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)). "The
Court has thus 'upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and
reliability of the electoral process itself."' Burson, 504 U.S. at 199 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). "In other words, it has recognized that a State has a compelling
interest in ensuring that an individual's right to vote is not undermined by fraud in the election process." Id. The Court further held that "[t]o survive strict scrutiny, however, a State must do more than
assert a compelling state interest-it must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted
interest." Id.
162. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (holding that during a challenge to a
state election law a court "must weigh 'the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate' against
'the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,'
taking into consideration 'the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights."').
163.
While voter fraud once was a distinct problem in this country, it has certainly become less
of a threat to democracy. See KEYSSAR supra note 99, at 123. As early as 1934, noted election
administration expert Joseph Harris found that voter fraud was disappearing and "[h]onest elections
have become the established rule in most sections of the country." See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 317 (1934). In one instance, the Court held that voter
fraud in Indiana has never been a problem. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S.
181, 194 (2008).
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To these arguments, courts have already spoken. For example, in Democratic Nat'1 Committee v. Republican Nat'1 Committee,'6 the court
found that the effect of the alleged incidents of fraud "pale[d] in comparison to the damage that would likely result from allowing the types of
ballot security initiatives that are currently prohibited by the Consent
Decree."' 6 5
The strongest response to such arguments is that although permitting statutory voter challenges helps prevent voter fraud, the elimination
of this ill is not the responsibility of private actors or partisan organizations. Instead, it is the government's sole responsibility to prescribe the
manner of elections and to protect the process. Moreover, in the recent
Supreme Court case Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Board,166 the
Court noted that the State of Indiana had not encountered any documented reports of voter fraud.16 7 In fact, once implemented, the voter ID
law that had the stated compelling reason of preventing fraud-much
like the voter challenges-was more effective at eliminating eligible
voters. Likewise, as other litigation has brought to light, so-called ballot
security measures tend to interfere with the balloting process and do not
promote voter participation and confidence.' 6 8
The precision that is used to eliminate, frustrate and intimidate eligible voters and, in most cases minority voters, should serve as a credible
reason to consider curtailing, if not eliminating, the position of voter
challengers. Or, at a minimum, to alter their authority and presence in the
polling site. Their presence clutters the polling site, and distracts poll
workers and election officials from the process of allowing citizens to
vote by requiring that they comply with verification procedures that are
based on a flawed discriminatory premise. Additionally, the means that
private partisans have utilized to arguably prevent fraud is tainted with
racial targeting and discrimination.

164.
671 F. Supp.2d 575 (D.N.J. 2009).
165.
Id. at 610 ("Even if the Court were to assume that all 300 of the alleged incidents of fraud
involved in-person misconduct at the polls, the effects of such fraud pales in comparison to the
damage that would likely result from allowing the types of ballot security initiatives that are currently prohibited . . . . [Another] matter involved a voter challenge list that included 35,000 predominantly-minority individuals. If only one tenth of those individuals were deterred from voting by
harassment at the polls, the effect would have been the disenfranchisement of 3,500 individuals-a
number far greater than the 300 alleged incidents of voter fraud which the [Republican National
Committee] points to in support of its claim.").
166. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
167. Id. at 194.
168. Democratic Nat' Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 610 ("The effects of ballot security initiatives ... pose a far greater threat to the integrity of modem elections than in-person voter fraud. In
fact, even a cursory investigation of the prevalence of voter intimidation demonstrates that ballot
security initiatives have the potential to unfairly skew election results by disenfranchising qualified
voters in far greater numbers of than [sic] the instances of in-person fraud that may occur during any
given race.").
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While the Supreme Court has found the State's interest in preventing voter fraud to be a constitutionally acceptable goal,169 the levels of
voter fraud- are miniscule when compared to the imposition placed on
voters to succumb to private inquisition.170 When you compare the level
of voter fraud, vote caging, and baseless voter challenges the voter is the
victim.' 7' The government's interest is to provide a fair and free process
for citizens to access the ballot. It has become clear, however, that the
goal of some private entities is to stop as many votes as possible under
the guise of voter fraud prevention, ballot security or voter integrity.
IV. STATE ACTION SOLUTIONS
"As against the unfettered right, however, lies the [c]ommon sense,
as well as constitutional law . . . that government must play an active

role in structuringelections; as a practicalmatter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if
some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes.

-1i72

In Crawford, Justice Souter recognized that voting legislation has
"two competing interests," the fundamental right to vote and the need for
governmental structure in elections. in In a democracy, political participation serves as a fundamental component of its legitimacy. 174 Partisan
voter challenges do not further these laudable principles. This allowance,
however, is often used to "game" the system. Ballot security initiatives
often use party as a proxy for race.' 75 The presumption against the voter

See, e.g., Crawford,553 U.S. at 196 (stating that there is "no question" that prevention of
169.
voter fraud constitutes a legitimate and important state interest).
170.
See David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental:The Myth of Voter Fraudand the Coming of
the Second Great Disenfranchisement,34 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 483, 486 (2008) ("[V]oter fraud
is used as a pretext for a broader agenda to disenfranchise Americans and rig elections.").
171.
In a 1986 election, the RNC used vote caging to compile a list of voters, mostly black, that
it attempted to have removed from the voter rolls. At the time, Kris Wolfe, the Republican National
Committee Midwest political director, wrote Lanny Griffith, the committee's Southern political
director, "I know this is really important to you. I would guess this program would eliminate at least
60-80,000 folks from the rolls .. . If it's a close race ... which I'm assuming it is ... this could keep
the black vote down considerably." See Martin Tolchin, The Political Campaign:Committees Prepare Negative Attacks in House Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1988, at B19 (discussing similar
tactics in a 1984 election); TERESA JAMES, CAGING DEMOCRACY: A 50 YEAR HISTORY OF
PARTISAN

CHALLENGES

TO

MINORITY

VOTERS

12

(2007),

available

at

http://www.projectvote.org/images/publications/Voter/ 20Caging/Caging
DemocracyReport.pdf (discussing the vote caging activities of the 1986 Louisiana election). Following this caging scandal, both parties agreed to amend the original 1982 consent decree to require
that the RNC would submit to the court any future ballot security plan for approval.
172. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 210.
174. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike
at the heart of representative govemment.").
175.
In his expert testimony in Democratic National Committee, Professor Chandler Davidson
opined:
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creates a barrier to participation. 6 Accordingly, voter challenges should
be abolished, or at a minimum, altered to a more uniform and silent
mechanism in the polling place.
In many instances, voter challenges are used for partisan gain, not
election integrity or ballot security, and derive from race based caging
schemes.17 7 In all these situations, the law should provide some protections to ensure that only those ineligible are burdened with the responsibility of proving or disproving private allegations. In current practices,
the presumption of eligibility has been removed from the voter and
placed squarely in the hands of the private actor.178 The following measures would provide a presumption of legitimacy to the voter and require
the state to determine eligibility, not the private actors. Moreover, private
actors would be more consistent with federal observers in their duties
and Election Day characteristics, i.e., they would be allowed to enter and
remain in the polls but not interject in the voting process.179
A. EliminatingVoter Challenges
The voter challenge process in its present form allows private parties the opportunity to disrupt the electoral process for partisan gain.'so
Because states, in large part, determine who has access to the polls, it
would take a major effort to legislate the voter challenger's presence out
of the voting precinct. However, the disruption that is caused and the
discriminatory basis for the challenges-whether race, national origin or
[T]he reason such programs are usually carried out by Republicans rather than Democrats
may simply be a matter of statistics: minority voters-who are far more likely to be
added to a challenge list because of irregularities in registration attributable to language
barriers, lack of photo identification cards ("ID"), or changes of address-have historically tended to vote for Democratic candidates.
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 590 (D.N.J. 2009).
176. See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71-79, 123 (2009)
(arguing for expanding the use of the "Democracy Canon," which generally construes election
statutes in the voter's favor).
177. See JAMES, supra note 171, at 5-6.
See Benson, supra note 62, at 271 (arguing for uniform election administration measures
178.
on basis that "the presumption that the voter is sovereign on Election Day, and that every policy and
practice implemented on that day must consider the voter and his or her experience as paramount").
179. See infra Part IV.B-C.
In Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1301-03 (2004), the State of Ohio allowed challeng180.
ers to be stationed in polls. The Hamilton County Republican Party requested to have additional
challengers beyond the typical filed list of precinct challengers present at polling places, assigned to
predominantly African American precincts. Id. at 1301. The district court overruled the State's
decision to allow the use of challengers on Election Day because it could create an extraordinary risk
of intimidation and delay. Id. at 1301-02. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision and the
Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at 1302-03. Justice Stevens reviewed the case without referring the
3
matter to the full Supreme Court. Id. at 130 . He noted in his brief opinion that although "the threat
of voter intimidation is not new to our electoral system," there was simply no evidence that votertargeted fraud would occur if challengers were permitted in the polling place. Id. at 1302. Emphasizing his "faith" that voter-targeted deception and intimidation would not occur and that "the elected
officials and numerous election volunteers on the ground will carry out their responsibilities in a way
that will enable qualified voters to cast their ballots," Justice Stevens upheld the Sixth Circuit's
decision to allow challengers in the polling place. Id. at 1302-03.
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language ability-as a proxy for party must be recognized and dealt with
in either litigation, via the Fourteenth Amendment, or a legislative manner, via state statute. Some scholars would argue that the presence of
voter challengers assist the electoral process as a deterrence factor. Such
an argument, however, has little basis in fact,'81 and pales in comparison
to the mammoth accounts of disruption and chaos. 1 82
As discussed, partisans use voter challenges like illegal peremptory
challenges. Armed with nothing more than an address, partisans make
presumptions based on race, primarily that the voter will not vote for
them thus they issue a challenge to frustrate the voter and the democratic
process. Challenges make lines longer and cause substantial confusion.
They can also intimidate voters and disrupt polling place procedures.183
The primary detraction for voter challenges is that the practice casts dispersions on a wide swath of voters. The government could not disqualify
a voter because of returned mail, yet, private partisans are given the ability to infringe upon a fundamental right.
While it is tempting to suggest that states eliminate the position of
voter challengers in the polls to avoid the instances of partisan manipulation at the expense of the voter's fundamental right, a more balanced
approach is warranted. The state rationale for massive voter challenges is
to deter voter fraud. However, the basis for this assertion rests upon race
discrimination.1 84 The partisan is not seeking to eliminate voter fraud, but
to eliminate voters whom it believes are predisposed to vote against its
candidate and/or its ideals.
Granting the challenger the authority to question a voter's eligibility
and requiring the voter to rebut the assertions of nongovernmental entities shifts the power from the voter to the partisan. This shifting is burdensome to the voter and requires the state to weigh the evidence and
make a decision against the voter. The eligibility is questioned based on
the challenge. If the voter cannot address the nature of the challenge, the
State will, in some instances, not allow the citizen to vote or require them

181.
See supra PartI11.B-C.
See Summit Cnty. Democratic Cent. & Exec. Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547, 554 (6th
182.
Cir. 2004) ("The burden on the right to vote is evident. In this case, we anticipate the arrival of
hundreds of Republican lawyers to challenge voter registrations at the polls. Behind them will be
hundreds of Democrat lawyers to challenge these Challengers' challenges. This is a recipe for confusion and chaos.").
See Schultz, supra note 170, at 485 ("A second great disenfranchisement is afoot across
183.
the United States as, yet again, voter fraud is raised as a way to intimidate immigrants, people of
color, the poor, and the powerless, and prevent them from voting."); see also Sherry A. Swirsky,
Minority Voter Intimidation: The Problem That Won't Go Away, II TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L.
REv. 359, 361-65 (2002) (arguing that voter intimidation is a common campaign tactic and providing examples of "ballot security measures" and other measures used to deceive and intimidate).
184.
See supra Part 11.

2010]

OUTSOURCING DEMOCRACY

265

to vote a provisional ballot.' 85 The shifting of power and the presumption
that the voter is in fact ineligible unduly burdens the voter.
As held in Tiryak, elections are public functions.186 Allowing private parties to begin a process that could lead to racial targeting and racial discrimination manipulates a state's authority to stage elections.
When this occurs, the private partisans "are abusing the process the State
... has provided to ensure the accuracy of voter rolls (indeed, they are
using the process designed to protect the integrity of the political process
to undermine it)." 187
If the poll worker allows the voter challenge to question a voter's
eligibility in a racially targeted manner, that worker could subject himself to liability for allowing racially based discrimination.' 88 In Tiryak,
the court recognized the duality of poll watchers and the potential for
state liability. The court opined that:
The poll-watcher performs a dual function on Election Day. On the
one hand, because he is designated and paid by a political party, his
job is to guard the interests of that party's candidates. On the other
hand, because exercise of his authority promotes an honest election,
the poll-watcher's function is to guard the integrity of the vote. Protecting the purity of the electoral process is a state responsibility and
the poll-watcher's statutory role in providing that protection involves
him in a public activity, regardless of his private political motive.1

Additionally, an unfortunate consequence of the voter challenges has been the misuse of
185.
provisional ballots, which are mandated in the Help America Vote Act to ensure that eligible citizens
are not turned away from the polls. See 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2006). The administration of provisional
ballots has been called into question for the myriad of ways that election administrators determine
whether to issue and count the ballot. In 2004, nearly 1.9 million provisional ballots were cast and
1.2 million were counted, which left more than half a million people disenfranchised. U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE 2004 ELECTION DAY SURVEY, 6-5 (2005). Moreover,

implementing the provisional ballot requirement left poll workers confused and many ballots unaccounted for, creating even more disparities. See PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY ET AL., SHATTERING THE
MYTH: AN INITIAL SNAPSHOT OF VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE 2004 ELECTIONS, 8 (2004),

available at http://www.866ourvote.org/tools/publicationstestimony/files/0002.pdf ("There was
widespread confusion over the proper use of provisional ballots, and widely differing regulations
from state to state-even from one polling place to the next-as to the use and ultimate recording of
these ballots."); see also R. Bradley Griffin, Note, Gambling with Democracy: The Help America
Vote Act and the Failureof the States to Administer FederalElections, 82 WASH. U. L. REV. 509,
525-28 (2004) (arguing that HAVA provides states too much control over federal election procedures); Tokaji, supra note 9, at 129-33 (assessing the 2004 election and the failure of election reform to remedy election administration problems).
186. Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("Protecting the purity of the
electoral process is a state responsibility and the poll-watcher's statutory role in providing that
protection involves him in a public activity, regardless of his private political motive.").
Mont. Democratic Party v. Eaton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (D. Mont. 2008) (discuss187.
ing the Montana Democratic Party's pursuit of a temporary restraining order to stop the Montana
Republican Party from challenging 6,000 registered voters who were predominately young and
registered Democrats).
See supra Part II.
188.
Tiryak, 472 F. Supp at 824.
189.
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In many instances, it is not the voter's ineligibility that is determined but his inability to produce supporting documents at the polling
place that are not required. For example, a poll worker, in response to a
voter challenge, could require a challenged voter to present valid photo
identification. If the voter is unable to present the requested identification, his inability to do so does not prove that a citizen was attempting to
commit fraud, but that he came to the polling place unprepared and for
this, his right to vote in this election has been negated. In many instances,
challenged voters receive a provisional ballot. The provisional ballots,
however, are not counted unless the voter returns to a central registrar's
office within a prescribed period of time to provide additional documentation to verify his identity. Without this additional step, the provisional
ballot is not counted. In this situation, the voter challenge merely caused
a frustrating delay at the polls and possibly the disenfranchisement of the
voter if she does not ultimately provide the necessary documentation.
Accordingly, the private partisan has effectively denied, with the state's
endorsement and assistance, an eligible voter the opportunity to vote.
B. Need for Uniform Guidelines

The federal government does not administer elections. It can, as
discussed infra, regulate elections through the passage of legislation. In
fact, Congress has passed legislation to curb discriminatory practices in
elections. Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,'90 the federal government is tasked to ensure that the method of electing federal offices is not
tainted with race, ethnic, national origin or language minority discrimination. 19 1 Other statutes, such as the National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA)192 and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 193 address the actual administration of elections, inter alia, providing funds for new voting machines, requiring the development of voter databases, and increas190.
See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, & Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973). The Voting Rights Act's most prominent temporary provisions
include Sections five and 203, which govern which jurisdictions must report all voting changes to
the Attorney General and designates those jurisdictions required to provide election materials in
certain minority languages. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (Section 5); id. § 1973aa-la (Section 203).
191.
See discussion supra Parts IA, II, Ill.A, IV.A (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment and
Equal Protection Clause).
192.
In enacting NVRA, Congress sought to increase voter registration and participation. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973gg(b)(l)-(2) (2006). The NVRA requires states to register voters for federal elections
through mail registration and when citizens apply for a driver's license or seek services from certain
state agencies that receive federal funds, such as public assistance offices providing welfare and
Medicaid, veteran's affairs offices, and libraries. Id. §§ 1973gg-2, 1973gg-5. See supra notes 73-74
and accompanying text.
193.
In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act to provide funding to replace outdated voting machines and created the Election Assistance Commission to serve as a "clearinghouse" for election administration matters. Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No.
107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545). For a detailed description of HAVA's legislative history, see Leonard Shambon & Keith Abouchar, Trapped by Precincts? The Help America Vote Act's Provisional Ballots and the Problem of Precincts, 10 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 133, 160-65 (2006).
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ing voter registration opportunities. Although both the NVRA and the
HAVA are federal creations, the legislation was left almost exclusively
to the states to implement.1 94 In order to thwart the racially discniminatory practice of racially targeted voter challenges, federal agencies, such
as the Election Assistance Commission should issue a Best Practices
guide for states and encourage the use of uniform guidelines.' 95 Congress
could pass these guidelines, however, the lack of funding and the political response may seem too costly to implement. States should provide
clear guidelines on the grounds for issuing challenges and limit those
grounds to those that a challenger would have personal knowledge ofsuch as voting more than once, similar to the Vermont challenge statute.
States should not allow challenges based on residence, age or
other voter qualification. It is the state that is in the best position to determine voter eligibility on these grounds. While state legislators provide
the opportunity for partisans to challenge voters, it is the voter's fundamental right to participate in the electoral process. State laws should not
allow challengers to jeopardize that right based on vote caging or intimidation schemes built to favor partisan outcomes instead of full participation in the electoral process or on other administrative grounds, such as a
valid registration.
Likewise, because local election workers are primarily responsible
for implementing federal and state election laws, it is crucial that poll
workers receive proper and comprehensive training.'97 The federal government has made an effort to provide states with best practices recommendations for poll worker recruitment and training. Many nonprofit or194.
Some states, like Tennessee, performed well, albeit only after federal intervention. See
United States v. Tennessee, No. 3-02-0938 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
voting/nvra/tn cd.pdf(consent decree); see also Jason Marisam, Voter Turnout: From Cost to Cooperation, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 190, 202-04 (2009) (criticizing the NVRA for not dramatically
improving voter turnout).
The EAC issued a Best Practices Guide for Poll Worker Training, but has not issued
195.
guidelines on poll watchers or voter challenges. EAC guidelines, however, are not met with the
honor and reverence regularly afforded a federal government agency because of its lack of enforcement power. See Heather K. Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1608 (2009)
(criticizing the EAC's attempts to suggest Best Practices); Hasen, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that the
EAC "has so far proven ineffective and now appears in danger of becoming a new site for partisan
stalemate over election reform."); Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3
ELECTION L.J. 424, 428 (2004) ("The EAC was designed to have as little regulatory power as possible. . . . [A]nd for the most part it cannot 'issue any rule, promulgate any regulation, or take any
) (quoting
other action' imposing a requirement on any state or unit of local govemment.
HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 209, 116 Stat. 1666, 1678 (2002)).
196. Karlan, supra note 9, at 19-24, 25-29 (arguing that the Bush administration treated vote
fraud as a much larger problem than political exclusion). Karlan argues that "we need legislation that
recognizes an official obligation to make sure all citizens who are eligible to vote are placed on the
voting rolls and that elections run smoothly and accurately." Id. at 29. Also, Karlan believes "it is
critical [in the area of election law] to make sure the rules are clear and clearly established before the
election begins." Id. The Bush administration also politicized the Civil Rights Division (and the
voting rights section in particular), and Karlan believes this department needs to be remade. Id. at
28-29.
197.
Many states call those persons who administer elections on Election Day at the polling
sites across the country election judges or poll workers.
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ganizations also seek to assist county and state governments with poll
worker training. Proper poll worker training can serve as the difference
between a smooth election and a troubled one. It is difficult to overstate
the importance of proper poll worker training and knowledge regarding
how the machines operate, what items are needed to operate the machines, what question are appropriately asked, who can assist the voter,
and how to avoid racial or ethnic discrimination during the exercise of the
political process.'98
C. From Poll Watchers to Silent Observers
On Election Day, certain jurisdictions are required either under the
Voting Rights Act or a court order to allow federal observers inside the
polling place to observe and document the election process.199 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 instituted the advent of the federal observer,
whose primary responsibility is to monitor the electoral process. 200 Federal observers are prohibited from interfering in the voting process or
198.
See United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 0073541 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2004) ,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec-2/hamtramck cd04.pdf (second amended consent order and
decree requiring that the City appoint bilingual translators to protect against voter discrimination
targeting Arab-Americans); United States v. Berks Cnty., 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575, 583 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (preventing race-based voter discrimination by ordering that, inter alia, all election-related
materials to be printed in English and Spanish).
199.
Various provisions in the Voting Rights Act authorize the Attorney General or a court to
order or appoint federal observers. 42 U.S.C. §I973a (2006). For example, subsection (a) provides:
Whenever the Attorney General or an aggrieved person institutes a proceeding under any
statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment in any
State or political subdivision the court shall authorize the appointment of Federal observers by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management in accordance with section
I 973d of this title to serve for such period of time for such political subdivisions as the
court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or
fifteenth amendment ....
Id. The Attorney General may also assign Federal observers to a jurisdiction certified under 42
U.S.C. §1973f. The Attorney General has certified approximately 148 jurisdictions in Alabama,
Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina and Texas.
About Federal Observers and Election Monitoring, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS

DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/examine/activ exam.php (last updated Sept. 7, 2010).
When determining where to send federal observers, the Attorney General assesses the following
information:
* Any incidents of discrimination or interference with the right to vote in connection
with upcoming or recent elections;
* Any complaints to local or state officials about the incidents and what, if anything,
was done in response;
* Names and contact information for victims of discrimination or other violations of
federal voting rights law;
* Names and contact information for any persons who have first-hand knowledge of
the incidents;
* Names and contact information, if possible, for persons alleged to have engaged in
discrimination or other violations of federal voting rights law;
* Locations where incidents have occurred.
See id. Thirteen jurisdictions in nine states have been ordered to allow federal observers to monitor
elections. Id.
200. See §1973f(d)(l)-(2) (charging Federal observers with the duties of attending places
where elections are being held or votes are being tabulated to "observe[] whether persons entitled to
vote are being permitted to vote," and "whether votes cast votes cast by persons entitled to vote are
being properly tabulated").
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attempting to correct what may seem to constitute voting irregularities or
illegalities. A federal observer documents what she observes from the
beginning of the Election Day to the counting of the ballots.201 Federal
observers are merely eye witnesses, and are not allowed to interfere with
the voting process. Unlike voter challenges they do not interfere with the
voting process. They do not speak to nor direct poll workers or voters. At
the end of the Election Day, federal observers draft a report that can be
used, if need be, in any litigation if it is found that systematic discrimination in the operation of the polling place occurred. Likewise, voter challengers could serve as eyewitnesses and document what they observe
throughout the Election Day experience. Federal observers help thwart
potential voter intimidation. Their presence promotes the exercise of
voter integrity and the elimination of voter fraud.
Instead of the voter losing her ability to vote or having that right
called into question, if the voter challenger has credible documentation
of voting irregularities, especially voter fraud, the voter challenger's
Election Day report can serve as evidence in the litigation proceeding.
Instead of forcing the voter to possibly lose her right to vote, the voter
challenger preserves the right to challenge the election in future litigation. In this way, the presumption of eligibility is restored to the voter.
More so, the burden to prove voter fraud or other irregularity is squarely
placed on the partisan but does not disrupt the voting process nor strip
the citizen's right to vote.202
This Article is not advocating that state governments treat voter
challengers as government federal observers. Voter challenger statutes
should include a crucial and vital characteristic that federal observers
203
have, which is that they are neutral and impartial. Just as the history of
partisan involvement has caused the scaling back of partisan involvement
in the election process, so here, an adjustment is needed to ensure the
impartiality of the electoral system. When private partisan concerns are
paramount to individual voters the process is skewed towards the partisan and questions the integrity of the system.
See James Thomas Tucker, The Power of Observation: The Role of FederalObservers
201.
Under The Voting Rights Act, 13 MiCi. J. RACE & L. 227, 248 (2007) ("Federal observers are able
to monitor [and document] every aspect of an election, from the time the voter enters the polling
place to the moment that he or she casts her ballot, and even thereafter when the ballots are tabulated.").
202. See Steve Barber et al., Comment, The Purging of Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws and
the Voting Rights Act, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 483, 483-84 (1988), for a discussion of the
burdens on mistakenly purged voters. The authors assert that the voter purge laws place the burden
of reregistering on the purged voters, which may "thwart political participation and place a disproportionate burden on minority voters." Id. at 483. The history of mechanisms such as voter purge
laws have created the disillusionment of minority voters and has resulted in low political participation from such groups. Id. at 483-84.
Federal observers are Office of Personnel Management employees. They are nonpartisan
203.
and merely observe the election process without comment or interruption. Tucker, supra note 208, at
230, 241,254.
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CONCLUSION

While our democratic form of government thrives on political participation, the level of authority that government has given to private
partisan organizations through the use of voter challenges may well
threaten the heart and integrity of the democratic process. If private individuals are allowed to determine who is allowed to vote and in what
manner, the damage to the integrity of the electoral process is deeply
wounded, particularly when those challenges are based solely on geographical designation, physical hue or language ability. In actuality, these
measures determined the eligibility of the voter and in many cases, prevent them from casting a ballot. A strong public-private alliance allows
organizations, groups and individuals to express their collective political
opinion. It is the ability, however, to silence those voices through the
lack of confidence 204 in the system and particularly allowing partisans to
determine voter eligibility that harms the system.
The State, which is given the authority to prescribe the requirements
for voting, has surrendered that authority to private and often partisan
individuals. More poll watchers, more litigation or stringent statutes are
not the only answer to this perplexing problem. The solution lies in our
willingness to prescribe measures that presume the validity and eligibility of voters and scale back the Jim Crow era disenfranchising methods
that are becoming prevalent in this new millennium.

204. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575, 611
(D.N.J. 2009).

MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS: UPHOLDING THE
GOALS AND GUARANTEES OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal
defendants the right to confront witnesses who bring testimony against
them.' The Clause is generally interpreted to afford criminal defendants
the right to cross-examine adversarial witnesses live in court, under oath,
and in the presence of the trier of fact. 2 Historically, accusatory testimony by absent witnesses was admissible in some situations, though
with the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, the right to have an accuser
present at a criminal trial became virtually absolute.3 Nevertheless, as
advances in technology ushered in new kinds of evidence, courts often
disagreed about which of these novel categories were subject to the
Clause.4
The admissibility of scientific evidence has certainly been no exception to this ongoing debate. 5 One issue stemming from this uncertaintywhether scientific evidence in the form of affidavits containing test results is admissible in court absent live testimony 6was answered by the
United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.7 Concluding such affidavits constitute testimonial evidence, 8 Melendez-Diaz
rightly subjected scientific analysts to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment. 9
Part I of this Comment gives a brief description of the history and
case law behind the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history, and opinions in
Melendez-Diaz. Part III commends the Melendez-Diaz Court for upholding the purposes, guarantees, and historical intentions behind the Con1. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2. Maryland v. Craig,497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990).
3. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50 (2004) (discussing the history
of the Confrontation Clause).
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009) (commenting on
4.
conflicting state laws exempting scientific affidavits from confrontation).
5. See Lisa Gonzalez, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The History and Demise of
Frye v. United States, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1993) (noting that "rapid developments in
scientific knowledge" have forced courts to readdress the admissibility of scientific evidence).
6. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530 (presenting this question).
7. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
8. Id. at 2530.
9. See id. at 2532 (holding certificates of analysis subject to the Confrontation Clause).
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frontation Clause. This Comment concludes by noting that the practical
implications of Melendez-Diaz are aligned with the overall goals of the
Confrontation Clause.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment sets forth the constitutional rights afforded to
defendants in "all criminal prosecutions."10 The Confrontation Clausemade applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment"provides that all criminal defendants have the right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against" them.12 As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
the Clause ensures that criminal defendants retain the right to be confronted face-to-face with sworn-in witnesses, in the presence of the trier
of fact, by reserving the right to cross-examine witnesses that testify
against them.' Designed to ensure the reliability of evidence,14 the
Clause acts as a safeguard for the basic rights guaranteed to all criminal
defendants.' 5
Prior to 2004, out-of-court accusatory statements 6 were admissible
in criminal trials if they bore an adequate indicia of reliability.17 Today,
however, the Confrontation Clause requires that a criminal defendant
have the opportunity to cross-examine an accusatory witness who is unavailable for trial in order for his or her statements to be admissible.' 8

10. U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.").
I1. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that the Confrontation Clause applies
to both state and federal governments through the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 158 (1970)).
14. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,61 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
15.
See id. at 42 (majority opinion) (identifying the Confrontation Clause as a "bedrock procedural guarantee" and noting its importance).
16. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 58-61, 77 (1980) (holding a transcript of a witness's
preliminary examination testimony constitutionally admissible evidence), abrogatedby Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
17. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. "Indicia of reliability" can be defined as those factors or circumstances that allow a jury to hear an out-of-court statement, despite a lack of confrontation of the
declarant. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (finding an indicia of reliability in a
statement that contained "no express assertion about past fact," contained a high level of personal
knowledge, was not likely to be based on poor memory, and was made spontaneously).
18. Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
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B. Ohio v. Roberts' 9 and the Now Abrogated "Reliability" Test
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court held that the admission of preliminary
hearing testimony without the speaker's presence in court satisfied constitutional standards. 20 In Roberts, the defendant was charged with forgery and possession of stolen credit cards. 21 During the preliminary hearing, the defense unsuccessfully tried to elicit an admission from the victim's daughter that she provided the defendant with the checks and credit
cards.22 The victim's daughter never appeared at trial despite being
served with five subpoenas. 23 At trial, the defendant testified that the
victim's daughter had given him the checkbook and credit cards-along
with permission to use them.24 On rebuttal, the State offered the transcript of the daughter's preliminary hearing testimony as evidence to the
contrary. 25 The trial court admitted the evidence and the defendant was
convicted.26
After the Ohio Supreme Court vacated the conviction,2 7 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that an unavailable witness's out-of-court statement was admissible if the statement bore an
adequate "indicia of reliability." 28 The Court reasoned that the preliminary hearing testimony fit this reliability requirement because it "afforded the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement." 29 The majority further held that reliability could be inferred "where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception',o or upon a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."3 1

19.
20.
21.

448 U.S. 56 (1980).
See id. at 74-77.
Id. at 58.

22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.

25. Id. (relying on the Ohio statute that permitted the use of preliminary hearing testimony
when a witness was unavailable).
26. Id.at 60.
27. Id.at 60-61.
28. Id. at 62, 66.
29. Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting that "there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness], and counsel
... availed himself of that opportunity" (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. "Hearsay" is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Hearsay exceptions include, among others, present sense impression, excited utterance, then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, recorded recollection, and records of regularly conducted
activity. FED. R. EVID. 803(l)-(6).
31.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The Court went on to explain that the purpose of crossexamination is "to challenge 'whether the declarant was sincerely telling what he believed to be the
truth, whether the declarant accurately perceived and remembered the matter he related, and whether
the declarant's intended meaning is adequately conveyed by the language he employed."' Id. at 71
(quoting David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-ConspiratorException in
CriminalProsecutions:A FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1378, 1378 (1972)).
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In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority for dispensing
with the right of confrontation "so lightly." 32 The decision was also criticized for creating an unpredictable rule that produced results contrary to
the intentions of the Confrontation Clause.33 Abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington3 4 in 2004,3s the Roberts reliability approach was rejected as
a "malleable standard [that] often fails to protect against paradigmatic
confrontation violations."3 6
C. Crawford v. Washington
In Crawford v. Washington, the defendant stabbed the victim after
learning that the victim tried to rape his wife. 37 Officers took a recorded
statement from the defendant's wife after the stabbing.3 ' At trial, the
prosecution introduced into evidence the wife's tape-recorded statement
describing the stabbing to the police. 3 9 The defense did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the defendant's wife40 and the defendant was
convicted. 41 The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and created a
new standard, holding that testimonial statements in a criminal prosecution are only admissible-absent live testimony-where the witness is
unavailable 42 and where the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness. 43 Distinguishing between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence, the majority recognized the "core class of 'testimonial' statements" 44 as including affidavits, depositions, prior statements
not subject to cross-examination, and statements "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 45
The Crawford Court abrogated the Roberts46 decision, relying heavily upon the text and history of the Confrontation Clause.4 7 The majority

32. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (criticizing the Roberts test for
admitting "core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude").
34. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
35.
See id. at 68-69.
36. Id. at 60.
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 39-40.
39. Id. at 40.
40.
Id. (explaining that the defendant's wife did not testify because of the state marital privilege law, which barred her from testifying without the defendant's consent).
Id. at 41.
41.
42. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (describing "unavailability" as the inability to
procure a witness despite good-faith attempts to locate and present the witness).
43. Crawford,541 U.S. at 59.
44. Id. at 51-52.
45. Id. (quoting Brief for the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
21754961 at *3).
46. Id. at 63-64.
47. See id. at 60-63 (stating that the Roberts reliability approach departed from the historical
principles of discouraging the use of ex parte evidence and the admission of testimonial statements
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reasoned that the Roberts reliability approach operated on a model that
was "amorphous, if not entirely subjective." 48 The Crawford Court went
on to conclude that "[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy the constitutional demands is
the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation."4 9
D. Davis v. Washington5 0
In Davis v. Washington, the Court granted certiorari to the consolidated cases of Adrian Davis and Hershel Hammon in order to further
define "testimonial" in the context of out-of-court statements made to
law enforcement personnel.5 ' Davis's case involved the admissibility of
statements made during a 911 call related to an in progress domestic disturbance. 52 The victim made statements to a 911 operator both during the
attack and after the defendant left the house. Although,the victim did
not appear for trial, the State successfully admitted a portion 54 of the victim's 911 call into evidence-leading to the defendant's conviction.
The Court, reviewed the constitutionality of the admitted evidence and
held that the statements were nontestimonial, and therefore, immune
from the reach of the Confrontation Clause.56 The majority noted that
because the statements were made "about events as they were actually
happening" and were "necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency,"57 they did not constitute testimonial evidence. Moreover, the
Court reasoned that statements made during 911 calls or at crime scenes
are generally nontestimonial in nature if "circumstances objectively indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."5 8 The Court considered several factors in making this determination: the timing of the statement, the
existence of an emergency, the primary purpose of the statement, and the
level of formality surrounding the circumstances under which the statements were made.59
Hammon's case involved a domestic violence dispute and centered
on the admissibility of the victim's written statements in an affidavit

not subjected to cross-examination because the test "often fail[ed] to protect against paradigmatic
confrontation violations").
48. Id. at 63.
49. Id. at 68-69.
50.
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
51.
See id. at 817.
52. Id
53. Id. at 817-18.
54. See id. at 826-29 (stating that the admissible portion of the call consisted only of the
victim's nontestimonial statements like those that relayed information vital to police intervention).
55. Id. at 819.
56. Id. at 828.
57. Id. at 827.
58. Id at 822.
59. See id.
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recorded by the police after the incident concluded.60 Because the victim
did not appear for the defendant's trial, the State admitted the affidavit as
evidence of the defendant's guilt. As a result, the defendant was convicted of battery. 62 The Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, reasoned that the lack of an ongoing emergency, in tandem with police
questioning, constituted "part of an investigation into possibl[e] criminal
past conduct," rendering the statements testimonial and subject to the
Confrontation Clause.63 The Court explained that a statement is testimonial when "the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."6 4
II. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MAASSACHUSETTS
A. Facts

In 2001, Boston police responded to a tip reporting the suspicious
behavior of Thomas Wright.65 An informant alleged that Wright frequently received phone calls at work that prompted him to leave, wait for
a blue sedan outside his place of employment, enter the car, and return in
the same vehicle a short time later.66 After observing this exact succession of events, officers arrested Wright and the two men in the blue sedan-one of whom was Luis Melendez-Diaz-on suspicion of drug pos67
session.
On the drive to the police station with the three men, the officers
observed the men "fidgeting and making furtive movements in the back
of the car."68 A search of the police car revealed nineteen small plastic
69
bags containing a substance resembling cocaine hidden in the back seat.
70
A similar substance was found during a personal search of Wright. Police submitted the substance to a state laboratory for chemical analysis
and identification.
Laboratory analysts produced and swore to certificates of analysis
stating the substance in the bags was found to be cocaine. 72 Melendez60. Id. at 820.
61.
Id.
62. Id. at 821.
63. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30 (stating that "the product of the interrogation in Hammon is a
much easier task, since they were not much different from the statements we found to be testimonial
in Crawford").

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 822.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (noting that the bags were hidden in a partition between the front and back seats).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2531 (mentioning that the certificates were sworn to before a public notary).
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Diaz was charged with distributing and trafficking cocaine. 73 Three certificates of analysis were submitted into evidence at trial, along with the
bags seized from Wright and the police car.74
B. ProceduralHistory

At trial, Melendez-Diaz argued that the Supreme Court's recent
Confrontation Clause decision, Crawford v. Washington, required the
state lab analyst to offer live testimony.75 Despite this argument, the trial
court admitted the scientific certificates into evidence as "'prima facie
evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic ...
analyzed.'" 76 Consequently, the jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of distributing and trafficking cocaine. 77
On appeal, Melendez-Diaz again asserted a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts held the admission of the certificates constitutional, relying on a
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case, 79 which exempted certificates of analysis from confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.so After
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied review, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
C. Majority Opinion

In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Massachusetts appellate courts, finding the
admission of the certificates unconstitutional.82 The majority, applying
Crawford,8 3 held that because the certificates of analysis constituted affidavits, they fell within the "core class of testimonial statements" covered
by the Confrontation Clause.84 The Court further held that because Melendez-Diaz was never provided with an opportunity to cross-examine
the analyst who prepared the certificates, his right to confront the witness
under the Sixth Amendment had been violated.

73.
Id. at 2530.
74. Id. at 2530-31.
75. Id. at 2531 (noting Melendez-Diaz's objection to the admission of the certificates at trial).
76. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2006)).
77. See id.
78.
Id.
79. Id
80. Id
81.
Id.
82. Id. at 2542.
83.
Id. at 2532-33 (stating that the decision is a "rather straightforward application" of Crawford).
84. Id. at 2532. The forensic reports contemplated in Melendez-Diaz fall firmly within the
testimonial category; and therefore the emergency/non-emergency distinction in Davis is not useful
in the discussion of scientific analysts. Id.
85.
Id.
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The majority went on to reject various arguments raised by the State
of Massachusetts and the dissent.8 6 First, the Court rejected the argument
that the non-accusatory nature of the certificates rendered them nontestimonial.8 7 Instead, the Court concluded that the certificates themselves
constituted the "witnesses against [the defendant],"8 8 whom MelendezDiaz had a right to confront.89 Second, relying primarily on Davis, the
Court found that the scientific nature of the testimony was not grounds
for removing analysts from the coverage of the Confrontation Clause. 90
Third, the Court dismissed the respondent's arguments that the neutral,
scientific nature of the testimony excluded analysts from confrontation as
"little more than an invitation to return to our overruled decision in Roberts." 91 The majority also held that a defendant's right to subpoena the
analyst who prepared the report was not a substitute for his or her right to
confrontation. 92
Finally, the Court reasoned that the demands of the Confrontation
Clause may not be relaxed in order to expedite the judicial process.93
While acknowledging the increased burden its holding places on prosecutors, the Court ultimately rejected the dissent's claim that requiring
analysts to testify imposed too high a burden on criminal prosecutions.94
In doing so, the "simplest form" of notice-and-demand statutes9 were
upheld as a constitutional way to expedite trials of this nature.96
D. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas clarified his position that out-ofcourt statements governed by the Confrontation Clause were limited to
those "contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions."9 7 Justice Thomas joined the
opinion of the Court because the certificates of analysis were "quite
plainly affidavits" and therefore, subject to the right of confrontation. 98

86. Id. at 2532-42 (responding to "a potpourri" of arguments advanced by the dissent and
respondent).
87. Id. at 2533.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2532.
90. Id. at 2535.
91.
Id. at 2536. The Court relied on Crawford's holding that a statement's purpose will determine whether it is testimonial or nontestimonial. Id. at 2532.
92.
Id. at 2540.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
Id. at 2541 ("In their simplest form, notice-and-demand statutes require the prosecution to
95.
provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence at trial, after which
the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence
absent the analyst's appearance live at trial.").
96.
Id.
Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
97.
98.
Id.
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E. Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito, criticized the majority for
discarding "an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence." 99 Justice Kennedy offered numerous arguments as to why the
introduction of scientific analysis into evidence should be allowed without an analyst's testimony. 00 First, he noted that the Court's failure to
define the word "analyst" could lead to confusion and inconsistencies as
to which scientists must testify at trial.10 ' Next, Justice Kennedy argued
that a number of suitable alternatives were available for defendants who
wished to challenge scientific evidence brought against them.102 These
options included serving subpoenas, seeking independent scientific tests,
forming opposing arguments, and objecting to the admission of evidence.103 The dissent further stated that laboratory analysts were not the
kind of conventional witnesses subject to the Confrontation Clause.104
Justice Kennedy distinguished between analysts and conventional witnesses by reasoning that analysts record near-contemporaneous events as
opposed to past observations,'0 5 they do not testify "against the defendant," 06 and they do not respond to questions under interrogation. 07
The dissent also listed a number of adverse results that could stem
from the majority's decision' 08 -including unjust, technical dismissals
on account of analysts unavailable to give testimony for reasons such as
death, illness, or travel.1 09 He further argued that requiring analysts to
testify at trial could result in an increase of "not guilty" verdicts,no an
increase in administrative costs, the creation of a "new prosecutorial
duty,""' a substantial burden on analysts' time, and an inundation of
cases requiring the presence of analysts in court.112

99. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 2543-53.
101.
See id. at 2544 (noting that many people play a role in preparing a test's results and the
majority opinion does not clarify which of these people the defendant has a right to confront).
102. See id.at 2547-49.
103. Id. at 2547.
104. Id. at 2550-51.
105.
Id. at 2551.
Id. at 2552 (noting that analysts rarely have knowledge of the defendant's identity or "of
106.
an aspect of the defendant's guilt").
107. Id.
108.
See id. at 2549-50.
109.
Id. at 2550.
110. Id. ("The result, in many cases, will be that the prosecution cannot meet its burden of
proof, and the guilty defendant goes free on a technicality that, because it results in an acquittal,
cannot be reviewed on appeal.").
111.
Id. at 2556.
112. See id at 2549-50.
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III. ANALYSIS
The Melendez-Diaz Court properly aligned its decision with the
goals and guarantees of the Confrontation Clause. First, the limitations
and deterrents created by Melendez-Diaz furthered the fundamental goals
of ensuring the reliability of evidence" 3 and avoiding the use of ex
partell4 examinations as evidence against criminal defendants.' 5 Second,
the guarantees of face-to-face confrontation' 16 and cross-examination'' 7
remain strong after the Court's decision. Furthermore, Melendez-Diaz
advanced the Framer's intent of securing rights for criminal defendants
by firmly reinforcing the underlying principles behind the Confrontation
Clause.
A. Upholding the Fundamental Goals of the Confrontation Clause
The holdings of Melendez-Diaz and Crawford reveal two primary
goals of the Confrontation Clause: (1) ensuring the reliability of evidence, and (2) preventing the use of ex parte examinations and accusatory out-of-court statements where the defendant is unable to crossexamine.1" 9 The Supreme Court recognized the reliability of evidence as
the Clause's "ultimate goal." 20 Melendez-Diaz maintained this goal by
establishing a deterrent for admitting unreliable evidence and broadening
the class of testimony subject to the Confrontation Clause.121 Similarly,
Crawford identified the use of ex parte examinations as the "principal
evil" the Confrontation Clause was intended to prevent.122 The Court's
decision in Melendez-Diaz advanced this goal by moving Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence in a direction that avoids the admission of ex parte
testimony.
1. Reliability
The Melendez-Diaz Court identified the Confrontation Clause's "ultimate goal" as ensuring the reliability of evidence, which is accomplished by requiring that the evidence undergo cross-examination.1 23 The
Court found that there was nothing uniquely reliable about scientific evidence and it is subject to cross-examination under the Sixth Amend113. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (identifying
reliability of evidence as the Confrontation Clause's "ultimate goal").
See id. at 49 (describing ex parle depositions as statements made by witnesses who have
114.
not been subject to cross-examination).
115. Id.
at50.
116. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990) (discussing the importance of face-toface confrontation to the Confrontation Clause).
117. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-56 (discussing the importance of cross-examination as it
relates to the Confrontation Clause).
118. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009).
119. Id. at2531.
120. Id. at 2536 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).
121.
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
122. Crawford,541 U.S. at 50.
123. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Crawford,541 U.S. at 61).
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ment.124 The Melendez-Diaz Court stated that "[c]onfrontation is one
means of assuring accurate forensic analysis."1 25 Confrontation is meant
to expose both fraudulently and honestly produced erroneous evidence.126 Finally, the right to confrontation does not vanish because other
state or federal procedures, such as the ability to subpoena analysts, are
aimed at ensuring reliability.127 Instead, the Confrontation Clause stands
as a fundamental safeguard in criminal prosecutions against unreliable
evidence. 128
The Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz furthers the goal of ensuring
the reliability of evidence by reducing opportunities for false information
to go unnoticed and by providing criminal defendants every opportunity
to expose fraudulent data. 129 After Melendez-Diaz, prosecutors are on
notice that their forensic evidence will be subject to the Confrontation
Clause.130 The case, therefore, acts as a deterrent to introducing unreliable evidence in the first place. 1 For example, knowledge that lab analysts are subject to cross-examination will likely compel prosecutors to
investigate the reliability of any forensic analysis before trial. Consequently, Melendez-Diaz results in more reliable evidence because it discourages the prosecution from initially introducing inadequate evi-

dence. 132
Furthermore, Melendez-Diaz broadened the categories of evidence
requiring cross-examination and provided criminal defendants with an
opportunity to expose certain weaknesses in the evidence brought against
them. 133 As a result, Melendez-Diaz ensures that more reliable evidence
will be available to the trier of fact by allowing them to consider a
broader range of facts surrounding the evidence presented.134 For example, before Melendez-Diaz, some juries would only be presented with the
fact that a laboratory affidavit confirmed the identification of a substance. 35 Now, juries will receive information regarding an analyst's
proficiency, a machine's calibration, and a lab's reputation.1 36 Confrontation may even lead to the discovery that no testing was ever performed
124.
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536 (explaining how forensic evidence is not immune
to manipulation because forensic scientists often need to answer precise questions regarding a specific case and may feel pressured to compromise methodology for the sake of expediency).
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 2537 ("Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but
the incompetent one as well.").
127.
Id. at 2540.
128. See id. at 2536.
129. Id.at 2536-37.
130. See id. at 2532.
131.
Seeid.at2537.
132. See id.
133.

See id. at 2532.

134.
135.

See id.
See id. at 2554-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

136.

5 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE

2010).

§ 34:27.35

(7th ed.
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on the substance at issue.' Conversely, cross-examination may reveal
that a lab had a 99.9% accuracy rate and employed the most esteemed
analysts in the country. Either way, the trier of fact will gain more information about the evidence brought against the defendant, and will therefore have a deeper understanding about that evidence's reliability.
Finally, had the Melendez-Diaz Court affirmed the lower court's
decision, the reliability of evidence in criminal prosecutions would have
deteriorated.'3 8 This is true because many kinds of evidentiary facts
would be held to very low standards of accountability. 139 The trier of fact
would never have the opportunity to learn how some evidence was collected, analyzed, or handled.14 0 Juries and judges would lack crucial
knowledge about the reliability of certain facts and the truth regarding
weaknesses in the prosecution's case.141 Furthermore, analysts that produce the evidence ultimately used against a defendant at trial might never
be called to testify regarding the grave impact of their work product. 142
Had the Melendez-Diaz court held differently, the decision would not
promote reliable evidence.
2. Avoiding Ex Parte Examinations as Evidence
The decision in Crawford centered on avoiding the use of ex parte
evidence.1 43 Instead of shifting the goal of the Confrontation Clause
away from reliability,14 4 Crawford simply shed light on another purpose
of the Clause. In Crawford, the Court stated that "the principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused." 45 In this statement, the Crawford Court
referred to the practice of admitting out-of-court statements into evidence
without providing the defendant with an opportunity to cross-examine
the speaker.146 Ex parte evidence has been deemed "utterly incompe-

137. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37 (majority opinion) (discussing "drylabbing"-a
procedure in which some analysts prepare scientific reports authenticating results of tests that were
never performed).
138. Id. at 2536 (discussing how confrontation assures accurate forensic analysis by exposing
and deterring fraudulent scientific reports).
139. Id. (stating that cross-examination may be the only way to challenge the results of scientific tests that cannot be repeated-like autopsies and breathalyzers).
140. Id. at 2537 ("Like expert witnesses generally, an analyst's lack of proper training or
deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination.").
141.
Id. at 2535. For example, Melendez-Diaz's trier of fact would be unaware of the fact that
the scientific affidavits were completed almost a week after the tests were performed. Id.
142. Id. at 2533-34.
143. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
144. Christopher B. Mueller, Cross-Examination Earlier or Later: When is it Enough to Satisfy
Crawford?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 319, 320 (2006) (advancing the argument that Crawford properly
shifted the goal of the Confrontation Clause away from reliability).
145. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
146. Id. (referring specifically to exparte statements wrongly admitted at Sir Walter Raleigh's
trial).
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tent"l4 7 and abhorrentl4 8 because of its unreliable and malleable nature.14 9
The Confrontation Clause is a crucial safeguard against this kind of practice.150

The holding in Melendez-Diaz advanced the goal of avoiding the
use of ex parte testimony as evidence. By holding that forensic analysts
are subject to cross examination, the Court made it clear that Confrontation Clause jurisprudence should move toward, and not away from, allowing confrontation. As the Court reasoned, "the paradigmatic case
identifies the core of the right to confrontation, not its limits."'5 1 Melendez-Diaz established these limits in a way that avoids a slippery-slope
toward admission of ex parte examinations.
B. Upholding the FundamentalGuaranteesof the Confrontation Clause
Not only did Melendez-Diaz promote the goals at which the Confrontation Clause is aimed, it also upheld the guarantees promised to
individual criminal defendants. It is generally accepted that the Clause
guarantees the right of face-to-face confrontation and the right to crossexamination.1 52 The Court's Melendez-Diaz decision guarded these two
guarantees, which are fundamental to the right of confrontation.
1. Face-to-Face Confrontation
As the CrawfordCourt noted, the right to face one's accusers dates
back to early Roman and English common law.1 53 This right allows the
trier of fact to observe the witness under questioning, 154 provides an opportunity for an accuser to tell the truth under oath,'55 and gives the defendant an opportunity to face his or her accuser.1 56 Melendez-Diaz
rightly granted defendants the opportunity to come face-to-face with the
scientific analysts who produced the evidence used against them at trial.
As Justice Scalia opined, "the analyst who provides false results may,
under oath in open court, reconsider his false testimony." 5 7 The re
147. Id. at 49.
148. Id. at 48.
149. Id. at 50.
150. Id.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009) (referring again to Sir
151.
Walter Raleigh's trial).
Marc C. McAllister, The Disguised Witness and Crawford's Uneasy Tension with Craig:
152.
Bringing Uniformity to the Supreme Court's ConfrontationJurisprudence,58 DRAKE L. REV. 481,
519 (2010) (referring to "Face-to-Face Confrontation and Cross-Examination as the Two Pillars of
Confrontation"). See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (discussing throughout
the importance of face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination).
Crawford,541 U.S. at 43.
153.
154.
See id.
155.
See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536-37.
156.
Jeffery L. Fisher, Preface: Reclaiming Criminal Procedure, 38 GEO L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC., at iii, ix (2009) (expounding on the importance of face-to-face confrontation in the
criminal justice system).
157.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537.
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quirement of live confrontation will cause analysts to be more careful in
their work and more conscious of its effect at trial. Furthermore, the
Court ensured that the right to face-to-face confrontation would not be
chipped away at over the years. The majority did this by holding forensic
test results to the same standard as any other testimonial evidence offered
against criminal defendants.158 Had the Court held otherwise, it would
have undermined the fundamental guarantee to confront one's accuser
face-to-face.
2. Cross-Examination
The right to cross-examination is so fundamental that the Supreme
Court held testimonial evidence inadmissible if the defendant was not
afforded such a right.159 Cross-examination allows the defense and
prosecution alike to show weaknesses in the opposing arguments and
reveal evidentiary facts. As the Melendez-Diaz Court noted, "[A]n analyst's lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed
in cross-examination." 1 60 By subjecting analysts to cross-examination,
Melendez-Diaz furthered this protection of the integrity of the adversarial
process.
The Confrontation Clause is a constitutional guarantee that is meant
to prevent the conviction of the innocent. The dissent in Melendez-Diaz
worried that subjecting analysts to cross-examination would result in
"guilty" defendants going free on purely technical grounds. However,
this apprehension is misguided because every defendant is afforded a
presumption of innocence,1 62 which is removed only when the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. If,
through the "crucible of cross-examination,"l63 among other means, the
prosecution fails to meet this burden, the defendant remains innocent.
This may result in the dismissal of some cases on technical grounds.
However, that result is better than stripping criminal defendants of their
constitutional rights based on a presumption of guilt. The Melendez-Diaz
decision correctly operated under the premise that revoking a defendant's
right to cross-examination based on a presumption of guilt would reorder
the prosecutorial system.
Additionally, the dissent's "parade of horribles,"l 64 if it does ensue,
will be short lived. If courts do become swamped with requests for live
158. Id. at 2532.
159.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
160.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537.
161.
Id. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
162.
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1859) ("The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.").
163.
Crawford,541 U.S. at 61.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2542 (characterizing the dissent's numerous arguments
164.
against the majority decision as a "parade of horribles").
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testimony of analysts, it will not last for long. Once analysts are called to
the stand to testify regarding their work, labs will begin to increase training, accuracy, and accountability.1 65 Defense lawyers will soon realize
that calling a credible, careful, well-trained analyst is of no help to their
case; ultimately resulting in more reliable data, less court costs, and a
protection of the criminal defendant's right to cross-examination.
C. Upholding the HistoricalIntentions Behind the Confrontation Clause
Not only did the Melendez-Diaz decision uphold the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, it also upheld the historical principles' 6 6 and intentions behind the Sixth Amendment. The Bill of Rights was drafted as a
guarantee of individual rights and freedoms. Each specified right is one
the Founders considered important enough to enumerate. The Sixth
Amendment is an enumeration of the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants. 167 The Confrontation Clause, specifically, was enacted in response to the concern68 that evidence would be admitted unjustly against
criminal defendants.'
By interpreting the Confrontation Clause as a text that imparts,
rather than limits, rights of criminal defendants, the Melendez-Diaz Court
upheld the historical purposes and intentions behind the Clause. The
Sixth Amendment grants privileges, it does not limit them. If scientific
data was not subject to cross examination, the rights of criminal defendants, as the Founders desired, would deteriorate. As the Founders intended, Melendez-Diaz protected the rights of defendants.
D. Pendergrass v. State1 69: Begging an Unanswered Question of Melendez-Diaz
Eventually, the Supreme Court will need to address some unanswered questions created by Melendez-Diaz. Which analyst is required to
testify is one such uncertainty.170 While the Court's Melendez-Diaz decision did "not mean that everyone who laid hands on the evidence must
be called,"'71 it did not specify any requirements for selecting which analyst should testify. Many phases are required for the production of most
Mark Hansen, Taking Techs to Trial: Two Terms in a Row, Justices Weigh Bringing Lab
165.
Analysts into Court, 96 JAN. A.B.A. J. 17, 18 (2010) ("Stanford University law professor Jeffery L.
Fisher, who represented Melendez-Diaz, says the decision will help ensure that analysts will be
careful when they do their testing and will be held accountable when they make mistakes.")
166. See Justin Chou, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusets: Raising the Confrontation Requirements for Forensic Evidence in California,14 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 439, 442-43 (2009) (discussing
various historical principles behind the Confrontation Clause).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
167.
168. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 49 (describing concerns of some early Americans regarding the
admission of evidence at trial and noting that "[t]he First Congress responded by including the
Confrontation Clause in the proposal that became the Sixth Amendment").
913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
169.
170. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2532 (majority opinion).
171.
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scientific reports submitted at trial. For example, DNA test results alone
go through several phases of analysis and exchange hands many times
before the results are finalized. Each report involves the work product
and supervision of numerous scientists.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to Pendergrass v.
State, 72 a case involving DNA certificates of analysis. 7 3 In Pendergrass,
the prosecution submitted DNA and paternity test results as evidence
against the defendant.174 Pursuant to Melendez-Diaz, a supervisor employed by the laboratory that produced the DNA results offered live testimony at trial. The supervisor, Lisa Black, testified to the certificates of
analysis produced by her employers and general lab procedures, among
other things.' 75 Ms. Black did not personally conduct the DNA testing.176
The defendant was convicted and appealed based on a Confrontation
Clause violation, arguing that Melendez-Diaz required the analyst who
actually produced the results to offer live testimony.177 The Supreme
Court of Indiana upheld the conviction and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
Pendergrasswas correctly decided in light of the goals of the Confrontation Clause. The analyst offering live testimony should be one who
is in a position to testify to the general and specific scientific procedures
that lead to the data submitted as evidence against the defendant. The
purpose behind the analysts live testimony is to ensure reliable evidence
through cross examination. Subjecting Ms. Black to cross-examination
accomplished this goal. First, she was able to testify to the general testing
procedures that were used in conducting the scientific tests. Second, she
was able to testify to the specific procedure that occurred in order to produce the certificates of analysis that were ultimately submitted at trial. In
doing so, she offered the trier of fact information regarding the general
reliability of DNA testing in her laboratory and specific information regarding the reliability of the evidence presented against the defendant.
For now, courts are left to their own discretion in determining
which analyst's testimony is sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause requirements set forth in Melendez-Diaz. These determinations
must be made in light of the goal of achieving reliability through crossexamination. However, the Supreme Court may eventually need to address this unanswered question.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
See Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 704-05.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 708.
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CONCLUSION

As new technologies expand, courts must determine what role, if
any, these scientific developments will play in criminal prosecutions.
These determinations must be made in light of and in a manner consistent with constitutional guarantees and limits. Accordingly, the Melendez-Diaz holding was decided correctly in light of the goals and guarantees of the Confrontation Clause. The decision promotes the reliability of
evidence and opposes the use of ex parte examinations; it upholds the
fundamental Confrontation Clause guarantees of face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination. Finally, the Melendez-Diaz Court upheld the
historical goals behind the Sixth Amendment by protecting the rights of
criminal defendants. The long-term, practical implications of MelendezDiaz remain to be seen. If negative conditions do result, these consequences will be short lived. The true long-term effects of Melendez-Diaz
will be more reliable evidence, more accountability in the criminal justice system, more information available to the trier of fact, and a strong
guarantee of the rights of criminal defendants.
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MARYLAND V. SHATZER: STAMPING A FOURTEEN-DAY
EXPIRATION DATE ON MIRANDA RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION

Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court established a
suspect's right to be informed of his rights to counsel and silence in
Miranda v. Arizona.' Today, Miranda rights inundate American televi-

sions, movie screens, and perceptions of criminal justice. 2 In its controversial decision, the Miranda Court used the Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment as the foundation for rights of the accused. 3 Although Miranda has been a part of American culture since the decision
was handed down in 1966, the Court is still fine-tuning the application of
Miranda rights.4 Most recently, the Court held in Maryland v. Shatzer5
that a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel is only powerful
enough to prevent further questioning by law enforcement for fourteen
days after the suspect's release from custody.
This Comment explores the flaws, inconsistencies, and impact of
the Shatzer fourteen-day rule. Overall, the Shatzer Court lost sight of the
prophylactic ideas of Miranda in its quest for an easy standardjeopardizing not only the accused's right to counsel but also his right to
remain silent. Furthermore, even though these constitutional rights are
more valuable to suspects today than they were at the time Miranda was
decided, the Shatzer fourteen-day rule continues the Court's pattern of
gradually deteriorating suspects' Miranda rights.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the Court's development
and clarification of Miranda rights, highlighting the topics most altered
by Shatzer. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural history, and opinions
of Shatzer. Part III asserts four propositions: (1) Shatzer continues the
Court's retreat from the prophylactic principles of Miranda,further compromising the right to remain silent and the right to counsel; (2) the
Court's retreat wrongly abandoned prophylactic measures in favor of
efficiency; (3) the Court's fourteen-day rule compromises a suspect's
Mirandarights at a time when those rights are increasingly valuable and
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Miranda has become embed2.
ded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national
culture.").
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 467.
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994) (holding that a suspect's
4.
request for counsel must be unambiguous); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that after a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, questioning cannot resume until the suspect
has obtained counsel or the suspect initiates discussion).
5.
130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
6. Id. at 1223.
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decisive to his case; and, (4) the Court's focus on the Edwards rule, instead of Miranda rights, makes it easier for the Court to continue to curtail the rights of the accused. This Comment concludes that Shatzer was
wrongly decided, and that the decision will have a detrimental effect on
the fair administration of criminal justice in America.
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to Miranda's landmark ruling in 1966, the only way for a defendant to attack the prosecution's use of his confession made before
indictment or the filing of charges was by bringing a due process claim. 7
A defendant cannot rely on the Sixth Amendment to challenge confessions made during initial interrogations because the right to counselguaranteed by the Sixth Amendment-attaches only when prosecution
formally commences, "whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 8 Although constitutional challenges under the Due Process Clause remained available to
defendants, the prophylactic measures established by the Miranda Court
provided additional protections to ensure that a suspect's constitutional
rights were fully honored.
However, because the rights guaranteed by Miranda were not explicitly found in the text of the Constitution,9 its holding has been subject
to several challenges-resulting in numerous exceptions to the Miranda
holding. Although the Court has kept Miranda's mandate alive, its pattern of fashioning exceptions to Miranda's application has slowly deteriorated the rights that it previously found indispensible to suspects in
custodial interrogation.
A. TraditionalConstitutionalChallenges to the Admissibility of Statements
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that "[n]o person .. . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 0 Prior to 1966, the United States Supreme Court
interpreted this right literally to mean that a criminal defendant cannot be
compelled to testify in his own criminal proceeding." Therefore, the
7. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 ("[F]or the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the
rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process.").
8.
Brooks Holland, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 390 (2009) (quoting McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966). Although there is no right to be advised of
one's rights in the Constitution, the Constitution's relation to Miranda warnings has been debated by
the Court. Compare Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (concluding "that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively"), with Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of playing "word games" to make Miranda a constitutional
mandate).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11.
William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda's Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813,
814-15 (2005) (explaining that prior to the Miranda decision, the United States Supreme Court held
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Self-Incrimination Clause cannot single-handedly protect suspects from
police coercion during interrogations outside of any criminal proceedings
or prevent the admission of any evidence obtained from such coercion at
trial.12 Similarly, the Fifth Amendment could not provide suspects with
counsel during interrogation because the Sixth Amendment alone governed the right to counsel.13
In the mid-twentieth century, the Court became increasingly concerned about coerced confessions obtained through dishonest and threatening police interrogations.14 Although the bare text of the SelfIncrimination Clause did not encompass police tactics prior to trial, the
Court sought to condemn and prevent involuntary confessions 5 by looking to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.16 Unlike voluntary confessions, coerced confessions offend due
process by forcing an individual to incriminate himself, thereby preventing him from attaining a fair trial. Framing the issue around due process, the Court established a totality of the circumstances inquiry to determine the voluntariness of a confession in Johnson v. Zerbst." This
analysis evaluated whether a confession was truly voluntary by determining "whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed."1 9
While the due process approach afforded defendants broader rights
than the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Due Process Clause had its own
set of limitations. 20 Notably, it did not affirmatively protect suspects
from coercion, but only afforded defendants the opportunity to challenge
any involuntary statements at trial. 21 Furthermore, because interrogations
that a "case" meant the actual criminal proceeding, and "compelled" applied only to a defendant's
right to not be held in contempt for refusing to testify at the proceeding).
12. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Ripeness of Self-Incrimination Clause Disputes, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1261, 1317-18, 1323 (2005) (arguing that the United States Supreme
Court violates the Constitution by hearing claims based on the Self-Incrimination Clause before
charges have been filed or a criminal proceeding has commenced because such claims are not yet
ripe for adjudication under the plain language of the Fifth Amendment).
13.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000) ("In Miranda,we noted that the
14.
advent of modem custodial police interrogation brought with it an increased concern about confessions obtained by coercion.").
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1966) (tracking the Court's historical disap15.
proval of coerced confessions, which finds its roots in the Star Chamber Oath).
16. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 ("[F]or the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the
rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process.");
see, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S 528, 537
(1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
17. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 515; Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 537.
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
18.
19. Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534.
20. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 796 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21.
Note, ProceduralProtections of the CriminalDefendant- A Reevaluation of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78
HARv. L. REv. 426, 430-31 (1964) (asserting that only preventing the admission of involuntary
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were often conducted secretly, defendants would struggle to prove the
use of coercive interrogation tactics in court over the contradictory testimony of law enforcement officers. 22 As a result, only extremely visible
instances of police brutality and deceit were found to violate due process.23 Due to concerns about more subtle and sophisticated police tactics
that made coercion often difficult to ascertain, the Court sought additional protections for suspects in custodial interrogation.24
B. Additional Safeguards to the Right againstSelf-lncrimination:
Miranda v. Arizona
In an "unprecedented stretch of the language of the SelfIncrimination Clause," the Miranda Court imposed an affirmative obligation on law enforcement to prevent the occurrence of involuntary
statements. 5 In Miranda, Ernesto Miranda was accused of kidnapping
and rape.26 Miranda was taken into custody and questioned without first
being advised that he had a right to have an attorney present.27 After being interrogated, Miranda eventually confessed. 28 At trial, the State pre29
sented evidence of Miranda's confession over his objection.
In considering whether Miranda's confession was properly admitted
at trial, the Supreme Court addressed "the necessity for procedures which
assure that [an] individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself."30 To set the stage for its landmark holding, the Miranda Court depicted the nature and setting of in-custody interrogations, focusing on
recent studies and case law revealing police brutality during such quesstatements at trial does not provide enough protection to defendants because juries may assume the
parties are debating over a confession when the defense objects to evidence the prosecution attempts
to admit, and the prosecutor's knowledge of a confession, admissible at trial or not, could heavily
influence his decision whether or not to press charges).
22. Id. at 431.
23. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558-59 (1954) (finding the defendant's confession involuntary because defendant had been questioned on different days for eight hours, fourteen
hours, and twenty-three hours respectively, and during the last session a police psychiatrist, posing
as a medical doctor to treat the suspect's sinus infection, attempted to hypnotize the suspect); Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 (1936) (finding the defendant's confession involuntary because
defendant had been whipped and tortured over several days).
24. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that absent the right
to counsel and an opportunity to remain silent, any incriminating statements obtained from a suspect
in custody were inadmissible at trial). The defendant in Escobedo was accused of murder, held in
custody, and not advised of his constitutional rights. Id. at 479, 481. The Escobedo Court found that
any rights lost during interrogation were irrevocably lost and therefore interfered with any rights
guaranteed to the accused during trial. See id. at 486. In other words, the Escobedo Court found that
although the Constitution's language only applied to the courtroom, certain rights could be curtailed
before a defendant ever reached the courtroom. See id.
25. Pizzi & Hoffman, supra note I1, at 815-16.
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,491 (1966).
27. Id. at 492.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 439.
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tioning.3 ' The Court was especially concerned with incriminating statements made by defendants who faced more subtle police tactics and "inherently compelling pressures"32 of custodial interrogation that were not
egregious enough to warrant protections under the Due Process Clause.
Thus, the Court returned to the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment in order to provide a more effective set of protections to
defendants in these circumstances. 33
Although the Fifth Amendment does not provide a textual right to
counsel, the Miranda Court considered the right necessary to secure the
explicit privilege in the Self-Incrimination Clause to remain silent. 34 Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, the right to remain silent was an established principle at the time of Miranda.35 The Miranda Court-aiming to
ensure that a suspect's choice to communicate with the police was voluntary throughout the interrogation process-reasoned that the presence of
an attorney would make a suspect more confident and able to remain
silent if desired.36 The Court found that in order to give meaning to a
suspect's right to silence, "the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation [had] to be diffused by warning the suspect not only of his right to
silence, but of his right to an attorney" as well.3 7 For this reason, the
Court held that the right to counsel, though not a textual right in itself,
was an indispensable companion to the fundamental right to remain silent. 38
C. Effects of Miranda

Miranda'smandate was clear: prior to any questioning, the authorities must warn a suspect that he has the right to remain silent and the
right to an attorney. 39 The Court made equally clear that any questioning
must automatically cease once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent. 40 Similarly, when a suspect invokes his right to counsel, the interrogation cannot continue until counsel is present.4 1 If a suspect cannot ob-

31.
Id. at 445-47; see also id. at 446 n.7 (citing multiple cases involving police brutality). The
Court was particularly disturbed by police manuals that described in detail how to psychologically
disadvantage suspects and extract confessions. Id. at 448-55; see also id at 449 n.8 (referring to
several of the manuals then in use by the police).
32.
Id. at 467.
33.
See id. at 442.
34. Id. at 466; Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1011, 1015 (2007).
35.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (holding that a person has the right "to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence").

36. Miranda,384 U.S. at 469-70.
37. Donald P. Judges & Stephen J. Cribari, Speaking of Silence: A Reply to Making Defendants Speak, 94 MINN. L. REV. 800, 812 (2010).
38. Id. at 812-13.
39. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
40. Id. at473-74.
41.
Id. at474.
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tain an attorney on his own, law enforcement must either accept his decision to remain silent or provide him with counsel.4 2
Adherence to these rules has become a prerequisite for the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant at his criminal trial.4 3 The
Miranda holding "drastically overhauled the law of police interrogations"" by imposing a "positive obligation on police to advise suspects
of a given litany of rights before any custodial interrogation could begin."45 Accordingly, most of Miranda's critics attack the decision for
meddling with law enforcement procedures,46 asserting that it prevents
the admission of voluntary confessions in criminal trials.47 Specifically,
extending the application of Miranda rights may deter police from trying
to obtain voluntary confessions, which are "essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the
law." 48 Although a suspect may waive his Miranda rights, the government has the heavy burden of demonstrating that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege. 49 The Court openly acknowledged that it imposed a heavy burden on the government, but
averred that because the government is in a position of authority
throughout the interrogation process, that "burden is rightly on its shoulders." 50 Furthermore, the American criminal justice system places the
burden of proof wholly on the government for every element of a crime,
including proof of the voluntariness of any confession offered as evidence.
D. A "SecondLayer of Prophylaxis": Edwards v. Arizona52
Fifteen years after Miranda,the Court buttressed the accused's right
to counsel in Edwards v. Arizona by clarifying that a custodial interrogation cannot be resumed until the protections articulated in Miranda have
been provided.5 3 In Edwards, the defendant was charged with robbery,
burglary, and first-degree murder. 54 Pursuant to an arrest warrant, Edwards was detained and interrogated by law enforcement officials after
42. Id.
43. Id at 476.
Strauss, supra note 34, at 1014.
44.
45. Pizzi & Hoffman, supra note 11, at 817.
46. See id. at 817 n.20.
47. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1221-22 (2010).
48. Id. at 1222 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991)).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (holding
49.
that the Constitution "imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused")).
50.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
Id. at 460; see also Judges & Cribari, supra note 37, at 806 (noting that in the late eight51.
eenth century to early nineteenth century, American criminal justice switched from an accusedspeaks model to a testing-the-prosecution model).
52. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The Edwards holding was labeled a "second layer of prophylaxis."
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991).
53. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
54. Id. at 478.
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being properly informed of his Miranda rights. 5 Questioning quickly
ceased after Edwards denied involvement in the crimes and requested to
speak with an attorney. 56 However, when officers visited Edwards at the
county jail the next morning, the jail's guard told Edwards that he "had
to" speak with them. 57 As a result, Edwards spoke to officers and implicated himself in the crimes, even after officers again informed him of his
Mirandarights.
In its review, the Edwards Court considered whether the defendant
had voluntarily waived his right to counsel by speaking with law enforcement at the second interrogation.59 Relying heavily on its rationale
in Miranda, the Court held that the waiver was involuntary and that the
confession was inadmissible at trial. 60 The Court reasoned that once a
suspect initially invokes his right to counsel, any subsequent waivers of
that right are presumed involuntary because such waivers are likely the
result of police coercion, badgering, or dishonesty. 61 Therefore, when
Edwards asserted his right to an attorney on the night of his arrest, the
police were required to honor his desire to communicate with law enforcement only through counsel for the remainder of the investigation. 62
However, the Edwards decision permitted questioning to resume if
the suspect initiated the discussion with law enforcement. 3 The Court
reasoned that where the accused initiated the discussion, the risk of any
police coercion was minimal and the presumption of involuntariness no
longer applied.64 The Court found that the effect of a suspect's assertion
of his right to counsel differed from a suspect's invocation of the right to
remain silent, which only temporarily paused the interrogation.65
Although a seemingly bright-line rule, the Court has since been inundated with proposed exceptions to the Edwards application. In nearly
all of the challenges to Edwards, "[T]he Court was concerned with preserving the clear, bright-line nature of the Edwards decision."6 6 For ex55.
Id.
56. Id. at 479.
57. Id.
58.
Id.
59. Id at 482-84.
60. Id at 487.
61.
Seeid.at484-85.
62. Id at 484-86.
63.
Id. at484-85.
64. See id. at 484-86 & n.9.
65.
Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 773, 818-19 (2009) (asserting that invoking the right to counsel has more dire consequences for law enforcement than does asserting the
right to remain silent). CompareEdwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that when a suspect invokes
the right to counsel, the interrogation must cease and cannot resume until counsel is made available
or the suspect initiates discussion), with Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-04 (1975) (holding
that although an interrogation must immediately cease upon assertion of the right to remain silent, it
does not follow that law enforcement may not resume questioning two hours later).
66.
Strauss, supra note 34, at 1022.
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ample, the Court applied the Edwards rule to interrogations concerned
with unrelated offenses, forbidding police from questioning a suspect if
he had asserted his right to counsel during a prior interrogation for an
unrelated offense.67 Additionally, the Court applied the Edwards rule
when a suspect had the opportunity to consult with counsel, but did not
have counsel present for questioning.68 For about a decade, the right to
counsel was a powerful and effective protection against deceitful interrogation techniques. Despite several challenges and critiques, Edwards
rendered any police-initiated confessions made after an assertion of the
right to counsel per se involuntary.
E. The Court's GradualRetreatfrom Additional Prophylaxes
Although Edwards secured a suspect's right to counsel, the Court
crafted various exceptions to other aspects of Miranda's application in
the decades following the advent of Miranda rights.
Davis v. United States69 established a notable limitation on
Miranda's application. In Davis, the defendant was accused of murder
and initially waived his Miranda rights during an interview. 70 However,
an hour-and-a-half into the interview, Davis stated that he might want to
speak with a lawyer.71 The defendant's interviewers testified that they
asked Davis if he meant that he wanted a lawyer, to which Davis allegedly answered, "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer." 72 After a short break,
the interview continued for another hour until Davis stated, "I think I
want a lawyer before I say anything else."73 At trial, Davis moved to
suppress statements made during the interview. 7 4 Specifically, Davis
claimed that his statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," constituted
an invocation of his right to counsel, and that based on Miranda and Edwards, the interrogation should have ceased until that right was fully
honored.
In its review, the Davis Court considered how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to counsel that is
insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning.76 Stressing the need for effective law enforcement, the Court
held that interrogations may continue unless a suspect clearly and uneArizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S 675, 687 (1988); see also Thomas N. Radek, Note, Arizona
67.
v. Roberson: The Supreme Court Expands Suspects' Rights in the Custodial InterrogationSetting,
22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 685, 686 (1989).

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146,153 (1990).
512 U.S. 452 (1994).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455. Specifically, Davis said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 459.
See id. at 454.
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quivocally requests an attorney.77 This caveat that a request for counsel
must be unambiguous introduced an element of uncertainty to the Edwards rule and limited its reach. 8 Paradoxically, the Court highlighted
the importance of Miranda rights,79 while making the invocation of those
rights difficult.
Other notable exceptions to Mirandaprovided loopholes for admitting statements obtained without advising a suspect of his rights, as required by Miranda.In Michigan v. Tucker,8 0 the Court held that the exclusion of the "fruits" of a Miranda violation-the statement of a witness
whose identity the defendant revealed while in custody-was not required.8 ' Additionally, the Court ruled in Oregon v. Haas82 that voluntary
statements obtained without advising a suspect of his Miranda rights
could be used to impeach a defendant at trial. In New York v. Quarles,84
the Court created a "public safety" exception that freed law enforcement
from Miranda requirements if questioning needed to occur quickly to
secure the safety of the public.8 5 Despite these exceptions, in Dickerson
v. United States,86 the Court asserted the continued importance and survival of Miranda's core holding when it invalidated an act of Congress
meant to overrule Miranda because Miranda was itself a "constitutional"
holding. In its ruling, the Court rejected the idea that the advisement of
Mirandarights was merely a factor for a court to consider in determining
the voluntariness of a statement.8 8
Although the Court has declined to overrule Miranda, it has begun
to limit the application of the Edwards rule. Prior to its decision in Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court had only broadly recognized a time limit to the
application of the Edwards case, noting, in dicta, that Edwards applied
"assuming there has been no break in custody." 89 The Court would next
have to determine what exactly constituted a "break in custody." The

77. Id at 460-61. In contrast to Mirandaand Edwards, the Davis Court appeared to value law
enforcement efficiency more than rights of the accused. According to Davis, the primary benefit of
Miranda was the advisement of rights. It was then up to the suspect to unambiguously invoke those
rights. See id.
78. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 1027-28.
79. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458.
80. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
81.
Id.at450-52.
82. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
83. Id. at 723-24.
84. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
Id. at 653. In a grocery store, police apprehended a rape suspect known to be carrying a
85.
gun, did not find the gun on his person, and then asked him where he had put the gun. Id at 652. The
suspect answered, "[T]he gun is over there." Id The statement was ruled admissible under a "public
safety" exception. Id at 659-60.
86. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
87.
18 U.S.C. §3501 (2000), invalidatedby Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
88. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442-44.
89. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (2010) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 177 (1991)).
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answer revealed just how far the Court was willing to extend the prophylactic measures it instituted in Miranda and solidified in Edwards.
II.

MARYLAND V. SHATZER

In Maryland v. Shatzer, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a suspect's invocation of his right to an attorney indefinitely shields the suspect from further questioning until he hires or is
provided an attorney. In Shatzer, the defendant was re-interrogated for
the same charge two-and-a-half years after he asserted his right to an
attorney concerning that charge. Although the entire Court agreed that
two-and-a-half years was a sufficient time period for the suspect's invocation of Miranda/Edwardsrights to expire, the majority insisted on pinpointing exactly how long law enforcement must honor a suspect's request for an attorney. Despite criticism from two concurring Justices, the
majority held that a suspect's assertion of his right to an attorney guarded
the suspect from further interrogation without an attorney present for
only fourteen days.
A. Facts
In Shatzer, a detective initially visited the defendant, Michael
Shatzer, Sr., in 2003 to question him about allegations of sexually abusing his own son. 90 At the time, Shatzer was serving a sentence for an
unrelated child sexual-abuse offense at the Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown. 91 When he learned the reasoning behind the detective's visit, Shatzer declined to speak to the detective without an attorney
93
present.92 The detective then ended the visit and closed the case.
Two-and-a-half years later, the case was re-opened based on additional evidence obtained from Shatzer's son. 94 Investigators visited
Shatzer at the Roxbury Correctional Institute, where Shatzer had been
transferred. 95 This time, Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and con96
sented to a polygraph examination. During the interview, he "admitted
to masturbating in front of his son at a distance of less than three feet." 97
Later, after failing the polygraph, Shatzer told police that he "didn't
force" his son to perform fellatio on him, thereby admitting that the act
had occurred. 98 Following this admission, Shatzer requested an attorney
and the detectives ended the interrogation. 99
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id at 1217.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id at 1217-18.
Id.
Id. at 1218.
Id
See id.
Id.
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B. ProceduralHistory
"The State's Attorney for Washington County, Maryland, charged
Shatzer with second-degree sexual offense, sexual child abuse, seconddegree assault, and contributing to conditions rendering a child in need of
assistance."' 00 In response, Shatzer argued that the Edwards protections
rendered his 2006 waiver involuntary and moved to suppress his statements from that day. 01 Shatzer pled not guilty and waived his right to a
jury trial. 102
The trial court denied Shatzer's motion and found him guilty of
sexually abusing his son.103 The Court reasoned that Edwards did not
apply because the two-and-a-half-year time period separating the two
interrogations constituted a sufficient break in custody to allow his previously asserted Miranda rights to expire. 104 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed and remanded, holding that: (1) the passage of time
alone was insufficient to end Edwards protections; and (2) if a break-incustody exception to Edwards existed, Shatzer's release back into prison
did not constitute such a "break in custody." 05 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether, and at what point,
"a break in custody
ends the presumption of involuntariness established
06
in Edwards."'1
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, with Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor
joining in the decision. 0 7 The majority's main concern was that without
some time limit on Edwards's protections, the effect of a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel would be "eternal," and therefore an acute
burden on the administration of justice. 08 Accordingly, the Court sought
to place an objective, predictable limit on the applicability of Edwards by
employing a cost-benefit analysis of the indefinite protection it provided.1 09
According to the Court, the primary benefit of Edwards was "measured by the number of coerced confessions it suppresse[d] that otherwise

100. Id.
101.
See id
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1218 & n.l (discussing Maryland's filing of a nolle prosequi to the second-degree
sexual offense charge, and consenting to dismissal of the misdemeanor charges barred by the statute
of limitations).
104. Id. at 1218.
Shatzer v. State, 954 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Md. 2008), revd, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
105.
106. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217.
107. Id
108. See id.at 1222.
109. See id. at 1220.
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would have been admitted" at trial."o On the other hand, any voluntary
confessions withheld from evidence constituted a cost paid by society."'
The Court elaborated on the costs by arguing that because Edwards protections apply even where a subsequent interrogation concerns a different
crime,112 or is conducted by a different law enforcement agency," a
repeat offender may escape conviction because he remains protected
after a single unrelated invocation of his rights.1 4 The Court concluded
that with no set limitations, the costs of the Edwards rule outweighed its
benefits." 5
In Shatzer's case, the Court found that the two-and-a-half year
break in custody was sufficient to make his subsequent waiver voluntary." 6 However, the Court then questioned whether a period of one year
or one week would have been sufficient.117 The Court held that it would
be impractical to leave these answers unresolved and established a clearcut rule that a fourteen-day break in custody was sufficient to end the
presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards."8
Although the fourteen-day limitation appeared with little explanation, the Court justified the rule in two ways. First, the Court reasoned
that the need for the Edwards protections lessened where a suspect returned to "normal life."ll 9 A return to normal life, the Court noted, increased the likelihood that the suspect would have consulted with
friends, family, or an attorney, and decreased the likelihood that a waiver
was the result of badgering or coercion by law enforcement officers.120
The Court found that two weeks was a sufficient amount of time to constitute a return to normal life.121 Second, the Court asserted that a suspect
would still be protected under Johnson v. Zerbst,122 which mandated a
totality of the circumstances inquiry into the voluntariness of a confession.123 While the Court acknowledged that it was unusual for the Court
to set precise limits governing police action, it asserted its prerogative to
its fourteen-day rule over
clarify its own legal mandatel24 and instituted
25 and Justice Stevens. 126
Thomas1
Justice
of
criticism
biting
the
110. Id.
I11.
See id
112. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1988).
113. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1990).
114. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at1223.
119. Id.at1221.
120. Id.
121.
Id. at 1223.
122. Id. at 1223 n.7.
123. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
124. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 ("We have frequently emphasized that the Edwards rule is not
a constitutional mandate, but judicially prescribed prophylaxis.").
125.
See infra Part II.D.
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The Court also considered judicial and law enforcement efficiency
in its determination.127 The Edwards bright-line rule conserved judicial
resources that would otherwise be dedicated to determining the voluntariness of a suspect's waiver.128 By establishing another clear-cut rule,
the Shatzer Court was able to maintain efficiency while restricting Edwards's application.129 The Court strengthened its holding by identifying

those hardships on law enforcement that the fourteen-day rule would
alleviate, increasing the admissibility of voluntary confessions. 30 Specifically, the Court reasoned that police investigations are more effective
if officers "know, with certainty and beforehand, when renewed interrogation is lawful."l 3 '
Last, the Court addressed whether release back into the general
prison population constituted a release from custody for Edwards and
Miranda purposes. 132 Because prisoners retain some control over their
lives, are often able to communicate with others, and the interrogator has
no power over the incarceration, the Court answered the question in the
affirmative.133 Thus, the Court defined "normal" as merely returning to
the state of life enjoyed by the suspect immediately before the interrogation. The Court held that as long as the suspect was not in "interrogative
custody," meaning isolated with his accusers, release back into the general prison population constituted a break in custody for purposes of
Miranda and Edwards.134
D. Justice Thomas's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and in the judgment, criticized
the majority's bright-line fourteen-day rule. Thomas immediately made
clear his disagreement with any extension of the Edwards rule beyond
the narrow facts of that case.135 He then argued that even if Edwards applied in Shatzer's case, the majority's rule was arbitrary, incomplete, and
inefficient.136
Furthermore, Justice Thomas maintained that the new fourteen-day
rule was unnecessary because Zerbst mandated a totality of the circum126. See infra Part II.E.
127. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1223-24 ("Now, in cases where there is an alleged break in custody, they simply
have to repeat the inquiry for the time between the initial invocation and reinterrogation. In most
cases that determination will be easy. And when it is determined that the defendant pleading Edwards has been out of custody for two weeks before the contested interrogation, the court is spared
the fact-intensive inquiry into whether he ever, anywhere, asserted his Miranda right to counsel.").
130. Id. at 1223.
Id. at 1222-23.
131.
132. Id. at 1224.
133. Id.
134. Id. at1224-25.
135. Id. at 1227 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136. See id. at 1227-28.
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stances test, which accounted for any time lapse, to determine the voluntariness of a waiver.' 37 In addition, Justice Thomas disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that the fourteen-day rule would aid police investigations.'38 Specifically, Justice Thomas stated, "Determining whether a
suspect was previously in custody, and when the suspect was released,
may be difficult without questioning the suspect, especially if state and
federal authorities are conducting simultaneous investigations." 39 Last,
Justice Thomas accused the majority of valuing certainty and ease of
application over well-reasoned, substantive conclusions.140
E. Justice Stevens's ConcurringOpinion

Justice Stevens, also concurring in the judgment, attacked the fourteen-day rule mainly on public policy concerns. He asserted that any
bright-line rule was unsatisfactory because "[n]either a break in custody
nor the passage of time ha[d] an inherent, curative power" to establish
genuine voluntariness.141 Justice Stevens argued that a suspect may assume that his requests for counsel have been ignored if he is reinterrogated after two weeks without having obtained counsel, and may
assume he has no choice but to submit to the interrogation.142 Moreover,
Justice Stevens maintained that the police will be motivated "to delay
formal proceedings, in order to gain additional information by way of
interrogation after the time limit lapses." 43
Justice Stevens also addressed the dangerous implications of the
fourteen-day rule for suspects already in prison. First, Justice Stevens
argued that because prisoners are summoned by guards to interrogation,
they may assume that the guards and police are not independent, and feel
forced to surrender to the questioning.144 Next, Justice Stevens asserted
that the fourteen-day rule could encourage officers or guards to badger
imprisoned suspects, who will not have the opportunity to overcome the
pressures from the interrogation. 145 Although Shatzer did not claim any
disparate treatment by prison officials or guards between his two interrogations, 146 Justice Stevens was concerned with this "troubling set of incentives for police."l147 Last, because a suspect is already in custody, po137. Id. at 1227 n.1 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966)).
138. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1228 n.2.
139. Id
140. Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1234 (Stevens, J., concurring).
141.
142. Id at 1229.
143. Id at 1231.
144. Id. at 1233 ("Prisoners are uniquely vulnerable to the officials who control every aspect of
their lives; prison guards may not look kindly upon a prisoner who refuses to cooperate with police.
And cooperation is frequently relevant to whether the prisoner can obtain parole.").
145. See id. at 1232 (asserting that a prisoner's freedom is "severely limited," making it unlikely that a suspect in prison has communicated with friends, family, or an attorney within fourteen
days after questioning).
146. Id at 1225 (majority opinion).
147. Id at 1233 n.13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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lice have no need to formally place the suspect under arrest and can
"comfortably bide their time, interrogating and reinterrogating their suspect" with little or no evidence of guilt, until the suspect surrenders and
incriminates himself.148
III. ANALYSIS
The Shatzer fourteen-day rule confirms the Court's retreat from the
prophylactic measures established in Miranda and Edwards. This retreat
jeopardizes a suspect's rights to counsel and to remain silent. With
Shatzer, the Court continued its gradual abandonment of Miranda's protections by valuing efficiency above individual rights. Distressingly, this
abandonment arrives at a time when Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
are increasingly more valuable to suspects. And while suspects are most
in need of those rights, the Court's recent focus on Edwards makes it
easier to curtail suspects' rights, making the Shatzer opinion more detrimental to suspects today. The Court's continued limitation of Miranda
rights is logically unsound, wrongly focused, and inconsistent with the
modern realities of criminal justice.
A. The Court'sRetreatfrom the ProphylacticIdeals of Miranda and
Edwards
The Court's recent retreat from prophylactic tenants overlooks the
general concerns that guided the Miranda Court forty years ago. Relying
on Miranda's assertions, the Shatzer Court noted that a set of prophylactic measures was necessary to protect suspects from the "'inherently
compelling pressures' of custodial interrogation." 49 "Inherently compelling" pressures denoted an inescapable characteristic of interrogation that
generated psychological pressures and uncomfortable experiences for
individuals under interrogation. Accordingly, the Court recognized some
degree of psychological pressure present in all custodial interrogations.so
In Edwards, the Court recognized that these inherent pressures build
with subsequent interrogations. '1' As such, Edwards held that waivers of
the right to counsel occurring after a previous invocation of that right are
presumed involuntary.'5 2 Concerned with genuine voluntariness, the Edwards Court likely declined to place a limit on the time between interrogations because every person will react to, and overcome, any coercive
techniques differently and within varying timeframes. Edwards adhered
to the Miranda Court's concerns about inherent pressures by holding that

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 1219 (majority opinion) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467 (1966)).
See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219.
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,483-84 (1981).
See id at 484-85.
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an inherent characteristic does not fade with time, and no generalizations
about individual triumph over coercion would prove effective.
However, the Shatzer Court imported its own determination of the
time it takes a suspect to overcome coercive effects of an interrogation
and make a voluntary waiver: fourteen days.' 5 3 That is all it takes to
eliminate coercive psychological pressures, according to the Court.154
The Court admits that pressures will still exist during subsequent interrogations, but assumes that the degree of pressure felt by a suspect after a
two-week break in custody will never be more than the pressure felt at
any prior custodial interrogations.' 5 5 This assumption ignores the likely
possibility that an individual will feel more pressured after a second,
third, or tenth interrogation because he feels hunted and badgered by
police.
Because pressure naturally builds in this way, the Court's estimation that pressure will only increase in "narrow circumstances" where no
break in custody has occurred is flawed.'5 6 Though the Court contends
that repeated interrogation attempts will increase the likelihood that a
suspect will again assert his right,157 it is more likely that a suspect will
feel his requests have been ignored and he has no option but to talk.' 58
Feeling that his rights have been ignored naturally increases pressure
because the suspect will feel that he cannot trust his questioners. Logically, a break in custody will not always place a suspect in the same, or
better, position than he was at the initial meeting.
Not only did the Shatzer Court discount and misapprehend the
meaning of inherent pressures, it also erroneously failed to account for
variances in individual personalities, experiences, and understandings of
the criminal justice system. Miranda sought to provide "individuals the
tools to counter inherently coercive pressure by asserting their right not
to deal with the police alone."' 59 However, although every suspect is
given the same "tool" by being read the same rights, every individual has
varying capacities to use this tool. For example, providing every American with a fishing pole does not mean that every American eats fish for
dinner that night. Some Americans will have no clue what to do with the
contraption, others will be scared of the sharp hook and live bait, and

153. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
154. Id. at 1222-23.
155. Id. at 1223 ("It seems to us that period is 14 days. That provides plenty of time for the
suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off
any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.").
156. Id. at 1226; see id. at 1231-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1226 (majority opinion) (arguing that if a break in custody has not changed the
157.
suspect's mind about having counsel present, he will know from experience that he need only ask for
counsel for the interrogation to cease).
158. Id. at 1229 (Stevens, J., concurring).
159. Strauss, supra note 65, at 815.
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others still will be physically unable to maneuver the device because of
age or disability.
A rule based on blanket generalizations is directly opposed to the
core of Miranda's analysis. The Miranda Court strongly asserted that
"the privilege against self-incrimination applies to all individuals."6 0 In
fact, Miranda declared that the Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental that the defendant's "age, education, intelligence, or prior contact
with authorities" should have no bearing on his ability to exercise his
rights.'6 1 This reasoning accorded with the Court's earlier holding in
Zerbst that "[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused."l 62
Interestingly, the Court made the same mistake in Davis when it declared that a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous.1 6 3 Numerous scholars argue that the Davis rule will have a disproportionate effect on females and minorities.164 Specifically, women
and minorities are far more likely to use indirect speech patterns such as
"maybe" and "I think." 65 Therefore, by failing to account for linguistic
variances in certain segments of the population, Davis arbitrarily denied
some individuals the right to counsel.166
Despite precedent that acknowledged and protected individual abilities, the Court ignored this principle in Davis and Shatzer. With its fourteen-day rule, the Shatzer Court took Miranda's and Edwards' concern
with genuine, individual voluntariness and replaced it with a blanket
generalization about human reaction to subsequent or repeated interrogation techniques. The Shatzer Court expressed this generalization as the
suspect returning to "normal life." 67 However, the emphasis on a return
to normalcy is troublesome because even if a suspect is placed back at
equilibrium, inherent pressures will still revisit him during subsequent
interrogation. And if he felt unwilling or unable to communicate to his
interrogators without counsel the first time, the return of these pressures
will probably restore, or even enhance, that feeling.

160.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,472 (1966) (emphasis added).
161.
Id. at 468-69.
162. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
163. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
164. Strauss, supra note 34, at 1030 (citing David Aram Kaiser & Paul Lufkin, Deconstructing
Davis v. United States: Intention and Meaning in Ambiguous Requests for Counsel, 32 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 737, 759 n.69 (2005) ("[T]he actual linguistic practices of many women and minorities
preclude them from meeting the standard of clarity demanded by Davis.")).
165. Strauss, supranote 34, at 1030-3 1.
166. Strauss, supra note 34, at 1031.
167. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1221 (2010) (majority opinion).
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The Court's retreat from prophylactic measures compromises not
only a suspect's right to counsel, but also his right to remain silent. "The
right to counsel exists only to protect the right to remain silent," as the
Miranda Court considered the former as a means to protect the latter.
Consequently, any limitations on the right to counsel also limit the right
to remain silent. Shatzer's limitation of the right to counsel may also spur
nationwide decisions similarly limiting the right to remain silent. Although courts have largely considered the two rights as separate and distinct standards,' 69 nine out of eleven circuits and the District of Columbia
have applied the Davis standard for invoking the right to counsel to the
right to remain silent.o7 0 Similarly, Shatzer's limitation of the right to
counsel may be applied in cases concerning the right to remain silent.
Admittedly, because the right to remain silent is already quite limited,' 7'
Shatzer's fourteen-day rule would actually bolster that right. But the underlying trend of Shatzer and Davis-limiting the prophylactic protections awarded by Miranda and Edwards-is a dangerous ideal to transport into cases involving the right to remain silent. Courts may use
Shatzer's fourteen-day rule to proportionally limit the time lapse required
to spoil a suspect's invocation of the right to remain silent. And any additional limitations on the right to remain silent may evaporate the right
entirely.
B. The Shatzer Court Wrongly Abandoned ProphylacticMeasures in
Favorof Efficiency
The Shatzer Court held that it would be "impractical" to leave Edwards's application open for clarification on a case-by-case basis, partly
for judicial efficiency 72 and partly to ensure that law enforcement officers know for certain when renewed interrogation is lawful. 73 Though
the importance of judicial efficiency is debatable, it is beyond the scope
of this Comment.174 Nevertheless, the Court placed too much emphasis

168. Strauss, supra note 65, at 817.
169. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
170. Strauss, supra note 65, at 784-85 (citing Valle v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 459 F.3d
1206, 1213-15 (11 th Cir. 2006); United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Sherrod, 445 F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2006); McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513, 519
(6th Cir. 2001); Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1131 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Anderson, No. 95-3048, 1996 WL 135720 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1996) (per curiam)).
171.
See supra note 65, and accompanying text.
172. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222-24 (finding that the fourteen-day rule would conserve judicial
resources by making the determination of voluntariness "easy" if a suspect has been out of custody
for two weeks or longer).
173. See id at 1222-23.
174. The Court has often expressed its preference for bright-line rules over totality of the
circumstances approaches. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) ("[I]f we were
to require questioning to cease ifa suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney,
this clarity and ease of application [set forth in Edwards] would be lost."); Minnick v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990) ("The merit of the Edwards decision lies in the clarity of its command and
the certainty of its application.").
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on ensuring ease of application for law enforcement, and abandoned its
dedication to prophylactic measures established in Miranda.
After the Court barely kept the core of Miranda's holding alive in
Dickerson, it once again turned its back on one of Miranda's main principles: that law enforcement's investigative powers, though valuable to
society, are limited by the rights of the accused guaranteed in the Sixth
Amendment.175 Individual rights should not and do not have to be compromised to establish an effective system of law enforcement.176 The
Miranda Court acknowledged the importance of police investigations
and interrogations but refused to abridge constitutional rights to make the
prosecutor's job a little easier. 177 With Shatzer, the Court tipped the
scales in the opposite direction based on a flawed focus on efficiency.
Contrary to the Court's assertion, the fourteen-day rule is not necessary to ensure the fair and effective administration of justice. The original Edwards rule did not prevent all confessions. If a suspect wishes to
make a voluntary confession, he may do so even after invoking his
rights, as Edwards allows questioning to resume if a suspect initiates the
discussion. And because only twenty percent of suspects invoke their
rights,'7 9 Edwards ultimately has no effect on a vast majority of cases,
and the number of confessions that may be suppressed is slim. Moreover,
the Court's fixation with law enforcement is unfounded and contrary to a
fair criminal justice system. In a just system, law enforcement should not
"have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he
will become aware of, and exercise, these rights."' 80 The mere fact that
law enforcement fears a suspect's exercise of his fundamental rights is
unsettling.
In fact, those fears may not be legitimate. Despite the Court's intentions in Miranda, false confessions are still prevalent,' 8 ' showing that the
numerous exceptions to Miranda have provided law enforcement with
sufficient loopholes to continue to practice coercive tactics during interrogations. Although it is now well established that physical abuse is an
illegal tactic to extract confessions, the line between acceptable psychological techniques and psychological coercion that is a violation of the
Constitution remains blurred.18 2 The fourteen-day rule, along with the
175.
Holland, supranote 8, at 390.
Strauss, supra note 65, at 773 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) ("If
176.
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement,
then there is something very wrong with that system.")).
177. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-81 (1966).
178. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
179. Strauss, supra note 65, at 774.
180. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
181.
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1060
(2010).
182. See Laura Hoffman Roppe, True Blue? Whether Police Should Be Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729, 732 (1994).
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Court's progeny of exceptions to Miranda, has informed law enforcement officers of exactly how much questionable behavior they can legally employ.
Specifically, Shatzer's rule will actually aid law enforcement in extracting confessions from suspects in custody because those suspects will
be susceptible to incessant re-questioning every two weeks, even if they
properly assert their right to counsel. Those people unable to make bail
for whatever reason will therefore be more detrimentally impacted by the
fourteen-day rule than will the rest of society. Hence, the rule will be
arbitrarily more harmful to certain individuals with no justification.
Ultimately, by continuing to institute exceptions and limitations to
the application of Miranda rights, the Court is instituting a dangerous
pattern that actually helps police engage in trickery and coercion. Nonetheless, the Shatzer decision continued the Court's precedent of chipping
away at Miranda rights to satisfy concerns about effective law enforcement. Moreover, as law enforcement officers become more clever and
confident in their techniques, suspects struggle to assert and protect their
fundamental rights, which are particularly critical in today's criminal
prosecutions.
C. Why Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights are More Important to Suspects Today
The Shatzer fourteen-day rule limited a suspect's rights at a time
when a suspect's pretrial rights are becoming increasingly critical to the
outcome of his case. Approximately ninety percent or more of today's
criminal trials are resolved by negotiated disposition rather than trial,
meaning defendants "rarely face their accusers during traditional courtroom proceedings that pit skilled trial lawyers against each other."183
This is a recent development in criminal law that differs from the reality
the Court faced at the time of Miranda. Specifically, between 1980 and
2002, the rate of federal criminal cases concluded by a bench and jury
trial fell from 23 percent to 4.8 percent.' 84 So today, pretrial contexts,
such as interrogation settings, are the stage for judgment, where damage
can be minimized, bargains can be struck, and cases can be won or
lost.185 In fact, only in rare cases does the "compulsion" sought to be
protected by the Fifth Amendment occur at trial.18 6
This modem reality makes a suspect's right against selfincrimination incredibly valuable, as there may not be a trial to argue the
Holland, supra note 8, at 382.
183.
184.
Frank 0. Bowman, III, Response, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the Gradual Extinction of the Federal Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 226, 226
(2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/i 1-2007/Bowman.pdf.
185.
Holland, supra note 8, at 382-83.
186. Manheimer, supra note 12, at 1265.
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voluntariness of a statement. Even more troubling for suspects, the rate
of acquittal has declined alongside the falling rate of criminal trials.' 87
The declining rate of acquittals has been attributed to the enactment of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which provided prosecutors
more bargaining leverage.' 8 8 Thus, suspects are at a disadvantage from
the initiation of the investigation because the interrogation context is
increasingly more influential to the result of their case, and prosecutors
have increased bargaining power. And at this time when pretrial contexts
are especially valuable to suspects, the Court is continuing to curtail the
pretrial rights of the accused.
The trend of modem criminal prosecution also clouds the line separating Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections, which further increases a
suspect's need for prophylactic protections that transcend the bare text of
the Constitution. Unlike the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment
textually guarantees a suspect's right to counsel in a "criminal prosecution."18 9 This right need not be invoked, but automatically takes effect
when prosecution commences.19 0 However, this right does not attach
until the "critical stage" of the proceedings, which can include postcharge interrogations and lineups.191 Today, as initial and pre-charge
interrogations grow increasingly influential in criminal prosecutions, the
definition of this "critical stage" is changing. While the increasingly
blurred line between the critical and non-critical stage of criminal prosecution would support stronger rights earlier in the process, the Court has
done the opposite. Ignoring the realities of modem criminal prosecution,
the Court has made the right to counsel harder to invokel92 and more
difficult to maintain. 193
D. How the Court's Focus on Edwards Makes it Easierfor the Court to
CurtailSuspect Rights
The Shatzer Court confidently flexed its muscles by declaring its
prerogative to alter its own "judicially prescribed prophylaxis."' 94 The
Shatzer Court justified its drastic limitation on individual rights by pro-

187. Bowman, supra note 184, at 227.
Bowman, supra note 184, at 226-27 (citing Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the
188.
End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 101-06 (2005) (presenting
data to support the assertion that the post-1987 federal sentencing system consisting of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines provided prosecutors more bargaining leverage, directly resulting in
the declining number of acquittals)).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
190. Holland, supra note 8, at 390.
191.
Id. (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,428 (1986)).
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (holding that a suspect's invocation of
192.
the right to counsel must be unambiguous to halt the interrogation).
193.
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (holding that a suspect's assertion of
his right to counsel forbids police from interrogating the suspect again for fourteen days if he has not
obtained counsel).
194.
Id. at 1220.
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claiming that the Edwards rule is not a constitutional mandate.19 5 But
only a decade ago in Dickerson, the Court avoided overruling Miranda
by declaring unconstitutional an act of Congress that purported to reduce
Miranda warnings to a mere factor for consideration in determining the
voluntariness of a statement.' 9 6 Critical to the Dickerson Court's reasoning was that Miranda was a "constitutional decision" of the Court, which
may not be overruled by an act of Congress.1 9 7 Although the Dickerson
Court qualified its decision by explaining that constitutional rulings are
not immutable, but are subject to judicial modification,' 98 the Court explicitly classified Miranda as a "constitutional decision." 99 Only ten
years after this controversial classification, the Shatzer Court declared
that Edwards, a direct offspring of Miranda,200 is not a constitutional
mandate.2 0 1
Because Edwards and Miranda are so intimately related, this shift is
not fully justified. The Edwards opinion simply reconfirmed 20 2 the
Miranda mandate that an accused has a constitutional right to have coun203
sel present during custodial interrogation. The Edwards Court aimed to
provide "substance" to Miranda and its progeny, and emphasized that it
is inconsistent with Miranda for police to reinterrogate a suspect in custody after he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.2 04 Therefore, the
Edwards rule was fashioned completely on Miranda's heels, and if one
rule is a constitutional mandate, the other should be as well.205
Characterizing Edwards as merely a judicially created prophylaxis
increases and assists the Court's ability to further curtail suspect rights.
By switching its focus from Miranda to Edwards, the Shatzer Court has
found an easier way to limit rights of the accused. Specifically, limiting
the Edwards rule is easier than limiting the Miranda rules because by
classifying the Edwards rule as a judicial prophylaxis instead of a constitutional rule, the Court need not defend its limitations on that prophylaxis, as it did with Mirandain Dickerson.2 06

195.
196.

Id.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).

197.

Id.

198.
Id. at 441.
199. Id. at 432.
200. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219-20 (describing the advent of the Edwards rule as an expansion
of Miranda rights).
201.
Id at 1220.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,485 (1981).
202.
203. Id at 482.
204. Id at 485.
205. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1228 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The source of the holdings in
the long line of cases that includes both Edwards and Miranda, however, is the Fifth Amendment's
protection against compelled self-incrimination applied to the 'compulsion inherent in custodial'
interrogation . .. .").
206. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 439-44 (2000).
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CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court began running with the idea of
additional safeguards for the accused in Miranda and Edwards, but
tripped over those safeguards with Davis and eventually fell backwards
with Shatzer. In Shatzer, the Court correctly asserted its prerogative to
clarify and constrain its own prophylactic creations, but lost sight of its
concurrent responsibility to protect individual rights, albeit those the
Court itself has created. By focusing on the Edwards rule instead of
Miranda rights generally, the Court was able to create the fourteen-day
rule with minimal constitutional challenge, although the changing process of criminal justice makes Edwards' prophylactic measures more
closely related to explicit constitutional rights.
Consequently, the Court ignored the realities of the modem criminal
prosecution process and drastically limited Miranda rights at a time
when suspects need them the most. The Court, and Justice Thomas in his
concurrence, ask their audience to find solace in Zerbst protections still
available to defendants. 20 7 But because Zerbst predates Miranda by
twenty-eight years, it can be argued that Miranda replaced the need for
Zerbst, meaning that Shatzer was the Court's last opportunity to salvage
Miranda rights. Given this opportunity, the Court not only constricted
the accused's right to counsel, but also jeopardized his right to remain
silent.
Given the Court's flawed reasoning, detrimental impact, and inconsistency with the realities of modem criminal prosecutions, Shatzer was
wrongly decided and will hinder the fair administration of criminal justice in America.
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